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We ask what the nature and basis of Christian moral thought and action is and
whether, in the contemporary context, ethical disputes can be resolved with those
whose thought and action is incommensurable with that of Christians. To address
these questions, first, we map the contemporary context in which Christians and non-
Christians encounter each other, second, we assess the depth of the differences
between Christian and non-Christian moral judgement, and third, we analyse how
Christians and non-Christians should relate to each other.
Alasdair Maclntyre's account of both the state of moral discourse in the
contemporary context and his meta-theory of how different traditions can resolve
ethical disputes is the starting point for our deliberations. In chapter one, we analyse
Maclntyre's description of the contemporary context of moral debate and his account
of how, despite their differences, particular moral traditions may resolve ethical
disputes. In chapters two, three and four, by comparing Maclntyre's work with that
of Gennain Grisez and Oliver O'Donovan, we assess whether Maclntyre's analysis
of the contemporary context and his account of the incommensurability between
traditions is adequate. The aim of comparing Maclntyre with both Grisez and
O'Donovan is to assess whether Maclntyre's account of the problem of
incommensurability between Christian and non-Christian moral judgements, and the
solution he proposes to this problem, is open to further theological specification.
In chapters five and six, following O'Donovan's account of Christian moral
judgement, we develop a theologically specified account of 'hospitality' as a way of
determining how Christians and non-Christians should relate in the contemporary
context with regard to ethical disputes. We argue that our theologically specified
account of 'hospitality' constitutes a better account than Maclntyre's for
understanding how Christians and non-Christians should relate with regard to ethical
disputes. In order to test our proposal, we analyse the nature of the dispute between
Christians and non-Christians with regard to whether euthanasia may constitute good
care for the terminally ill and how hospice care, as an embodiment of Christian
hospitality, constitutes both the optimal Christian response to the question of how to
care for the terminally ill, and the best way of shaping relations with non-Christians
with whom there is substantive disagreement over this question.
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And the angel said to me, 'Write this: Blessed are
those who are invited to the marriage supper of the
Lamb.' And he said to me, 'These are true words of
God.'
- Revelation 19.9
'Naturally, come in and come in.
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The lumbering Chinook helicopter carried us from Skopje, over the mountainous
border and across the central, arable plain of Kosovo. As dusk encamped around us,
we could see many charred houses and a few which had recently been set alight.
This jarred with the sight of whole families joyously waving as we passed overhead.
Seated beside me were a number of Anglican Bishops, part of an official delegation
invited by the Serbian Orthodox Church to begin efforts at reconciliation between
Britain and Serbia. We arrived four weeks after the bombing had stopped.1
By the time we reached Pee, in north-west Kosovo, it was pounding with rain.
Our British Army escorts met us and drove us to the monastery that is the seat of the
Serbian Patriarchate. Seeing the devastation from bombs and burning as we drove
through the town was depressing. A few vegetable stalls were set up and one or two
cafes had opened. On street corners were gathered clusters of Italian soldiers. The
monastery itself had an Italian armoured personal carrier parked outside it. We were
greeted by a monk, led past a clod of women huddled in the entrance, and taken to
view the medieval churches of the Holy Apostles, the Holy Virgin, and Saint
Nicholas. These churches form a single building inside the walled monastery
grounds. The evening liturgy was in progress and the sound of prayer and chanting
followed us as we looked at the darkened frescoes and the salvaged remains from
other churches recently destroyed.
Here we were, members of an established church from a de facto secular liberal
democracy, whose government had been at war with the government of this country
and whose troops now occupied part of it. We were in a medieval Serbian Orthodox
monastery surrounded by nominally Catholic soldiers, who, as part of a secular
'humanitarian' military force, were now protecting the Serbs from nominally Muslim
and nationalist Albanians who were still, de jure at least, Serbs, and who had
themselves, until a few weeks previously, been the object of racist and nationalist
inspired ethnic Serbian violence. The great complexity and history of this moment
'Our delegation travelled to Kosov&a on 9th July, 1999, exactly a month after NATO's last air strike.
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brings home the importance of addressing the seemingly innocuous questions of this
thesis: that is, how should Christians relate to their neighbours when ethical disputes
arise? And how is the relationship between Christians and their neighbours affected
by the context in which this relationship is situated?
This question was provoked initially by working with local churches in Central
and Eastern Europe from 1992 to 1997. These churches were adjusting to a radically
new and highly plural context. This context was one in which state socialism clashed
with consumerism; Christianity jostled with nihilism, paganism and a myriad of
other faiths; and nationalists raged alongside communists and liberals in a complex
weave of political power grabbing. Amidst the ruins of the European Marxist
project, it was, ironically, Marx's dictum that 'all that is solid melts into air' which
seemed most fitting.2 The very newness of this situation - and its instability -
brought to light the problem of whether Christians and non-Christians can settle their
ethical differences and whether the social, economic and political context affects the
possibility of resolution or not.
Working in Central and Eastern Europe highlighted an important aspect of this
question; that is, the importance of communities of nurture. Many churches had
become close-knit communities. Despite oppression by the State these churches had
managed to sustain an alternative woridview and produce people of courageous
character who stood against the oppression. However, a picture of plucky little
churches standing against the Communist ogre is too romantic. After 1989 it was
apparent that many churches had become introverted and self-referential, while
simultaneously taking on the very structures of oppression in their life together
which they were seeking to resist. This paradox raised a question as to the nature of
the church's response to its social, economic and political context, and in particular
how far the church enabled (or disabled) good and truthful action in that context.
In Western Europe and America, during this period, triumphalism about
capitalist, liberal democracy reigned. Those forces that resisted this 'end' to history
were seen as atavistic survivals from a barbarian past that would soon wither. Yet
this triumphalism led to dangerous mistakes, notably in the Balkans, but especially in
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relation to the role of religion in national and international affairs. A well-
documented early example of this kind of mistake was America's response to the
1979 revolution in Iran. The Central Intelligence Agency did not take seriously the
Islamic forces seeking to overthrow the Shah of Iran; this was because religion had
no place in their analysis. Edward Luttwak comments:
Characteristically, a contrast was drawn in U.S. reporting between 'pious' (traditional,
therefore necessarily in decline) and 'modern' Iranians (the 'wave of the future'), when in
fact it was the most earnestly pious who were the most modem in their ability to control
Iran's fate, while Westernizing 'moderns' and their attitude were being made obsolete by
the course of events.3
The example of the CIA's myopia highlights two important aspects to the question of
how to resolve ethical disputes in a context in which a plurality of religious and
moral traditions co-exist. What it highlights is firstly, the problem of how to pay
sufficient heed to the differences between divergent groups, and secondly, the
importance of paying attention to the particular presuppositions of a tradition and not
judging a tradition in terms alien to it. For unless the claims of a particular tradition
are taken seriously, in terms of their own frames of reference, real understanding is
not possible. Instead, like the American government in 1979, we try to enter a
conversation shaped decisively by one side. The result is misunderstanding and
badly judged actions.
In addressing the above context and question this thesis attempts to take the
theological presuppositions of Christianity seriously. However, this itself is a
problematic task. Jeffrey Stout identifies the problem noting that academic theology
is both marginal within the academy and has marginalized itself from the church. He
states: 'To gain a hearing in our culture, theology has often assumed a voice not its
own and found itself merely repeating the bromides of secular intellectuals in
transparently figurative speech.' 4
 Meanwhile, theologians with something distinctive
to say often talk to themselves. Stout then poses a very pertinent question: 'Can a
theologian speak fhithfully for a religious tradition, articulating its ethical and
political implications, without withdrawing to the margins of public discourse,
2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Man festo, trans. Samuel Moore (London: Penguin,
1967), p. 83.
Edward Luttwak, 'The Missing Dimension', in Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, ed.
Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 8-19 (p. 12).
4 Jelfrey Stout, Ethics After Babel: the Language of Morals and the Discontents (Cambridge: Clarke,
1988), p. 163.
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essentially unheard?' 5	Similarly, Alasdair Maclntyre posits the following
dichotomy:
Either [the church] will remain within the theological closed circle, in which case it will
have no access to the public and shared moral criteria of our society. Or it will accept
those criteria, in which case it may well have important things to say, but these will not
be distinctively Christian.6
This statement represents well the dilemma as understood by many both inside and
outside the church. Unfortunately, this problem has turned many theologians into
methodologists, concerned as they are with how this might be done and not with
what must be said. But as Stout points out:
Theologians who dwell too long on matters of method can easily suffer both kinds of
alienation they fear. They become increasingly isolated from the churches as well as
from cultural forums such as the academy. [...] Meanwhile, secular intellectuals have
largely stopped paying attention.7
The reason for this inattention by secular intellectuals? Theologians give the
impression of saying nothing non-believers do not already know. As Stout remarks
later: 'Serious conversation with theology wifi be greatly limited if the voice of
theology is not recognizably theological. [...] They must be able to clariI' the
difference their outlook makes and to say why they differ from the rest of us at the
most crucial points.' 8 Therefore, according to Stout, the dichotomy posed by
Maclntyre is a false one: speaking persuasively necessitates speaking distinctively.
As we shall see, Maclntyre himself has come to share this view. In his later work he
argues that participation in a 'closed circle' (that is, a particular tradition of moral
discourse) is a requirement of rational enquiry and coherent debate with those
outside any given 'circle'.
A vivid example of the problem Stout articulates is the reaction of most
Christians in Germany to the rise of Nazism. Karl Barth's critique of German
Protestant liberalism pinpointed the danger of not taking the theological
presuppositions of the church seriously and dressing up the 'bromides' of secular
culture in pious sounding language. It led, ineluctably, to the co-option of Christians
Ibid.
6 A1afr Maclntyre, Against the Self-image of the Age: Essays on ideology and Philosophy (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1978), p. 23.
Stout, Ethics After Babel, p. 163.
Stout, Ethics After Babel, p. 184.
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by the society and thence the Nazi State, to the extent that there was no difference
between the majority of Christians and their neighbours. In effect, Christians had no
ground on which to resist or oppose the evil of those around them because they had
neither an independent means of evaluating the claims of their neighbours, nor
anything distinctive to say.
Mindful of such capitulation this thesis does seek to take the theological claims
of Christianity seriously. Indeed, a foundational premise is the thesis Michael
Banner sets out. Banner states that 'the task of Christian ethics is to understand the
world and humankind in the light of the knowledge of God revealed in Jesus Christ,
witnessed to by the Scriptures, and proclaimed in the Creeds.' 9 He does on to say
that 'Christian ethics may and must explicate this understanding in its significance
for human action through a critical engagement with the concerns, claims and
problems of other ethics.'1°
Furthermore, we follow Banner, and thus answer affirmatively Stout's question as to
whether a theologian can speak for a religious tradition without withdrawing to the
margins of public discourse, in holding that a Christian ethicist can address
contemporary debate while remaining faithful to the particularity of Christian claims.
As Banner puts it, the first part of the above statement does not exclude taking up the
tasks set out in the second part of it. 11 We will thus analyse how Christians relate to
their neighbours both theologically and through critical engagement with non-
theological accounts of ethical pluralism.
It is in the light of the need to take the presuppositions of Christianity as starting
points for reflection on the question of whether moral disputes between Christians
and non-Christians can be resolved, that we find inadequate the dominant paradigms
for how Christians and non-Christians are to relate. The pre-eminent way of
conceptualising these relations has been to analyse them sociologically and develop a
typology. Representative of such categorisations, and perhaps the most influential of
them, is the typology of Ernst Troeltsch in The Social Teaching of the Christian
Michael Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), pp. xi-xii.
'°Ibid.
' Banner, Christian Ethics, p. xii.
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Churches.' 2 Troeltsch made a distinction between a 'church' and a 'sect' (and a
'mystic'; however, the category of 'mystic' does not relate to any community). The
basic difference is that you are born into a 'church' that embraces you irrespective of
your behaviour; but you must actively join a 'sect' and thereafter follow a strict
ethical code to remain part of it. Troeltsch observed that theology cannot be
separated from sociology. He thought that the 'church' that sought to embrace
everyone, would thence proclaim grace. By contrast, an elite 'sect' will stress law.
Likewise, the 'church' will affirm the world, whereas the 'sect' will deny the world
by retreating from it or attacking it. The 'church' will seek power in the world, and
to achieve it, will make the necessaiy compromises, whereas the 'sect' will insist on
purity and remain at the margins of the world. The 'church' will stress sacraments
and education, whereas the 'sect' will emphasise conversion and commitment.
Similarly, the respective theology of the 'church' and 'sect' would be different, for
their social forms would shape their doctrine. For example, the Christ of a 'church'
is a gracious redeemer while the Christ of a 'sect' is a commanding Lord. A further
example of these sociological typologies is that developed by Richard Niebuhr in his
influential work Christ and Culture. He essentially modified and developed
Troeltsch's work. He set out five different types of relation between the 'church' and
its neighbours: 'Christ against culture,' 'the Christ of culture,' 'Christ above culture,'
'Christ and culture in paradox,' and 'Christ the transformer of culture." 3 Each of
these types expressed both a distinct social formation of Christians and a pattern for
how such a formation related to those around it.
While we agree with Troeltsch and Niebuhr that the beliefs and the social
practices of a Christian community are directly related, we contend that they are not
inextricably bound. To bind them is to ignore the work of Christ and the Spirit.
Furthermore, Troeltsch and Niebuhr's position depends on the world having some
autonomous existence that can be set over and against Christ and those who follow
him. Among numerous other criticisms of Niebuhr's typology and basic thesis, John
Howard Yoder comments:
12 Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, trans. Olive Wyon, 2 vols
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931).
' Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (London: Faber & Faber, 1952).
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It is a necessary presupposition of the entire argument that the value of culture is not
derived from Jesus Christ but stands somehow independently of him. his independent of
Jesus Christ in the orders of both being and knowing. [...] Once this axiom is (tacitly)
established, then the question will be simply to what extent in particular cases this
autonomy is allowed to remain standing over against the call of Jesus, or how it may be
qualified.'4
In sum, Troeltsch and Niebuhr establish a false dichotomy between 'Christ' and
'culture'. Both Christianity and culture are constituted and defined by their
relationship to their Creator, Lord and Redeemer, Jesus Christ (whether this is
acknowledged or not) who, with the Holy Spirit, is at work in both, independently of
either. Schema's like Troeltsch and Niebuhr's limit Christ's sphere of activity to
working, in one way or another, through the visible church. However, Christ and the
Holy Spirit are at work beyond the bounds of the institutions and social formations
we identif' as 'church' (in other words, the Kingdom of God, while in continuity
with the visible church, is not to be wholly equated with it, and may include aspects
of any given culture). Moreover, Christ is the very ground of all cultures, their
sovereign judge, and ultimately, the end they should seek as their fulfilment.
As well as being theologically problematic, this dichotomy is historically
problematic. Both in the West and elsewhere, culture cannot be understood outside
of its relations to Christianity. For example, the undoubted problem of how
Christians today are to relate to a liberal, plural polity is not, as Niebuhr suggests it
is, the same problem as how early Christians related to Roman civilisation.' 5
 As
Oliver O'Donovan argues, the contemporary liberal polity is an apostate child of
Christ that cannot be understood outside of relationship to its genealogy.'6
Therefore, quite apart from questioning the theological validity of the basis on which
Troeltsch and Niebuhr made their distinctions, we must call into question the
plausibility of the rigid lines they draw between groups of Christians and their
neighbours. This thesis will seek to assess whether the dividing line between
Christians and non-Christians is more permeable and fluid than Troeltsch and
Niebuhr allow. For it seems that a simple equation between one particular
' 4 John Howard Yoder, 'How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned: A Critique of Christ and Culture', in
Authentic Transformation: A New Vision of Christ and Culture, ed. Glen Stassen and others
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), pp. 31-90 (p. 55).
15 Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, pp. 22-24.
16 Oliver O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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sociological formation and a particular attitude to the prevailing culture ignores the
constantly shilling boundary between Christians and non-Christians.'7
While Troeltsch and Niebuhr's sociological descriptions might be true of certain
churches at certain points in history, they cannot tell us much about the reality of the
church as defined by Jesus Christ. However, what the work of writers like Troeltsch
and Niebuhr does is illustrate the problematic nature of relations between Christians
and non-Christians and raises the question of what constitutes an appropriate
formulation of this relationship, especially in relation to ethical disputes. It is in an
attempt to formulate an appropriate conception of relations between Christians and
non-Christians, that takes into account the contemporary context, that we assess the
work of Alasdair Maclntyre by comparing and contrasting it first with that of
Germain Grisez and then with that of Oliver O'Donovan. In the light of this
assessment we seek to construct an account of how Christians can relate to their
neighbours when they come into conflict with them over particular ethical issues.
B) The Problem
The problem we shall be addressing centres on what the nature and basis of
Christian moral thought and action is and, in the contemporary context, whether
moral disputes may be resolved with those who do not share the same basis as
Christians to their thought and action. Addressing this problem will involve firstly,
mapping the contemporary context in which Christians and non-Christians encounter
each other; secondly, defining how significant are the differences between Christian
and non-Christian moral judgements; and lastly, analysing how Christians and non-
Christians should relate to each other.
C) The method of addressing the problem
C.!) Establishing the parameters of the problem: Maclntyre
To undertake this exercise we shall first address the following questions: what is
the shape and nature of the contemporary context in which moral debate is situated,
and within this context, how substantial are the differences between Christian and
' 7 Niebuhr recognises the limitations of his typology. He states: 'To what extent the types are mental
constructs to which no historic individuals conform completely becomes evident in any effort to
classi1' the historic Christian groups into churches and sects.' Richard Niebuhr, 'Prologue: Types of
Christian Ethics', in Authentic Transformation, p. 17.
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non-Christian moral judgements? Alasdair Maclntyre provides an influential
account of the contemporary situation as characterised not just by a plurality of
traditions, but an extreme form of plurality wherein coherent traditions have broken
down into fragments that co-exist in a confused mélange.
Maclntyre holds that there have often existed different traditions of thought and
practice that are 'incommensurable'. When Maclntyre uses the term
'incommensurable' he means that, when two or more traditions encounter each other
at a particular moment in time, there is no common standard of measurement to
judge between their respective conceptions for determining what is rational and
moral. What Macintyre seeks to address is how, despite their incommensurability,
rival traditions might develop a means of adjudicating between themselves.
Maclntyre does not see incommensurability as either inevitable, or a permanent
condition, or impossible to overcome; instead, he seeks to steer between the Scylla of
relativism and the Charybdis of positing some universally human and culturally
neutral grounds for adjudicating between rival traditions. Macintyre's conception of
incommensurability is based on his view that standards of judgement regarding
morality and rationality are internal, and peculiar to, a particular tradition, so that
each set of standards excludes the possibility of the key predicates of another
tradition being applied to it. Furthermore, the use of predicates in a particular
tradition will give expression to distinctive modes of observation, of seeing and or
imagining, as well as of reasoning. Another dimension of the incommensurability
between rival traditions relates to their differing conceptions of the ultimate good.
For it is the vision of the ultimate good held by a particular tradition that provides
that tradition with its overall unity of vision and its ordering of the virtues.
According to Maclntyre, different visions of the ultimate good lead to different
conceptions of the moral life. However, despite the lack of common measure
between rival traditions Maclntyre does not believe resolution of ethical disputes
between incommensurable traditions to be impossible; rather, it is a possibility which
will involve a complex process. For Maclntyre, resolution can be achieved neither
by finding some external point of reference by which to judge between rival
traditions, nor by a simple process of translating one set of measures from one
tradition to another. Instead, Maclntyre thinks that the process he sets out in his
meta-theory of how different traditions relate, can, over time, resolve disputes
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between rival traditions. What troubles Maclntyre is that the fragmentation of
traditions existent in the contemporary context severely hinders the process he sets
out from being undertaken effectively. Such fragmentation makes conflicts between
traditions, which at heart are conflicts about the criteria to evaluate what is just (that
is, they are debates about what is due to each member of the community) extremely
difficult to resolve.
The result of this fragmentation of traditions for Maclntyre is that, today, justice
is what the strong make it. In Maclntyre's view it is capitalist corporations and the
bureaucracies of the nation-state that are strong. Thus, it is capitalist corporations
and the bureaucracies of the nation-state that determine justice. Furthermore,
because of the fragmentation of tradition, public debate has become civil war carried
on by other means. According to Maclntyre, this is the contemporary context in
which the Christians live and work and carry on relations with their neighbours. In
addition, he conceives the differences between Christians and non-Christians
primarily in terms of how the Christian tradition (which, for Maclntyre, is best
instantiated in Thomism) relates to other traditions wherein there are substantial
differences between them.
C.2) Challenging whether the nature of the problem is accurately identified:
Maclntyre compared and contrasted with Germain Giisez
Maclntyre gives an account of Christian ethical thought and action as constitutive
of a tradition that is incommensurable with non-Christian traditions. Furthermore, he
furnishes us with a theory for how incommensurable traditions might enter into
rational conversation. However, his assessment of the contemporary context is that
the kind of rational conversation between traditions he envisages is actively
undermined and opposed by the dominant modes of moral discourse, namely
liberalism and what Maclntyre calls 'genealogy'. If Maclntyre's diagnosis is correct
then it could provide a formulation for how, in the contemporary context, Christians
might resolve ethical differences with non-Christians. Likewise, ii his diagnosis is
wrong, and another set of conditions is understood to prevail, then the construal of
Christian ethical thought and action, and analysis of relations between Christians and
non-Christians, will differ accordingly. For the purpose of questioning Maclntyre's
diagnosis we shall compare and contrast it with the work of Germain Grisez and
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Grisez's understanding of the degree of difference between Christianity and other
traditions. Grisez holds that while faithful witness to Jesus Christ, as understood and
defined by the magisterium of the Catholic Church, is the identifying feature of
Christian action, Christians and non-Christians share a self .evident, tradition-free set
of criteria for evaluating what is just and good which enables them to resolve
disputes between them in a relatively unproblematic fashion.
If Grisez's understanding is found to be better than Maclntyre's then Grisez's
conception of the contemporary context, the depth of the differences between
Christians and non-Christians, and the means by which Christians might resolve their
disputes with non-Christians will form the background against which we proceed to
analyse the shape of relations between Christians and non-Christians. However, we
will contend that Grisez's diagnosis of the contemporary context and his analysis of
the depth of difference between Christians and non-Christians is inadequate. This is
not to say that the questions (lrisez raises about Maclntyre's thesis are not important.
However, Grisez's own analysis does not take sufficient account of the distinctive
basis of Christian ethical thought and action. This leads him to see greater
congruence between Christian and non-Christian ethical thought and action than is
actually the case given their respective foundations. Thus, Maclntyre's proposals
require further assessment.
C.3) Challenging whether the nature of the problem is accurately identified:
Maclntyre compared and contrasted with Oliver O'Donovan
If we accept Maclntyre's diagnosis of the contemporary context, must we also
accept his account of how Christians are to relate to non-Christians? Just because
Maclntyre thinks there is a greater difference between Christians and non-Christians
in terms of their ethical judgements than (Irisez, this does not mean that Maclntyre
pays sufficient heed to the depth of difference between them. We shall address this
question by comparing Maclntyre's conception of the difference between Christian
and non-Christian ethical thought and action with that set out in the work of Oliver
O'Donovan. We shall thereby draw a conclusion as to the viability of resolving
ethical disputes between Christians and non-Christians. If O'Donovan's account of
how Christians should relate to non-Christians proves better according to a set of
evaluative criteria derived from theological presuppositions, then it is his account we
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shall use to provide the framework for addressing the question of whether Christians
can resolve ethical disputes with non-Christians.
Foundational to Maclntyre's conception of how Christians can relate to, and
resolve disputes with, non-Christians is his notion that Christianity can recommend
its view as better on the basis of its greater philosophical ability to deal with ethical
questions. How the Christian tradition does this is worked out through Maclntyre's
meta-theory of how traditions relate. By contrast, O'Donovan does not think
Christianity can wholly recommend its ethics on such a basis. As far as he is
concerned, Maclntyre fails to pay sufficient heed to the way in which Christian
ethical action is not known solely by participation in a tradition, but is revealed by
Jesus Christ. This is to say that Jesus Christ is both the content of the knowledge
Christians hold and he is also a means, even today, by which Christians know of him.
O'Donovan holds that Christians will not be able to resolve disputes with non-
Christians on the basis of Christianity's greater philosophical ability to deal with a
particular ethical problem. This is not to say that Christian and non-Christian
approaches to specific moral issues are never the same. O'Donovan holds that
because Christians and non-Christians share the same 'moral field' (that is, they both
participate in the created order) there may well be similarities between their
respective approaches to particular moral problems. O'Donovan can even allow for
a dialectic between traditions in a manner similar to Maclntyre's meta-theory.
However, any similarity will only ever be partial and any resolution achieved
through a dialectic of traditions will be incomplete. The 'evangelical' moral
knowledge that Christians possess - that the created order is fallen, reconciled, and
redeemed - can be known only through the revelation given in the Christ-event. This
'evangelical' knowledge is one that cannot be inferred from anything within the
created order. According to O'Donovan, this knowledge cannot be inferred for two
reasons. Firstly, human knowledge of the created order is fallen and therefore
impaired. Secondly, this evangelical knowledge is knowledge about the destiny or
telos of the created order and this destiny does not emerge from within that order but
is a gift given by God. Therefore, the emergence of the new, eschatological order
(which is both the end and fulfilment of the created order) cannot be revealed by
anything within the existing order. Thus, in O'Donovan's view, the only secure
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knowledge we may have of this order is revealed in the life, death and resurrection of
Jesus Christ. For O'Donovan, any attempt to explain the moral order that does not
take account of Jesus Christ - the revelation of the created order's telos - is doomed
to arbitrariness. Thus, philosophy (which by definition only takes into account the
created order) cannot provide a basis for resolving disputes between Christians and
non-Christians. To attempt to ground the resolution of ethical disputes between
Christians and non-Christians in philosophy alone would, according to O'Donovan,
be arbitrary. Instead, sight of any possible resolution can only be gained from the
perspective of the created order's telos and this is only given in the revelation of
Jesus Christ.
No philosophical argument can 'convert' a non-Christian to the way in which
Christians approach moral questions. Such conversion is only possible by the whole
person participating in Christian patterns of thought and action: that is, thought and
action directed to Jesus Christ and empowered by the Holy Spirit. This thought and
action is exemplified by acts of worship, for example, prayer and the eucharist,
however, it is not restricted to such acts. it is at this point that we can recover
something of Maclntyre's own substantive theory with its focus on practices and
virtue, both of which emphasise the embodied and participatory nature of moral
formation and decision-making. We shall argue that it is only by participation, in a
direct relationship with God and in patterns of sociality (that is, Christian practices)
that are faithful responses to, and orientated toward, God, that non-Christians might
come to accept the whole response of Christians to moral issues. Conversely,
through the participation of non-Christians (who are coming into relationship with
God) in Christian practices, Christians will have their own approach questioned.
This questioning opens up established patterns of Christian sociality and responses to
moral issues to revision and further specification. The emphasis here is not on
philosophical adequacy but on the nature of the relationships a person is participating
in. As O'Donovan puts it: 'True knowledge of the moral order is knowledge "in
Christ"." 8 This is distinct from Maclntyre's meta-theory because the point of
'conversion' from one tradition to another is not just an 'epistemological crisis' but
involves an ontologically changed relationship to God. The result of this change is
Olivec ODonovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Grand
Rapids: Eerdinans, 1986), p. 85. Hereafter referred to as RMO.
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that the person seeks to, and is able to, participate in communion with God, and in
the patterns of thought and action that are a response to this relationship.
The differences between Maclntyre and O'Donovan centre on their different
conceptions of the role of tradition and its authority in ethical judgements.
Maclntyre sees tradition as the guiding authority in determining Christian thought
and action. O'Donovan agrees with Maclntyre about the ontological ground of
Christian ethical action: however, he has a very different view of the role tradition
plays in determining ethical thought and action. O'Donovan conceives the role and
authority of tradition in determining Christian thought and action to be diminished,
relatively, by the authority and role of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. In short,
Maclntyre sees Christian ethical thought and action as tradition guided, whereas
O'Donovan sees tradition as having an important but less determinative role. For
O'Donovan, the role of Christ and the Spirit in guiding ethical thought and action
must be accounted for.
In addition to their different conceptions of the role and authority of tradition in
relation to moral thought and action, O'Donovan has a different conception of time
and history to Maclntyre. O'Donovan's conception of time and history leads to a
vision of how Christians can relate to non-Christians that is not only distinct from,
but also contradicts Maclntyre's conception of Christianity as a rival tradition in
competition with other traditions.
D) Constructing a response to the problem identified
The practical recommendations Maclntyre gives for organising relations between
Christians and non-Christians with regard to ethical disputes are grounded on his
theoretical framework for how rival traditions can resolve ethical disputes. As a
result of both the intrinsic relationship between theory and practice in Maclntyre's
work, and the conceptual differences between Maclntyre and O'Donovan at the
theoretical level, we must assess whether these theoretical differences are mirrored at
the level of practice. To assess this we must first analyse Maclntyre's practical
recommendations for resolving ethical disputes between different traditions. After
this exegesis, we can then compare and contrast Maclntyre's recommendations with
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those based on O'Donovan's account of the nature of relations between Christians
and non-Christians.
D.1) Maclntyre's response
Earlier we noted that Maclntyre has a first order theoiy of traditions and a meta-
theory of how different traditions relate. These form the basis of Macintyre's
conception of how Christians can relate to non-Christians and bow they might
resolve disputes between them. In summary, Maclntyre conceives Christianity as a
particular tradition in rivalry with other, largely incommensurable traditions. As a
tradition Christianity will have social practices peculiar to it. These distinctive
practices are the identiljing feature of Christian action and social formations.
Furthermore, they constitute a way of structuring relations with non-Christians.
Macintyre's first and second order theory forms the basis also of Maclntyre's
suggested response to the contemporary context: that is, a particular tradition should
form a community in which the practices and rationality of that particular tradition
can be lived out and the dominant, incoherent patterns of the contemporary context
resisted. These 'communities of resistance' can then engage in forms of local
politics that are just and rationaL Different communities formed by different
traditions can then engage in a particular type of 'local politics' that allows for the
kind of conversation and gradual convergence that Macintyre sees as crucial to
resolving ethical disputes between rival traditions. In the light of Maclntyre's
conception of Christianity as a tradition in relation to other traditions and his
suggested response to the contemporary context, a model of Christian and non-
Christian relations can be constructed. Rodney Clapp's suggestions for how
Christians might respond to the 'family values' debate in the USA is an example of
this model in practice.
D.2) Critique of Maclnlyre's account of how Christians can resolve ethical
disputes with their neighbours in the contemporary context
The question arises as to whether this model of how Christians can relate to non-
Christians is true to the nature and basis of Christianity. In other words, given
O'Donovan's critique of the epistemological basis of Maclntyre's conception of
Christian thought and action, we must ask of Maclntyre's model whether it properly
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takes into account the ground on which Christian ethical thought and action stand:
that is, does he pay sufficient heed to the selcrevelation of God given in Jesus
Christ?
To address these questions we shall compare and contrast Maclntyre's
conception of relations between Christians and non-Christians as one of rivafry
between competing traditions with O'Donovan's conception. If O'Donovan's
account should prove more open to theological specification, then it is from his
account that we will formulate a response to the problem of how Christians and non-
Christians should relate when confronted by ethical disputes in the contemporary
context.
O'Donovan, while largely agreeing with Maclntyre's diagnosis of the
contemporary context, has a conception of Christian thought and action and how it
relates to non-Christian thought and action that is explicitly formulated in response to
the revelation of God given in Jesus Christ. While acknowledging the role tradition
plays in enabling people to know revelation O'Donovan understands there to be
more involved than just tradition. It is at this point that questions about ecciesiology
arise. Up until now we have been addressing the question of relations between
Christians and non-Christians via the particular problem of how, in the contemporary
context, Christians should resolve ethical disputes with non-Christians. However, by
moving toward the point at which we must describe relations between Christians and
non-Christians in explicitly theological terms, we must take account of ecclesiology.
Crucially, the church is more than a tradition. The terms 'the Christian tradition' and
'the church' cannot be used as synonyms for each other. Rather, the term 'tradition'
is an epistemological category, whereas 'the church' is an ontological one: 'the
church' of which Christians are a part, makes a claim to be a way of being.
O'Donovan helps us negotiate the relationship between Christian ethics and
ecclesiology, for his ecciesiology relates directly to his conception of Christian
ethical thought and action and how it is distinct from non-Christian action. We can
then analyse how, within a theological framework, Christians relate to non-
Christians, and thus how Maclntyre's model of such relations is contrary to this.
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D.3) A constructive theoJogical response to the problem
After addressing the above questions, we will seek to delineate how Christians
should, in terms of their own criteria of evaluation, engage with non-Christians when
confronted by ethical disputes or common moral problems. We shall do this by
following O'Donovan's framework for Christian reflection and deliberation, and his
approach to identi1,ring the 'marks' of the church. This will involve reflecting on the
life and teaching of Jesus Christ given in Scripture, and seeing how the early church
echoed this in its actions and social formations. What emerges from this process is
the motif of hospitality as a way of defining and understanding relations between
Christians and non-Christians. We shall argue that our theologically specified motif
of 'hospitality' constitutes a better account than Maclntyre's meta-theory of how
Christians and non-Christians may relate with regard to ethical disputes.
D.4) A case study
In order to make our analysis concrete, we will focus on the problem of care for
the terminally ill and whether euthanasia is an appropriate way to treat them or not.
The dispute over whether euthanasia is a legitimate form of care for the terminally ifi
constitutes a paradigmatic instance of the problem we have been addressing; that is,
how do Christians organise relations with their non-Christian neighbours with regard
to ethical disputes if there is no common ground to appeal to in order to resolve the
dispute? This assessment of care for the terminally ill as a morally contentious
problem will also constitute a rehearsal, or recapitulation of, the overall argument of
this thesis.
We shall analyse the call for euthanasia as the appropriate response to the
terminally ill and the assumptions which drive this call: that is, that death is at times
preferable to suffering, and patient autonomy is paramount when determining
medical care. After giving a critique of these assumptions we assess both Maclntyre
and Grisez's response to the issue.. Concluding that both of these responses are
inappropriate, we analyse why hospice care is an instance of Christian hospitality,
and why it constitutes the best Christian response to care for the suffering-dying. In
addition to this, we set out why hospice care, as an instance of Christian hospitality,
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is a faithful way for Christians to relate to non-Christians in relation to this ethical
dispute in the contemporary context.
E) Summary
In summary, our aim is to assess Maclntyre's diagnosis of the contemporary
context and his conception of relations between Christians and non-Christians, in the
light of premises the Christian tradition takes to be basic to defining what is
normative for such relations. Through this process we will seek to analyse the nature
and basis of Christian ethical thought and action and to establish a way of
conceptualising and organising relations with those who do not share the same basis
to their thought and action as Christians have.
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Chapter One
Alasdair Maclutyre's diagnosis of the contemporary context
and his conception of the incommensurability of Christian and non-Christian
ethical action
1.1 Introduction
This section establishes the framework for the thesis by setting out the substantive
argument of the primary conversation partner and the means by which the parameters
of the thesis are defined. The focus of our attention is Alasdair Maclntyre's work
after and including After Virtue. The questions we shall address in this chapter are:
what is the shape and nature of the contemporary context in which moral debate is
situated? And how substantial are the differences between Christian and non-
Christian ethical judgements: that is, is there common ground between Christianity
and other traditions in relation to morality?
As noted in the introduction, Maclntyre offers an account of the contemporary
context as distinct from ages past in its inability to resolve ethical disputes.
Furthermore, he gives an account of Christian ethical thought and action as
constitutive of a tradition that has no immediately available or obvious common
measure by which it can resolve ethical disputes with other, non-Christian, traditions.
A correct diagnosis of Christian ethical thought and action will demonstrate the
extent to which it is affected by the contemporary context, and will show Christians
how best to engage with and undertake ethical thought and action in this context; and
also, how Christians may best resolve ethical differences with non-Christians within
this context. But the question is, is Maclntyre's diagnosis correct?
It is Macintyre's diagnosis that forms the basis of our deliberations in this thesis.
We seek to discern whether Maclntyre paints an accurate picture of the
contemporary context of moral debate, whether his substantive theory is sufficiently
open to theological development, and whether a conception of relations between
Christians and non-Christians shaped by Maclntyre's moral philosophy can at the
same time be faithful to the presuppositions of Christianity. The purpose of
engaging with Maclntyre's work is to use Maclntyre as a dialogue partner in the
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attempt to formulate a conception of how Christians are to engage with non-
Christians, which is both rooted in the Christian tradition and attentive to the reality
of the contemporary context.
We shall first outline Maclntyre's diagnosis of the contemporary context of moral
debate. We shall then analyse how Maclntyre's critique is based on his first order
theory of tradition-guided rationality (noting especially his criticism of liberalism as
the currently dominant mode of public discourse), and his second order meta-theoiy
of how different traditions might resolve disputes between themselves. Included in
the discussion of his meta-theory will be a discussion of why Maclntyre believes
Thomism is the optimal instance of a tradition. In the light of these two substantive
theories we will discuss how Maclntyre understands different traditions to be
incommensurable to one another. These discussions will clari1,' how the
contemporary context differs to ages past and how justice has become what the
strong make it. In summary, Maclntyre's position is that, even though different
traditions have incommensurable ways of deciding what is true and just, these
traditions can,, over time, resolve ethical disputes between themselves along the lines
set out in Maclntyre's meta-theory. However, according to Maclntyre, the
development of liberalism has involved, simultaneously, the development of
individualism and of bureaucratic rationality. These three elements - liberalism,
individualism and bureaucratic rationality - have together led to the fragmentation of
traditions and the structures of community central to creating a just and rational
society. The injustice of contemporary society and the fragmentation of traditions
make resolving disputes between those holding different viewpoints extremely
difficult, so that public debate on moral problems is now interminable, highly
conflictual (sometimes deadly), and stifles rational deliberation between contending
parties. This is the context in which Christians must relate to their neighbours.
1.2 Maclntyre's diagnosis of the contemporary context
Maclntyre's critique of contemporary moral debate is derived directly from his
first and second order substantive theories. For Maclntyre, what is rational and just
demands some conception of practical rationality at work within a particular
tradition's conception of the common good. An example of this in practice is
Macintyre's critique of the modern way of achieving translatability and rational
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debate. He notes that it involves translating all traditions into international English
and decontextualising the tenets of a particular tradition and hence removing the very
ground - its social practices, community and history - which make any tradition
coherent and rational.' Indeed, Maclntyre criticises contemporary modes of
reasoning and notions of justice because they lack the necessary conditions to be
rational and just. These modes of reasoning lack the necessary conditions because
they are based on conceptions of jus as a property (or dominium) of the individual,
whereby rationality becomes the justification of the preference (or will) of such an
individual, or of a particular interest group.2
 Given this situation, social co-operation
breaks down, society is highly conflictual, and there is an inability to resolve
fundamental disputes. In effect, justice becomes what the strong make it. In
contemporary society the strong are the bureaucracies of nation states and the
management of capitalist corporations, both of which manipulate people solely in
pursuit of the 'goods of effectiveness'; that is, profit, power and status.
Maclntyre uses two literary devices to illustrate the process by which he believes
this situation came about. The first is a parable of catastrophe and the second is to
draw a parallel with anthropological accounts of the Polynesian concept of 'taboo'. At
the opening of After Virtue Maclntyre invites us to imagine that the natural sciences
suffered a catastrophe: scientists are lynched, science teaching stops, laboratories are
destroyed, and books are burned. Afler a time, people try to reinvent science.
However, all they possess are fragments detached from any knowledge of the contexts
that gave them significance. They have bits of theories, instruments whose real use has
been forgotten, single pages of articles, and half-chapters of books. As a result, they
might do 'chemistry', or 'physics, or 'astronomy', in the sense that they would argue
about good and bad theories, or debate the theory of relativity, but what they could not
do would be real science: for there would be no overall conception of what the point of
science was. The crux of the parable is simple. Maclntyre states:
The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the aclual worki which inhabit the
language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science
in the imagmaiy world which I describeii What we possess [...] are fragments of a
conceptual scheme parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance
'Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988), pp. 384-86;
hereafter referred to as WJ.
2 MacInte, 'How Can We Learn What Verilatis Splendor Has to Teach,' The Thomist, 58 (1994),
171-95 (p. 182).
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derived. We possess, indee4 simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key
expressions. But we have very largely if not entirefy lost our coniprebension, both
theoretical and practical, of morality.3
The implication of the 'disquietmg suggestion' that modem morality is in chaos is that
we lack the resources even to recognise the full extent of the disorder, much less
extricate ourselves from it.
The process by which this situation came about, and its implications, becomes even
clearer in Maclntyre's discussion of the Polynesian word 'taboo'. In the journal of his
third voyage Captain Cook records how the Polynesians strictly prohibited certain
practices, such as men and women eating together, and yet could offer no clear
explanation for their prohibition. Forty years later, King Kamehanieha II abolished
taboos in Hawaii with no apparent social consequences. Maclntyre notes that
anthropologists have drawn a variety of conclusions from this. Mary Douglas suggests
that, initially, taboo rules were embedded in a context which conferred inteffigibility
upon them, much in the same way that Deuteronomy presupposes a certain cosmology
and taxonomy to make sense of its prohibitions. 4 Once deprived of this context and
background belief the taboo rules appeared to be a set of arbitraiy prohibitions which
were then eventually abandoned. For the rules had been gradually deprived of any
status that could secure their authority. In the absence of the status conferred by their
original context and background, and of any possible meaningful re-evaluation, such
rules resisted both interpretation and justification For when the resources of a culture
are too meagre to carry through the task of reinterpretation, the task of justification
becomes impossible too.
Maclntyre holds that this is exactly the position of liberal attempts at justification of
contemporary moral norms. Analytic philosophy has sought to justif3i our own
contemporary taboos without reference to any wider context, but has fulled. It
presupposed that morality is an autonomous field of study that does not require an
overall context to make sense of it. In Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry
Maclntyre traces a stage in this process to tale Victorian 'encyclopaedic' thinking, as
propounded by Henry Sidgwick, Adam Gifford and others. He discusses how the




misunderstanding of taboos by such thinkers reveals their own confusion. According to
Maclntyre, they misunderstood taboo rules as primarily negative prohibitions, rather
than as merely the negative side of enabling prescriptions. He states: 'They were
unable [...] to envisage the possibility that both morality and rationality ought to be
Understood in a way which would make much of what they took to be morality appear
as irrational and as arbitrary as the taboo customs of the Polynesians appeared to
thent'5 For Maclntyre, modem moral utterance and practice can only be understood as
a series of fragmented survivals from an older past. So for example, the deontological
character of moral judgements is the ghost of conceptions of divine law, which are alien
to the metaphysics of modernity. The insoluble problems, which these ghosts have
generated for modem moral theorists, will remain insoluble Until their history and
context is properly understood. Maclntyre states that the only true story
wllbeonewhchwillbothenabeustodisshbetwnwhatltlSfOraSetOftllbOOrUles
and practices to be in good order and what it is for a set of taboo rules and practices to have
been fragmented and thrown into disorder and enable us to understand the historical
transition by which the latter state emerged from the former.6
The task Maclntyre has undertaken in After Virtue and his subsequent work is to narrate
what he considers to be the true story.
1.2.1 The loss of teleological modes of moral reasoning leads to morality being
understood as arbitrary
The loss of any sense of rational enquiry into morality as taking place in a wider
context or framework means we have no criteria by which to judge the gap between
what we are and what we ought to be. According to Maclntyre's account of history,
what was eliminated by the eighteenth century was any concept of 'man-as-he-could-
be-if he-realised-his-telos'. This left an apparently unbridgeable gap between the
notion of morality having a definite content, and a certain notion of human nature in its
basic or primitive state: that is, there was no way to relate coherently existing moral
imperatives to the notion of human nature as it naturally existed because the teleological
framework to relate them was abandoned. The ethical injunctions were supposed to
nurture and educate human nature into its telos, and so these injunctions could not be
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Enquiry: Encyclopaedia; Genealogy, and Tradition
(London: Duckworth, 1989), p. 29; hereafter referred to as TRy.
6 AV,p. 113.
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derived in reverse from an appeal to the reality of human nature. Yet this is precisely
what was attempted. Macintyre writes:
The eighteenth-century moral philosophers engaged in what was an inevitably unsuccessful
project; for they did indeed attempt to find a rational basis for their moral belief in a
particular understanding of human nature, while inheriting a s of moral injunctions on one
hand and a conception of human nature on the other which had been expressly designed to
be discrepant with each other.7
In his book analysing Maclntyre's critique of modernity and capitalism in particular,
Peter McMylor concurs with Maclntyre on this point. He comments that the upshot of
jettisoning any notion of 'man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos' was that: 'No
moral argument could move from factual premises to moral and evaluative conclusions.
This is unsurprising since the intellectual material for such a move had been removed.'8
This abandonment of teleology has been carried into the heart of contemporary
moral philosophy, which asks not 'What sort of person am I to become?' but 'What
rules ought we to follow and why ought we to obey them?' As outlined in the taboo
parallel, the lack of any coherent rational justification leads to a set of rules and
principles that appear arbitraiy. This is compounded by the lack of any historical
context in debates about morality, for history is judged irrelevant to what are conceived
of as abstract universal principles. Morality is thereby reduced to a set of rules and
principles lacking context and it is in this form that it fulls prey to the critique which
argues that appeals to moral objectivity are in fuct expressions of subjective will: such
as Nietzsche's. Maclntyre depicts Nietzsche as a European Kamehameha II who
dismisses all attempts to base morality on conscience, the categorical imperative, or
moral sentiment, and abolishing natural rights and utility as fictions no longer worthy of
being told.9
 For Nietzsche, morality can be only what the individual will creates. Far
from being able to make judgements about what we are and what we ought to be, we
can only properly say that morality is whatever passes for morality; that is, justice is
what the strong make it. Thus, the contemporaiy question - 'what rules ought we to
follow and why ought we to obey them?' - allows no criteria for agreeing a resolution,
and the central problem of contemporary debate has become its simultaneous,
7 AV,p. 55.
8 Alasdair Macinlyre Critic of Modernity (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 89.
9 AV,p. 113-14.
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inconsistent treatment of moral argument as both an exercise of rational powers and as
mere expressive assertion.0
1.2.2 Strength as the determining factor in contemporary morality
We can see that for Maclntyre the parables of the destruction of science and of
taboo rules in Polynesia portray a situation that arises precisely when the conditions
Maclntyre demands for rational deliberation no longer exist, either within a tradition
or between traditions. As far as Maclntyre is concerned, when any society loses its
modes of tradition-guided rationality, and in particular a shared belief in some
conception of an ultimate human good, then three important consequences ensue.
First, participants in that society are deprived of any shared standard of judgement in
debates over particular moral and evaluative issues. This is the case in contemporary
society, wherein more and more substantive moral issues are contested. Second, this
development, reinforced by doubts as to the trustworthiness of those with whom one
has entered into moral disagreement, strengthens the tendency to construe appeals to
principle as nothing more than masked expressions of desire, preference and will.
Thus, distinguishing between genuine rational debate and its parody becomes
increasingly difficult. Third, in Maclntyre's words 'a new need would arise for
norms whose central purpose would be protective: to defend each person from
becoming merely an instrument for the achievement of someone else's desires,
preferences and will'." The result of the three elements, taken together, is that:
Justice could no longer be understood exclusively or even primarily as a matter of
sustaining and repairing the breaches in an order in which allocations were in respect of
contributions to a good, in shared allegiance to which social co-operation found its
warrant.12
Rather, justice would be transmuted into the defending of each against all.
Maclntyre traces the genealogy of this transformation of justice from Aquinas,
through Hobbes, flume, Kant, Nietzsche and others to its present incoherent and
essentially defensive conception in the rhetoric of rights. He concludes:
What I have argued, then, is that we inhabit a culture in which disagreements, and more
especially fundamental disagreements, about rights cannot be rationally debated, and
indeed that it was in key part because those beliefs and commitments which must be
'°AV,p. 11.
'Community, Law and the Idiom and Rhetoric of Rights', Listening, 26 (1991), 96-110 (p. 101).
12 Ibid.
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shared if a particular society is to be capable of rational debate were at an earlier stage no
longer widely enough held, that the modern conception of rights developed in the way
that it did. It follows that it is seriously imprudent, if one not only cares about advancing,
sustaining, and protecting the goods of human life, but also counts rationality, theoretical
and practical, as central among those goods, and believes that only rational modes of
achieving one's social and moral ends are justifiable, to adopt the contemporary idiom
and rhetoric of rights.'3
Given his critique of the 'rhetoric of rights' it is hardly surprising that Maclntyre
does not see liberal democracy as the vanguard of freedom. Rather, he sees the
politics and practices of liberal democracy as intrinsically unjust. He describes the
modern state as 'a large, complex and often ramshackle set of interlocking
institutions, combining none too coherently the ethos of a public utility company
with the inflated claims to embody ideals of liberty and justice'. 14 He condemns its
democratic aspects as a charade.' 5 For Maclntyre, the societies of advanced Western
modernity are run by 'oligarchies disguised as liberal democracies'.' 6 The range of
what is open to be discussed and changed is severely curtailed, so that no substantive
issues about ways of life can be raised.' 7
 Such debate as occurs is the antithesis of
serious intellectual enquiry, prohibiting as it does systematic rational analysis.
instead, policies and decisions emerge 'from a strange melange of arguments,
debating points and the influence of money and other forms of established power'.'8
It would be wrong, however, to characterise Maclntyre as specffically anti-modern,
for he sees such problems as possibilities in all societies. For example, in Natural
Law as Subversive: The Case of Aquinas MacIntyre discusses how Aquinas's
thirteenth century contemporaries, Emperor Frederick 11 and King Louis IX of
France, both attempted to pursue the goods of effectiveness, over and against the
goods of excellence, in their legal and political administration.' 9 However,
Macintyre does see the modern predicament as particularly acute, especially since it
is characterised by 'a politics from whose agendas enquiry concerning the nature of
that politics has been excluded, a politics thereby protected from perceptions of its
' Maclntyre, 'Rhetoric of Rights', p. 106.
14 Maclntyre, 'Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good', in The Maclnlyre Reader, ed. by Kelvin
Knight (London: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 235-252 (p. 236).
15 Dependent Rational Animals: Why Hwnan Beings Need the Virtues (London: Duckworth, 1999), p.
131; p. 142; hereafter referred to as DRA.
' 6 Alasthir Macintyre, 'Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good', in The Maclnlyre Reader, pp.
235-252 (p. 237).
Maclntyre, 'Common Good', p. 238.
IS Macintyre, 'Common Good', p. 239.
'9 'Natural Law as Subversive: The Case of Aquinas', Journal ofMedieval and Early Modern Studies,
26 (1996), 61-83.
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own exclusions and limitations'. 20 It is this situation which is distinctive and which
we intend to consider further.
1.2.3 Maclntyre's critique of liberalism as incapable of securing justice and as
inherently unjust in its outworking
Maclntyre perceives the acuteness of the contemporary situation as rooted in
problems intrinsic to the primary discourse of contemporary moral philosophy: liberal
individualism. As briefly noted above, the inability to provide justification for moral
principles develops out of a conception of rationality as universal and without social
context. By contrast, Maclntyre believes there can be no spectators' gallery from which
a pure, abstract rationality 'free' from tradition, histoiy, and social context can look
down upon and evaluate all others. All forms of rationality are protagonists within the
play, each claiming they have the true script. They encounter each other as actors upon
a single stage. Maclntyre's complaint is that the principles which inform the theory
and practice of justice within a liberal polity claim to be, but are not, neutral with
respect to rival and conflicting theories of the human good. He states that where
these principles are in force:
they impose a particular conception of the good life of practical reasoning, and of justice
upon those who willingly or unwillingly accept the liberal procedures and the hleral terms
of debate. [...] The starting points of liberal theorizing are never neutral as between
conceptions of the human good they are always liberal starting points.2'
In Maclntyre's understanding, rational enquiry into morals is inherently tradition-
bound and must take account of its social context. Maclntyre follows Aristotle in
holding that humans require some kind ofapolis. He states:
Aristotle gave us excellent reasons for believing that both rational enquiry in politics and
ethics and rationality in action require membership in a community which shares allegiance
to some tolerably specific overall conception of the ultimate human good. [...] What such a
shared understanding provides is precisely the kind of standard independent of, not only
individual desires, preferences and will, but also of the interests of particular groups within
the community, by appeal to which rational debate on practical questions can be carried
on.22
This rational debate, which is founded on the movement towards a more explicit and
detailed understanding of the ultimate human good, is an essential condition for justice
20 Mac1nte, 'Common Good', p. 239.
21 wj, p. 345.
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to be secured. In Maclntyre's view, the securing of justice requires that each member
of the community can receive what is her due in respect of her contribution to the
ultimate human good (as conceived by the particular tradition in which she is
situated).23
 Consequently, as the understanding and specificity of the ultimate good
increases, so the ability of a society to give each person her due increases, and thus that
society is increasingly just.
Maclntyre's conception of the relationship between justice and rationality seems to
stand opposed to that of liberalism. Maclntyre cites the work of John Rawis and Robert
Nozick as examples of how hleral conceptions of rationality and justice contrast with
his account. Maclntyre writes:
Rawls and Nozick articulate with great power a shared view which envisages ently into
social life as - at least ideally - the voluntaiy act of at least potentialy rational individuals
with prior interests who have to ask the question 'What kind of social contract with others is
it reasonable for me to enter into?' Not surprisingly, it is as a consequence of this that their
views exclude any account of human community in which the notion of desert in relation to
contributions to the common tasks of that communit' in pursuing shared goods could
provide the basis for judgements about virtue and injustice."
However, it could be argued that, far from excluding the kind of account of human
community Maclntyre seeks, liberalism is just such an account. For example, Brian
Barry contends that liberalism could be presented as a self-conscious tradition, with
Rawis' A Theoty of Justice as an equivalent to Aquinas' Summa.25 Maclntyre has
come, in his later work, to concur with those, like Bany, who make this point. Yet
instead of constituting a reason for praising liberalism, the fact that liberalism functions
like a tradition is for Maclntyre a failure of liberalism. In Whose Justice? Which
Rationalhy? Maclntyre notes that liberalism, in seeking some neutral, tradition free
standard of rational justification, to which appeal could be made on issues of morality,
has contradicted itself by becoming a tradition: one partly defined by the interminability
of the debate over what such neutral principles might consist of26
 A further
contradiction resides in the fact that, contrary to its own claims, hleralism has an
e%ident conception of the good. Although eveiy individual is equally free to propose
and to live by whatever theory of the good he or she proposes, derived from whatever
Maclntyre, 'Rhetoric of Rights', p. 99.
23 
'Which God Ought We To Obey and Why?', Faith and Philosophy, 3.4 (1986), 359-71 (p. 367).
24 AV, p. 251.
25 Brian Barry, 'The Light That Failed', Ethics, 100.! (1989), 160-168 (p. 165).
26 Wi, p. 335.
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theory or tradition he or she may adhere to, that conception of the good must not
involve reshaping the life of the rest of the community in accord with it. This
qualification demonstrates hleral individualism's own broad conception of the good
(which it is engaged in imposing politically, legally, socially, and culturally wherever it
has power to do so) and also the severe limitation in its toleration of rival conceptions of
the good in the public arena. As Maclntyre states:
The overriding good of hl,eralism is no more and no less than the continuing sustenance of
the hleral social and political order. Thus hl,eralism, while initially rejectmg the claims of
any overriding theory of the good, does in fact come to embody just such a theory.27
Hence, although liberalism seems to contradict Maclntyre's conception of rationality as
tradition guided enquiry, in practice it mirrors it. According to Maclntyre, liberalism, in
acting like a tradition, not only contradicts its own basic presuppositions, but is also, in
practice, oppressive.28
MaclntyTe directly opposes the premise of liberalism that we are not merely
choosers, but are essentially isolated choosers, of our own good. The conception of
human beings as isolated choosers is, in Maclntyre's view, the root of our present
anomie, atomised and alienated condition. Maclntyre's Aristotelian conception,
wherein excellence is directly linked to the nature of one's society, correspondingly sets
limits to the ability of individuals to 'create' their own conceptions of the good. For
Macintyre, the fruit of liberalism is an increasingly fragmented society which
increasingly inhibits the ability to make appropriate choices as there is less and less
society to be a part o1 Hence, hl,eralism is incapable of securing justice and ensuring
that morality is not what the strong decide.
In this context, where each is against all, anarchy does not ensue because the
structures and forms of governance control and rationalise society to their own ends.
For Maclntyre, this control is exercised by the bureaucratic and management practices
both of the administrative structures of the modem nation state and of capitalist
corporations. These systems embody 'bureaucratic rationality'. As defined by Weber,
this rationality involves being engaged in a competitive struggle for scarce resources,
27 Wi, p. 345.
For a critique of Maclntyre's notion that liberalism has itself become a tradition see: Jeffiey Stout,
'Homeward Bound: Maclntyre on Liberal Society and the History of Ethics', Journal of Religion, 69
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both human and non-human, and in seeking to direct these resources as effectively as
possible to specified ends. 29
 Thus, according to Maclntyre, not only is public life and
moral discourse in disarray, it is also oppressive because the quest for justice has been
replaced by the demand for managerial effectiveness.
Maclntyre holds that the values and morals of every culture assume embodied
expression in the social world through certain archetypes or characters. 3° The primary
moral representatives of contemporary culture, who illustrate the character of its moral
disarray and injustice, are: the aesthete (whose primary evaluative criteria is pleasure
and the avoidance of boredom); the manager (whose key criteria for evaluation is
effectiveness in matching means to a predetermined end: which is nothing more than
successful power); and the therapist (who is like the manager seeking effectiveness, not
of an organisation, but of the individual).3'
In summary, the development of liberalism, from the enlightenment period on, has
involved, simultaneously, the development of individualism and bureaucratic
rationality. These three elements - liberalism, individualism and bureaucratic
rationality - have together led to the fragmentation of traditions and the structures of
community central to creating a just and rational society. The injustice of the present
context and the fragmentation of traditions make resolving disputes between
different viewpoints extremely diflicult, so that public moral discourse is now highly
conflictual and often violent; for example, the contemporary debate over the morality
or otherwise of fox hunting has often been characterised by physically violent
conflict. This is both the context in which Christians must relate to their neighbours
and the malaise that affects Christianity itself as one tradition that is itself subject to
the forces of fragmentation.
1.3	 Maclntyre's first order substantive theory
Maclntyre's diagnosis of the contemporary context is founded on his first order
substantive theory of tradition-guided rationality and his second order meta-theoiy of
(1989), 220-232 (p. 229). Ct:, Jean Porter, 'Openness and Constraint: Moral Reflection as Tradition-





how different, incommensurable moral traditions relate. Many commentators fail to
take full account of Maclntyre's substantive theory. They focus instead on his
critique of contemporary moral discourse. However, his critique cannot be
understood properly except in the light of his substantive theory. This theory centres
around Maclntyre's conception of practices, virtues internal to practices, the
narratives that enable the proper ordering of such practices, and the tradition which is
constituted over time by a particular constellation of narratives, practices and virtues.
We will assess Maclntyre's conception of practices, virtue and tradition. However,
we will not discuss Maclntyre's use of 'narrative', because this has ceased to play
any major role in his substantive theory since he has moved from arguing from
sociological premises to arguing from philosophically derived first principles.32
1.3.1 Practices and virtues
Maclntyre defines a practice as:
Any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of tiying to achieve
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially defmitive of, that form
of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions
of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.33
He cites chess, football, funning, architecture, and the creation of political communities
as examples of practices. The central feature of Maclntyre's understanding of a
practice is that it implies a standard of excellence internal to that practice. To play
football well, a player must heed the standards which define the playing of football.
Not just anything counts as playing football well, and those features that do count are
defined by the practice, not by the player. Maclntyre understands morality as a
practice. The criteria for being moral, or acting well, are defined by the kind of practice
in which we are engaged, not by the decision or preference of the individuaL This
conception of morality gives a central place to the virtues (which are the goods internal
to the practice) rather than to general rules or abstract principles. As Horton and
Mendus put it:
32 For an account of this shift see: Kelvin Knight, 'Introduction', in The Maclntyre Reader, pp. 1-27
(p. 15); Cf., DRA, pp. 8-9. For an account and critique of Maclntyre's use of narrative see: Gregory




Maclntyre insists that morality should be construed primarily m terms of a life embodying
the virtues; and our understanding of what the virtues are, and why they are virtues, is
crucially dependent on coming to recognize their place in the practices that define them and
their centrality to the narrative unity of the setf
For Macintyre, the virtues are the means by which we fulfil the various practices that
constitute our life. They are also necessary to enable us to seek the good life. They are:
Those dispositions which will nnt only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods
intemal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good,
by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we
encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing
knowledge of the good The catalogue of the virtues will therefore include the virtues
required to sustain the kind of households and the kind of political communities in which
men and women can seek for the good together and the virtues necessaiy for philoshical
enquiry about the character of the good.35
Thus the virtues are central to the formation of personal identity and the very pattern
and shape of life together in society.
As indicated in the quotation, the virtues are central to sustaining practices.
However, practices must become institutionalised in some form if they are to survive
for any length of time. This process of institutionalization is, in Maclntyre's view,
good and necessary. However, there is, for Maclntyre, an inherent tension between
practices and institutions. Institutions are primarily concerned with external goods.
For example, the practice of medicine has developed the institutional forms of the
hospital; yet the goals of a hospital, in contrast to the goals of medicine, are to acquire
the necessary money and resources to sustain the hospital. The ideals and creativity of
a practice are always vulnerable to the competitiveness of its institutional form.
Therefore, without the virtues (for example, of justice, courage, and truthfulness)
practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions.
Maclntyre does not claim that there is one catalogue of virtues fixed for all time. He
notes how diflërent social and historical contexts emphasise different virtues. For
example, he contrasts the catalogue of virtues in I-Joiner with those of the New
Testament pointing out that humility, a primary virtue in the latter, is counted a vice in
4 John Horton and Susan Mendus, 'Alasdair Macintyre: After Virtue and After', in After Macintyre:
Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair Macintyre, ed. by John Horton and Susan Mendus




the former. Following Aristotle, Maclntyre believes changes hi what is considered a
virtue are determined by changes in how the good for humans is conceived. Thus
Homer's teleology - his conception of the good life - was very different from the
teleology of the New Testament. It should be noted that in Homer virtue is secondary
to and dependent upon a clear concept of social role, whereas in Aristotle (and related
accounts) it depends on what the good life for man, as the telos of human action, is
defined as. However, all the catalogues of the virtues that Maclntyre gives an account
of, from Homer to Benjamin Franklin, require for their application some prior account
of certain features of social and moral life in terms of which the virtues can be defined
and explained. As previously noted, in his later work Maclntyre has endeavoured to
give a Thomist account of what the pattern and shape of life together should consist of;
and thence what virtues should be cultivated. He summarises this account as follows:
In order to flourish, we need both those virtues that enable us to fimction as independent and
accountable practical reasoners and those virtues that enable us to acknowledge the nature
and extent of our dependence on others. Both the acquisition and the exercise of those
virtues are possible only insofar as we participate in social relationships of giving and
receiving social relationships governed by and partially defined by the norms of the natural
law.37
13.2 Tradition
Practices and the exercise of the virtues presuppose a wider social and historical
context: a tradition. To enter a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with its
contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us hi and extended
the practice. Maclntyre states: 'it is thus the achievement, and a fortiori the authority,
of a tradition which I then confront and from which I have to iearn.' A tradition is
constituted by a set of practices and is the medium by which such practices are shaped
and transmitted across generations. Muihall and Swill note that, for Maclntyre,
'Traditions may be primarily religious or moral (for example Catholicism or
humanism), economic (for example a particular craft or profession, trade union or
manuficturer), aesthetic (for example modes of literature or painting), or geographical
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For Maclntyre, it is traditions that are the repositories of standards of rationality,
which in turn enable appropriate moral deliberation and action. A tradition is an
ongoing rational conversation in which the best hotheses so far achievable are
examined, tested, refined, and ultimate'y surpassed by succeeding formulations. It is
only through this kind of cumulative process that significant progress in inquiiy can be
made. It is only by participation in the dialectical discipline of a particular tradition that
human beings are able to refine and advance their understanding of a given subject
matter.
Maclntyre's understanding of tradition lies at the heart of his moral and
epistemological theory. For Maclntyre, the narrative of an individual's life is to be
understood against the background of the wider social context within which that
individual finds herself This wider social context consists of sets of practices that serve
to define the virtues, and those practices, in turn, sustain and are sustained within a
tradition that provides the resources with which the individual may pursue her quest for
the good. Thus, the individual does not decide to join a tradition, but is inducted into a
particular tradition and, through that tradition, into a way of reading the world.
Macintyre writes:
The intending reader has to have inculcated into him or herself certain attitudes and
dispositions, certain virtues. So a pre-rational reordering of the self has to occur before the
reader can have an adequate standard by which to judge what is good reason and what is
not.40
Herein lies the epistemological dimension of traditions. it is traditions that are the
repositories of standards of rationality, which in turn enable appropriate moral
deliberation and action in accord with the natural law.
While Maclntyre understands practical rationality as socially embodied in a
myriad of cultural forms he identifies its generic structure as Aristotelian, and
Thomism as the best account of practical rationality yet articulated. For Aristotle, to
be human is to act rationally in society with others. This involves identi1'ing a good
to be pursued and identiliing the action most likely to secure that good under present
circumstances. Action is undertaken for the sake of some good, lesser goods being
pursued for the sake of greater goods, the greatest good being that of the good life.
40 TRV, p. 82.
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There are four implications to this view. Firstly, both ends and means are subject to
reason; secondly, reasoning itself cannot be solely instrumental because reason and
action are themselves partially constitutive of the end for which they are undertaken
thirdly, practical reasoning necessarily results in action; and lastly, rationality can be
articulated in ways that are no longer simply cultural and conventional but also
philosophical and critical.
1.4	 Maclntyre's conception of truth
Central to Maclntyre's view is the contention that while standards of truth and
rationality are inseparable from a particular, historical tradition, truth is the goal of
all inquiry. We advance toward this truth by degrees, error being attributed to the
mind's inadequate grasp of its object. Maclntyre has thus come to change his
position in his later work, moving from the implicit relativism in After Virtue to
committing himself to a Thomist conception of truth. This includes the espousal of
natural law grounded in a conception of the ultimate good as friendship with God as
defined by Christian theism.
Philosophy, for Maclntyre, should be a journey toward the discovery of first
principles and to embark on such a journey presupposes an end - meaning both
completion and telos - to that journey.4 ' He holds that contemporary schools of
philosophy and the wider culture of modernity deny the possibility that any principle
is or can be llrst. 42
 Macintyre argues that first principles are essential in order to
guide the mind to its telos. However, this presupposes there is such a thing as a telos
and that this telos is fixed and finite. 43
 Such a presupposition is not obvious to the
contemporary universe of discourse, which, according to Maclntyre, has no place
within it for any conception of fixed ends that can be discovered; instead, all ends are
decided upon or invented or relative to a particular social context. Maclntyre points
out that, by contrast,
Genuinely first principles [...J can have a place only within a universe characterised in
terms of certain determinate, fixed and unalterable ends, ends which provide a standard
by reference to which our individual purposes, desires, interest and decisions can be
WJ, p. 175.
42 Alasdair Maclntyre, 'First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues', in The
Macinlyre Reader, pp. 171-201 (p. 172-73).
Maclntyre, 'First Principles, Final Ends', p. 172.
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evaluated as well or badly directed. For in the practical life it is the telos which provides
the arche, the first principle of practical reasoning.
Thus, the telos provides the first principle, and the two stand or fall together. This
realist view constitutes the acceptance, by Maclntyre, of natural teleology.45
1.4.1 Thomism provides the optimum account of how to discover truth
Macintyre has moved beyond saying that rational enquiry demands a tradition:
instead, he holds that Aristotelianism represents the best theory of what makes a
tradition rational and Thomism is the best instance of such a tradition. Thus he
states: 'For it is indeed a Thomist thesis that all practical reasoners, often unwittingly
and often very imperfectly, exhibit in significant ways the truth of the Thomist
account of practical reasoning by how they act.'
For Maclntyre, the articles of the Summa, with their constant engagement with
other viewpoints and positions, are the exemplary instance of tradition-constituted
enquiry that seeks truth. Maclntyre argues that through this dialectical process
Aquinas successfully synthesised Aristotle and Augustine. Aristotle gave Aquinas
that which Augustine could not: that is, a comprehensive analysis of practical
rationality, the virtues, and the nature of moral enquiry. However, Maclntyre sees
Aristotle's work as ultimately tragic because, in its conception, only the gods can
achieve the happiness which Aristotle sees as ordering the telos of the moral life.47
Aquinas, on the other hand, drew from Augustine and the Bible the ultimate end of
practical rationality and the conditions for the possibility of achieving such an end.
Thus for Aquinas, revelation complemented Aristotle by supplying a more adequate
characterisation of the nature of the end of practical rationality, and providing a
formulation for achieving this ultimate end.
In addition to its formulation of the ultimate end, Aquinas also drew from the
Augustinian tradition the notion of the perverted will. Maclntyre understands the
Macintyre, 'First Principles', p. 173-74.
See DRA, p. x. For a critique of Macintyre's lack of natural teleology in After Virtue and the
implications of this see Russell Hittinger, 'After Macintyre: Natural Law Theory, Virtue Ethics, and
Eudaimonia', International Philosophical Quarterly, 29 (1989), 449-461 (p. 454); Porter, The
Recovery of Virtue, p. 83; and O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, p. 222.
Maclntyre, 'How Can We Learn', p. 174.
TRy, pp. 137-8.
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perverted will, or ma/a voluntas, within the Augustinian tradition, to mean 'a rooted
tendency to disobedience in the will and distraction by passion, which causes
obscuring of the reason and on occasion systematic cultural deformation.'48 This
concept of sin and the perverted will disturbs the Aristotelian moral framework
completely, for it claims that at some point no amount of virtue or training will
enable one to progress toward the ultimate good. Acting against our best interests is,
according to Maclntyre, inexplicable within the framework of a strictly rational
account of human nature. Moreover, Maclntyre recognises that sin, as defined by
Augustine, affects not only our ability to achieve the good, but also human
knowledge of the good. 49
 For Macintyre, once the notion of sin is introduced a
radically new vision of action and agency becomes necessary. To know and do what
is good requires radically new qualities of character, infused by the free grace of a
good God, whereby we may pursue our ultimate end. In Aquinas's account, these
new qualities of character are the freely given gifis of faith, hope, and charity. For
Macintyre, the Augustinian notion of the perverted will does not derail the Thomist
appropriation of Aristotle but complements it. 50
 However, it does relativise
Aristotle's account of the virtues because grace becomes the necessary complement
to practical rationality.51
 On Maclntyre's reading of the Thomist synthesis, it is
precisely because of Aristotle's analysis of practical rationality as involving the
virtues that something like grace is required: if we need to be a particular kind of
person in order to move towards knowledge of the truth about the human good, but
we cannot become this kind of person in our strength alone (because our will is
perverse), then we need the grace and revelation of God to continue on our quest to
the human good (that is, friendship with God). It is important to note, however, that
Maclntyre thinks basic knowledge of the natural law is possible 'to any plain
person's unclouded moral apprehension'. 52
 To move beyond this basic knowledge
requires excellence in virtue and the disclosure of revelation. In Maclntyre's
estimation, Aquinas's use of the concept of the perverted will completes, rather than






For positive assessments of Maclntyre's account of Aquinas see: Thomas Hibbs, 'Maclntyre,
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1.4.2 Maclntyre's Thomist account of truth
Following Aquinas, Maclntyre understands humans to be fallible, fallen, and finite.
Thus the scope of human discourse is limited so that, in Maclntyre's view, humans
must advance to truth incrementally. Only by subjecting the views of one's tradition
to dialectical testing can one attribute reasonableness to the tradition. Success in
such encounters grants warrant to the truth claims and assertions of a tradition.
Through dialectical testing, error is attributed to the mind's inadequate grasp.
Discovery of limitations is the source of progress not despair. Maclntyre couples
this conception of warranted assertability with a conception of truth as timeless and
universaL He states:
The concept of truth is timeless. To claim that some thesis is true is not only to claim for
all possible times and places that it cannot be shown to fail to correspond to reality [...]
but also that the mind which expresses its thought in that thesis is in fact adequate to its
object.TM
In his discussion of types of first principles Maclntyre justifies a limited degree of
selcevidence; for example, the statement that 'every whole is greater than its part' is
obviously selfevident. However, most first principles are understood as evident
only in the context of a larger conceptual framework. First principles are embedded
within traditions and one must be 'wise' to grasp them; that is, one must have
become a certain type of person to reason rightly and so be able to discover the truth.
Maclntyre understands this to be a Thomist conception of truth that he summarises as
follows:
My mind or rather my soul is only one among many and its own knowledge of my self
qua soul has to be integrated into a general account of souls and their teleology. Insofar
as a given soul moves successfully toward its successive intellectual goals in a
teleologically ordered way, it moves toward completing itself by becoming formally
identical with the objects of its knowledge, so that it is adequate to those objects, objects
that are then no longer external to it, but rather complete it. [...] The mind, actualised in
knowledge, responds to the object as the object is and as it would be, independently of the
mind's knowledge of it."
The above quotation is indicative of Maclntyre's realist view of truth. However,
Maclntyre maintains that we can only gain access to the truth within a particular
59(1995), 379-407. For a critical assessment see John Haldane, 'Maclntyre's Thomist Revival: What
Next?', in After Maclntyre, pp. 9 1-107.
Wi, p. 363.
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tradition. He argues that only certain kinds of experiences will provide adequate
premises for sound practical reasoning. Furthermore, Maclntyre states that:
Only a life whose actions have been directed by and whose passions have been
disciplined and transformed by the practice of the moral and intellectual virtues and the
social relationships involved in and defined by such practice will provide the kind of
experience from which and about which reliable practical inferences and sound
theoretical arguments about practices can be derived.56
However, this does not imply any form of relativism with regard to moral enquiry,
for even though practical reason is tradition guided, its operation within a rational
tradition presupposes there is a telos for human beings which it is the object of moral
and political enquiry to discover.57
in developing this line of argument Maclntyre has come to recognise that while
the pursuit of truth is relative to a particular tradition the truth that tradition seeks is
independent of any particular tradition. In his positive assessment of the Papal
encyclical Veritatis Splendor MacIntyre states that the projects and goods we seek as
individuals, communities and institutions, and what means there are for achieving
these goods, will vary from culture to culture. However, what is universal is
twofold: 'The need for a presupposed understanding that such goods will contribute
to the achievement of the human good and the need for recognition of a set of
requirements which enable human beings to benefit from the disciplines of
learning.' 58
 For Maclntyre, these are the preconditions for a rational conversation
and for justice to be secured. These universal preconditions are 'definitive therefore
of what human beings share with one another by nature, as rational beings. And they
are in fact the requirements imposed by the precepts of the natural law'.59
 Thus,
while humans necessarily seek the truth from a particular perspective by virtue of
being fallible, finite, and fallen, and this quest inevitably draws on the resources of a
particular culture (thus truth claims are relative to particular traditions), humans do
seek a truth which is independent of their particular perspective. Macintyre states:
What is required is that truth should be understood to be something other and something
more than warranted assertability. What we take to be warrantedly assertible is always
" Macintyre, 'First Principles', p. 176.
Maclntyre, 'First Principles', p. 177.
For Macintyre's argument against relativism see: Wi, pp. 366-69.




relative to the standards of warrant upheld in our particular time and place, in our
particular culture. But in asserting that something is true we are not talking about warrant
or justification, but claiming rather that this is in fact how things are, not from the point
of view of this or that culture, but as such.60
The very nature of this quest for truth, and the reality of such culture-transcending
truth, means that humans are able to transcend their particularity. As Macintyre puts
it:
Just as we are not to be explained as wholly determined by our physical and biological
make-up, so we are not merely products of our cultural environment, but actual or
potential creative shapers of it, precisely insofar as we can evaluate its perspectives in
terms that are nonperspectival, the terms of truth.61
Maclntyre recognises that his account of truth has an ineliminable theological
dimension. He points out that thinkers such as Nietzsche and Derrida, whom he calls
'genealogists', have realised that such an ultimate and final and true account has
hidden within it some view of the relation of contingent beings to some ground
beyond contingent being. Maclntyre states: 'The genealogical accusation is not just
that theism is in part false because it requires the truth of realism, but that realism is
inherently theistic' 62
 Maclntyre considers Thomism to provide sufficient ground for
holding that some ground beyond contingent being does indeed exist and that this
ground must be thought of in terms of Christian theism.63
 Maclntyre states:
The only type of teleologically ordered universe in which we have good reason to believe
is a theistic universe. Hence, moral progress of the plain person towards her or his
ultimate good is always a matter of more than morality. And the enacted narrative of that
progress will only become fully intelligible when it is understood not only in terms of
metaphysics but in an adequate theological light, when, that is, the particularities of that
narrative are understood to embody what is said about sin and about grace in the IalIae of
the Summa as well as what is said about law and the virtues. The moral progress of the
plain person is always the beginnings of a pilgrim's progress.
1.5 The justification for natural law as the necessary condition for moral
relations
Macintyre's line of argument constitutes a justification for natural law based not
on intuition or inherent conscience, but on what constitutes the basis of rational
60 Maclntyre, 'How Can We Learn', p. 187. Cf, WJ, p. 363.
61 Maclntyre, 'How Can We Learn', p. 188.
62 TRy, p. 67. For Maclntyre's discussion of Derrida see: 'First Principles', pp. 178-SO.
For a more extended account by Maclntyre of his argument see: WJ, pp. 349-369; and TRy, PP.
127-148.
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deliberation about moral action and how it is inherently teleological unless negated
by other institutions.65
 Thus Maclntyre states:
When I discover that my life is, as a matter of biological and social fact, partially ordered
by regularities which give expression to these primary tendencies towards particular ends,
I have it in my power to make these ends mine in a new and secondary way by self-
consciously directing my activities to these ends and, insofar as I have rightly understood
my own nature, it will be rational for me to do so. The rules to which I will have to
conform, if I am so to direct my activities, are those expressed by the precepts of the
natural law. What was mere regularity become rule-governedness.
With Aquinas, Maclntyre holds that human beings 'are indeed by our specific
nature directed toward certain hierarchically ordered ends, and it is not in our power
to have ends other than these.'67
 We can decide whether or not to engage in rational
decision making and to direct our actions to those ends or not. However, Maclntyre
warns that the 'virtues of independent rational agency' which enable humans to
transcend their animal nature need for their adequate exercise to be accompanied by
'the virtues of acknowledged dependence'.68
 Thus human flourishing requires a
certain kind of society, one whose common good takes account of human
vulnerability and inter-dependence. Natural law articulates the necessary conditions
for humans to direct their actions toward appropriate ends. Thus Maclntyre states:
'So natural law is discovered not only as one of the primary objects of practical
enquiry but as the presupposition of any effective practical enquiiy.' 69
 As such,
adherence to the natural law is the necessary condition for justice to be secured and
for social relations to be moral.
It is important to realise that Maclntyre is not proposing some form of natural
theology. Even though he seeks to defend the view that 'we have a knowledge of
justice prior to and independently of our knowledge of divine commands,' 7° this does
not entail the claim that: 'Any appeal to a standard of truth or goodness, established
independently of our knowledge of God's revealed Word and will, is and must be an
64	 Persons and Moral Philosophy Rules, Virtues and Goods', in The Maclnlyre Reader, pp. 136-
1S2(p. 152).
65 For a discussion of the deleterious impact of institutions on the ability of persons to reason rightly
see: AV, p. 194.




70 Maclntyre, 'Which God', p. 359.
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appeal to something external to that Word and ilJ.' Rather, the claim is made that
we can know of some basic form of justice prior to knowledge of revelation, and that
such knowledge is the precondition for the reception of revelation, only because this
is how God has so ordered things. Maclntyre states that by progressing beyond our
initial conceptions of justice, by which we evaluate and accept the Divine claims as
just,
we discover, as our analogically and historically ordered concept of justice develops, that
the standards by which we judged God is itself a work of God, and that the judgements
which we made earlier were made in obedience to the divine commands, even although
we did not and could not have recognized this at that earlier stage. God, it turns out,
cannot be truly judged by something external to his Word, but that is because natural
justice recognized by natural reason is itself divinely uttered and authorized.72
Maclntyre warns elsewhere that progression beyond our initial conceptions of
justice is not inevitable. He states: 'Unless, unlike the rich young man, we respond
to God's offer of grace by accepting it, we too shall be unable to fully understand and
to obey the law in such a way as to achieve that ultimate good which gives to such
understanding and obedience its point and purpose.' 73 And such a litilure in turn
leads to a radical loss to and of the self, for it is the loss of that to which we are
ordered. Thus simply discerning and conforming to the natural law makes us neither
free nor fully human. Rather, it is a minimum condition for such freedom and
fullness to be possible, 'but without understanding of and obedience to God's law,
we become selffrustrating beings.'74
1.6	 Maclntyre's second order meta-theory of how different traditions relate
Maclntyre differentiates truth from 'rational justification [which] can only be
internal [
... 1 and relative to [...] each particular standpoint'. 75 Truth, in contrast, is
not relative to a standpoint but is the telos, the final end, of all versions of veritable
enquiry, so that 'progress in enquiry consists in transcending the limitations of such
particular and partial standpoints in a movement toward truth'. 76
 However, this
" Macintyre, 'Which God', p. 366. This point is made in explicit reference to Barth's critique of
attempts to construct such a defence of knowledge ofjustice independent of knowledge of revelation.
Maclntyre, 'Which God', p. 370.
Maclntyre, 'How Can We Learn', p. 190.
' Macintyre, 'How Can We Learn', p. 194.
" Maclntyre, 'Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification', in The Macinlyre Reader, pp. 202-220 (p.
203).
76 Maclntyre, 'Moral Relativism', p. 207.
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position raises the issue of how one tradition may relate to another. Maclntyre
accepts that a neutral account of near universal features of human life can be drawn
up; however, such an account will be equally compatible with far too many rival
bodies of theory to be of any use in adjudicating between thern7 Equally, though,
any account which is rich enough in its identifications and characterizations to be
genuinely relevant to the evaluation of a set of theoretical claims concerning the virtues
will in fact turn out already to presuppose in those identifications and characterizations
some one such theoretical stance regarding the virtues, rather than its rivals.78
Therefore, to use Michael Walzer's term, any genuinely 'thin' theory will be so thin
it would not be of use, and any 'thick' theory is too thick. 79
 This still leaves room for
working out some genuinely rational way of rival traditions engaging with one
another as rival traditions.
To address this issue Maclntyre develops a second order theory. Knight points
out that while this second order theory cannot provide a solution to the problem of
relativism, it can establish that the problem is solvable in principle: a claim already
implicit in Maclntyre's first order theory. As Knight puts it: 'Only a substantive
theory might, according to Macintyre's meta-theoiy of traditions, solve the problem
by demonstrating its superiority over its rivals.' 80
 Maclntyre takes Thomism to be
just such a substantive theory. This still leaves the issue of how Macintyre
understands rival traditions to adjudicate which one best approximates the truth they
seek without recourse to some external criteria.
As noted above, his basic starting point is that all good traditions attempt to
articulate some notion of the truth. Truth here is conceived of in terms of the mind's
correspondence to its object; that is, there is an external reality to be conformed to.
While rival traditions may share a similar structure, or conception of the virtues, or
overlapping modes of practical rationality, or even 'penultimate' ends, they are at
root 'incommensurable'. Maclntyre summarises what he means by describing two or
more traditions as being 'incommensurable' when he states:
Maclntyre, 'Incommensurability, Truth and the Conversation between Con flicians and Aristotelians
about the Virtues', in Culture and Moderniy: East-West Philosophic Perspectives, ed. by Eliot
Deutsch (Honolulu: UniversityofHawaii Press, 1991), pp. 104-122 (p. 105).
Ibid.
Michael Waizer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home andAbroad(Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1994).
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During such a stretch of time it will be the case that those who inhabit each of the two or
more rival schemes of thought and practice embody them in their beliefs, actions,
judgements, and arguments in such a way that it is both the case that the members of the
two or more rival parties can agree, each from their own point of view, that they are
referring to, characterizing, and conducting their inquiries about what is indeed one and
same subject matter, and yet also in their characterizations of and questions about that
subject matter employ, to some large and significant degree, concepts whose applicability
entails the nonapplicability, the vacuousness, of the conceptual scheme or schemes
employed by their rivals. it is not that what is according to the one scheme true is
according to its rival false; it is rather that the standard or standards which determine how
the true-false distinction is to be applied are not the same. And there is, during this
stretch of time at least, no higher standard yet available to judge between these rival
standards.81
In short, when Maclntyre uses the term 'incommensurable' he means that, when two
or more traditions encounter each other at a particular moment in time, there is no
conmon standard of measurement to judge between their respective conceptions for
determining what is rational and moral. What Maclntyre seeks to address is how,
despite their incommensurability, rival traditions might develop a means of
adjudicating between themselves. It is important to realise that Macintyre does not
see incommensurability as either inevitable or a permanent condition. The element
of time is important: conceptual schemes and social practices can change over time
and become compatible due to both internal and external changes.
Macintyre's conception of incommensurability is based on his view that standards
of judgement regarding morality and rationality are internal, and peculiar to, a
particular tradition such that each set of standards excludes the possibility of
application to key predicates of those in another tradition. Furthermore, the use of
predicates in a particular tradition will give expression to distinctive modes of
observation, of seeing and or imagining, as well as of reasoning. Another dimension
of the incommensurability between rival traditions relates to their differing
conceptions of the ultimate good. For it is the vision of the ultimate good held by a
particular tradition that provides that tradition with its overall unity of vision and its
ordering of the virtues. Thus, according to Maclntyre, different visions of the
ultimate good lead to different conceptions of the moral life.
Maclntyre argues that over time rational debate is possible between
incommensurable traditions as long as a certain process is followed and certain
° Knight, 'Introduction', in The Macinlyre Reader, p. 16.
Maclntyre, 'Incommensurability', p. 109-10.
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criteria are met. The first stage is that protagonists from each tradition must learn the
language of their rivals' tradition, enriching their own vocabulary where necessary.
Maclntyre holds that when profound differences between different traditions occur
this does not preclude all mutual understanding. However, understanding is only
possible for those adherents of one tradition who are able to learn the language of the
other as a 'second first language'. 82 By inhabiting both standpoints they will be able
to recognise what is and what is not translatable from one language to the other.
Maclntyre states: 'it is they therefore who will be able to understand what would
have to be involved by way of an extension and enrichment of their own language-
in-use if it were to be able to accommodate a representation of the other.'83
Maclntyre cites the examples of Cicero translating between Greek philosophy and
Latin and the Jesuits translating between Confucianism and European languages as
instances of this process.
	
One tradition undergoes a process of enrichment,
achieving for itself the partial translatability of the other tradition. Partial
translatability makes possible rejection instead of incomprehension. Prior to such
translatability, Maclntyre contends, incomprehension is inevitable, as the foreign
schema is still evaluated solely in terms alien to it. However, translatability, and the
consequent option of rejection, make possible the second stage in the conversation
between rival traditions. The second stage involves each rival giving an account or
history of the other in terms defined by the other, thus demonstrating that it has
properly understood the other within the other's own criteria of evaluation.
Maclntyre states:
Insofar as each of these two incompatible and incommensurable bodies of theory and
practice has passed beyond the initial stage of partial incomprehension and partial
misrepresentation of the other, by so enriching its linguistic and conceptual resources that
it is able to provide an accurate representation of the other, it follows that accurate
representation will be of the other as a historically developing body of theory and
practice, succeeding or failing at each stage, in the light of its own standards, in respect of
the difficulties or problems internal to it.8
Macintyre then asks: 'To what might the construction of such histories lead?' He
answers this question by setting out the third stage in his meta-theory of how
different traditions may negotiate their incommensurability.
*2 Maclntyre, 'Incommensurability', p. 111.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Maclntyre, 'Incommensurability', p. 117.
Ibid.
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The third stage involves each tradition evaluating itseff in the light of its rival and
judging whether its own account of the truth is inferior to that offered by its rivaL
For this to take place Maclntyre believes two conditions must be met. He states:
The first [condition] is that [a tradition's] own history, as narrated in the light of its own
standards, the standard internal to it, should lead in the end to radical and, so far as it is
possible to judge, irremediable failure, perhaps by reason of its sterility and
resourcelessness in the face of some set of problems which its own goals require it to
solve, perhaps because, in trying to frame adequate solutions to its problems and an
adequately comprehensive account of the subject matter with which it deals, it lapses into
irreparable incoherence. [..] And those external to that standpoint, who have
incorporated within their own structures of understanding an accurate representation of
that standpoint and its history, may on occasion be able to recognise such a condition of
failure, even when it has gone unacknowledged by the adherents of the tradition of
inquiry which has failed.87
The second condition which has to be satisfied, in order that adherents of one
tradition may be justified in acknowledging that some alternative, incompatible, and
rival tradition is rationally superior, is as follows. The adherents of this alternative
rival tradition must be able to provide the resources to explain to the other tradition's
adherents why that other tradition failed by its own standard of achievement and,
more precisely, why it succeeded and why it failed at just the points and in just the
ways in which by those same standards it did succeed and fail. Moreover, the
resources for such explanation must not be available in anything like the same
way within the body of theory and practice whose failure is being explained.88
Maclntyre concludes: 'When both of these conditions are satisfied, then it is rational
for the adherents of the tradition of inquiry which has failed to transfer allegiance to
that which has provided the explanation of failure.' 89
 In other words, if these
conditions are met, then adjudication between the rival traditions can take place.9°
For if each has given an account of the other and irresolvable problems are seen in
either of the traditions that the rival can explain, or give a solution to, then it is
rational, according to Maclntyre, for the 'loser', within the terms of reference of their
own tradition, to accept their rival's criteria of evaluation. Thus, as Macintyre puts
Ibid.
Maclntyre, 'Incommensurability', p. 118.
Ibid.
9° In addition, Maclntyre has two necessary conditions for this kind of rational debate between
traditions to be possible. These are that both traditions admit they are fallible, and both admit there is
not some external point of reference. Maclntyre, 'Incommensurability', p. 121.
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it, 'Incommensurability [...] does not after all preclude rational debate and
encounter.'91
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry constitutes Macintyre's most extensive
attempt to follow the process outlined above. 92
 For Maclntyre it is Thomism that is
vindicated above its contemporary rivals. As Maclntyre puts it:
It is [...] precisely because and in so far as Thomist Aristotelianism enables us to achieve
an adequate understanding both of our history and of that of others [...] [that] it
vindicates its claim to have identified the standards by appeal to which all practices and
traditions are to be evaluated.93
In short, Maclntyre thinks incommensurability does not exclude rational debate nor
the eventual resolving of disputes about ethics, and that, when debate between
traditions is entered into, Thomism will be vindicated as the bearer of standards by
which to evaluate the morality of all other traditions.
1.7 Summary
The analysis presented here of Maclntyre's substantive theory clarifies why he
believes the contemporary context of moral discourse differs to ages past and why he
holds that justice is what the strong make it. His substantive theory provides the lens
through which he is able to bring into focus what is wrong with present moral debate
and, as we shall see, it furnishes him with a vision for its remedy.
We first considered how Macintyre understands the contemporary context of
moral debate to be incoherent and the social order to be inherently unjust and
oppressive. His use of the parable about science, and the discussion of taboo rules,
illustrate how Maclntyre thinks moral deliberation has come to be seen as
independent of any particular tradition or social context. Furthermore, in this process
moral deliberation itself has been undermined because morals themselves have come
to be seen as both arbitrary expressions of particular interests, and thus pointless.
The key shift for Macintyre was the loss of teleology from moral deliberation.
Maclntyre has traced the genealogy of this process from the development of
Macintyre, 'Incommensurability', p. 118.
Macintyre gives a further account of this process in the article 'Moral Relativism, Truth and
Justification'.
Alasdair Maclntyre, 'A Partial Response to my Critics', in After Macintyre, pp. 283-304 (p. 300).
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scholasticism to the contemporary 'rhetoric of rights' through analysing various
moral philosophers and the concomitant social embodiments of which these
philosophers are an expression. The result of this process is that justice is what the
strong make it, which means justice is what the bureaucracy of nation-states and the
management of capitalist corporations decide. This situation is exacerbated by the
dominant contemporary discourse about justice (that is, liberalism), because the
claims of liberalism mask its results. The direct results of liberalism are an anomic,
atomised and alienated social order wherein people eagerly seek the goods of
effectiveness - money, status and power - over the goods of excellence.
We then analysed how this critique of the contemporary context of moral
deliberation was founded on Maclntyre's first and second order substantive theories.
Wenotedhowhisflrstordertheoryisbasedonetbicsasguidedbyatraditionwhich
itself is made up of practices and ordered to a particular conception of the good life.
Within this generic framework, Maclntyre understands Thomism to be the best account
yet formulated for determining what really is the good life for humans. We then
examined how Maclntyre, arguing from the Thomist premise that we live in a
'teleologically ordered [...] theistic universe', understands adherence to the natural
law to be the necessary condition for moral relations between humans, whatever their
tradition.
Maclntyre's first order theory of tradition-guided ethics raised the question of
what happens when two traditions come to conificting positions about either a
particular moral issue or their conception of the good life itselfi Are the traditions'
respective positions incommensurable? If they are incommensurable, how might the
traditions resolve their dispute? Macintyre addresses these questions with his second
order meta-theory of how traditions relate. Within our analysis of his meta-theory
we established what Macintyre means by the term 'incommensurable' and saw how
he understood disputes between rival ethical traditions to be capable of resolution by
a particular dialectical process.
We can see that for Maclntyre Christianity has always been incommensurable
with other ethical traditions. However, the contemporary context in which Christians
encounter those outside its tradition is unjust, oppressive, and detrimental to rational
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debate between Christians and non-Christians (via the kind of conversation between
traditions that Macintyre outlines). On the basis of this analysis we can say that
while Christians themselves will often be incoherent to their neighbours, and their
moral positions viewed by non-Christians as mere power plays, according to
Maclntyre it is still possible for Christians to engage with their neighbours in ethical
disputes in a rational way. Furthermore, rational engagement with rival traditions is
not only possible, but attainable if Christians hold to a Thomistic account of ethics.
Maclntyre contends that a Thomistic account of ethics can adjudicate and resolve
disputes with those who follow its two predominant, contemporary rival traditions:
that is, liberals and genealogists.
This account of Maclntyre's work has both clarified the parameters of the
problem we are seeking to address and proposed a way to address this problem. We
shall now assess Maclntyre's account of contemporary moral debate, his conception
of the diflérences between Christians and non-Christians, and his account of how
Christians might resolve disputes with non-Christians. In the first instance we shall
do this by comparing and contrasting his account with that of Germain Grisez.
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Chapter Two
The challenge Germain Grisez poses to Alasdair Macintyre's diagnosis of the
contemporary context and his conception of the incommensurability between
Christian and non-Christian ethical thought and action
2.1	 Introduction
Maclntyre gives an account of Christian ethical thought and action as constitutive
of a tradition that is incommensurable with non-Christian traditions. Furthermore, he
furnishes us with a theory for how incommensurable traditions might enter into
rational conversation. However, his assessment of the contemporary context is that
the kind of rational conversation between traditions he envisages is actively
undermined and opposed by the prevailing modes of moral discourse. If his
diagnosis is correct then it could furnish us with the means to identif' Christian
ethical thought and action in the contemporary context and to understand how
Christians might resolve ethical difièrences with non-Christians. Likewise, if his
diagnosis is wrong, and another set of conditions are understood to prevail, then any
attempt to identify Christian action and analyse relations between Christians and
non-Christians will differ accordingly.
For the purpose of questioning Maclntyre's diagnosis we shall compare and
contrast it with the work of Germain Grisez and (Irisez's understanding of the degree
of difference between Christianity and other traditions. (lrisez holds that while
faithful witness to Jesus Christ, as understood and defined by the magisterium of the
Roman Catholic Church, is the identifying feature of Christian action, Christians and
non-Christians share a self-evident, tradition-free set of criteria for evaluating what is
just and good which enables the resolution of disputes between them. If Grisez's
account is found to be better than Maclntyre's, then Grisez's conception of the
contemporary context, the depth of the differences between Christians and non-
Christians, and the means by which Christians may resolve their disputes with non-
Christians will,, form the conceptual framework from which we can proceed to define
the shape of relations between Christians and non-Christians in the contemporary
context.
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This chapter aims to analyse the manner in which Grisez contests Alasdair
Macintyre's diagnosis of the contemporary context and his conception of the
incommensurability between Christian and non-Christian ethical action. Grisez
contests Maclntyre's claim that Christian and non-Christian moral judgements are
incommensurable and thus also contests Maclntyre's thesis concerning the difficulty
of resolving ethical disputes between incommensurable traditions. Furthermore,
Grisez contests Maclntyre's argument that, even if resolution is eventually possible,
it is severely hampered by the contemporary context which, in Maclntyre's view, is
anomic, atomised and alienated, and as a result severely impedes the process of
resolving disputes rationally between discrete moral traditions. If Grisez's alternative
account of ethics is correct, then the depth of difference between moral traditions is
not as fundamental as Maclntyre believes it to be; hence, resolving ethical disputes
between Christians and non-Christians would be a simpler process than Maclntyre
envisages. The process of resolution would be simpler because, for Grisez, all
traditions, despite great variation of culture, and the problems of sin, share a general,
or universal, ethic based on practical reason. Furthermore, what Maclntyre identifies
as the central problem of contemporary moral discourse (namely, the fragmentation
of particular moral traditions) would cease to be as devastating as Maclntyre takes it
to be.
We shall examine the challenge Grisez poses to Maclntyre first by analysing how
Grisez's account of ethics forms the basis of his very different view to that of
Maclntyre of how to resolve ethical disputes. We shall note that for Grisez ethical
disputes with non-Christians can be resolved on the basis of a shared rationality and
a general ethics. Central to Grisez's position is his view that there is no moral
knowledge that cannot, in principle, be known by non-Christians on the basis of
reason alone. Having analysed this view, we will contrast Grisez's view of practical
rationality and his conception of the role of teleology, virtue and tradition in moral
decision making with Maclntyre's. This will draw out how their accounts are
divergent. This comparison leads us to propose two ways in which (Irisez contests
the work of Maclntyre.
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The first is that Grisez's account of ethics represents a fundamental challenge to
Macintyre's claim that ethical disputes are the result of incommensurability between
rival moral traditions. This challenge is based on Grisez's account of first principles,
practical rationality, and his conception of basic goods. These lead Grisez to
conclude that ethical disputes are to be resolved not in the manner proposed by
Maclntyre, through some dialectic of traditions, but via a general ethics grounded on
practical rationality. The second challenge posed by Grisez's account of ethics is to
Maclntyre's claim that contemporary moral discourse is fundamentally incoherent
and that modern moral traditions (for example, liberalism) lack the internal resources
to heal themselves. While recognising that the contemporary context is becoming
increasingly inhospitable to rational deliberation about morals, Grisez accepts neither
Maclntyre's description of the context as suffering fragmentation nor his critique of
modern, post-Kantian ethics as inherently flawed. This difièrence is based on
Grisez's meta-theory that accepts the proposition that one cannot derive an 'ought'
from an 'is', and his understanding of ethics as an autonomous sphere of human
knowledge undetermined by a prior theoretical or metaphysical account of human
nature. On the basis of these two challenges we address the question of whether we
should abandon Maclntyre and proceed with our analysis using Grisez's account of
the contemporary context and his understanding of ethics.
2.1.1 Continuities and discontinuities between Gnsez and Maclntyre
It is worth stating that Grisez and Maclntyre do share a common project: both
attempt to re-formulate and re-accommodate natural law theory in a modern context.
Their common project is born in part out of a similar sense that the concept of the
natural law, and Aquinas in particular, represents a vital resource for addressing the
dysfunctional character of contemporary moral discourse. Thus, while having a very
different evaluation of, and response to, this context to Maclntyre, Grisez is
sympathetic to Maclntyre's critique of it. Indeed, Grisez is himself a vehement critic
of liberalism, utilitarianism and proportionalisnt' Hanink notes that Grisez's first
formulations of his natural law ethics were as part of his response to changes in
'See Grisez's critique of proportionalism: Germain Grise The Way of the Lord Jesu5: Christian
Moral Principles, 3 vols (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), I, pp. 141-171; hereafter referred
to as CMP.
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legislation regarding abortion that were justified on grounds of individual freedom.2
Grisez rejected the radical individualism the policy presupposed, perceiving it to be a
denial of the human community of trust basic to the bearing and nurture of children.3
He was appalled that human rights, which formed the intellectual foundations of the
policy, could become restricted to the strong and the self-sufficient. Thus, like
Maclntyre, his critique of liberalism fonns part of a deeper concern that justice must
not be what the strong make it. Maclntyre's concern for this was outlined in the last
chapter. Grisez's concern for it is indicated by his theory of the goods. We see in his
theory essentially the same project as Plato's: how to say that the goods of excellence
supersede and define the goods of effectiveness, so that justice is not simply what the
strong make it? Grisez reveals this concern in relation to the contemporary context
when he quotes Centesimus Annus: "It must be observed in this regard that if there is
no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity, then ideas and convictions can
easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy
without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism." 4 As Nigel
Biggar comments: 'Grisez notes - as Alasdair Maclntyre and Charles Taylor have
done before him - that this moral 'relativity' [...] leaves no objective basis for
resolving moral conflicts, makes force the only arbiter, and so undermines social
order.
Grisez's reformulation of natural law has been referred to as the 'new natural law
theory'. Afler his initial engagement with Aquinas, Grisez developed the
philosophical foundations of this new natural law theory in two works: Beyond the
New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion and Free Choice: A Self Referential
Argument.6 His approach to natural law has been further developed by collaborative
2 James Hanink, 'A Theory of Basic Goods: Structure and Hierarchy', The Thomist, 52 (1988), 221-
245 (p. 222). For a thU account of his arguments see Germain Grisez, Abortion: The Myths, the
Real ities, and the Arguments (New York: Corpus Books, 1970).
The same concerns underlie Grisez's critique of nuclear deterrence which seeks to preserve political
community by instnimentalising human life and putting at risk the wider community of the innocent
throughout the world. See John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and Germain Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence,
Morality and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
' Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus: Living a Christian Life, 3 vols (Quincy, Illinois:
Franciscan Press, 1993), 11, p. 348. Hereafter this work will be referred to as LCL.
Nigel Biggar, 'Review of The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 2', Studies in Christian Ethics, 8.1(1995),
105-118 (p. 113). Studies in Christian Ethics will hereafter be referred to as SCE.
6 Gain Grisez, Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1975); and (lennain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, Olaf To1lefen, Free Choice: A Self-
Reftrential Argument (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976).
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work with John Finnis and Joseph Boyle. 7
 Although there are slight differences
between Grisez, Finnis and Boyle, for the purposes of this chapter their views can be
taken as interchangeable. Where their differences are pertinent, they wifi be made
explicit. The parallels between the new natural law theorists and Macintyre are
drawn out by Pauline Westertnann who states (in relation to Finnis and Maclntyre):
Both men, different as they may appear, assume that we should return to the happier
times of Aristotle and Aquinas, in order to bring moral theory to a more inspiring level
than it is nowadays. Both men criticise modernity for its stress on the individual as a
right-holder, and its emphasis on procedures rather than virtues. Both thinkers stress the
importance of the community, in which citizens can participate and in which moral
discourse is guided by a practical orientation on the good life. Both criticise the
distinction between private and public and the modern tendency to relegate morals to the
private domain only.8
However, as Westerman goes on to comment, what distinguishes the new natural law
theorists from Maclntyre is that they explicitly refuse to underpin their approach with
any significant criticism of the essentially modem programme in which reason is
given priority over nature. 9
 This difference is drawn out sharply in the different
approaches (lirisez and Maclntyre have to Aquinas.
Maclntyre has noted that many modem readers of Aquinas tend to read questions
90-97 of the Summa Ia-Iliae, with its discussion of law, in isolation from the rest of
Aquinas's writings. However, Maclntyre argues that the disputes over the meaning
of the principium of the natural law indicate that questions 90-97 are not sell-
interpreting. Rather, Aquinas's discussion of these questions must be read within the
wider context of his work, notably his natural teleology and the development of the
debate between Augustinians and Averroists in questions l89.b0 This observation
by Maclntyre prompts Pavlischek to ask whether Grisez's approach to natural law
enables a genuine congruence of faith and reason which is the hallmark of Catholic
philosophy or 'whether it leads to an emasculation of the theological tradition to fit
7 See especially: Nuclear Deterrence; and John Finnis, Joseph Boyle and Germam Grisez, 'Practical
Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,' American Journal ofJurisprudence, 32(1987), 99-151.
Although Grisez has collaborated with a number ofother writers, including his wife, Jeannette Grisez,
it is Finnis and Boyle with whom he has worked the most.





the philosophy." We shall address this issue later on. Meanwhile, we can note that
Macintyre thinks Grisez approaches Aquinas in an essentially modem way. He
states: 'Germain Grisez interprets the principium in the light of a post-Humean fact-
value distinction.'12
Grisez would not deny this charge by Maclntyre. The 'new' natural law theory
explicitly seeks to take account of modern moral philosophy, and specifically the
proposition that one cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. According to Porter this
contradicts what Aquinas believed. Porter states: 'For [Aquinas], there is no final
distinction between what an agent ought (morally) to do and what is in that agent's
true self-interest." 3
 Hence, according to Porter, moral claims have a motivational
force for Aquinas because they are in the agent's self-interest: that is, what they
ought to do relates to what they are in reality. Porter goes on to say: 'Anyone who
understands that his own true good lies in acting in accordance with these claims
[about what he is] will necessarily be motivated to act upon them. Of course
someone who does not understand that will not be so motivated." 4
 What Porter
articulates as Aquinas's perspective is exactly the position Macintyre has come to
adopt. In Maclntyre's analysis: 'Evaluative judgements are a species of flictual
judgement." 5
 This is the opposite of the view taken by (Irisez, who, following
Hume, does not see a direct relationship between what someone is and what they
ought to do.' 6
 This contrast between Maclntyre and Grisez in relation to the 'post-
Humean fiwt-value distinction' will be assessed at greater length below.
While some, like John Haldane, question whether Maclntyre is a true Thomist, he
is closer to Aquinas than Grisez with regard to the relationship between metaphysics
"Keith Pavlischek, 'Questioning the New Natural Law Theory: The Case of Religious Liberty as
Defended by Robert George in Making Men Moral', SCE, 12.2 (1999), 17-30 (p. 29).
12 TRy, pp. 133-34
' Recovery of Virtue, p. 47. She interprets Aquinas as saying: 'If anyone perceives that a particular
course of action is necessary to her attainment of happiness, she is rationally committed to following
that course of action, and correlatively, to the degree that her actions are fully rational, they will admit
of explanation in terms of her beliel about happiness.' See also Ralph Mclnerny, 'Ethics', in The
Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. by N. Kretzmann and E. Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1993), pp. 196-2 16 (pp. 200-202).
" Recovery of Virtue, p. 48.
' 5 TRV,p. 134.
'6 Gain Grise 'First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae 1-
2, Question 94, Article 2', Natural Law Forwn, 10(1965), 168-201 (pp. 194-195).
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and practical rationality.' 7 Grisez would probably agree. However, the nature of the
relationship between metaphysics and practical rationality does raise a central point
of contention between Grisez and Macintyre, one which we will analyse in this
chapter: that is, in contrast to Maclntyre, does Grisez's approach to natural law, and
his essentially modern account of moral decision making, provide both a better way
to address the question of whether Christians and non-Christians can resolve ethical
disputes (and if so how can this be done), and a better account of how Christians
might respond to the dysfunctional nature of contemporary moral discourse?
2.2	 Grisez's account of ethics forms the basis of his very different view from
that of Maclntyre of how to resolve ethical disputes
We shall now summarise Grisez's substantive theory of moral philosophy in order
to understand why his work represents an alternative to the account of resolving
ethical disputes and the diagnosis of the contemporary context given by Maclntyre.
For Grisez, our capacity for reflective freedom is part of our bearing God's image
and is central to our ability to realise the whole range of basic goods open to us. These
basic goods are divided into two kinds. There are substantive goods: these are prior to
and apart from our choices. There are also reflexive goods that can be instantiated only
in and through the choices by which one acts towards their attainment. Choice enters
into their very definition; they cannot be realised or participated in except by choosing
to realise or participate in them.' 8 This leads to (hisez's axiology: our natural
inclinations point us to these goods and each of these goods is a dimension of what it
means to be human so that each of these basic goods is a constituent of human
flourishing or integral flillilment. This fulfilment is our telos so that we do not aim
merely to fulfil certain roles or skills but to develop a kind of human excellence. It is
reason that directs our free responses to the basic goods, enabling us to pursue them in a
creative way. But we are limited in our ability to pursue and fulfil these goods.
At this point Grisez claims that these goods are incommensurable: there is no
common measure enabling us to say that one good is more valuable than another, and
one cannot replace one good for another. For example, the good of friendship cannot
' John Haldane, 'Maclntyre's Thomist Revival: What Next?', in After Maclnlyre, pp. 9 1-107.
CMP, p. 124.
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be compared with the good of religion, and if one loses one's faith, friendship may
compensate for the loss, but it cannot replace or act in religion's stead. But how are we
to proceed, given the existence of a plurality of incommensurable and nonflingible
goods? For (Irisez, the moral course is to remain open to all of the goods and co-
operate with others so that the community, if not the individual, can realise the fullest
range of goods. It is this that constitutes the conmxn good. This gives rise to (irisez's
first principle of morality, which he formulates as follows:
In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to
choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible
with a will toward integral human fulfillment.'9
This first principle is natural not because it is deduced from some prior theoretical or
metaphysical account of human nature, but rather because precisely by one's originally
practical understanding of these aspects of human flourishing and fulfilment one comes
both to realise (make actual in practice) and reflectively and theoretically to understand
the nature of the sort of being (the human person) who is fliuilled through seeking these
basic goods.2°
On the basis of this brief summary (which will be elucidated over the course of
this chapter) we can see why (Irisez does not accept that different moral traditions
are incommensurable. For Grisez, practical rationality provides a tradition-free and
universal means of settling ethical disputes between different traditions. Indeed,
Grisez's understanding of ethics forms the basis of his view that we can, as
Christians, resolve ethical disputes with non-Christians on the basis of a shared
rationality and a general ethics. What is especially significant for resolving ethical
disputes is that, for Grisez, there is no substantive body of Christian knowledge.
2.2.1 On whether Grisez envisages there to be substantive differences between
the moral knowledge of Christians and non-Christians
' CMP, p. 184.
20 For a pithy summary of Grisez's position see James Hanink, 'On Germain Grisez: Can Christian
Ethics Give Answers?,' in Theological Voices in Medical Ethics, ed. by Allen Verhey and Stephen
Lainmers (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 157-177. CI, Rufus Black, 'Introduction: The New
Natural Law Theory', in The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical
Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School, ed. Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black (Aidershot: Ashgate, 2000),
pp. 1-25.
-68-
For Grisez, there are no substantive differences between the moral knowledge of
Christians and non-Christians; thus, according to Grisez, Christians and non-
Christians can resolve ethical disputes on the basis of practical reason. Grisez holds
that the Christian faith deepens both the epistemic and axiological level of his
account of practical rationality. Thus, Scripture underscores and clarifies what
reason can discern and our covenant relationship with God sets the basic goods
within a broader and deeper context. For example, from the perspective of unaided
reason alone, friendship, and its distinctive expression in marriage (sexual
community), are great goods. Understood in the light of Scripture, however, their
significance as part of integral human fuffilment is intensified for they point to our
friendship with God. 2 ' As regards concrete moral judgements the Christian can
arrive at decisions of conscience different to those dictated by reason alone, but not
contradictoiy to reason.. For example, to respond to deadly aggression non-violently
instead of reacting in self-defence (which entails the use of violent force) is to go
beyond the dictates of reason alone. Only a deepened understanding of the nature of
reality could make a more demanding principle appear reasonable or purposeful.
(irisez envisages the Christian virtues of faith, hope and charity to bring this
deepened understanding. He states:
The modes of responsibility [are] transformed by faith (which tells us how to live a good
life in a fallen world), by hope (which supplies the confidence in God required to make
the effort), and by charity (which gives one the power to really live in this way).22
Therefore, Grisez believes there is such a thing as Christian ethics; however, it is
only formally and not substantively different from an ethic derived from right reason.
This is because, as 11w as he is concerned, revelation brings no new moral knowledge.
Grisez states: 'The teachings of thith neither conflict with any of the general
principles of morality nor add principles to them. Yet faith does generate specific
norms proper to Christian life.' 23
 (Irisez elucidates further:
In taking the actual human condition into account, divine revelation proposes specific
norms, which can be derived from the general norms of human morality, yet are
unknowable without the light of faith. Christian norms add to common moral
requirements from within, by specifying them, not from without by imposing some
21 For an extensive disciission of this in relation to marriage see Germain Grisez, 'The Christian
Family as Fulfilment of Sacramental Marriage', SCE, 9.1 (1996), 23-33.
22 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ: A Summary of Christian Moral Principles
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1991), pp. 304-05.
CMP, p. 607.
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extrahuman demand upon human acts. Rather than ignoring or violating the general
requirements of human morality, one who lives by Christian faith fulfils them.24
Grisez's position is clarified by Oliver O'Donovan's analysis of the work of John
Finnis. O'Donovan notes that Finnis, and also, we contend, Grisez, do have a
'Christian' ethics, but not a theological ethics. For Grisez and Finnis, there are no
distinctive moral inferences to be made from the evangelical proclamation; that is,
there are no Christian first principles to supplant the first principles of natural law.
Rather, the Christian sees the world and its potentialities more accurately because
through the revelation of Jesus Christ the world acquires an enhanced intelligibility.
O'Donovan states:
There is no evangelical content to [their] moral reasoning. The difference between Finnis
and myself, then, seems to amount to this: while I believe that a distinct behaviour is
demanded by the resurrection of Jesus, he believes that the same behaviour is demanded
which was demanded anyway, but that the demand is clearer and more cogently
perceived.25
Truly to fuffil morality requires Christian faith, but there is nothing new to such
fulfilment. Therefore, there is no moral knowledge that is in principle unknowable
by non-Christians. Hence, within Grisez's system, moral disputes can, in theory, be
resolved by practical reason without recourse to revelation (although in practice this
may be required). Furthermore, for Grisez, while there is Christian action (derived
from the moral law further specified by revelation) this action cannot, in any
substantive way, be said to be unique or distinctive to moral knowledge available
apart from revelation. The implications of this view in relation to how (irisez
conceives the depth of difference between Christians and non-Christians on moral
questions are manifold. We shall assess these implications by comparing and
contrasting Maclntyre and (]risez.
2.3	 Grisez and Macintyre compared and contrasted
Grisez's account of ethics contrasts directly with Maclntyre because for (irisez
practical rationality is universal and not situated within a tradition. In other words,
Grisez rejects Maclntyre's view that all knowledge is tradition-guided, and has a
very different conception of practical rationality and truth. It is important to untangle
24 CMP, p. 608.
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this cluster of key differences between Maclntyre and Grisez. We shall do this by
first clarifring exactly what (hisez's position is, and then comparing and contrasting
his position with Maclntyre's.
In summary, for Grisez, moral knowledge is not based on theoretical knowledge,
but practical knowledge. In contrast to Maclntyre, (irisez believes morality is not
derived from some prior reality, discerned by theoretical knowledge. Rather, Grisez
posits a universal and self-evident practical rationality through which morality is
discerned. Unlike theoretical or metaphysical knowledge that is necessarily arrived
at through a particular tradition, any reasonable person anywhere can arrive at
practical knowledge. Thus knowledge of morality is not necessarily situated within a
particular tradition. We shall now examine Grisez's explanation of his position in
order to understand how and why his account of ethics is radically divergent from
Maclntyre's.
2.3.1 An analysis of Grisez's account of the foundation and nature of ethics
Central to Grisez's moral theory is the distinction between first principles of
practical reasoning and the first principles of morality. According to Grisez practical
reasoning has two stages. The first is concerned with what might be done, the
second with what ought to be done.26 Everyone, whether moral or not, uses the
principles of the first stage of practical reasoning in considering what they might do.
Following Aquinas, Grisez identifies as the first principle of practical reason that 'the
good is to be done and pursued: the bad is to be avoided' •27 This principle directs
action and does not distinguish between moral good and evil: 'good' here refers to
what is intelligibly worthwhile, while 'bad' refers to whatever is considered to be a
privation of inteffigible goods. 28
 Thus for Grisez, there is an intrinsic relationship




28 CMP, pp. 178-79.
29 CMP,p. 180.
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2.3.1.i The first principles of practical reason
This first principle of practical reasoning is specified by identi1iing the basic
forms of human flourishing which are the goods that are to be pursued and done.
Unlike Aquinas, Grisez argues that we can identi1' a specific list of goods: for
Grisez, there are eight. 3° These basic goods, having been grasped by practical
reason, serve as the principles of practical reasoning; that is, they provide the
framework for thinking about what to do. Grisez states: 'One way the basic goods
function as principles of actions is through being known as ultimate rational grounds
(principles of practical reason) for proposing actions to be done for certain benefits
(anticipated instantiations of those goods).' 3 ' He goes on to say that these goods are
self-evident; that is, 'these truths are known (nota) without any middle term (per se),
by understanding what is signified by their terms.' 32 Thus, for Grisez, knowledge of
the basic goods that give substantive content to the principles of practical reason is
underived and therefore sell-evident (although this is not to say they are innate, in the
sense of being known prior to all experience). As Robert George summarises it:
'Qua basic, such goods, and reason for acting they provide, cannot be deduced from
still more fundamental practical principles or from theoretical truths [...]. They are,
rather, underived, and, in that sense, "self-evident".'33
2.3.1.ii The distinction between theoretical and practical reason
At this point it is important to make a clear distinction between theoretical and
practical reason. Theoretical reason is used to pursue knowledge about reality. It
seeks to establish the truth of a proposition by testing the conformity of the content
of that proposition with some prior reality, actual or possible. 3 ' Operating using both
deductive and inductive forms of reasoning, it produces theoretical or speculative
knowledge. Examples of such knowledge include history, biology and theology.
Such knowledge is distinguished from practical knowledge by being founded on
prior realities. Grisez states: 'In coming to know theoretically, one comes into
30 These basic goods do differ between different 'new natural law theorists'. For example, cf., John
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 85-92.
Grisez, 'Practical Principles', p. 106.
32 Ibid.
Robert George, 'Natural Law and International Order', in Catholicism, Liberalism and
Communilarianism: The Catholic Intellectual Tradition and the Moral Foundations of Democracy,
ed. by Gerard Bradley and others (London: Rowan & Littlefield, 1995), pp. 133-149 (p. 136).
' Grisez, 'Practical Principles', p. 115.
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accord with prior reality. But in coming to know practically, one becomes able to
bring something into reality. It follows that practical knowledge cannot have its truth
by conformity to what is know.: Hence, practical reason is concerned with
bringing realities into being. In using practical reason to make a decision, a person
seeks to act on the basis of a possible future reality rather than an existent prior
reality. Thus, practical reasoning is used when concerned with moral questions, for
example, 'Should I have an abortion or not?'. The answers to such questions will be
knowledge that was not and cannot have been known prior to asking them.
Therefore, the function of practical reason is to enable people to make inteffigent
choices about how to pursue human fulfilment. Thus, it is through practical reason
that Grisez comes to the first principle of morality. The first principle of morality
might best be formulated as follows: in voluntarily acting for human goods and
avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and
only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral
human fulfilment. 36 Note that this conceives human goods not simply as diverse
fields for possible action, but as comprising the totality of integral human fulfilment.
This avoids subordinating moral reflection to specific objectives; instead, the upright
person is to remain open to goods that go beyond his or her present capacity for
realising them in action.
The self-evidence of the principles of practical knowledge does not preclude their
being rationally defended. (irisez sees such a defence as dialectical and necessarily
theoretical. He notes that: 'Theoretical reflection deepens understanding of the basic
goods.' 37 He gives the example of the need for knowledge of biology in order to
promote health. Grisez goes on to outline three dialectical arguments that can be
used to defend practical principles. These are: firstly, insights won from empirical
studies, the data of which supports the list of basic goods as basic; secondly, the very
possibility of anthropology which would be inexplicable unless there were common
starting points of cultural development; and thirdly, that rejecting the first principles
of practical reason is theoretically indefensible. 38 However, none of these
compromises the separation between theoretical and practical reason. Nor do they
Grisez, 'Practical Principles', pp. 115-16.
36 CMP,p. 194.
Grisez, 'Practical Principles', p. 111.
38 Grisez, 'Practical Principles', p. 113.
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suggest any need for an account of how traditions with different theoretical
knowledge might have incommensurable conceptions of ethics. Rather, we can
conclude from this discussion of Grisez's account of first principles, practical
rationality and basic goods, that for Grisez, ethical disputes are to be resolved not
through some dialectic of traditions, as Maclntyre contends, but via a general ethics
grounded on a universal practical rationality.
2.3.1.iii Grisez's conception of practical truth
(irisez summarises his conception of practical truth thus:
What human persons can be through their freedom and action depends on practical
knowledge rather than vice versa, and so the adequation which is the truth of practical
knowledge is not conformity to some already existing order. The adequation of practical
knowing is not that of theoretical knowing, namely, conformity of knowledge to known.
But neither is it a merely formal truth involving a "conformity to its own structures" or
something of that sort. The truth (that is, the adequation) of practical knowledge is the
conformity of what is to be through knowing to the knowledge which will help to bring it
about.39
Therefore, moral truth for (Irisez is a kind of practical truth. As he phrases it: 'The
truth of practical knowledge with respect to its first principles is their adequation to
possible human fulfilment considered precisely insofar as that fulfilment can be
realized through human action.' 40
 That which is practically true seeks that which
leads to integral human fuffilment, whereas that which is false is specified by its
incompleteness; that is, it lacks adequacy to possible human fulfilment.4t For
example, the statement 'One must look after number one' is false because it lacks
adequacy to the necessity of community in human fulfilment. In short, practical
knowledge, which is universal and self-evident, is the means of discerning moral
truth.
2.3.1.iv The basic goods
The self-evidence of practical knowledge as the foundation for moral action is
established by it being based on non-inferential acts of understanding in which we
grasp possible ends or purposes as worthwhile for their own sake. it is basic goods,
known by way of practical reason, rather than theoretical observation, that form the
Grisez, 'Practical Principles', p. 117.
4°Grisez, 'Practical Principles', p. 125.
41 CMP,p. 117.
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reasons for acting. In acting on the first principle of practical reason we can identilr
the eight basic goods that enable us to seek integral human fulflhnent. As noted
above, Grisez divides these basic goods into two groups. The first is substantive
goods that provide independent grounds for our choices, but which are not
themselves defined or made intelligible by our choices. These substantive goods are
life, knowledge and the appreciation of beauty, and excellence in work or play.42
Reflexive or 'existential' or 'moral' goods are both reasons for choosing and are in
part defined in terms of choosing. These goods are: self-integration (or harmony
between all the parts of a person which can be engaged in freely chosen action),
practical reasonableness or authenticity, justice and friendship or interpersonal
harmony, and religion or harmony with God or the gods, or some non-theistic but
more than-human-source of meaning and value. 43
 And in Living a Christian Life
Grisez adds marriage to this list of reflexive basic goods. These two kinds of basic
goods are intrinsically related. (]risez conceives of the substantive goods as 'the
"stuff' of a morally good life' 45 ; that is, substantive goods are the vehicles for
reflexive goods.
These basic goods are that which define the nature and parameters of human
flourishing or fulfilment. It is in this sense that they are part of human nature. For as
Grisez understands it, the basic goods are neither a mere contingent fact about
psychology nor an accident of history. Rather, 'being aspects of the fulfilment of
persons, these goods correspond to the inherent complexities of human nature.' It
is thus on the strength of his account of basic goods that Grisez claims to be giving a
natural law account of morality.
2.3.1.v The natural law
Grisez's conception of natural law is summarised by Joseph Boyle. Boyle states
that natural law refers to 'a set of universal prescriptions whose prescriptive force is a
function of the rationality which all human beings share in virtue of their common
humanity.' He goes on to say that:




Grisez, 'Practical Principles', p. 107.
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The basic principles and norms of the natural law, as natural, are addressed to all human
beings, and they are held to be accessible to all who are capable of forming the concepts
which comprise them. Furthermore, the foundations of moral life and judgement are in the
moral law, and moral laws are propositional realities, 'dictates of reason'.47
This concurs with the view Grisez sets out in Beyond the New Theism where he argues
for a form of rationality that believers and non-believers share, which is independent of
religious belief and which can be used to judge whether religious beief are rationally
defensible.48 In other words, (Irisez is committed to an idea of a shared, common,
neutral philosophical rationality to which appeal can be made on disputes about
morality that is independent of faith commitments for its autbority.
As noted earlier, while Grisez does have a Christian ethic, he maintains that this
ethic has no distinctive content. Black argues that Grisez should abandon this claim
that Christian faith brings no new moral principles. 49 Black contends that all the
modes of responsibility, when they arise from a Christian understanding of reality, will
be new moral principles. They will be new moral principles because the acceptance of
Christian faith radically changes the nature of one's understanding to such an extent as
to bring radical changes to what is thought to be practically reasonable. 5° Black states:
'Correspondingly, it also appears that all the modes of Christian response insofar as
they arise from a Christian understanding of reality will likewise be 'new' moral
principles.' 51 However, Black's argument, making the case for the possibility of new
moral principles within Grisez's framework, is questionable. While Grisez's
framework may well be strengthened by changing it along the lines Black sets out,
Grisez's existing position is that there is no materially distinct Christian moral
knowledge. Black himself notes that more often than not in Grisez's work, Christian
modes become peripheral rather than central. 52 Black highlights Grisez's discussion of
abortion and just war to point out how Grisez recognises distinctly Christian insights
47 Joseph Boyle, 'Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions', in Natural Law Theory. Contemporary
Essays, ed. by Robert P. George (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 3-30 (p. 4).
48 For a full discussion of Grisez's arguments about the proof of the existence of God and his
epistemological methodology see John Ross Berkman, 'The Politics of Moral Theology Historicizing
Neo-Thomist Moral Theology, With Special Reference to the Work of Germain Grisez' (PhD, Duke
University, 1994), pp. 194-209.
Black, 'Is the New Natural Law Theoiy Christian?', in The Revival of Natural Law, pp. 148-63 (p.
157).
50 Black, 'Is the New Natural Law Theory Christian?', pp. 152-53.
Black, 'Is the New Natural Law Theory Christian?', p. 156.
52 BIk, 'Towards an Ecumenical Ethics', p. 45.
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about these issues, yet never includes them in his discussion. 53 He thus calls for Grisez
to recognise explicitly the episiemological distinctness of a Christian ethic so that
analysis of issues like abortion might take account of specifically Christian insights.54
However, what Black fails to perceive is that Grisez's own method rules out such an
approach. (Irisez is logically committed to the view that the ethical judgments of
Christians cannot be distinct epistemologically from judgments that never consider
Christian revelation.
We can conclude from this analysis of Grisez's account of ethics that he denies any
significant incommensurability of moral judgement between Christians and non-
Christians. We shall now assess how this diverges from Maclntyre's position. This
assessment is achieved through comparing and contrasting the two writers' respective
conceptions of coming to know moral truth: firstly, in relation to the role tradition and
community play in this; and secondly, in relation to the role of practices and virtues in
moral decision making.
2.3.2 Different conceptions of the role of tradition
While Grisez does accept a limited role for tradition in acquiring knowledge of
morality, unlike Macintyre he does not accept that tradition in any way authorises
moral knowledge. There are various kinds of tradition-dependence that Grisez's
natural law theory accepts. Joseph Boyle points to two. The first is that all
intellectual effort depends on cultural contingencies and particularities: for example,
language. Any body of knowledge is dependent, in a variety of ways, upon its
cultural inheritance. Boyle recognises that while natural law theorists have not
developed an account of this, they need not deny it. He states: 'The apparently
undeniable dependence of all enquiry on language and on other cultural features is
consistent with what natural law theorists are required by their own views to believe
about their own theorizing.' 55 However, a universal prescription cannot be impugned
just because an individual moralist in a particular culture foimulates it. Contingency
of enquiry and language does not necessarily prohibit universal applicability. 56 This
Ibid. See also, Black, 'Is the New Natural Law Theory Christian?', p. 157.
54 Back, 'Towards an Ecumenical Ethics', p. 46.
B'le, 'Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions', p. 7.
56 Boyle, 'Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions', p. 6.
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allows there to be some overlap with Maclntyre's insistence on rationality involving
a degree of historicity and communal practice. However, Maclntyre has a much
more convincing account of the problem of translatability and the inherent
incommensurability of different moral traditions.
There is a second form of tradition-dependence that Boyle accepts applies to new
natural law theory. He states that new natural law theorists recognise themselves 'to
be developing a body of thought which prior thinkers have originated and developed
but left incomplete, at least as far as its application to the problems and challenges,
both internal and external, which the theory must deal with at any given time [is
concernedj.' 57 Boyle again admits that there has been a lack of self-consciousness
about this aspect of natural law that has tended to stifle the development of its
internal resources in order to address external challenges. 58 Again, there is overlap
with Maclntyre's conception of tradition as a form of open-ended enquiry that must
be developed through dialectical engagement with internal and external problems.
We can thus see two ways in which Grisez would accept that tradition plays a part in
reasoning rightly about morality.
There is a third form of tradition dependence which Grisez rejects. It is the view
that ethical enquiry must be rooted in the lived experience of people who share a
common way of life and its goods and live them out within a community which
embodies these shared values as part of an on-going moral tradition. 59
 While Grisez
does envisage a positive role for community, it is a very limited one. He follows
Aristotle in understanding humans to be naturally social animals. We become self-
conscious and establish our individuality only within interpersonal relationships so
that integral human fulfilment requires community. Grisez asserts: 'This natural
vocation to community belongs to human persons as made in God's image, it
foreshadows the revelation of their likeness in communion to the Trinity, and is the
natural foundation for their calling to enter into communion with the divine
family.'6° Hence Grisez is far from being atomistic in his understanding of sociality.
Like Maclntyre, he conceives of the moral life as a quest that requires help and
Boyle, 'Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions', p. 7.
Boyle, 'Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions', p. 8.
Boyle, 'Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions', p. 9.
60 LCL, p. 333.
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advice from others.6 ' The issue for Grisez is that making moral decisions is neither
dependent upon nor sanctioned by community and its fruit - character, practices, and
virtue. He states:
No culture [or community] has standards of morality superior to the principles and nonns
human beings naturally know - principles and norms reaffirmed and further specified by
God's revelation, which is handed on by the Church's belief and teaching.62
So community and tradition do have a role but knowing what one ought to do is not
dependent on them. Grisez's criticism of Maclntyre is that the latter has no way of
countering a phenomenon like slavery, because there is nothing extrinsic to a
particular tradition by which to evaluate its practice. He states: 'I do not think
[Maclntyre's] proposed shift in priorities will help much. Character and community
are simply the fleshed-out living wholes whose form comes from principles and whose
existence comes from choice.' 63 Grisez goes on to criticize Maclntyre for introducing
a more subtle form of legalism by confusing given social requirements with the moral
truth.0
 We see here a critical difference made explicit. As Boyle puts it:
The [new] natural law account of moral life and thinking includes a set of views according to
which much of moral thought is ni essentially dependent upon the lived values of a moral
community. [...} For a key [new] natural law claim is that these principles are known or at
least knowable by anyone independent of whether one is part of a vital moral community.65
Therefore, while tradition might condition specific moral norms, these norms are
intelligible naturally, and do not of necessity require either community or traditionf'
By contrast, coming to think truthfully about morality for Macintyre is dependent upon
participating in a particular tradition and community that is ordered to a particular
conception of the common good.
This discussion of the place of tradition in Grisez's work demonstrates again that
Grisez does not see that there is a problem of incommensurability between rival
traditions which have different conception of the ultimate good. Indeed, for Grisez,
61 LCL, p. 249. This is implicit in the whole raison d'être behind his four volume opus.
62 LCL, p. 258.
63 Germain Grisez, 'Review of "Revisions; Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy." Ed. by
Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair Macintyre', Theological Studies, 45 (1984), 579-581 (p. 580).
Whether this is a valid criticism of Macintyre is another matter.
'4 Grisez, 'Review of "Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy.", pp. 580-81.
65 Boyle, 'Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions', p. 11.
See Black, 'Introduction: The New Natural Law Theoiy', p. 10.
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Christianity and other traditions share a self-evident practical rationality that enables
them to share common moral frameworks. This difference between Maclntyre and
Grisez comes to the fore in their different conceptions of virtue.
2.3.3 Different conceptions of the role of practices and virtues in Maclntyre and
Grisez
For Maclntyre there is an intrinsic relation between the ability to make right moral
choices and one's virtue. In Maclntyre's view one must become a particular kind of
person in order to make particular kinds of decisions that are counted as moral by
one's community. Furthermore, 'it is only through the acquisition and exercise of
the virtues that individuals and communities can flourish in a specifically human
mode.'67 By contrast, while (lrisez counts virtues as an essential part of the moral life
their cognitive function is strictly limited and subordinated to the modes of
responsibility and the prior exercise of choice.
For Grisez the exercise of choice lies prior to the cultivation of virtue. This is not,
however, immediately apparent. (iIrisez states that: 'Virtues are character traits, which
organise the various aspects of the complex human personality. The ordering of these
aspects establishes some form of harmony among feeling, judgement, choice,
performance.'68
 As Black notes, virtue in Grisez's account can be described as a
disposition which orders an aspect of a person's choosing so that all the elements which
are involved in that choosing - intentions, emotions, beliefl and actions - are
consistently in harmony with one another and with a person's prior moral
commitments.69
 The issue then is, what is the relationship between virtue and prior
moral commitments? Do one's prior commitments and choices determine what counts
as a virtue or is virtue intrinsic to what constitutes good choice? For Grisez
commitments establish an individual's identity
Human persons are historical beings who day by day build themselves up by their free
choices. One shapes one's own life, one determines one's self, by one's free choices. To
be responsible ultimately means to be a self one cannot blame on heredity, environment, or
anything other than one's own free choices.7°
67 DRA,p. 112.
68 Grisez, 'Practical Principles', p. 129.
69 Black, 'Towards an Ecumenical Ethic', p. 54.
CMP, p. 42.
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He then relates virtue and choice: 'A personality is formed by choices which are in
accord with the first principle of morality and the modes of responsibility, the virtues
embody the modes.' 7 ' Virtues embody the modes that pre-exist them, with these modes
of responsibility predetermining what will count as a virtue. Thus virtues are known
through choices, with the modes of responsibility directing people towards a virtuous
character. Black, who significantly extends and develops (Irisez's account of the
relationship between choice and virtue, surmises that: 'In [Grisez's] approach, virtue is
cultivated by consistently choosing to pursue the good and then, where necessaiy,
seeking to integrate into the process of choosing and pursuing the good emotions which
are appropriate to the good being sought.' 72 Through such a process the individual
arrives at the virtuous life by way of distinct choices.
Grisez's view is the reverse of the position held by Maclntyre, for whom the
cultivation of certain virtues enables good choices to be made and not vice versa. As
Maclntyre puts it:
Without developing some range of intellectual and moral virtues we cannot first achieve and
then continue in the exercise of practical reasoning; and without having developed some
range of those same virtues we cannot adequately care for and educate others so that they
first achieve and are then sustained in the exercise of practical reasoning.73
As noted previously, Maclntyre's criteria for being moral, or acting well, are
defined by the kind of practice in which we are engaged, not by the decision or
preference of the individual. This conception of morality gives a central place to the
virtues (which are the goods internal to the practice) rather than to general rules or
abstract principles. Maclntyre insists that morality should be construed primarily in
terms of a life embodying the virtues (as opposed to the virtues embodying a set of
moral norms as in Grisez); and our understanding of what the virtues are, and why they
are virtues, is crucially dependent on coming to recognise their place in the practices
(not the principles or modes of responsibility) which define them. Unlike (Irisez,
Maclntyre understands there to be a necessazy connection between virtue and seeking
the good life. Furthermore, in contrast to Grisez, the virtues for Maclntyre are central
71 CMP,p. 192.
72 Black, 'Towards an Ecumenical Ethic', p. 62.
DRA, p. 97.
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to the formation of personal identity and the veiy pattern and shape of life together in
society.
The difference between Grisez and Maclntyre in relation to virtue raises the
question, for Grisez, of how the basic goods relate to the practices of a community.
As noted above, Grisez conceives of the basic goods as being self-evident and
existing prior to and independent of any given tradition. This essentially
disembodied view of goods contrasts with Maclntyre, for whom the goods are
internal to practices, and practices constitute the embodied goods of a given tradition.
For Maclntyre, goods such as marriage and health may be universal, but they are not
universally accessible. They can only be acquired through being practised within a
particular tradition's conception and embodiment of what marriage or health in fact
consists of.
This comparison of how Grisez and Maclntyre treat the role of tradition, virtue
and goods in moral decision making emphasises that their accounts of ethics are
fundamentally divergent. While they both agree that ethical disputes between
Christians and non-Christians are capable of resolution, Maclntyre considers such
resolution to be hard won, whereas Grisez considers it to be relatively unproblematic
given that both Christians and non-Christians share a practical rationality. There is
no synthesis possible: rather, we are faced with a choice between following Grisez's
or Maclntyre's account of what might be an appropriate response to resolving ethical
disputes between Christians and non-Christians. If Grisez is right, the problem of
incommensurabilty highlighted by Maclntyre is not so great; for Grisez, there is
sufficient common ground between Christians and non-Christians for them to resolve
ethical disputes by recourse to evaluations grounded on practical reason. Indeed, the
differences between Grisez and Maclntyre lead us to posit two challenges that (irisez
presents to Maclntyre's work. First, Grisez's account of ethics represents a
fundamental challenge to Maclntyre's claim that ethical disputes are the result of
incommensurability between rival moral traditions. Second, Grisez's account
challenges Maclntyre's claim that contemporary moral discourse is fundamentally
incoherent and that modern moral traditions (for example, liberalism), Jack the
internal resources to heal themselves.
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2.4 How Grisez challenges both Maclntyre's conception of
incommensurability and his diagnosis of the contemporary context
2.4.1 Grisez's challenge to Maclntyre's account of incommensurability
Grisez's account of ethics represents a fundamental challenge to Maclntyre's
claim that interminable ethical disputes are the result of incommensurability between
rival moral traditions. This challenge is based on Grisez's account of first principles
and practical rationality, and his conception of basic goods as self-evident. Together,
these constitute an account of a tradition-free, general ethics through which ethical
disputes can be resolved which arise between people of different cultures, languages
and traditions.74
 Thus, Grisez's approach dispenses with any need to formulate a
process by which different traditions might first understand each other and then
resolve disputes. In short, questions of incommensurability between diflèrent
traditions do not arise for Grisez. We can see why, from our earlier, extensive
discussion of Grisez's account of ethics. On the basis of this analysis of Grisez's
account of first principles, practical rationality and basic goods, we can conclude that
for Grisez, ethical disputes are to be resolved not through some dialectic of
traditions, as Maclntyre contends, but via a general ethics grounded on a universal
practical rationality.
2.4.2 Grisez challenges Maclntyre's claim that contemporary moral discourse is
fundamentally incoherent and that modern moral traditions lack the
internal resources to heal themselves
Grisez is acutely aware that rational thought about morality and 'living a Christian
life' is beset by numerous problems in contemporary Western society and that these
problems are distinct to the modern era. In addition, he recognises that Christians
live surrounded by a secular culture in which the whole idea of Revelation and a way
of life based upon it is dismissed out of hand, and that believers have no 'insulation'
against 'the intrusive witness of non-belief'. 75
 However, while he recognises the
contemporary context is becoming increasingly inhospitable to rational deliberation
about morals, and to Christianity in particular, Grisez does not accept Maclntyre's
An example of how Grisez's account of ethics might resolve conflicts arising from cross-cultural
interaction is developed in: Sabina Alkire and Rufus Black, 'A Practical Reasoning Theory of
Development Ethics: Furthering the Capabilities Approach', Journal of International Development,
9.2 (1997), 263-279.
" Russell Shaw, 'Pioneering the Renewal in Ma1 Theology', in Natural Law and Moral Inquiry, pp.
241-271 (. 242).
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description of the context as suffering fragmentation and the modern tradition of
ethics (initiated by Kant) as inherently flawed. Thus the second challenge Grisez's
account of ethics represents is to Macintyre's claim that contemporary moral
discourse is fundamentally incoherent and that modern moral traditions (for example,
liberalism), lack the internal resources to heal themselves. This challenge is based on
Grisez's view that the shift away from natural teleology was not a disaster for moral
reasoning, and his acceptance of the proposition that one cannot derive an 'ought'
from an 'is'. Whereas the basis of the first challenge was made clear in the earlier
comparison of Maclntyre and Grisez, the basis of this second challenge needs some
further explanation.
Unlike Maclntyre, Grisez does not see the modern shift away from teleology as a
problem in moral reason. Hence, he would not accept Maclntyre's two parables
about the fragmentation of moral reason as it forgot the over-arching context that
gave its prescriptions meaning. In (lrisez's view, we are still capable of reasoning
rightly about morality, even if many do not, because right reasoning about morality
does not require a comprehensive teleological framework in order to make sense.
While Grisez does see proportionalism as the predominant mode of moral reason,,
and sees it as irrational, he would not ascribe to it the hegemony and actively
destructive role that Maclntyre gives to liberalism. Rather, for Grisez, as long as
people are prepared to reflect along the lines of the first principle of practical reason,
they will reason rightly. As noted above, this process of reasoning is not dependent
on some prior theoretical knowledge because it is self-evident and universal.
Furthermore, and in contrast to Maclntyre's teleological conception of natural law,
Grisez criticizes Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas for positing a final (dominant)
end, as though there is a determinate and objective hierarchy of human goods prior to
choice. it is precisely this notion, he argues, that leads to various species of
consequentialism and proportionalism; that is, that human goods can be
subordinated, instrumentalized, or acted against for the sake of a 'greater good'.76
Grisez's rejection of natural teleology is founded on his acceptance of the dictum
that it is logically impossible to derive any conclusions about what is good or what
76 It should be noted that Maclntyre is also very critical of utilitarianism. For a discussion of
Macintyre's critique of utilitarianism in relation to a defence of it see Paul Kelly, 'Maclntyre's
Critique of Utilitarianism', in After Maclnlyre, pp. 127-145.
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ought to be from premises containing any sort of empirical or metaphysical claims
about the way things are. (Ilirisez treats the prohibition of moves to derive a moral
'ought' from a theoretical/factual 'is' as an undeniable tenet of pure logic. He rejects
scholastic natural-law theory because: 'It moves by a logically illicit step - from
human nature as a given reality, to what ought and ought not to be chosen. Its
proponents attempt to reinforce this move from what is to what ought to be, by
appealing to God's command.'77 Instead, Grisez proposes:
The moral ought cannot be reduced to the is-to-be of practical truth without eliminating
the distinction between the directiveness of a practical judgement that something immoral
is to be done and the normativity of the moral truth that it should not be done. The is-to-
be of practical truth cannot be reduced to the is of human nature without eliminating the
distinction between, on the one hand, action and fulfilment through it, and, on the other,
what persons are by nature, prior to their exercise of free choice.78
Grisez does, however, recognise a limited relationship between what is and what
ought to be. He goes on to say:
Still, this twofold irreducibility does not mean that morality is cut off from its roots in
human nature. For the normativity of the moral ought is nothing but the integral
directiveness of the is-to-be of practical knowledge. And any adequate theory of human
persons will include among its true propositions: Everyone who does rationally guided
actions naturally knows the first principles of practical knowledge and naturally wills (by
simple volition) the goods to which they direct. In this sense, the is-to-be of the first
principles of practical knowledge is itself an aspect of human nature.79
Even given the limited concession made by Grisez, Grisez's view directly
contradicts Maclntyre's position. Maclntyre holds that one can derive an 'ought' from
an 'is' if one uses functional concepts. For example, a good watch should tell the time
accurately because this is what a good watch does. The problem for post-
Enlightenment thought is that man, unlike for Aristotle, is conceived of as an individual
prior to and apart from all roles, so that 'man' ceases to be a functional concept. For
Maclntyre, following Aristotle and Aquinas, to call something good is also to make a
flictual statement. He states:
To call a particular action just or right is to say that is what a good man would do in such a
situation; hence this type of statement too is factual. Within [the Aristotelian] tradition moral
and evaluative statement can be called true or false in precisely the way in which all other
factual statements can be so callaL Hover, once the notion of essential human purposes
77 CMP,p. 105.
Grisez, 'Practical Principles', p. 127
Ibid.
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or functions disappears from morality, it begins to appear implausible to treat moral
judgements as factual statements.
So against the division between 'is' and 'ought' made by Hume and Grisez,
Maclntyre argues for the intrinsic relation between what is and what ought to be. For
Maclntyre, the conception that 'flicts' (what is) are independent entities which stand in
judgement over mere theories (what ought to be), and to which appeal can be made in
solving any and all theoretical disputes is wrong. It is wrong because it is a flhlse
dichotomy. Statements about what 'is' presuppose, and can only be made sense of in
relation to, statements about what 'ought' to be. In Maclntyre's view, post-
Enlightenment thought denied this connection and thereby rendered its own moral
statements incoherent. For Maclntyre, moral judgements can be facts in the same way
as scientific judgements can be statements of fict, for both depend on presuppositions
about the work! as it is.
In sumnlaly, (irisez accepts what Maclntyre rejects: that is, the modern, post-
Enlightenment epistemology that attempts to found morality on reason and/or choice
independent of metaphysical presuppositions about the way the world is. For
Maclntyre, any notion of moral norms or basic goods as existing without the
guidance of the theistic and teleological context in which they were originally at
home means that moral judgements lose any clear status and their meaning becomes
highly debatable. Any project that seeks to provide a rational vindication of morality
in such a way has, as far as Maclntyre is concerned, decisively failed. Maclntyre
holds that the morality of our predecessor culture - and subsequently of our own -
lacks any public, shared rationale or justification. 8 ' So in Maclntyre's view, Grisez's
attempt to make a claim for such a rationality is unfounded and unsustainable. For
Grisez, however, Maclntyre's view is irrational and incoherent.
We can say, on the basis of these two challenges, that according to (irisez,
Maclntyre's critique of contemporary moral discourse is wrong and his thought
constitutes an inappropriate resource for Christians to utilise in the contemporary
context when confronted with ethical disputes with non-Christians. According to
(Irisez, Christians can resolve disputes with their neighbours on the basis of a shared
80 AV,p. 59
' AV, p. 50
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practical rationality and a general, or universal, ethic. The differences of approach
between Grisez and Maclntyre to the contemporary context can perhaps be
encapsulated in the distinctions between their remedies. While Maclntyre advocates
the formation of communities that can nurture and induct into, and teach people
about, morality, (irisez emphasises the need to draw out or clarit' what people can
already know but either deny, or are mistaken about, or are inured to through sin.
These two challenges to Maclntyre by Grisez raise the question: should we
abandon Maclntyre at this point and proceed with our analysis on the basis of
Grisez's account of the contemporary context and his understanding of ethics? To
address this question we need to assess Grisez more closely.
2.5 An analysis of Grisez's account of ethics in order to assess whether he
provides a better account of how Christians might resolve ethical disputes
with non-Christians.
It is our contention that on examining Grisez's system more closely we find that it
is inadequate at a number of crucial points. This leads us to conclude that he does
not provide a viable account of how to resolve ethical disputes between Christians
and non-Christians. Essentially, there are two sets of problems. The first set relates
to inconsistencies within Grisez's own work. The second set of problems relates to
foundational issues concerning the relationship between Grisez's approach to ethics
and certain theological questions.
2.5.1 Certain problems internal to Grisez's account of ethics
2.5.1.1 There is a tension between Grisez's insistence on the deep impact of sin
and his contention that the basic goods are self-evident
Grisez has a very strong account of the impact of sin at an individual and a social
level, and how they are interrelated. He states: 'The cultural consequences of sin set
up a kind of vicious circle. Distortion at the cultural level returns to, and reinforces,
distortion already existing at the individual psychological level.' 82 This vicious
circle can result in what recent papal encycicals have referred to as a 'culture of
death': that is, 'whole societies settle for solutions which mutilate human nature.'83
This recognition of the deep impact of sin leads Grisez to realise that: 'The necessary
82 Gii, Fulfillment in Christ, pp. 167-68.
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reasoning does not always occur spontaneously. [...] Moreover, because human
nature is fallen, redeemed, and called to heavenly glory, the full moral truth needed
to guide Christian life can be found only by using the light of the gospel.' 84 And
adherence to this light requires checking one's personal faith and insight into God's
plan 'against the Church's faith and moral teaching.' 85 There is a clear sense then,
that sin severely distorts the human ability to reason rightly and that the morality
upheld by the church will not necessarily be accepted by those outside the church.
Grisez's account of sin raises two problems. The first is the problem that if we
really do know the truth, and can know it by practical deliberation, then how and
why do 'societies settle for solutions which mutilate human nature'? The answer
would seem to be, through wrong or sinful choices. However, this brings us to the
second problem. To say we may know the truth, but no longer know it because of
sin, is one thing, but to insist, in the face of the impact of the fall, that we must know
the truth is another. Yet this seems to be Grisez's line of argument. For Grisez, it is
not the case that the appeal to conscience and reason may work, but rather that it
must work. However, in the light of his own account of sin, the possibility of healing
mutilated societies via the supposedly metaphysics-free realm of conscience and
rights appears somewhat remote. Conversely, if it really is the case that appeals to
conscience will bring people, inured by sin, to direct their choices to integral human
fulfilment, then we must question how significant was the mutilation of the society in
the first place. This lack of clarity raises a question about the means Grisez sets out
for Christians to resolve their disputes with their sinful neighbours.
2.5.1.11 There is an inconsistency between Grisez's advocating a separation
between theoretical and practical reason and his ethical arguments in
practice
If it turns out in practice that Grisez does not, or cannot, separate theoretical and
practical reason then this will undermine his challenge to Maclntyre's account of
incommensurability. This is because, if theological accounts of the way the world is
are inseparable from ethical prescriptions for how we are to act then those who do
not share a Christian account of the world will have difficulty in understanding and
83 CMP,p. 182.
LCL, p. 246.
" LCL, p. 261.
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sharing the ethical prescriptions derived from such an account. Leaving aside
Maclntyre's account of how moral terms can be factual we can see that (irisez
himself violates the rigid separation he advocates.
Russell Hittinger gives a critique of Grisez's separation of practical and
theoretical knowledge. He has analysed in detail how, in relation to the basic good
of religion, Grisez fails to keep a separation between theoretical and practical reason.
Grisez wants to claim that it is self-evident and not in need of theoretical
specification, but according to Hittinger, this is plainly not the case. As Hittinger
argues, to have any purchase as a good, 'religion' must be specified by a particular
form of religion; that is, there is no such thing a 'religion', there are only particular
'religions'. By implication the good of religion must be tied to a particular account
of a religion in order to bear any significance when it comes to making a choice. If
the good of religion floats free of a particular religious tradition then it lacks any
motivational weight in determining choice: that is to say, without specification the
good of religion is too vague and empty a notion to constitute a real choice. To
paraphrase Maclntyre, to choose religion as a good we must first answer the
question: whose God ought we to obey and why?
Hittinger charts how Grisez in practice makes exactly this move. He notes that in
Grisez's writing, the good of religion gradually becomes defined in more and more
particular terms, and thus becomes less and less self-evident. In Contraception and
the Natural Law (1964) Grisez defines the good of religion as 'the tendency to try to
establish a good relationship with unknown higher powers'. By 1970, in the book
Abortion, Grisez defines religion as: 'worship and holiness - the reconciliation of
mankind to God'. This is a highly specific statement involving the substantive moral
terms: 'holiness', and 'reconciliation'. By 1980 in Beyond the New Morality the
effort to define religion as a good has become even more complicated. In the book
Grisez struggles to pin down the precise nature of religion as a value. Hittinger
outlines the problem at the heart of this struggle:
There is the problem of how to keep ethics and the religious sphere distinct, and yet
coherently related. This is further complicated by the question of which religion we are
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intending to interrelate with ethics: the immanent good of religion, or the good of religion
once seen in the light of [Christian] faith.
Hittinger points out that for Grisez, moral norms govern the manner by which goods
are chosen. By implication, any difference in the formal way in which religion is
grasped as a good will become crucial. For example, if religion is one good, but is
grasped difirently depending upon the presence or absence of faith, we run the risk
of saying that there are two diflërent, and morally significant, attitudes toward the
same value. Conversely, if we have two different goods - religion as immanent
good, and religion as a share in the supernatural life - then Grisez must either change
his axiology accordingly (and make the supernatural life the over-arching good) or
run the risk of promoting the same moral attitude toward things that are different and
incommensurable in value. In short, Hittinger is saying that the good of religion is
inconsistent with Grisez's account of the first principles of practical reason: what is
attractive about the good of religion as it is viewed first in the light of Grisez's pre-
moral natural law theory, is incompatible with why it is attractive in the light of faith.
As Hittinger puts it:
When [Grisez] goes on [...] to say that 'there would be no genuine religious community
to which any person could belong apart from God's redemptive work,' it is exceedingly
difficult to see not only how we are referring to the same value of religion, but how the
value can be upheld as a good that satisfies moral requirements in any respect without an
explicit faith in Christianity.87
Pauline Westermann provides an even stronger critique of Grisez's attempt to
separate theoretical and practical reason. She argues that Grisez's inconsistency is
inherent in his approach to natural law. Against the claim that the 'new natural
lawyers' do not have a teleological and theoretical vision of the good she states:
The selection of the basic goods is clearly informed by their belief that these seven basic
goods are truly 'perfective' of man's nature. Because they are perfective of man's nature,
they are regarded as intrinsic values. it is no good pretending that the basic goods are
first selected on the basis of their 'self-evidence', and only afterwards 'happen' to be
perfective of human nature.88
She goes on to say: 'The conclusion seems to be justified that the modern
formulation of natural law rests on a hidden assumption of teleology, coupled with
Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1987), p. 120.
Hittinger, Critique, p. 122.
Westerman, Disintegration of Natural Law Theory, p. 254.
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the belief in God.' 89
 Nigel Biggar, in his comparison of Barth and Grisez, identifies
the same problem. Biggar notes that Grisez fails to take sufficient account of how
the basic goods are necessarily situated within a particular 'theological context'. He
states:
Where Grisez is wrong is to suppose, as he sometimes does, that there is a coherent body
of knowledge about the human good, its components and its moral implications, which is
sound per Se, and to which reason can in fact attain 'naturally' - that is, without
illumination by revelation. The theory of the good and the moral law that Grisez presents
as attainable 'naturally' is actually formed by specifically Christian presuppositions. It is
in fact a Christian theory, formally abstracted from the theological context in which alone
it makes sense.90
The criticisms of Grisez made by Hittinger, Westermann, and Biggar raise again the
problem of incommensurability between traditions. If Grisez's ethical prescriptions
are situated in, and grounded on, a particular teleology, and cosmology, then there
must be conflict with traditions with a different vision of the good and an alternative
conception of God. Hence, the supposedly self-evident basic goods only seem self-
evident to someone situated within an over-arching vision of that in which the human
good consists.
These questions about the consistency of (irisez's account of ethics, especially in
relation to its universality, become even more pressing when we assess Grisez's
work in the light of certain theological questions.
2.5.2 Problems relating to foundational issues concerning the relationship
between Grisez's approach to ethics and certain theological questions
The primary issue at stake in analysing how Grisez's ethics relates to wider
theological questions is the following: given that Grisez's proposal for how
Christians and non-Christians are to resolve ethical disputes rests on a self-evident,
general ethics, is there anything substantially and identifiably 'Christian' in his
proposal for how Christians are to resolve their disputes with non-Christians? The
short answer to this is: no, there is not. The reason we give this answer is twofold.
Firstly, Grisez fails to take full account of the implications of the resurrection and
eschatology for ethics; and secondly, Grisez subsumes the Word of God to a general
89 Westerman, Disintegration ofNatural Law Theory, p. 256.
9° Nigel Biggar, 'Karl Barth and Germain Grisez on the Human Good: An Ecumenical
Rapprochement', in The Revival of Natural Law, pp. 164-83 (J). 179).
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ethics. We shall now explain why these constitute the basis of our negative response
to the above question.
2.5.2.i Crisez fails to take full account of the implications of the resurrection
and eschatology for ethics
As discussed earlier, Grisez thinks that while there can be a distinct Christian
moral knowledge, this knowledge is not substantively diflërent from moral
knowledge derived from right reason alone. In effect, Grisez is saying that Christ
simply republishes the moral law. While recognising that knowledge of the moral
law can be severely impaired, true and full knowledge of what it means to enjoy
integral human fulfilment is available outside of relationship to Jesus Christ.
Hittinger notes that for Grisez 'faith makes up for a certain deficiency in the
motivation that ought to be at work without faith'. 9 ' As Grisez himself puts it:
Even though people can naturally know a great deal about right and wrong,, in the fallen
human condition they often have trouble doing so. Thus, God generously reveals a
number of moral truths which in principle could be known without revelation.
It is our contention that this view is based on Grisez's failure to take seriously
enough the implications of the resurrection and eschatology for ethics.
Revelation does not merely enable enhanced intelligibility of an already existent
morality. While it does do this, it does more than this as well. Revelation furnishes
the Christian with a materially new content that entails distinct moral demands. By
contrast, creation for Grisez represents the limits of the possibility of 'fulfilment in
Christ' and there is nothing substantially different or new into which we may now
move in and through Jesus' resurrection. 93
 Grisez fails to account for how
humankind, even if it remained sinless, could not have known or fulfilled all the
goods. This is to say, that even without the fall we would still not enjoy integral
human fulfilment, nor, more importantly, could we know what this fuffilment in fhct
consisted of. This is because the true horizon by which to evaluate what integral
human fuffilment consisted of is only revealed fully in Jesus Christ. Through the
resurrection, humankind is both redeemed (from sin and death) and can now enter a
' Hittinger, Critique, p. 143.
Grisez, Fulfillment in Christ, p. 76.
This is not toy that Grisez does not have a strong emphasis on the bodily resurrection; he does.
Cf., Grisez, Fulfillment in Christ, pp. 390-97.
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new order of being. Christ's resurrection constitutes both humanity's redemption
and its transformation. 94 Therefore, however long and hard one studies creation, one
can never discern its full meaning. O'Donovan clarifies the implications of this
when he states:
Eschatological transformation resolves the unanswered question of creation, the question
of what its temporal extension means. This question would be unanswered even in an
unfallen world and to an unfallen mind; the sealed scroll of history is painfully
inscrutable even to one who has gazed devoutly and joyfully on the order of creation in
all its wholeness.95
Hence, Christian ethics is materially, not just formally, dependent on Jesus Christ.
There is a distinct 'Christian' knowledge about what is good and right which is in
addition to that knowable apart from Revelation.96
Grisez partially addresses this issue by stating that 'in history' integral human
fuffilment is an 'ideal' and thence unrealisable. 97 This view, however, misses the
implications of one of the central teachings of the doctrine of eschatology: that is,
that in Christ our fullulinent is already realised and this fuffilment can now, through
the Holy Spirit, break into the present age. By implication, our participation in
Christ, through the Hoiy Spirit, brings new insight, and calls (and enables) new kinds
of responses to old problems. Furthermore, this knowledge, given in Revelation,
must at times call into question and correct both fallen and shortsighted knowledge
founded on practical reason alone. Thus the logical prohibition against such a
transaction collapses in the face of tighter analyses of ethics in relation to
eschatology.
The implication of Christians having a distinct knowledge is that when they are
engaged in ethical disputes there are specifically Christian insights into moral issues
which non-Christians may accept (for a variety of reasons) but cannot access by
RMO, p. 57. Black contends that while Grisez does not entertain the possibility that Christians
moral principles are new, Grisez does describe Christians moral principles as the 'transformation' of
'apparently parallel secular moral principles'. However, as we shall see, the transformation envisaged
by Grisez is not truly eschatological in character. Rufus Black, 'Is the New Natural Law Theory
Christian?', in The Revival of Natural Law, pp. 148-63 (p. 152).
RMO, p. 55.
This point is drawn from the criticism Banner makes of the same problem in Evangelium Vitae. See
Michael Banner, 'Catholics and Anglicans and Contemporary Bioethics: Divided or United?', in
Issues for a Catholic Bioethic, ed. by Luke Gormally (London: Linacre Centre, 1999), pp. 34-57.
Grisez, Fulfillment in Christ, p. 80.
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reason alone. Therefore, contrary to Grisez's position, the problem of
incommensurability between Christian and non-Christian moral judgements cannot
be overcome by recourse to a universal ethic based on practical reason. It is our
contention that Grisez does not even entertain the possibility of incommensurability
because of the mistaken theological presuppositions on which his ethic is based.
And as we have already noted, his defence that the rightness or wrongness of his
ethics is not dependent on such prior theological presuppositions is unsustainable.
2.5.2.11 Grisez subsumes the Word of God to a general ethics
Following on from the problem of whether Christianity brings new moral insight
is the question of how Grisez relates his general ethics to his Christian ethics. In
contrast to Grisez, we contend that a properly Christian ethic cannot hold to the
notion of a general ethics and remain Christian. To advocate this is to demand that
Christians who are subject to the Word of God share that allegiance with something
which is autonomous from God's Word. For Christians to resort to an autonomous
general ethics, as a means of arbitrating their disputes with non-Christians,
constitutes a denial of the authority Christians have as creatures of the Word of God.
To resort to a general ethic to justilji Christian moral claims demonstrates a lack of
faith in Christ. It lacks faith in Christ because it is a failure to believe that Christ
really does reveal the nature of reality and holds that there might be another source of
knowledge about what is good and right apart from Christ.
The theological problem at the heart of this issue is that Grisez allows a parallel
lordship to God's by allowing a validity and autonomy to general moral enquiry. As
Banner argues, to advocate an autonomous general ethics is to cast doubt on the
authority of Christian ethics by supposing, in effect, that Christian ethics and general
ethics rule jointly over the same sphere. 98 The impact of this in relation to resolving
ethical disputes is that Christian approaches to ethical issues, even within Grisez's
framework in which Christian ethics is a further specffication of general ethics, must
always be ready and able to prove itself to be consistent with, and authorised by,
general moral enquiry. However, as Banner contends, a thoroughly Christian ethic
must in no way be constrained or conditioned by the extraneous demands of a prior
Michael Banner, 'Catholics and Anglicans', pp. 41-42.
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epistemological commitment to a general ethics. 99 Christians are authorised to
understand, interpret and make judgements solely on the basis of what is revealed in
Jesus Christ. For Christians to do otherwise is to call into question the validity of
this revelation.
O'Donovan further draws out the problematic nature of the relationship between
Christian ethics and general ethics in the new natural law in his discussion of Finnis's
defence of exceptionless moral norms. O'Donovan notes that in the attempt to
safeguard the exceptionless character of moral norms and emphasise the distinction
between practical and theoretical reason, Finnis insists on the autonomy of the norms
even from revelation. O'Donovan notes that even when revelation does disclose
authoritative norms, these are distinct from evangelical affirmations. The result is a
tight distinction between Law and GospeL'°° Such a distinction is very far from an
evangelical morality in which obedience is authenticated not because the norm is good
in and of itself according to the process of practical reason, but because it is an intrinsic
part of the joyful proclamation of the redemptive goodness of God. In effect, Grisez
and Finnis's insistence on a division between theoretical and practical reason, and the
autonomy of a general ethic, constitutes a refusal to allow the reality of what God has
achieved in Christ to influence or change morality.
On the basis of this discussion of problems relating to foundational issues
concerning the relationship between Grisez's approach to ethics and certain
theological questions, it is our conclusion that Grisez's account of ethics is inadequate
at a number of crucial points. This leads us to conclude that he does not provide a
viable account of how to resolve ethical disputes between Christians and non-
Christians. The primary reason for this is that it takes insufficient notice of whom
Jesus Christ is and the implications of what Christ has done.
2.6 Summary
This chapter has analysed the following proposition: that Grisez calls into
question Alasdair Maclntyre's diagnosis of the contemporary context and his
conception of the incommensurability between Christian and non-Christian ethical
Banner, 'Catholics and Anglicans', p. 42.
'°°Oliver O'Donovan, 'John Finnis on Moral Absolutes', SCE, 6.2 (1993), 50-66 (p. 66).
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action. We have assessed whether (irisez effectively undermines both Maclntyre's
contention that Christian and non-Christian moral judgements are substantively
different and therefore very difficult to resolve, and Maclntyre's argument that even
if resolution is eventually possible, it is severely hampered by the contemporary
context: which is anomic, atomised and alienated and, as a result, severely impedes the
process of resolving disputes rationally between rival moral traditions.
We examined this proposition by comparing and contrasting Grisez's account of
ethics with Maclntyre's. We noted that for Grisez ethical disputes with non-
Christians could be resolved on the basis of a shared rationality and a general ethics.
This comparison led us to propose two ways in which Grisez challenges the work of
Maclntyre. The first is that Grisez's account of ethics represents a fundamental
challenge to Maclntyre's claim that ethical disputes are the result of
incommensurability between rival moral traditions. This challenge is based on
Grisez's account of first principles, practical rationality, and his conception of basic
goods. These led Gnsez to conclude that ethical disputes are to be resolved not
through a dialectic of traditions, as Maclntyre contends, but via a general ethics
grounded on practical rationality. The second challenge Grisez's account of ethics
represents is to Maclntyre's claim that contemporary moral discourse is
fundamentally incoherent and that the pre-eminent moral traditions within this
discourse lack the internal resources to heal themselves. While recognising that the
contemporary context is becoming increasingly inhospitable to rational deliberation
about morals, we examined why (]risez does not accept Maclntyre's description of
the context as suffering fragmentation and the modern tradition of ethics as
inherently flawed. This difference is based on Grisez's meta-theory and his
understanding of ethics as autonomous from metaphysics which presupposes that one
cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.
On the basis of these two challenges we addressed the question of whether we
should reject Macintyre's account and proceed with our analysis utilising Grisez's
account of the contemporary context and his understanding of ethics. To address this
question we analysed Grisez more closely. This analysis revealed that Grisez is
mistaken at a number of crucial points and that he does not provide a viable account
of how to resolve ethical disputes between Christians and non-Christians. In the
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light of this further assessment of (irisez's approach to ethics we concluded that
Grisez's challenge to Maclntyre does not succeed. The problem of
incommensurability between Christians and non-Christians' moral judgements
remains a problem. Thus, Maclntyre's analysis of the problem of
incommensurability needs further consideration. We base this conclusion on the
following arguments: that there is a tension between Grisez's insistence on the deep
impact of sin and his contention that the basic goods are selfevident; that there is an
inconsistency between Grisez's advocacy of a separation between theoretical and
practical reason and his actual ethical arguments in practice; that Grisez fails to take
full account of the implications of the resurrection and eschatology for ethics; and
that he subsumes the Word of God to a general ethics. Therefore, while Grisez does
seem to pose a real challenge to Maclntyre, further analysis reveals that the
differences between Christians and non-Christians really are significant and they do
not share a general ethics; thus disputes between them cannot be resolved on the
basis of such an ethics. Christian ethics is necessarily Christian: that is, it is distinct
and particular. The response to this proposition is that we must leave behind Grisez
and analyse the nature of the differences between Christian and non-Christian moral
judgement further to discern how significant are these differences, and thus whether
resolution between Christians and non-Christians regarding ethical disputes is




The challenge Oliver O'Donovan poses to the adequacy of Atasdair
Maclntyre's conception of the relationship between Christian and non-
Christian ethical thought and action
3.1	 Introduction
What we are trying to develop is a coherently theological account of whether
Christians can resolve ethical disputes with their non-Christian neighbours in the
contemporaiy context. To do this we have been assessing whether Maclntyre can
provide us with such an account or even a generic framework within which such an
account can be developed. A central issue of contention is the depth of difference
between Christians' and non-Christians' ethical thought and action. This chapter
aims to assess whether a theologically grounded account of ethics, as given by Oliver
O'Donovan, calls into question the adequacy of Maclntyre's proposals for over-
coming the incommensurability between Christians and non-Christian moral
judgements.
As we have seen, Maclntyre gives an account of Christian ethical thought and
action as constitutive of a tradition that is incommensurable with non-Christian
traditions. Furthermore, he furnishes us with a theory for how incommensurable
traditions might enter into rational conversation in order to eventually resolve ethical
disputes. However, his assessment of the contemporary context is that the kind of
rational conversation between traditions he envisages is actively undermined and
opposed by the dominant modes of moral discourse, namely liberalism and what
Maclntyre calls 'genealogy'. If Maclntyre's diagnosis is correct then it could
provide a formulation for how, in the contemporary context, Christians might resolve
ethical differences with non-Christians. Likewise, if his diagnosis is wrong, and
another set of conditions are understood to prevail, then the analysis of Christian
ethical thought and action and relations between Christians and non-Christians will
differ accordingly. In the last chapter we sought to question Maclntyre's diagnosis
of the contemporary context and his thesis about the incommensurability between
Christians and non-Christians by comparing and contrasting it with the work of
Germain Grisez. Gnsez challenged both Macintyre's claim that Christian and non-
-98-
Christian moral judgements are significantly incommensurable and, therefore, veiy
difficult to resolve, and Maclntyre's argument that even if resolution is eventually
possible, it is severely hampered by the contemporaly context which is anomie,
atomised and alienated and as a result, severely impedes the process of resolving
disputes rationally between rival moral traditions. By contrast, Grisez held that
Christians and non-Christians share a self-evident, tradition-free set of criteria for
evaluating what is just and good which enables the resolution of disputes between
them. However, in the light of further assessment, we concluded that Grisez's
challenge to Macintyre does not succeed. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether
Maclntyre's account of the incommensurability between Christian and non-Christian
ethical thought and action, his diagnosis of the contemporary context, and his
proposals for resolving ethical disputes are adequate in the light of the need to take
the presuppositions of Christianity as starting points for reflection on these questions.
If we accept Maclntyre's diagnosis of the contemporary context, must we also
accept his account of how Christians are to relate to non-Christians? This will
depend on whether Maclntyre's analysis of the differences between Christian and
non-Christian ethical thought and action is accurate. Just because Maclntyre thinks
there is greater difference between Christians and non-Christians in terms of their
ethical judgements than Grisez, this does not mean that Maclntyre pays sufficient
heed to the nature and depth of the difference between them. We shall address the
question of whether he does or not by comparing Maclntyre's conception of the
difference between Christians and non-Christian ethical thought and action with that
found in the work of Oliver O'Donovan.
The substantive differences between Maclntyre and O'Donovan centre on their
different conceptions of the role of tradition and its authority in ethical judgements.
O'Donovan conceives the role and authority of tradition in grounding and
determining Christian thought and action to be relativised by the authority and role of
Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, O'Donovan has a difirent
conception of time and history to Maclntyre. O'Donovan's conception of time and
history leads to a vision of how Christians can relate to non-Christians that is not
only distinct from, but also contradicts Maclntyre's conception of Christianity as a
rival tradition in competition with other traditions. In addition, O'Donovan's
conception of time and history shapes how he conceives the role of tradition in
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relation to ethical judgements. O'Donovan agrees with Maclntyre about the
ontological ground of Christian ethical action: however, he has a very different view
of the role tradition plays in determining ethical thought and action. In short,
Maclntyre sees Christian ethical thought and action as tradition-guided, whereas
O'Donovan sees tradition as having an important but less determinative role. For
O'Donovan, the role of Christ and the Spirit in guiding ethical thought and action
must be accounted for.
3.2 O'Donovan agrees with Maclntyre's critique of the contemporary context
It is important to establish how the contemporary context affects and shapes
relations between Christians and non-Christians. Therefore, before proceeding to
assess the challenge O'Donovan poses to Maclntyre's account of how Christians
might resolve ethical disputes with their non-Christian neighbours, we must analyse
whether Maclntyre's critique of contemporary moral discourse is concurrent with
O'Donovan's theologically grounded characterization of the present context. If
O'Donovan's critique is concurrent with Maclntyre's, then even if there is no
agreement between them about how to resolve ethical disputes between Christians
and non-Christians, there can at least be agreement about the context in which
Christians and non-Christians engage with one another.
Unlike Grisez, O'Donovan offers a similar critique of modernity to that given by
Macintyre: that is, modern moral discourse does not have the internal resources to
heal itself and that modern approaches to ethics are fundamentally incoherent.
Indeed, it is clear that O'Donovan has been directly influenced by Macintyre.' In
The Desire of the Nations O'Donovan reviews different critics of modernity, among
whom is Maclntyre.2
 O'Donovan understands their primaiy criticisms of modernity
to be threefold: that modernity postulates a primacy of the will which creates itself
out of nothing; it replaces practical reason with technique; and it holds to the
possibility of having a view from nowhere. O'Donovan then sets out his own
parallel critique. The major difference between his critique and the others is that he
seeks to understand how modernity has its roots in Christianity. O'Donovan
considers this important for: 'This helps us understand at once how modernity is the
'Oliver O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations, pp. 18-19; hereafter referred to as Desire.
2 Desire, p.18. Cf, RMO, p. 18.
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child of Christianity, and at the same time how it has left its father's house and
followed the way of the prodigal.'3
O'Donovan concurs with Maclntyre view that the loss of teleology in moral
reasoning is central to understanding the incoherence of most contemporary moral
discourse. For O'Donovan, this loss expresses itself most clearly in voluntarist
notions of freedom wherein freedom is conceived as the assertion of the human will
by an autonomous, self-sufficient agent. Like Maclntyre, O'Donovan understands
this vision of freedom to emerge out of the matrix of the attempt by medieval
scientific enquiry to rid itself of teleological philosophy and the objection by thinkers
of the Enlightenment to the idea that the moral will can be determined by a
teleological order discerned within nature. This dual thrust led to a division between
will and nature. O'Donovan states: 'On the one hand scientific thought is anxious to
free nature from immanent purposiveness; on the other, moral philosophy wishes to
free the will from any purposiveness in nature. It suits both of them to assign
purposiveness exclusively to the human wifi, and to dissociate it from nature.' 4 Like
Maclntyre, O'Donovan sees both Hume and Kant as key figures in bringing about
the rejection of natural teleology that results in the thise understanding of freedom as
an unbounded assertion of the will.5
In addition to this critique of modernity's denigration of teleology, O'Donovan
shares Maclntyre's critique of technology and technical rationality. O'Donovan
believes that critics who have made 'technology' the centre of their account of
modernity (often following Heidegger's famous essay Die Frage nach der Technik)
have meant not technical achievements, but the mutation of practical reasoning into
'technique'. It is in this sense that Maclntyre can be understood to be a critic of
technology. According to Maclntyre, practical reason has been usurped by
'technique'.6
 Using a parallel argument, O'Donovan states: 'Set free from obedience
to comprehensible ends of action, confronting all reality as disposable material,
Desire, p. 275.
4 RMO, p. 46.
O'Donovan notes how Hume's advocacy of conscientious conviction as central to moral judgement
and Kant's 'rational will' both attempt to vindicate freedom as autonomy, that is, freedom of action
belongs entirely to the moral agent herself and can in no way be derived from external reality (RMO,
pp. 118-119).6 See Mactntyre's critique of the representative 'characters' of modernity: the manager, the therapist
and the aesthete (AV, pp. 30-31).
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[reason's] primary imperative is manipulation.' 7 For example, politics is understood
to be about 'making a better world' through the efficient and effective management
of resources, instead of about determining the common good through reflection and
deliberation. O'Donovan states: 'The fate of a society which sees, wherever it looks,
nothing but the products of the human will, is that it fails, when it does see some
aspect of human activity which is not a matter of construction, to recognise the
significance of what it sees and to think about it appropriately.' 8 He gives numerous
examples, especially in the realm of medicine. For example, cloning and certain
forms of artificial reproduction render the child a project - a subject of human
making - so that the child ceases to be an irreplaceable gifi of equal dignity to other
humans, and becomes a product at the disposal of other humans.9
Further to his critique of technology and the loss of teleology, O'Donovan has a
critique of individualism and the privatisation of morality that is parallel to that given
by Maclntyre. In O'Donovan's view, individualism and the privatisation of morality
are two additional consequences of the modern emphasis on the individual will.
O'Donovan recognises that there is a right and proper freedom from society (which
is, for O'Donovan, inaugurated by Jesus Christ). The new social reality created by
Christ relativises all other forms of society and lordship. According to O'Donovan,
the one who follows Christ is no longer subject to her family, tribe and nation. She
takes responsibility for decisions she alone can take and on grounds that are not
given her from within the old forms of society. This provides a model of the
individual as one fully engaged in and for society; so that society itself becomes free
by being upheld by the free self-giving of each member.'° There is thus no dialectic
between the individual and the collective, but a dialectic of two freedoms, in which
both community and believer are authorized to be free agents. 11 However, the
individualism of modernity is not about free self-giving but the assertion of
individuality, whether that be freedom from control or freedom for seif-realisation.
Within this modern conception, freedom is not creative, but is essentially passive.
Desire, p. 274.
S Oliver O'Donovan, Begotten or Made? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 2.
This is one of the central points of Begotten or Made?.
'° O'Donovan, Desire, p. 254. One of the key assumptions here is that we can talk about social
realities and societies as being entities or oects or facts independent of the wills of their members.
This is an alien idea to much modern political thought, which, after Hobbes, and the emphasis on
society being the result of a 'social contract', tends to see society and any social entity as dependent
for its existence on the will of its members.
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As O'Donovan contends: 'It is the freedom of consumers, rather than participants."2
It is the freedom to exist in a private realm in which no one may interfere with one's
family arrangements, religion, sexual practice, eating habits etc.; however, the
inverse of this freedom is that judgements about the 'private life' of others are
prohibited because to make a judgement would be to infringe on another's freedom..
As O'Donovan puts it: 'To presume to exercise freedom of conscience in one's
public dealings is, as we say, "thrusting your private convictions down other people's
throats", that is to say, bringing them out of the private realm into the public forum
where they might challenge community policy." 3
 Thus morality is privatised and
decisions in the public realm are judged in terms of good administration and effective
management and not in terms of how wise or virtuous they are. In practice, this
leads to a fundamentally incoherent, and highly conflictual, public discourse about
morality.
We have seen above that like Maclntyre, O'Donovan understands there to be
extensive and deep-rooted problems in contemporaiy moral discourse. He shares
Maclntyre's pivotal concerns in two ways. A central theme of O'Donovan's work,
like Maclntyre's, is the attempt to recover an understanding of what constitutes
appropriate authority. Furthermore, O'Donovan, like Maclntyre, perceives that the
roots of the current confusion about legitimate authority, and the resultant oppressive,
incoherent and fragmented discourses about morality, lie in the historical development
of the primaiy, contemporary philosophical framework - liberal individualism - and
that to understand and so address the problem we must trace the history of liberalism.
However, O'Donovan diverges from Maclntyre in that his focus is more concrete and
his premises are theological.
O'Donovan agrees with Maclntyre that modern liberalism does not have the
resources to heal itself and can find no rational justification for its project.'4
However, O'Donovan understands the primary cause of this problem to be that
liberalism lost its roots as a theological venture. Therefore, it is not just that
liberalism tried to deny the importance of history, tradition and context, but more
importantly, it denied the Christ-event as its very foundation. Maclntyre believes
"RMO, p. 164.
12 O'Donovan, Begotten or Made?, p. 9.
13 O'Donovan, Begotten or Made?, p. 10.
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that the primary resource for recovering the rationality of moral discourse is for
liberalism to take on the moral frameworks of Christianity (as instantiated in
Thomism); however, his concern is with the form of Christianity's moral discourse,
rather than the content. By contrast, while he is concerned about the form of
contemporary moral discourse, O'Donovan's primary concern is the content of that
discourse. For O'Donovan, it is a re-engagement with the person of Jesus Christ, and
not just the recovery of modes of moral discourse, that wifi enable liberalism, both
philosophically and politically, to recover its sanity. In short, liberalism must
reconnect to political theology, and thus take seriously again the Gospel's claim to be
public truth. The implications of this difference between Maclntyre and O'Donovan
will become apparent when we compare Maclntyre's accounts of how Christians
should engage with non-Christians with an account derived from O'Donovan.
O'Donovan's narration of history runs parallel to Maclntyre's in that he does see
a disjunction after the development of the early modern liberal state. In the Desire of
the Nations O'Donovan gives an account of the rise of the limited state and the
development of the rule of law from the Christ-event up to the sixteenth century.
After this point, O'Donovan recounts a story of decline wherein the liberal polity,
mirrored in liberal philosophy, becomes an instance of the anti-Christ: that is, it is a
'parodic and corrupt development of Christian social order'.' 5
 It is important to note
that, according to O'Donovan, the canker at the heart of this decline was the
existence of problems within theological discourse and the corruption of particular
Christian social practices.
Putting to one side Maclntyre and O'Donovan's respective accounts of the
genealogy of liberalism, we shall now examine the distinctively theological premises of
O'Donovan's account of ethics.
3.3 O'Donovan's explicitly theological conception of ethics is distinct from
Maclntyre's philosophically derived one
While Maclntyre and O'Donovan agree about the context and state of
contemporary moral discourse, O'Donovan has an explicitly theologically grounded
conception of ethics, as distinct from Maclntyre's philosophically grounded account.
14 AV, p.241.
15 Desire, p. 275.
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The rest of this chapter contains extensive exegesis of O'Donovan's theologically
grounded conception of ethics. This exegesis is important in order that the
differences between O'Donovan's theologically derived account of ethics and
Maclntyre's account of ethics may be made transparent. With the differences made
clear we can then evaluate whether Maclntyre's account of ethics can be
appropriated by Christians as a lens by which to analyse and approach ethical
disputes with non-Christians.
We will begin the process of comparing and contrasting O'Donovan's and
Maclntyre's respective accounts of ethics by analysing how O'Donovan defines
moral knowledge in order to c1aril' how it compares and contrasts with Macintyre's
definition of moral knowledge. We shall see that while there is much convergence in
relation to their respective understandings of knowledge of the order of creation,
O'Donovan's conception of 'evangelical' moral knowledge is both distinctive and
central to his articulation of an ethics specific to the Christian tradition.
3.3.1 Natural and evangelical knowledge
For ODonovan, a person's ability to know the order of creation, and so participate in
it, will depend on her knowledge. This is because, in O'Donovan's conception,
knowledge is the particular way humans participate in creation.' 6
 Hence, right
participation depends on right knowledge. However, such knowledge is difficult to
win. In this lies a critical distinction for O'Donovan. He distinguishes between an
ontology of creation - there really is a proper or natural order to which we can conform
- and the epistemological issues of how we have knowledge of that order. This
clarification of the ontological and epistemological issues in ethics underpins one of the
central thrusts of O'Donovan's work; its attempt to restore the concept of 'the natural'
and the doctrine of creation within ethics.' 7
 By separating the ontological from the
epistemological issues O'Donovan can aflirin that nature/creation is good, although
flillen, while allowing that discernment of that order is problematic.
' RMO, p. 76.
17 This concern was first expressed in an early article that amounts to a manifesto for his later work:
Oliver O'Donovan, 'The Natural Ethic', in Essays in Evangelical Social Ethics, ed. by D. Wright
(Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1978), pp. 19-35.
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The distinction between the ontological and epistemological issues in ethics leads
ODonovan to ask the questioir What kind of knowledge can this be that has the order
of creation as its object?" 8 This knowledge is the knowledge of things in their relation
to the totality of things. O'Donovan does not imply that humans must know the totality
of things; that is the prerogative of God. Rather, humans know what they do know as
part of a meaningful totality. This overall picture allows us to give meaning to the
particular. However, there can be no Archimedean point from which the subject can
stand over and above creation, evaluating from the 'outside'. Following Maclntyre's
critique of the modem conception of the neutrality of rationality, O'Donovan holds that
we are all actors upon the same stage. The knowledge that we can have is 'existential':
that is, it occurs only as the subject participates in what she knows. O'Donovan states:
Knowledge of the universe never takes shape at an observer's distance; it is not knowledge-
by-transcendence. We may, of course, know particular objects m this way, from a relative
distance that is what makes the natural sciences possible. But the more encompassing the
object of observation is, the more difficult it is to isolate and transcend.'9
Thus the knowledge we may possess, even though it is knowledge of the totality of
things, always has both an incomplete character, and is subject to continual refinement
in the light of new particulars. An analogy to illustrate O'Donovan's conception of
knowledge is that of a picture. One sees a picture in its totality, with all its parts in
relation to one another. As the picture is contemplated, so the differing elements come
to be understood with an ever-increasing degree of nuance and subtlety. One also
views a picture from a particular angle or position in relation to it. Likewise, humans
can only view the order of creation from a particular position, however, unlike the
viewer of the picture, humans are situated within that which they contemplate.
For O'Donovan, as distinct from Maclntyre, all knowledge is contingent in two
other ways. Firstly, it is subject to the Creator; and secondly, it is subject to judgement
and transformation (not abolition) at the eschaton. This knowledge, however, is
unitaxy: whether knowledge is true or false, in accord with reality or not, there is only
one reality to know. This is in contrast to Gnostic or Manichean conceptions of reality
as dualistic: that is, split, and forever in a battle between good and evil, or ethereal and
material. We can have assurance that the order of things will not be suddenly over
thrown by a different one.
18 RMO, p. 76
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ODonovan summarises his understanding of knowledge in stating:
It must be apprehensive knowledge of the whole of things, yet which does not pretend to
transcendence over the universe, but reaches out to understand the whole from a central
point within it. It must be a human knowledge that is co-ordinated with the true performance
of the human task in worship of God and obedience to the moral law. It must be a
knowledge that is vindicated by God's revelatc*y word that the created good and man's
knowledge of it is not to be overthrown in histoy. Such knowledge, according to the
Christian gospel, is given to us as we participate in the life of Jesus Christ. [...J True
knowledge of the moral order is knowledge 'in Christ°
This conception of true knowledge being 'in Christ' makes clear that knowledge is
grounded in being, and human knowledge specifically in Christ's human being.
The cornerstone of O'Donovan's ethics, and what makes it different in substance
from Maclntyre's, is that for O'Donovan we have access to the shape of the order of
things through the resurrection of Jesus Christ. This is a universal claim 'because the
good news that we may live in [creation] is addressed to all mankind'.2'
foundational claim leads O'Donovan to state, in contrast to Maclntyre, that the
resurrection is the only sure basis on which moral decisions might be made. While
the order of creation is good, it can do nothing to reconcile rebeffious man to itself
nor can it interpret itself to humankind's disordered reason: 'Hence [nature] is
tyrannous, arbitraiy and sometimes frankly misleading in character.' 22 Only when
humans participate in God's life (which is to say in God's ways) can they be sure to
apprehend the proper order of creation and so act in accordance with it.
The difference between Maclntyre and O'Donovan in relation to how revelation
relates to natural knowledge is highlighted in how they envisage non-Christian
thought being utilised. For Maclntyre, Thomas represents a systematic synthesis of
classical thought, Aristotle in particular. As Thomas Hibbs notes, for Maclntyre:
'The theological engagement of the philosophic tradition on its own terms involves
the correction and fulfilment of the telos of ancient philosophy by means inaccessible
to unaided reason.'23 In short, for Maclntyre grace complements what is naturally
knowable. By contrast, for O'Donovan, the true 'nature' of man has not been
RJvK, p. 79.
20 RMO, p. 85.
21 RMO,p. 17
22 RMO p.22
23 ThOm Hibbs, 'Mactntyre, Tradition and the Christian Philosopher', The Modem Schoolman, 68
(1991), 211-23 (p. 218). Cf., Wi, pp. 150-154.
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properly apprehended by classical thought, so it is not the case that nature, as they
understood it, can be perfected by theological insight. Rather, the disparate jigsaw
pieces of fallen natural knowledge about justice or human nature, which are strewn
around classical thought, are sifted and brought together by understanding them in
the light of who Jesus Christ is. This places such knowledge in a proper order and so
a true picture begins to emerge. Further pieces of the jigsaw can then be added to the
sketchy outline of human nature as more reflection on human nature is undertaken in
response to what has been revealed. Christian morality is humankind's glad response
to the deed of God 'which has restored, proved and fulfilled that order, making man free
to confonn to it'.24
An example of the different approaches to classical thought in Maclntyre and
O'Donovan is provided by Augustine's treatment of slavery. Augustine drew on
classical thought about human nature yet redefined it in reference to the revelation of
God in Jesus Christ. Thus, in contrast to Aristotle and Plato, for whom slavery was
natural, Augustine understood slavery to result from the Fall and not to be part of
nature. He states: '[God] did not wish the rational being, made in his image, to have
dominion over any but irrational creatures, not man over man, but man over beasts.
Hence the first just men were set up as shepherds of flocks, rather than as kings of
men.'25 Augustine's treatment of whether men are 'naturally' slaves or not
exemplifies O'Donovan's conception of the relationship between grace and nature.
For O'Donovan, the fragmentary knowledge in classical thought about human nature
is properly grounded in the revelation of Jesus Christ and the proper order of creation
is thus able to be apprehended. By contrast, for Maclntyre, the problem is not that
Plato and Aristotle fundamentally misapprehended the created order, but that their
account of that order was insufficient to furnish them with a true understanding of
whether humans were naturally slaves or not.
Within O'Donovan's conception of 'evangelical' moral knowledge, Christian ethics
becomes a fruit of the Spirit, for it is the Spirit which 'forms and brings to expression
the appropriate pattern of free response to objective reality': 26 that is, it is the Spirit
which enables humans to respond subjectively to the objective, created order of things
24 RMO, p. 76
25 Augustine, City of God, XIX, p. 15.
26
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which has been restored and vindicated by Jesus Christ in his resurrection. The proper
form this pattern takes is kwe, which is itself ordered and shaped in accordance with the
order it discovers in its object. It is the task of Christian ethics, guided by the Spirit, to
trace, participate in and so bear witness to this ordering of love.
We can conclude this description of O'Donovan's conception of natural and
evangelical knowledge, as distinct from Macintyre's conception of moral knowledge,
by noting that, while there is considerable possibility of convergence between
Maclntyre and O'Donovan, O'Donovan's conception of a distinct 'evangelical'
moral knowledge, unknowable except by revelation, does raise serious questions
about Maclntyre's conception of the incommensurability between Christians and
non-Christians and his account of how to resolve ethical disputes between them.
Prior to addressing the question of whether Maclntyre takes sufficient account of the
incommensurability between Christians and non-Christians, we must first consider
Maclntyre and O'Donovan's respective accounts of sin.
3.3.2 Sin and the inherent disarray of moral discourse
Having understood O'Donovan's conception of knowledge, we must now consider
why he thinks knowledge of creation is problematic. Given O'Donovan's emphasis on
the revelation of who God is as the starting point for reflection on the world, we must
begin by considering the life of Christ. Christ's life is one of conflict between true
human life and misshapen human life. For O'Donovan, in the present age, the false
excludes the true. This exclusion of true human life by its parody may happen through
structures of domination or injustice, or it may occur at a more personal level through
temptation to compromise, for example, seeking sexual satisfaction outside of its true
place. However, the resurrection declares this exclusion of true human life temporaly.
The implications of the exclusion of true human life is that, in this age, there will be
goods that cannot be fully enjoyed given the present alienation between humankind and
the created order that we see played out in Christ's crucifixion. For example, sexual
desire and satisfaction is a good of creation, but given its present distortion, humans are
unlikely to enjoy it hi its proper form.
At the root of the exclusion of true human life by misshapen human life is the fall.
The fall distorts the human capacity to know and will the good. In the fall we lost our
place in the universe (which is intimately bound up with ordering our lives toward the
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love of God), and so we lost our understanding of the proper relationship between
Creator and creation which is the ground of the inteffigibility of the created order.
Despite this, the universe, though fractured and broken, displays the fact that its
brokenness is the brokenness of order and not merely disordered chaos. 27
 Man in his
own strength either tries to participate in the created order of God; or through his flulien
knowledge completely misconstrues or misinterprets this order. This results in both
idolatry (primarily in the form of self-love) and abuse of creation. In contrast, Christian
morality, which entails proper participation in the created order, involves both a re-
ordering of the will and new moral knowledge. This re-ordered will and true sight of
the created order results from participation in the life of God, empowered by the Spirit,
through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
it is important to note that ODonovan is not saying that revelation in Christ
completely replaces our fragmentary knowledge. The Christian moral thinker has no
need to deny or destroy what she finds valued in any culture, including her own, neither
does she have to prove that anything of worth in them arises out of Christian influence.
But she cannot simply embrace the perspectives of any culture, be it liberal, Hindu, or
otherwise. As O'Donovan argucs the Christian can only approach other cukures and
traditions critically
evaluating them and interpretmg their significance from the place where true knowledge of
the moral order is given, under the authority of the gospel. From that position alone can be
discerned what there is to be found in these various moral traditions that may be of interest
or of value.28
While Maclntyre does allow for the impact of sin (it is incorporated into his
account of Thomistic Aristotelianism via Augustine), O'Donovan's account, as
stated above, is filler and more systematic. O'Donovan's account of sin gives rise to
a stronger sense of the inherent disarray of all moral discourse in every period of
history. Unlike Maclntyre, who holds that the depth of disarray in contemporary
moral discourse is a new phenomenon, peculiar to modernity, and unlike (hisez, who
thinks that while the 'culture of death' is serious, it does not prohibit rational
deliberation about morals, O'Donovan maintains that the disarray of contemporary
moral discourse is the particular, modem manifestation of an inherently fragmented
area of human knowledge apparent in one shape or form in all periods and cultures.
27 RMO, p. 88
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For O'Donovan, the only way to have a secure and coherent understanding of
morality is to reflect and deliberate on morality in the light of who Jesus Christ is.
There is no ground in fallen history on which to gain access to reality, for what is
arbitrary cannot provide security. O'Donovan states: 'To repudiate arbitrariness, we
must regain contact with that which is not arbitrary.' 29
 Neither reason, nor will, nor
any human action can enable humans to regain contact with that which is not
arbitrary. Rather, true cognition of reality depends on the re-orientation of the will
and reason to their object. This is what is meant by 'conversion'. As O'Donovan
puts it:
Conversion, then, is not something in which either the will or the reason has a leverage
upon the other, by virtue of a residual connection which either can claim with objective
good. It is an event in which reason and will together are turned from arbitrariness to
reality, an event which is 'miraculous' in that there are no sufficient grounds for it,
whether rational or voluntative, within the subject himself.30
Or we might add, within any given tradition. Between fallen human history and the
new creation, there is a radical discontinuity between the old will and the new one,
and between the old knowledge and the new one. By contrast, and even allowing for
his notion of 'epistemological crises', Maclntyre fails to account for the need for
conversion.3 ' Maclntyre, following his reading of Augustine, accepts that the human
will 'is systematically misdirected and misdirected in such a way that it is not within
its own power to redirect itself.' 32 But he does not have a sufficient grasp of how
deeply human knowledge Is affected by sin. In contrast to O'Donovan, Maclntyre
does not see human knowledge as inherently arbitrary and fragmentary.
As stated before, O'Donovan's tradition-specific account raises questions about
Maclntyre's generic account of the differences between Christians and non-
Christians. The primary question is: does Maclntyre allow for greater
commensurability between Christians and non-Christians than O'Donovan's
p. 90.
29 RMO, p.113
30 Ibid. As we shall see later, O'Donovan's account of conversion is commensurate with his account
ofjustification and election. Conversion constitutes the re-directing of the human will and knowledge
to their ontological justification and flilfllment in Christ.
' For a positive assessment of Maclntyre's notion of 'epistemological crises' in relation to resolving
disputes between Christians and non-Christians see Stanley Hauerwas, 'The Non-Violent Terrorist: In




tradition-specific account actually allows for? The answer is 'yes and no'. We shall
now seek to analyse why we have given this answer.
3.4	 A comparison of O'Donovan and Macintyre's conceptions of how
morality is grounded and mediated
We have shown that O'Donovan's explicitly theological account of ethics leads to
a different conception of moral knowledge from that of Maclntyre. We shall now
compare and contrast their respective accounts of the authority or the ground on
which knowledge of morality is based, and how they understand knowledge of
morality to be mediated. Comparing and contrasting Maclntyre and O'Donovan on
these two issues will clariQv the differences between them in relation to their
respective accounts of the incommensurability between Christianity and other moral
traditions. If it is the case that O'Donovan's account of incommensurability is
substantively different from, and raises questions about, Maclntyre's, then
Maclntyre's account of how, in practice, Christians might resolve ethical disputes
with non-Christians must be analysed further. If, on further analysis, Maclntyre's
account is rejected, then another approach needs to be formulated for thinking about
relations between Christians and non-Christians with regard to ethical disputes.
3.4.1 Different conceptions of what authorises moral knowledge
Both Maclntyre and O'Donovan hold that 'natural' knowledge is, to a greater or
lesser degree, only known via a particular tradition. In relation to morality,
Maclntyre emphasises how knowledge is relative due to its contextual character,
while O'Donovan gives greater weight to sin as the cause of its relativity. This does
not imply that morality itself is relative. Both Maclntyre and O'Donovan agree that
there really is a moral order humans can conform to. However, while there is a
definitive shape to nature which presses in upon and limits human action, there is no
way to determine which of the regularities we encounter in nature should be counted
as normative for determining moral action. it is at this point that differences between
Maclntyre and O'Donovan emerge. Both understand the natural order to be opaque
in its meaning, but while Macintyre seeks to determine what is normative via a
dialectic of tradition-guided rationalities, O'Donovan understands nature to have an
unmediated authority and Divine authority to be the only secure means by which to
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determine normative moral thought and action. We shall now assess their respective
accounts of the role of nature and tradition in authorising moral action.
First, it is important to distinguish between 'morality' and 'moral action'. When
we refer to 'morality' we are referring to the moral order as a totality. By 'moral
action' we mean particular attempts to correspond to this over-arching order.
Morality of itself is grounded in the creation or natural order. Moral action is not.
This is because it is part of the human endeavour to conform to the over-arching
order of things, and as such, it is subject to the finitude, contingency and falleness of
human knowledge of that order. Therefore, the question to ask in relation to moral
action is: how can we determine whether moral action is in conformity with
morality?
3.4.2 The authority of nature and tradition
Like Maclntyre, O'Donovan has a correspondence theory of truth. As noted
above, tradition does not provide a rational foundation for knowledge, but it is vital
for the transmission of morality and for enabling moral action. However, in
O'Donovan's view, to ground knowledge of morality on tradition would be to
mistake communication of knowledge (which has its own particular kind of
authority) for knowledge itseffl 33
 The truth or falsity of this knowledge can only rest
on whether it corresponds to reality, whatever a tradition decrees. For example, a
tradition may hold that the earth is flat, but reality will intrude upon this doctrine.
This is not to say that for O'Donovan the authority of tradition is not a legitimate
form of authority.
There is a close affinity between O'Donovan and Maclntyre in their conception of
the role of tradition in relation to determining moral action. For O'Donovan all
common knowledge, in that it is possessed by a society (as distinct from being
possessed by a group within society) is possessed through the medium of tradition.
In specific relation to the Christian tradition, O'Donovan identifies four loci of moral
authority. 34
 First, he includes in tradition not only the formulated moral wisdom of
Oliver O'Donovan, 'What Can Ethics Know About God?' (Paper presented at the Doctrine of God
and Theological Ethics Conference, King's College, London, 30th April 1997), p. 5.
' Oliver O'Donovan, 'Moral Disagreement as an Ecumenical Issue', SCE, 1.1 (1988), 5-19.
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the past but the whole record of the way the Christian life was lived by former
generations in the history of the Church: the ensemble of story and memory as well
as of thought. The second locus is moral norms. Within a tradition there is a special
place for moral norms (the identification of generic principles or policies), which
communicate the intelligible structure of the community's life. O'Donovan states:
'Such norms are valid only insofar as they succeed in giving faithful expression to
the tradition, just as the tradition is valid only insofar as it succeeds in giving faithful
expression of what has been disclosed to us in Christ.' 35 Norms, like tradition,
require the disciplines of critique and engagement. Without norms though,
obedience to Christ's call would be over-laborious and impracticaL Third, there is
the didache or teaching ministry. This keeps the commands and teaching of Christ
and the story of his life, death and resurrection, vitally present to the mind of the
church so that they distinctively shape the thought and action of its members.
Fourth, there is the conscience of the Christian agent. The individual has a particular
authority to speak what the law of Christ demands of her in any situation.
Again, like Maclntyre, O'Donovan believes that the recognition that moral
knowledge is tradition-situated does not necessitate scepticism or relativism. It does,
however, make such knowledge problematic, because a spurious appearance of self-
evidence may attach itself to opinions simply because they are widely or historically
held within a tradition. However, O'Donovan, like Maclntyre, makes allowance for
the problematic Ilature of moral knowledge by requiring that we engage in the
disciplines of tradition-situated rationality. These are the disciplines of reasoning
and engagement (exposing our ideas to argument from other traditions). 36
 These
disciplines ensure that a tradition remains open to greater discernment of the moral
order. A central part of the practice of these disciplines is dialogue with the past.
O'Donovan states:
Ethics m my view cannot be studied seriously unless it is studied with a historical
dimension; for without a dialogue between the ages, we can frame no serious critical
questions about the prejudgements with which our society approaches practical
reasoning.37
O'Donovan, 'Moral Disagreement as an Ecumenical Issue', p. 16.
36 For O'Donovan's systematic account of moral reason see Oliver O'Donovan, 'Christian Moral
Reasoning', in New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology, ed. by David Atkinson and
David Field (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995), PP. 122-127.
'What Can Ethics Know About God?', p. 6. Cf. Oliver O'Donovan, On the 39 Articles: A
Conversation with Tudor Christianity (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1986), p. 8; and p. 14. In this book
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These disciplines belong to the process of tradition formation, and for O'Donovan,
the above ways of testing claims are built into the activity of social communication
embodied in a tradition.
Beyond this point, O'Donovan and Maclntyre part company in their conception of
the relationship between morality and tradition. As we look more broadly at the role
O'Donovan assigns to tradition within his schema we see he circumscribes its role
severely. For O'Donovan, tradition is but one of a number of natural authorities. He
identifies four forms of natural authority: beauty, age, community and strength
(which includes the range of natural virtues from might to wisdom). For him
tradition is merely part of the natural authority of age. This hints at the more
substantive point that nature itself is not an inert, meaningless thing waiting to be
assigned meaning. Rather, it has its own inherent meaning and authority.
O'Donovan states: 'The created order carries its authority for action in itself; because
agents, too, are a part of the created order and respond to it without being told to.'38
This natural authority is given/created by God and so has a created independence and
order that can evoke a proper response, undetermined by tradition. Hence, far from
being something we choose or construct or which is solely dependent upon tradition,
moral reasoning must treat morality as a claim upon humans. O'Donovan states:
What we recognise when we recognise a moral claim is the claim of certain generic
categories of relation that can be grasped as transhistorical realities. Through the
concrete moral demands that we encounter we hear the distant call of an intelligible
world-order. [...] The moralist, by reflecting upon the conditions for the certainty of
moral utterances, has come to the point of positing something ontological, a moral order
that is part of reality.39
While knowledge of this objective moral order can be common knowledge through
being the possession of a community via tradition, the moral order has authority of
its own independent of tradition.
There is still the problem of determining how we can say that the regularities in
nature with which we are confronted are normative. To this problem Maclntyre and
O'Donovan present different responses: Maclntyre relies solely on tradition-guided
there is an inherent respect for tradition as a proper and worthy conversation partner in the
discernment of truth in relatiofi to the presuppositions of a particular community.
38 RM0,p. 127
39 0'Donovan, 'What Can Ethics Know About God?', p. 7.
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rationality, whereas O'Donovan secures moral knowledge in Divine authority. We
will now analyse O'Donovan's conception of Divine authority, especially how Christ
and the Spirit serve to make this authority present to humans. This analysis is
important because it is O'Donovan's conception of Divine authority, and the role of
Christ and the Spirit in relation to morality, that most sharply distinguishes
O'Donovan's theologically derived account of ethics from Maclntyre's account. It is
on the basis of O'Donovan's account, especially his account of the role of Christ and
the Spirit, that we will assess the adequacy of Maclntyre's account of the
incommensurability between Christianity and other moral traditions.
3.4.2.i Divine authority in relation to tradition
In O'Donovan's work, the Divine authority is absolute authority since it commands
us as absolute reality. O'Donovan states: 'Authority presupposes a foundation in being,
and, just as truth prevails over the natural authority because it is the truth of reality as a
whole, so divine authority will prevail only because it belongs to that first reality in
which truth is grounded.'4° ODonovan argues that the only appropriate response to
Divine authority is trusting obedience since this is the only appropriate self-critical
reaction on man's part. This in turn renders any other form of natural authority,
including the authority of tradition, contingent.
Divine authority is not oppressive or destructive, because it is rooted, through Christ,
in the created order. O'Donovan states:
Since the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, transcendent divine authority has
presented itself as worldly moral authority. It comes to us not as a mysterium tremendum
which simply destroys all worldly order, but as creation restored and renewed, to which God
is immediately present in the person of the son of man. The teaching and life of Jesus must
be morally authoritative if we are not to be thrown back upon the gnostic gospel of a visitor
from heaven who summons us out of the world.4'
This reaffirms that the kingdom of God is not in opposition to creation; rather, the
incarnation and resurrection, the divine 'yes' to creation, is the foundation of ethics.
Therefore, we look to Christ to determine true moral action because Christ is Divine
authority made present to and in the creation order. In looking to Christ we can see
the totality of things and thus we can situate our particular actions in relation to their
place in the whole.
40 RM0,p. 132
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ODonovan points out that the content of Christ's teaching is not unique (the content
of his teaching is replicated by others with no relation to Christ or Christianity). To say
it was would be to confuse what Christ said with the foundation on which he said it.
Any number of people can say: Forgive your enemies'. The point at which Christ
becomes irreplaceable is as the ground of the moral order, for in his resurrection God
publicly and cosmically vindicated the moral order. This is not to say that his moral
teaching is irrelevant: the reverse is true. The moral teaching of Christ is good news: it
is evangelical because it speaks of Christ's redemption of all things. Jesus Christ is
ultimately authoritative for morality because he constitutes the ontological ground of
morality. Thus, the uniqueness of Christian morality does not lie in the teachings of
Christ, but in the nature of the teacher.
Christ's authority is also historicaL For God confers meaning on a particular event
giving it unique significance within the flow of other similar events. Thus it is Christ,
the Word of God, who confers upon the totality of events their shape and point as
bistory'. This leads ODonovan to contrast Christ's historical authority (which can
reconcile) with his moral authority (which can only judge). If Christ is the ultimate
authority in relation to morality, then anything that does not conform to Christ must be
judged as not moral. However, the passing of histoiy enables that which is not moral to
be reconciled with, and so conformed to, Christ. Within history it seems as if there are
contradictory actions in God's relationship to the world; for example, the genocide of
the Canaanites when Israel enters the promised land seems to contradict Christ's
sacrificial selfgiving in order that all people might be reconciled with God. However,
Christ draws together in one narrative these seeming contradictions so as to serve one
historical purpose. In the case of the example, the treatment of the Canaanites relates to
God as judge and the revelation of the impact of God upon mankind; whereas Christ's
sacrificial seff-giving relates to the form of the moral life; both have their reconciliation
in Christ. While there may be moral conflicts in the 'story', these are reconciled through
seeing the whole picture at the summing up of history. Christ's life, death and
resurrection are the revelation of this 'summing up'.
3.4.2.ii The authority of the Holy Spirit in relation to tradition
41 RMO,p. 143.
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If Christ re-establishes the ground of creation, it is the Holy Spirit who makes this
present to us and enables us to participate in it. The role of the Spirit in relation to
morality is crucial to understanding a properly Christian account of ethics and how
Christian ethics differs from and converges with the morality of non-Christians.
O'Donovan states that it is the Holy Spirit who makes the authority of Christ's
eschatological triumph subjectively present and immediate to us 42 O'Donovan says of
the work of the Spirit, firstly, 'that the Spirit makes the reality of redemption, distant
from us in time both present and authoritative', and secondly, that the Spirit 'evokes
our free response to this reality as moral agents.' 43 The events of Jesus' life, death,
resurrection and ascension shape our present reality through the actions of the Spirit
who makes this history present: 'The work of the Holy Spirit defines an age - the age
in which all times are immediately present to that time, the time of Christ.' 44 Indeed,
it is the Spirit who makes the eschaton present to us, bringing the reality Christ has
established to bear upon our Ihilen reality:
The effect of this is twofold: our world is judged, and it is recreated. [...1 The Holy Spirit
brings God's act in Christ into critical opposition to the falsely structured reality in which
we live. At the same time and through the same act he calls into existence a new and
truer structure for existence.45
Thus the Spirit gives substance to the renewed creation in Christ, giving it historical
embodiment in present human decisions and actions. We can already begin to see
that the role Maclntyre gives to tradition in transmitting moral knowledge is severely
curtailed in the light of O'Donovan's account of the role of the Spirit.
Ultimately, it is the Spirit who enables true judgement and action. Character or
virtue may well be enabled by the Spirit, but, on O'Donovan's account of the role of
the Spirit, and in contrast to Maclntyre's position, character and virtue in isolation
cannot be relied upon to enable true judgement and action. it is the Spirit who
enables authentic agency, both by the individual and the community through time, by
enabling them to participate in the order of creation by true knowledge and action.
Such knowledge and action is the basis of freedom. There is thus an intrinsic






an ordered reality, and the action of the Spirit in enabling this on the basis of the
actions of Christ. Hence, ethics for O'Donovan has a Trinitarian nature. To be
moral is to be judged and re-created by Christ and so free to direct oneself, through
knowledge and actions, to one's eschatological transformation; which is being
accomplished now through the priestly actions of Christ with the Father, in which we
can participate through the actions of the Spirit.
As we saw in the first chapter, Maclntyre offers an account of how morality is
ultimately secured by Divine authority. Crucially, what is distinct about
O'Donovan's approach is that this authority is immediately available and present
through the actions of Christ and the Spirit. Furthermore, this comparison between
Maclntyre and O'Donovan draws out the ambiguity of whether Maclntyre takes
sufficient account of the incommensurability between Christian and non-Christian
moral knowledge. O'Donovan's account of the 'evangelical' nature of Christian
morality, and the need for 'conversion', would seem to suggest that Maclntyre fails
to appreciate the depth of the differences. However, O'Donovan's insistence on the
authority of other natural authorities, and the circumscribing of the role of tradition
via the unmediated action of Christ and the Spirit, indicates that Christians and non-
Christians can share moral knowledge independent of their respective traditions. We
shall now analyse this ambiguity in more detail.
33 The ambiguity of Maclntyre's account of incommensurability in the light
of O'Donovan's theological account
On the basis of O'Donovan's account of Christ and the Spirit in relation to
tradition, we can derive an important criticism of Maclntyre's approach: that is,
theologically, Maclntyre over-emphasises the role of tradition. This in turn leads
him to misconstrue the nature of the incommensurability between Christians and
non-Christians. In contrast to Macintyre, O'Donovan wants to avoid what he calls
an 'angel-ecciesiology': that is, after Christ, there is no longer any need for
mediating structures (or angels) between God and His people (as there was for the
Israelites) because, through Christ, all may now have direct access to God.
O'Donovan argues that after Christ tradition may not be the sole means by which
Christ's moral law is mediated to individual Christians.
	 When tradition is
RMO,p. 165
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understood to be the sole means then the church becomes the only route to the
formation of Christian thought and action. Yet to say the church and tradition are the
only route to the formation of Christian thought and action ignores the actions of
Christ and the Spirit. We shall now analyse how the kind of over-emphasis on the
role of tradition that O'Donovan argues against, and to which Maclntyre falls prey,
constitutes a denial of the possibility that individuals may encounter the moral
authority of Christ by means other than the tradition of church law and discipline.
3.5.1 Ethics as tradition-situated and not tradition-guided
Central to understanding the relativity of tradition in relation to Christian thought
and action is the role of the Holy Spirit, who re-directs us, on the basis of what Christ
has achieved, to our redeemed, and reconciled, life in God. If Christ is the one in
whom all things hold together, the Spirit is the one who maintains the particularity,
distinctiveness, and uniqueness through the Son, of each within this unity. 47
 In doing
so, the Spirit sustains our humanity by enabling us to participate in the renewed
creation, and its moral order, in a truly human way. The consequence of this is that
the Spirit breaks down the need for a particular tradition to mediate participation in
the moral order and enables direct communication with God. O'Donovan clarifies
this when he states:
It is the Holy Spirit who bears witness with our spirit, addressing us at the seat of our
individual agency and teaching us to pray the Abba prayer with Jesus (Rom. 8:15-16). And
it is the Holy Spirit who breaks down the Mosaic mediatorial community-structure, which
concealed God as much as it revealed him, and who creates a different relationship of
freedom and openness within the Christian community.48
An over-emphasis on tradition is, for O'Donovan, a denial of the work of the Spirit.
It masks the possibility of direct relationship with God, mediated through Christ and
the Spirit, and not through tradition. 49 The reliance on tradition in the formation of
moral judgements in Maclntyre's conception of ethics seems to fall prey to precisely
O'Donovan's criticism of 'angel-ecciesiology'.
O'Donovan understands Christian ethics not to be tradition-guided but Spirit-
47 RM0, p. 199. CL, Cohn Gunton, The (Jie, The Three and The Many: Goat Creation and the




guided. It is the Spirit who guides us into all truth. Tradition is a means of
mediation, which, while it might be a condition of; is not sufficient for, guiding us
into truth. Some might argue that there is no need for tradition if it is the Spirit who
guides Christians into truth. However, even though the risen and ascended Jesus
Christ exists as a present reality, he cannot be known apart from the Jesus of
scriptural description. This in turn is mediated through the tradition of interpretation
(which is theology) and of embodied practice. Christians measure the shape and
authenticity of their interpretative and embodied response to Christ through dialogue
with scripture that is the primary and authoritative testimony to human responses to
Jesus, empowered by the Spirit. As Cohn Gunton frames it:
Tradition is necessary because the present Jesus is the one who at a particular time in our
past lived a certain life, died upon the cross and was raised from the dead for our
justification, and as the Lord both absent and present is mediated in different ways by
scripture and its tradition of interpreters. Tradition in the church, then, is a process of gift
and reception in which the deposit of faith - the teaching and ethics of the Christian
community - is received, interpreted and handed on through time.50
O'Donovan affirms the above in conceiving tradition in terms of a legacy, or an
inheritance, we living receive from the dead. However, this legacy is not mere
diachronic transmission; rather, it must involve a synchronous sharing, for it is 'a
passing round of goods among contemporaries rather than a handing-on.'5'
O'Donovan comments further: 'The monstrous inequity of generational succession is
that all our possession becomes a kind of robbery, something we have taken from
those who shared it with us but with whom we cannot share in return.' 52
 It is only
through the Spirit that such a synchronous sharing is possible, and it is then only
really possible at the parousia when this age is fulfilled and the resurrection of the
dead makes equal and reciprocal sharing among generations a dynamic reality.
Those who have responded to the Spirit's prompting now (and in the future) inherit
from, and look forward to, the day when they wifi share with those who have gone
before. The Christian tradition is thus a fruit of human responses to Christ,
empowered by the Spirit.
49 RM0,p. 168
° Cohn Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), p. 103.
51 Desire, p. 287.
52 Desire, p. 288.
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In an attempt to formulate a definition of tradition in the light of O'Donovan's
theology we can say the following: our knowledge and moral practice is tradition-
situated, but the Spirit validates it as true knowledge, and Christ is the ground and
object of this knowledge. In this age, our knowledge is partial and necessarily
tradition-situated, and we accept the revelation of the truth in faith, via the actions of
Christ and the Spirit. Therefore, the Christian tradition provides the resources for,
and the means of transmission of, human knowledge of Jesus Christ and human
responses to acts of the Spirit. In short, the Christian tradition constitutes the
concrete accretion in Scripture, social practices and doctrine of redeemed humanity's
response to Christ, empowered by the Spirit, within the rightly ordered creation and
through history. As such, tradition is the living faith of the dead. Tradition-situated
ethics helps shape human responses to Christ, led and empowered by the Spirit, in
harmony with previous faithful responses. Indeed, the living faith and faithful
testimony of the dead, encountered in their concrete accretion in Scripture, social
practices and doctrine, furnish faithful living in the present with the necessary
material resources for truthful responses to Christ.
On the basis of this definition of the Christian tradition in the light of
O'Donovan's theology, we can summarise the differences between Maclntyre and
O'Donovan in relation to the role of tradition in Christian thought and action. In
short, where O'Donovan sees Christ and the Spirit as the determining authority for
making moral judgements, Maclntyre sees tradition as having that determining
authority. On the basis of O'Donovan's theological account of the role of tradition in
relation to Christian thought and action we can say that Maclntyre over-emphasises
the role of tradition in relation to ethics. However, Maclntyre himself is not unaware
of this problem.
3.5.2 Transcending relativism: Christ or dialectics?
There appears to be an ambiguity at the heart of Maclntyre's ethics. The
ambiguity centres on whether Maclntyre's account of the role of tradition in guiding
moral thought and action is consistent with his account of how different moral
traditions resolve ethical disputes. We shall now analyse a number of criticisms of
Maclntyre. The point of this analysis is not to decide whether the criticisms are
justified or not. The purpose of drawing attention to the various criticisms of
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Maclntyre's account of how different traditions resolve ethical disputes is to
highlight the ambiguity at the heart of Maclntyre's account of the
incommensurability between different moral traditions. If it is the case that there is
ambiguity about whether Maclntyre's account of the role of tradition in guiding
moral thought and action is consistent with his account of how different moral
traditions resolve ethical disputes, then its adequacy for furnishing Christians with an
account of how to engage with non-Christians in relation to ethical disputes is called
into question.
Some commentators see Maclntyre avoiding the problem of an over-reliance on
tradition as the ground of moral thought and action by resorting to an exterior
process of rationality: namely, dialectics. As noted previously, many criticised After
Virtue as slipping into relativism. 53
 However, as already stated, in his later work,
Maclntyre has developed a conception of natural law. This move has involved
Maclntyre in placing much greater emphasis on human rationality per Se. To some
commentators Maclntyre has gone too far in this direction. For example, John
Milbank argues that:
Maclntyre's realism conflicts with his historicism, and [...1 he actually downplays the
potentially more relativizing, rhetorical aspects of Aristotle. This means that Maclntyre
is more firmly bound within Aristotle's ethical categories than Aristotle himself, by
making them more emphatically a matter of universal reason and natural law.54
Michael Banner is another such commentator. Banner notes how Maclntyre seeks to
offer an account of moral reasoning and justification as highly tradition-specific,
whilst at the same time offering an account of how traditions may lay claim to, and
indeed contest alternative claims to, rational justification. Banner considers
Maclntyre's position to 'represent a continuing affinity with the so-called
"enlightenment project" of which Maclntyre has been such a stern and penetrating
critic.' 55
 This 'continuing affinity' is witnessed in Maclntyre's 'presentation of the
resolution of the dispute between moral realism and moral relativism as one which
depends crucially on the willingness of advocates of a realist viewpoint to maintain,
inter a/ia, that any moral tradition they support be capable of exhibiting its
Cf., RMO, p. 222.
' Milbank Theology and Social Theory, p. 339.
55 Michael Banner, 'Turning the World Upside Down - and Some Other Tasks for Dogmatic Christian
Ethics', in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), pp. 1-46 (pp. 42-43).
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argumentative superiority to its rivals.' 56 John Milbank makes a similar criticism
when he states that: 'Maclntyre totally subordinates the telling and acting out of
different stories [or narrative traditions] to the dialectical process of question and
answer which gradually opens up for us 'reality'. 57
 In other words, Maclntyre is
criticised for responding to the charge of relativism by resorting to a schema whereby
the rationality of one tradition must be proved to be philosophically better than that
of a rival tradition.. Milbank and Banner are suggesting that for Maclntyre rationality
is not tradition-guided, as we originally suggested, but is grounded on a prior,
universal rationality. While this circumvents the problem of his 'angel-ecciesiology'
it does introduce the same problem highlighted in relation to (hisez's work: that is, it
introduces a reliance on an autonomous, universal rationality that takes insufficient
account of Divine authority and the particularity of 'evangelical' moral knowledge.
Another commentator on Maclntyre, David Fergusson, also argues that Maclntyre
is not a relativist. However, against those, like Banner and Milbank, who say
Maclntyre resorts to a quasi-foundationalism, Fergusson contends that Maclntyre
does not believe in a rationality antecedent to, or independent of, any tradition by
reference to which one tradition can prove itself superior to others. For Fergusson,
Maclntyre's position is that there is an 'ad hoc commensurability', which allows for
gradual absorption from one tradition to another and for common ground to be
established. 58
 If this were the case, then the accusation that Maclntyre posits an
autonomous, universal rationality would be forestalled.
If Fergusson is correct in his analysis of Maclntyre, then Maclntyre's account
could furnish us with an adequate account of how Christians can engage with non-
Christians in relation to ethical disputes. The reason for its potential adequacy as an
account of how Christians are to relate to non-Christians are as follows. Given the
previously argued contention that Christ and Spirit are not limited to the Christian
tradition, resolving disputes between Christians and non-Christians cannot simply be
56 BaI	 Turning the World Upside Down, p. 43. For the clearest statement of this position in
Maclntyre's work see Aiasdair MacJrnyre, 'Morai Rejativism, Truth and Justification', in Moral Truth
and Moral Tradition: Essays in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe, ed. by Luke
Gorrnally (Dubiin: Courts Press, 1994), pp. 6-24. See also Mark Kingwell, A Civil Tongue: Justice,
Dialogue and the Politics of Pluralism (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p.
131.
" Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 344.
58 David Fergusson, Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), pp. 131-37.
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a question of one tradition being philosophically vindicated over another. There will
of necessity be an ad hoc commensurability because Christ and the Spirit are at work
in other traditions and therefore Christians should expect to find convergence with
other traditions. Furthermore, all traditions are subject to the natural authorities and
so Christians should expect to discover parallels between their approach to certain
moral problems and the approaches established in other traditions. However, it is on
the issue of the means of evaluation that Christians come into conflict with non-
Christians. It is at this level that the question of incommensurability is raised. Christ
is the sole measure of truth and thus it is only on the basis of what accords with
Christ that Christians can resolve disputes with their neighbours. Therefore, any
account of relations between Christians and non-Christians with regard to ethical
disputes must account for a degree of both continuity and discontinuity between
Christians and non-Christians. Fergusson's interpretation of Maclntyre suggests
Maclntyre can take account of this simultaneous continuity and discontinuity.
The theological ground of the necessity of continuity and discontinuity between
Christianity and other traditions is set out in the doctrine of eschatology. Within an
eschatological framework the Spirit is understood to make present the restored and
fliffilled creation now, to all people everywhere; however, the restored and fuffilled
creation will not be fully present until Christ returns. The theological premise that
the ascended and absent Christ is made present by the Spirit to humans, while we
await the full disclosure of Christ's kingdom, emphasises how Christians exist
between two ages. The result of Christians selcconsciously living between this age
and the next is that they are marked off from non-Christians, not by race, or culture,
or even by religion, but by their union with Christ whose ascension marks a
relativisation of this age and the inauguration of the new age. Christians must accept
this situation of continuity and radical discontinuity with those around them.
O'Donovan's ethics represents a self-conscious attempt to spell out the ethical life
amidst this tension. We shall now analyse whether Maclntyre is open to such an
account. We will undertake this analysis by re-visiting the issue of whether
Maclntyre's account of the role of tradition in guiding moral thought and action is
consistent with his account of how different moral traditions resolve ethical disputes.
3.5.3 Ad hoc commensurability or a clash of traditions?
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It is our contention that what Fergusson suggests is the right direction, but he is
wrong to describe it as the direction Maclntyre takes. Maclntyre give too much
significance to the internal coherence of traditions to be proposing we should look
for 'ad hoc commensurability'. Likewise, the break up of coherent traditions appears
to Maclntyre to be a tragic loss. In Maclntyre's view, currently we all stand 'betwixt
and between' a variety of traditions from which we draw our resources. 59 Miroslav
VoW notes that for Maclntyre: 'Being "betwixt and between" presents an inconsistent
and unstable state. The person living "betwixt and between" is neither a "citizen of
nowhere", as a good liberal should be, nor "at home" in a tradition, which is where
any wise person would want to be.' 6° Volfs account of Maclntyre is at odds with
Fergusson's reading of Macintyre. In VoWs view, far from positing an ad hoc
model of relations between traditions, Maclntyre demands traditions engage one
another in a coherent and unified manner. This leads to a highly conflictual model of
relations between traditions. VoW comments: 'The more integrated traditions are, the
more their relations will be agonistic. One tradition struggles against another, its
justice against the justice of another tradition, until one defeats the other by proving
itself rationally superior.' 6 ' By contrast, VoW suggests that traditions themselves are
never 'pure' but, through their history of interaction and encounter, they themselves
depend and draw on other traditions. He proposes, as Fergusson does, that we do not
seek overall victory but look for piecemeal convergence and agreement. For this
'more modest' endeavour, VoW believes that Maclntyre's tradition-based conception
of justice and rationality is helpful. it is helpful because Macintyre is right to argue
that we need some means of determining how traditions might relate as 'thick' moral
discourses. However, success or failure in determining how traditions can relate as
'thick' moral discourses does not preclude, prior to any conclusions about the ability
of traditions to relate as 'thick' moral discourses, there being an ad hoc
commensurability between the moral and social practices of Christians and non-
Christians. It does, however, demand retaining theological presuppositions as the
criteria for evaluating what is morally right. A question remains as to whether
Maclntyre gives an adequate account of how the Christian tradition can relate to
Wi, p. 397
60 MirosJav Vo1f Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of identity, Otherness, and
Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), p. 209.
61 Volf Exclusion and Embrace, p. 207. Stout makes a similar observation: cf., Jeffiey Stout,
'Homeward Bound: Maclntyre on Liberal Society and the History of Ethics', Journal of Religion, 69
(1989), 220-232 (pp. 230-3 1).
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other traditions as a 'thick' moral discourse in such a way that it does not preclude
there being ad hoc commensurability between Christians and non-Christian moral
and social practices.
Fergusson thinks a theologically specific approach can be accommodated within
Maclntyre's framework. He holds that Maclntyre, following Thomas, conceives of
grace as converting partial understanding. He states: 'Maclntyre approaches Aquinas
primarily as a resource to complement and correct an Aristotelian moral
philosophy.'62 This would seem to draw Maclntyre closer to O'Donovan's
theologically specified position. However, as Fergusson himself says: 'If the
Christian life is viewed merely as the correction of the moral life, the radical nature
of God's grace is threatened.' 63 For Fergusson this is a lacuna in Maclntyre's
work rather than a fatal flaw. He is confident that theology can fill this lacuna and
still retain Maclntyre's framework. However, we must assess whether Fergusson is
right to suggest Maclntyre's account of how to resolve ethical disputes between
Christians and non-Christians is open to a more theologically specific approach to
the same issue; that is, do the omissions in Maclntyre's account represent a lacuna
(and thus is Maclntyre open to theological specification) or do these omissions
represent a fundamental flaw in Maclntyre's thesis?
In the rest of this chapter we shall assess whether Maclntyre is open to theological
specification. In the next chapter, we will continue to analyse what is entailed by ad
hoc commensurability between the moral and social practices of Christians and non-
Christians. This assessment will be carried out in the light of an analysis of
Maclntyre's concrete suggestions for how Christians are to engage the contemporary
context.
3.6	 Maclntyre's openness to theological specification
Maclntyre cannot be blamed for not giving an account of the role of Christ and
the Spirit in relation to the nature, authority and mediation of moral knowledge. He
is after all a philosopher and not a theologian. However, the critical question that
must be addressed is this: is Maclntyre's generic account open to further
62 Fergusson, Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics, p. 135. This is contrary to Milbank's view
as stated above. Milbank sees Maclntyre as closer to Aristotle than Aquinas in method and content.
63 Ibid.
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specification in the light of O'Donovan's 'thicker' Christian account of the nature
and basis of ethics? The answer is ambivalent. As we have seen there is much that
can be taken up, as the convergence and continuities analysed above between
Maclntyre and O'Donovan's accounts demonstrate. However, there is a fundamental
difference between the shape of Maclntyre's ethics and that of O'Donovan's
explicitly Christocentric ethics. The differences between Maclntyre and O'Donovan
in relation to how tradition is relativised and how Christ and the Spirit make moral
knowledge available point to a very different overall shape to their ethics, and thus to
their conception of the relationship between Christians and non-Christians with
regard to ethical disputes.
Stanley Hauerwas, whose own work can be seen as the most consistent attempt to
make use of Maclntyre's account of ethics, brings into sharp focus the underlying
issue we have been hinting at. Hauerwas questions whether Maclntyre's teleology is
compatible with Christian eschatology. Hauerwas states: 'It is an important and
largely unexplored question as to what the relation may be between Paul's
eschatology and the teleology insisted upon by Maclntyre.' 65
 Hauerwas does not
address this question at all; however, it forms one of the key questions of this thesis,
for central to this question is how we understand tradition in relation to eschatology
and, consequently, what is the nature of the relationship between Christians and non-
Christians with regard to ethical disputes. We shall examine the question Hauerwas
poses through a further comparison of O'Donovan and Maclntyre. The primary
point of contention that needs investigating is Maclntyre's metaphysics and whether
it is sufficiently open to theological considerations or whether he is insufficiently
attentive to the very tradition from which he claims to derive his substantive theory.
3.6.1 The need for an eschatological horizon
For references to the direct influence of Maclntyre on Hauerwas see: The Peaceable Kingdom, p.
xxv, p. xiii; p. xix; and there are a further seven strategic references to Maclntyre's work in this book.
He admits his debt to Maclntyre in Charles Pinches and Stanley Hauerwas, Christians Among the
Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modem Ethics (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1997), p. 60, and makes substantive use of Macintyre's work elsewhere in the
book. See also Stanley Hauerwas, 'Medicinie as Tragic Profession', in Truthfulness and Tragedy:
Further Investigations into Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977)
where Hauerwas makes use of Maclntyre's earlier work. This connection is made by numerous
commentators on Hauerwas's work. See, for example, Joseph Woodill, The FelIoiship of L4fe: Virtue
Ethics and Orthodox Christianity (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998), p. 5-6.
65 jwas Christians Among the Virtues, p. 118.
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We shall now assess Hauerwas's question about whether Maclntyre's teleology is
compatible with Christian eschatology through contrasting Macintyre's conception
of time and history with that of O'Donovan.
From the emphasis on Christ and the Spirit in O'Donovan there emerges very
different conceptions of time and history to those at work in Macintyre. O'Donovan
understands there to be a single reality which itself is under transformation by the
eschatological kingdom of God: hence God already determines the 'future'. We can
encounter history and novelty without terror because God has revealed the overall
shape of things and its destiny in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
This contrasts sharply with Maclntyre for whom the shape of reality is opaque and
the future undetermined.
Perhaps unsurprisingly for someone primarily concerned with moral philosophy,
Maclntyre lacks an eschatological perspective. However, as we have seen, there is a
shape to his conception of time. It is our contention that the implications of his
conception drive his ethics in a distinctly unchristian direction. For Maclntyre, the
true meaning of history is immanent within history and so is something to be
established through human endeavour rather than received from God. O'Donovan
disagrees fundamentally with this view.
Both O'Donovan and Maclntyre want to see a proper conception of teleology re-
established as a central feature of moral discourse. Furthermore, both see all things
as created with inherent possibilities or ends. However, Maclntyre's teleology is
wrong in the eyes of O'Donovan. O'Donovan has an eschatological teleology that,
while aflirming the created independence of nature and the ordering of nature to
certain ends, holds that these ends find their resolution and perfection in the eschaton
and not in creation. The fuffilment of these ends is only possible insofar as they
participate, through the Spirit, in the new creation established by Christ's
resurrection and ascension. After the fall, the true direction of creation's teleology is
re-established in Christ. That which does not participate in Christ has a 'misdirected
progress' and can in no way fuffil itself out of its own resources. In direct contrast
to Maclntyre's position, perfection within an eschatological teleology denotes radical
Desire, p.251.
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transformation, so that the perfection of nature is not immanent within itself but is
given by God.
Maclntyre's latent historicism comes to the fore at this point. For him the
meaning of history and its direction is implicit in its own possibilities. In this
respect, he is similar to Grisez in that there can be nothing truly 'new': creation, and
human action within creation, are conceived of as the limit of possibilities. For
O'Donovan, history does not contain all possibility immanent within itself. Just as
creation is distinct from history, so is the fuffilment of history - the eschaton -
distinct from the historical process. It is Jesus Christ alone who confers destiny and
purpose to history; history cannot achieve this for itself nor can it justi1r itself. Only
Christ is 'worthy to open the scroll' and reveal the meaning of history.67
At the heart of this difference is the distinction between Maclntyre's historicist,
protological teleology and O'Donovan's Christian eschatological teleology. For
O'Donovan, the transformations by man within history are entirely different in kind
from the transformation God is bringing about. For unlike man, God is not just
responding to the necessities intrinsic to creation, but is doing something new. As
O'Donovan puts it:
The transformation is in keeping with the creation, but in no way dictated by it. This is
what is meant by describing the Christian view of history as 'eschatological' and not
merely as 'teleological'. The destined end is not immanently present in the beginning or
in the course of the movement through time.6$
John Zizioulas clarifies this when he says:
In the eschatological approach [...] the Spirit is the one who brings the eschata into
history. He confronts the process of history with its consummation, with its
transformation and transfiguration. By bringing the eschata into history, the Spirit does
not vivif' a pre-existing structure; He creates one; He changes linear historicity into a
presence. It is no longer possible to understand history simply as 'past', i.e. to apply to it
the psychological and experiential notion of anamnesis in the sense of the retrospective
faculty of the human soul. When the esehata visits us, the Church's anamnesis acquires
the eucharistic paradox which no historical consciousness can ever comprehend, i.e. the
memory of the Jut ure.6
67 RMO, p. 85.
6$ RMO, p. 64.
69 John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (New York: St
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), p. 180.
-130-
Christ's resurrection has the double aspect of being resurrection from death (thus
redeeming creation) and glorification at God's right hand (thus looking forward to the
eschatological transformation, as distinct from a revolutionary or teleological
transformation). By contrast, Maclntyre's ethics is not open to the possibility of this
kind of newness or transformation.
An eschatological conception of history and teleology allows for radical newness
and continuity and openness to genuine development rather than fulfilment of what is
already present. It is our contention that a truly 'Christian' ethic must be open or
have space for this kind of eschatological transformation. Through an assessment of
O'Donovan's eschatology, we shall analyse why this is the case, and by implication,
why Maclntyre's lack of openness to eschatology is not just a lacuna, as Fergusson
believes it is, but a fatal flaw. We can then begin to see why Maclntyre's account of
how the Christian tradition can relate to non-Christian traditions is inadequate.
The key to understanding this emphasis on eschatological teleology for
O'Donovan is his doctrine of justification and predestination. Thus, his concern for
eschatological teleology in ethics springs from some of the fundamental building
blocks of Christian life and thought. For O'Donovan, justification is a total relation
to Christ whereby we are never independent in any of our actions from Christ, each
action being justified by Christ's prior action. When we speak of justification as
finished and accomplished this does not apply to our individual lives. Rather it is
finished and accomplished in world-history. O'Donovan states: 'The individual
biography moves, not in an upward curve away from the resurrection of Christ as a
starting point, but in a circle around it, always in the same relation to it.' 70 This does
not deny individual progress and development in Christ, but it does deny a
biographical relation whereby justification is a starting point. We are always
justified in Christ, from beginning to end: our indebtedness is 'coextensive with life
itself. 7 ' God created humans to be a certain way: being more or less human does not
merit favour with God. Participating in the life of Christ is what finds favour, and
that is dependent on God.
70 O'Donovan, On the 39 Articles, p. 80.
' O'Donovan, On the 39 Articles, p. 81.
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Directly related to O'Donovan's account of justification is his conception of the
doctrine of predestination. O'Donovan describes this doctrine as follows:
Predestination, like justification, is salvation in Christ; but where justification associates
us with the righteousness of Christ made manifest in his human life, predestination
associates us with the eternal relation between Son and the Father before all time.[. . .]The
phrase "chosen in Christ" is not to be understood as though we were chosen and he was
merely the instrument by which our choosing was given effect. We are chosen in him,
because he is the chosen one, the eternal object of the Father's good pleasure. Just as our
justification means our participation in his righteousness, so our predestination, our
'election', means our participation in his position as the object of the Father's favour
from eternity.72
Predestination, or the doctrine of election, is a formal way of expressing our
participation in the communion of the Trinity.
This understanding of justification and predestination underpins O'Donovan's
conception of the moral life as 'good news'. For the moral life bears witness to the
possibility of true life: the life of the Trinity. Hence, the structure of the good life is
not that of a proto logical teleology wherein true life is born out of the substance of
nature. Rather, true life lies in greater participation in the freedom that already exists
in the Trinitarian communion of God. Thus, human fulfilment is not constituted by
the resolution of inherent possibilities but the moving into previously defined and
already achieved relations. In saying this, we are not setting up a false dichotomy
between the potential of creation and its fulfilment in the escbaton; rather, the issue is
whether one views creation as the limit of possibility or whether Christ can introduce
something new into creation. In short, if Christ's fulfilment of creation does involve
something new, then human fulfilment is not dependent on anything immanent
within creation; instead, we can seek, by faith, and empowered by the Spirit, to
anticipate and participate in the new future already established by Christ. By
contrast, Maclntyre's ethics postulates precisely the kind of protological movement
that is challenged by this eschatological approach.
A further criticism that transpires from O'Donovan's eschatological teleology is
that Macintyre fails to see that tradition is a child of time which has an end: this end
being the eschaton. For without eschatology there is no ultimate horizon to, and
transformation of the present, only an endless dialectic of traditions. Thus there is
no stable vision of the good life. It could be argued that Maclntyre anticipates the
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time when one tradition - Thomist Aristotelianism - vindicates itself against all other
traditions. Then its vision of the good life would predominate. However, there is a
false messianism here whereby Maclntyre hopes one particular tradition will be
vindicated above all others by its own rational superiority. For O'Donovan, it is not
rational superiority that will be vindicated as the means of resolution, but the true
Messiah, the good and faithfiil servant. Neither can a single tradition provide us with
the definitive vision of the good life, only Jesus Christ can.
Maclntyre's lack of an ultimate horizon, due to his protological teleology, means
he is unable to specily how ethical disputes can finally be resolved. Insecurity is
inherent in his framework: despite one tradition vindicating itself over another, there
is always the possibility that another tradition might arise which can usurp the former
victor. There is no room for slipping into such insecurity in Christianity: the gospel
is good news precisely because the future is already achieved in Christ and we can
now trust that goodness and justice will prevail against all that oppose their
establishment. Despite our present problems in resolving ethical disputes, we know
now that all disputes are ultimately resolved in Christ. We must ask therefore,
whether Maclntyre's meta-theory of how to resolve disputes is an appropriate model
for Christians to use.
In addition, we must question Maclntyre's essentially pessimistic outlook on
history that arises from this lack of eschatology. At the end of After Virtue
Maclntyre concludes that we have entered a 'new dark ages' of 'barbarism and
darkness'. His ground for hope is the possibility of constructing 'local forms of
community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be
sustained'. 73 This is a slender hope. Without Christ and the Spirit, these local forms
of community wifi have no light to bring to the 'new dark ages'. In contrast,
O'Donovan understands the 'future' as determined by the eschaton that is constantly
breaking into the present. Therefore, the future is secure and provides light, however
dark the present age.
This lack of a secure future has a direct implication for Maclntyre's central
concern that justice should not be what the strong make it. Maclntyre, through his
72 O'nov On the 39 Articles, p. 83.
-133-
substantive thesis about tradition-guided rationality, wants to suggest that justice can
be found in a particular tradition and at a local leveL By his own admission, the
justice found in these places is flawed and constantly in need of improvement.
Furthermore, precisely at the point at which he seeks concrete guidance to shape
present resistance to the incursions of advanced capitalism and the bureaucratic
nation-state he resorts to invoking Utopian fantasies. He states in relation to his
concrete suggestions about how to shape local politics: 'These are of course Utopian
standards, not too often realized outside Utopia, and only then, as I have already
suggested, in flawed ways.' 74 It seems that for Maclntyre true justice is firmly
established nowhere and can be seen only in Faustian dreams of Utopia, which, time
and again, are both conservative and more oppressive than that which they seek to
rectify.75 This resort to Utopia makes Maclntyre guilty of precisely the charge which
he levels at Aristotle: that is, the justice he seeks can neither be found nor
established. It is the eschatological vision of Christianity that is lacking at this point
and this lack gives rise to Maclntyre's essentially pessimistic view. By contrast, for
O'Donovan justice is found and firmly grounded in the ascended Christ. O'Donovan
does not look to this world for justice, but looks to the in-breaking kingdom of God,
established by Jesus Christ, in whom the nations are to put their hope (Mt. 12:2 1) and
whose justice rolls like a river from heaven (Amos 5:24). This is not a utopian,
protological vision, but an eschatological one. Its form is neither oppressive nor
unrealisable. Rather, it is present by the Spirit who enables true freedom and 'just
generosity' both in the church and in a limited form in the state when political
authority acts in accord with its subjection to Christ's rule. 76 It is on the basis of this
eschatological vision, in contrast to Maclntyre's Utopian dreams, that we shall seek
to offer a constructive proposal for how Christians and non-Christians can relate in
the contemporary context.
3.6.2 A perpetual dialectic as against an eternal peace
This comparison between Maclntyre and O'Donovans' conception of time and
history reveals that the shape and trajectory of Maclntyre's work is very different to
AV, p. 263
' Dependent, p. 145.
" See Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (London:
Verso, 1983), pp. 72-74; and David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity: An Enquiry into the
Origins of Cultural Change. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 14-15.
76 Desire pp. 233-34; and for his critique of utopianism see: Desire, pp. 228-29.
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one born out of attention to distinctively theological presuppositions. The heart of
the problem seems to be Maclntyre's realism which owes more to the metaphysics of
Aristotle than a distinctively Christian, Trinitarian ontology. Maclntyre needs an
ontology properly attentive both to creation and to eschatology. Hence, if it is to be
sufficiently open to theological development, Maclntyre's conception of tradition
should be shaped by an eschatological teleology and not shaped by a protological
teleology. O'Donovan's theologically specified account of the end of the moral life
as a gift from God calls into question whether Maclntyre's conception of tradition
can be of use in determining how Christians and non-Christians should relate with
regard to ethical disputes.
The implications of this difference in Maclntyre and O'Donovan's respective
conceptions of time and history is played out in Maclntyre's ultimate vision of
human relations, which may or may not be Christian. Milbank and Hauerwas make
the point that Maclntyre's basic vision of relations is one of violence, and has no real
place for the peace achieved by Christ on the cross and through the resurrection. On
the basis of the above discussion we can add that in contrast to a theologically
specffied account, Maclntyre's conception of ethics as protological allows for no
eschatological space of stable, peaceful communion present now in human relations.
Milbank argues that Maclntyre's second order theory of how different traditions
relate seems to ontologise violence as basic to reality. He notes that Maclntyre never
avows a heroic conception of virtue and the overcoming of difference through
competitive conquest. 77
 This is pressing because the pagan account of virtues is
founded on a politics of violence and exclusion, which is radically different from the
account of the virtues given in Christianity. Milbank identifies the key difference in
the respective accounts of virtue as being between Greek arete and Christian caritas.
Hauerwas, who shares Milbank's concerns, states:
Arete has meaning in relation to a fundamentally heroic image that has no telos other than
conflict. The hero vanquishes his foes, and the virtues are his wherewithal, as well as
those traits for which he is accorded honor in the polis he violently defends. By contrast,
caritas, the very form of the virtues for Aquinas, sees the person of virtue as essentially
standing in mutuality with God and with her fellow human being.78
Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 352-3.
78 Hauerwas, Christians Among the Virtues, p. 63.
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This difference leads to a greater contrast that Maclntyre never identifies: that is,
the contrast between the Greek polis and the church. Following Augustine, Milbank
and Hauerwas see the church, in so far as it is based on caritas and not arete, as
bringing to the polis the possibility of true peace. Hauerwas states:
In effect, the ancient world knew no peace, it knew only the absence of conflict in an
exclusive polis where the virtuous life always took meaning and direction from heroism
in war. [...] Unlike arete, Christian charity [...] transcends a model of the person whose
telos involves the practice and perfection of the virtues in conflict, and it offers the new
political possibilities of mutuality and community that previously were inconceivable.79
Thus in the church it is peace (defined by Jesus Christ) and not violence which is
ontologically basic. Maclntyre, however, admits his revival of virtue leads to
conflict, but he thinks this conflict can be managed via dialectics. But as Milbank
notes, dialectics are no more than Greek conceptions of the normative character of
violence writ large. We see this played out in Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry where each tradition competes against rival versions for the prize of
dialectical superiority. This is especially clear in the last chapter wherein Maclntyre
uses this competition as the basis for a new vision of the university as a place of
'constrained disagreement'. Hauerwas notes that 'Maclntyre has no means, and
perhaps no desire, to stop the war, nor to confine it to discussions occurring among
academics in the university.' 80 Therefore, because Christian ethics must take account
of the future already achieved in Christ, its conception of how Christians engage with
non-Christians in relation to ethical disputes cannot be determined by Maclntyre's
meta-theory of how different traditions relate to each other. To let Christian ethics
be determined by Maclntyre's meta-theory would be, on the basis of the comparison
with O'Donovan and the above criticism made of Maclntyre by Milbank and
Hauerwas, to import a framework that was alien and incompatible with Christian
presuppositions.
3.7	 Evaluating the adequacy of Maclntyre's account of how to resolve
ethical disputes
In the light of this comparison between Maclntyre and O'Donovan, the validity of
Maclntyre's meta-theoiy of how different traditions relate is undermined as an
appropriate model for Christians to follow. From the above comparison we can draw
Hauerwas, Christians Among the Virtues, p. 65.
Christians Among the Virtues, p. 67.
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two conclusions: firstly, Maclntyre underestimates the discontinuities between
Christians and non-Christians; and secondly, Maclntyre over-emphasises the role of
tradition in guiding ethics. Hence, the whole question of whether Christians can ever
really resolve disputes with their neighbours is raised once more. We will now
summarise these conclusions.
3.7.1 Maclntyre underestimates the discontinuities between Christians and
non-Christians
We have analysed how for the Christian tradition Jesus Christ is the only secure
way of knowing the good. Those who do not evaluate moral issues in the light of
who Jesus Christ is will not share the same evaluative criteria as Christians.
Maclntyre's proposal that Christians might prove their tradition to be of greater
philosophical sufficiency than rival traditions allows for this. However, it neither
takes adequate account of sin (and hence the need for conversion), nor the
distinctiveness of 'evangelical' moral knowledge, nor how the Spirit guides all moral
knowledge, including that of non-Christians. The central difference between
O'Donovan and Maclntyre is founded on their respective accounts of the teleology
of the moral life. O'Donovan takes account of eschatology, while Maclntyre does
not. Within his eschatological framework, O'Donovan is able to account for the
continuity and radical discontinuity between this age and the age to come. It is our
contention that O'Donovan is thus able to account for the continuity and
discontinuity between Christian and non-Christian approaches to morality.
Maclntyre, by contrast, is ambiguous in relation to the continuity and discontinuity
between Christians and non-Christians. On the one hand Maclntyre emphasises the
role of tradition in determining moral judgement, but on the other, the basis of this
judgement is secured through a dialectical process independent of any tradition.
3.7.2 Maclntyre over-emphasises the role of tradition in resolving moral
disputes
The distinctively Christian cosmology, which we have set out above, leads us to
repudiate Maclntyre's conception of resolving ethical disputes being understood in
terms of how the Christian tradition relates to other traditions. Tradition has a
proper, created, authority, but it is only one of a number of such created authorities.
Like all created authorities, the authority of tradition is subject to the fall and
contingent upon Divine authority. In Christ, and through the Holy Spirit, created
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authorities are now re-directed to their true fulfilment. Furthermore, we can now
encounter Divine authority directly. Thus, the work of Christ and the actions of the
Spirit both reveal the limits tradition can play, and relativises its importance in
enabling moral action. The eschatological horizon of true action relativises the
significance of tradition-situated ethics: we look forward to a time when no
mediation, via tradition, between God and humans is necessary, nor between one
generation and the next, for we shall participate fully in the presence of God and will
share equally and reciprocally with everyone, including past generations. Therefore,
we find Maclntyre's conception of the problem in terms of how the Christian
tradition (or in his case the Thomist Aristotelian tradition) relates to other traditions
as not taking into account this wider cosmological framework. In turn, his lack of
this distinctively Christian cosmology leads him to rest too much weight on the
coherence and integrity of a tradition. Instead, greater attention needs to be given to
the ad-hoc nature of commensurability between Christian and non-Christian
approaches to moral problems and the way in which Christians live 'betwixt and
between' different traditions.
3.8 Summary
This chapter, through comparing Maclntyre and O'Donovan, has shown that
Maclntyre's account of the incommensurability between Christians and non-
Christians is too ambiguous and not sufficiently open to theological specffication to
be useful in furnishing us with an account of how Christians can resolve ethical
disputes with non-Christians.
We began this chapter by accepting Maclntyre's diagnosis of the contemporary
context as commensurate with a theologically derived diagnosis as set out by
O'Donovan. We then considered if we should accept Maclntyre's account of
whether Christians can resolve ethical disputes with non-Christians, and if so, how
this can be done. We addressed this by comparing Maclntyre's conception of the
difference between Christian and non-Christian moral thought and action with
O'Donovan' s.
Maclntyre holds that Christians can, in a systematic fashion, resolve ethical
disputes with their neighbours. Foundational to Maclntyre's conception of how
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Christians can relate to, and resolve disputes with, non-Christians, is his notion that
Christianity can recommend its view as better on the basis of its greater philosophical
cogency for the purpose of dealing with ethical questions. How it does this is
worked out through Maclntyre's meta-theory of how traditions relate. By contrast,
O'Donovan does not think Christianity can wholly recommend its ethics on such a
basis. For O'Donovan, the nature and basis of Christian ethical thought and action is
divergent with that of other traditions. As far as O'Donovan is concerned, Maclntyre
fails to pay sufficient heed to the way in which Christian ethical action is not known
solely by participation in a tradition, but is revealed by Jesus Christ. This is to say
both that Jesus Christ is the content of the knowledge Christians hold and that this
knowledge is made 'subjectively' available to them by the actions of the Holy Spirit.
For O'Donovan, Christians may not be able to resolve disputes with non-
Christians on the basis of Christianity's greater philosophical cogency for the
purpose of dealing with a particular ethical problem. This is not to say that Christian
and non-Christian approaches to specific moral issues are necessarily
incommensurable. O'Donovan holds that because Christians and non-Christians
share the same 'moral field' (that is, they both participate in the created order) there
may well be similarities between their respective approaches to particular moral
problems. O'Donovan can even allow for a dialectic between traditions in a manner
similar to Maclntyre's meta-theory. However, any similarity will only ever be
partial and any resolution achieved through a dialectic of traditions will be
incomplete. The 'evangelical' moral knowledge which Christians possess - that the
created order is fallen, reconciled, and redeemed - can be known only through the
revelation given in the Christ-event. This 'evangelical' knowledge is one that cannot
be inferred from anything within the created order. According to O'Donovan, this
knowledge cannot be inferred for two reasons. Firstly, human knowledge of the
created order is fallen and therefore impaired. Secondly, this evangelical knowledge
is knowledge about the destiny or telos of the created order, and knowledge of this
destiny does not emerge from within that order but is a gift given by God. Therefore,
the emergence of the new, eschatological order (which is both the end and fulfilment
of the created order) cannot be revealed by anything within the existing order. Thus,
in O'Donovan's view, the only secure knowledge we may have of this order is
revealed knowledge. To take an analogy, it is as if we had a sequence of numbers
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and wanted to know how the sequence continued and ended. The ordering principle
of such a sequence is not given within the sequence itself but must be disclosed by
the originator of the sequence. Neither is the end of the sequence given within the
sequence itselt we can only be given the ending. Any attempt to explain Christian
moral practice that does not take account of Jesus Christ - the revelation of the
ordering principle of the created order and its telos - is doomed to arbitrariness.
Thus, philosophy that only takes into account the created order cannot provide a
basis for resolving disputes between Christians and non-Christians. To attempt to
ground the resolution of ethical disputes between Christians and non-Christians on
philosophy alone would, according to O'Donovan, be arbitrary. Instead, sight of any
possible resolution can only be gained from the perspective of the created order's
telos and this is only given in the revelation of Jesus Christ.
No amount of philosophical prowess can 'convert' a non-Christian to the way in
which Christians approach moral questions. Such conversion is only possible by the
whole person participating in Christian patterns of thought and action: that is,
thought and action directed to Jesus Christ and empowered by the Holy Spirit. This
thought and action is exemplified by acts of worship (for example, prayer and the
eucharist) however, it is not restricted to such acts. As the Anglican dismissal prayer
reminds us, all forms of life and work can be to God's praise and glory. It is at this
point that we can recover something of Maclntyre's own substantive theory with its
focus on practises and virtue both of which emphasise the embodied and
participatory nature of moral formation and decision-making. We shall argue that it
is only by participation in direct relationship with God and patterns of sociality (that
is, Christian practices) that are faithful responses to, and orientated toward, God, that
non-Christians might come to accept the whole response of Christians to moral
issues. Conversely, through the participation of non-Christians (who are coming into
relationship with God) in Christian practices, Christians will have their own
approach questioned. This questioning opens up established patterns of Christian
sociality and responses to moral issues to revision and further specification. The
emphasis here is not, as Maclntyre supposes, on philosophical prowess, but on the
nature of the relationships in which a person is participating. As O'Donovan puts it:
'True knowledge of the moral order is knowledge "in Christ".' 8 ' This is distinct
RMO, p. 85.
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from Macintyre's meta-theory because the point of 'conversion' from one tradition
to another is not just an 'epistemological crisis' but involves an ontologically
changed relationship to God. The result of this change is that the person seeks to,
and is able to, participate in communion with God, and the patterns of thought and
action that are a response to this relationship.
The substantive differences between Maclntyre and O'Donovan centre on their
different conceptions of the role of tradition and its authority in ethical judgements.
O'Donovan conceives the role and authority of tradition in grounding and
determining Christian thought and action to be relativised by the authority and role of
Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, the contrast between O'Donovan's
eschatological teleology and Maclntyre's protological teleology undermines
Maclntyre's conception of Christianity as a distinct and rival tradition in competition
with other traditions.
In the light of this critique of Maclntyre's concept of how to resolve ethical
disputes between Christians and non-Christians we can now evaluate Maclntyre's
proposed response to the contemporary context of moral discourse. This will involve
setting out Maclntyre's proposal and then assessing it in the light of the above
theological critique. This assessment is necessary in order to discern whether what
Maclntyre proposes is suitable as a model for structuring relations with non-
Christians in the contemporary context.
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Chapter Four
The challenge Oliver O'Donovan poses to the adequacy of Alasdair
Maclntyre's conception of how Christians and non-Christians can relate in
practice with regard to ethical disputes in the contemporary context
4.1	 Introduction
Our purpose is to address the question of whether Christians can resolve ethical
disputes with their non-Christian neighbours in the contemporaiy context. We have
been assessing whether Maclntyre can provide us with an account of whether and
how this is possible. Having set out Maclntyre's conception of the differences
between Christians and non-Christians, and his framework for how Christians can
resolve disputes with their neighbours, we then challenged this account by
comparing it with that of Germain Grisez. While Grisez agreed with Maclntyre that
disputes between Christians and non-Christians are amenable to resolution, he does
not consider resolving ethical disputes to be as problematic as Maclntyre does.
However, we concluded that Grisez's challenge did not undermine Maclntyre's
conception of the incommensurability between traditions. We then sought to
challenge Maclntyre's work from a different perspective, by asking whether
Maclntyre's account of the differences between Christians and non-Christians took
sufficient notice of the depth of the differences between them. For this purpose we
compared Maclntyre's work with that of Oliver O'Donovan. While Maclntyre and
Grisez hold that resolution of ethical differences is possible (albeit they have
different accounts of why and how this is so), O'Donovan forced us to return to the
fundamental question of whether Christians can in fact resolve ethical disputes with
their neighbours after all.
The central question that has surfaced is, how can a 'thick' account of Christian
ethics resolve disputes with similarly thick accounts in other traditions while
retaining its own distinctively Christian criteria for evaluating moral claims? On the
basis of the comparison between Maclntyre and O'Donovan we have seen that a
theologically specified account of ethics cannot vindicate itself against its rivals on
the basis of its philosophical cogency. Yet this is what Maclntyre proposes. The
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incongruence between, on the one hand, Macintyre's meta-theory of how different
traditions relate, and on the other, O'Donovan's theologically specified account of
the foundation of Christian ethics, led us to reject Maclntyre's meta-theory as
inadequate. However, what began to emerge, and what we will analyse more closely
in this chapter, is how, despite the lack of philosophical convergence, Christians and
non-Christians may share an ad hoc commensurability in relation to their social
practices. Nevertheless, we shall argue that it is only by participation in direct
relationship with God and patterns of sociality (that is, Christian practices) that are
faithful responses to, and orientated toward, God, that non-Christians might come to
accept the whole response of Christians to moral issues. The first step in this
argument has already been taken in the last chapter. This step involved assessing the
adequacy of Maclntyre's meta-theory of how different traditions can overcome their
incommensurability. The second step is to assess the adequacy of Maclntyre's
account of how different traditions relate in practice, and whether this account is
congruent with a theologically specified account of relations between Christians and
non-Christians as given by O'Donovan.
4.1.1 Chapter summary
The differences between O'Donovan and Maclntyre lead to very different
conceptions of how, in practice, Christians are to relate to non-Christians. Maclntyre
proposes both a way for the Christian tradition to relate to other traditions, and a
response to the contemporary context. Earlier we noted that Maclntyre has a first
order theory of traditions and a meta-theory of how different traditions relate. These
form the basis of Maclntyre's conception of how Christians can relate to non-
Christians and how they might resolve disputes between them. In summary,
Maclntyre conceives Christianity as a particular tradition in rivalry with other
incommensurable traditions. Maclntyre's first and second order theory forms the
basis also of Maclntyre's suggested response to the contemporary context: that is,
that particular traditions should form communities of resistance in which the
practices and rationality of that particular tradition can be lived out and the dominant,
incoherent patterns of moral discourse in the contemporary context can be resisted.
These communities of resistance can then engage in forms of 'local politics' that are
just and rational. This form of 'local politics' allows for the kind of conversation and
convergence between traditions that Maclntyre sees as crucial to resolving disputes
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between different traditions. In the light of Maclntyre's conception of Christianity as
a tradition in relation to other traditions and his suggested response to the
contemporary context, a model of Christian and non-Christian relations can be
constructed. We analyse Rodney's Clapp's suggestions for how Christians might
respond to the 'family values' debate in the USA as an example of this model.
As we focus on Maclntyre's practical suggestions for how Christians might
respond to the contemporary context and structure relations with their non-Christian
neighbours, a number of problems that we touched on in the last chapter are clarified.
These problems centre on giving an account of how Christianity can retain its
distinctive criteria of evaluation yet at the same time have an ad hoc
commensurability at the level of its social practices. The tension between the
incommensurability of Christian criteria of moral evaluation in relation to those of
other traditions and the ad hoc commensurability of its social practices establishes a
paradox. The paradox is that while Maclntyre argues for the possibility of
philosophical convergence, the model of practice he suggests is characterised by
conflict; whereas the model of practice suggested by O'Donovan's account, in which
there can be no ultimate theoretical convergence, can nonetheless, allow for a great
deal of convergence between Christians and non-Christians at the level of social
practice.
We will analyse this paradox by comparing Maclntyre's conception of local
politics with O'Donovan's account of relations between Christians and non-
Christians. O'Donovan's account of relations between Christians and non-Christians
is framed within the terms of his ecciesiology. It is framed in terms of ecclesio logy
because, while acknowledging the role tradition plays in enabling people to know
revelation, O'Donovan understands there to be more involved than just tradition.
Christians do not structure their relations with non-Christians simply in terms of how
the Christian tradition relates to other traditions. The primary category for thinking
about relations between Christians and non-Christians is 'the church', and the church
is more than a tradition, that is, it is more than a mechanism for transferring
knowledge through time. Furthermore, the terms 'the Christian tradition' and 'the
church' cannot be used as synonyms for each other. 'The church', of which
Christians are a part, makes a claim to be a way of being, an ontological category;
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whereas the term 'tradition' has no ontological reference, only an epistemological
one. O'Donovan helps us determine the relationship between Christian ethics and
ecciesiology, for his ecciesiology relates directly to his conception of Christian
ethical thought and action and how it is distinct from non-Christian thought and
action. We can then analyse how, within a theological framework, Christians relate
to non-Christians, and thus how Maclntyre's model of such relations is contrary to
this.
4.2	 Maclntyre's response to modernity
4.2.1 Local politics
In the light of his critique of post-Enlightenment thought and its embodiment in
capitalist, liberal democratic states, Maclntyre proposes some strategies of resistance.
In effect, he proposes a politics of the local community. He sees the renewal of
contemporary social, economic and political structures as emerging from local
reflection and local political structures. This is in accord with the initial emergence
of political thought via local traditions of practice and Maclntyre's substantive theory
that all rational thought and justice must be rooted in a particular tradition. It makes
sense, therefore, to seek to build up a conception of the common good from
particular, local social and political embodiments of such a conception. Furthermore,
Maclntyre has little invested in the continuation of the modem nation-state, which
can never, by its very nature, constitute the context for shared deliberative rationality
about the common good. Indeed, 'insofar as the rhetoric of the nation-state presents
itself as the provider of something that is indeed [
... J a common good, that rhetoric is
a purveyor of dangerous fictions." it is only in the context of local communities that
a common good can be rationally deliberated upon, justice secured, and that the
requisite virtues of acknowledged dependence and independent practical reason
might be nurtured.
Macintyre's emphasis on the politics of the local community does not constitute a
withdrawal into 'sectarian' ghettos and an abdicating of engagement with and
responsibility for wider society. Rather, such local embodiments of conceptions of
the good seek, and are the source of, universal conceptions of the common good that
can then be generalised as visions for the wider society. Furthermore, through
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maintaining or developing such local embodiments, one is sustaining models of what
justice should consist of and what rational debate about the common good involves.
And even prior to the adoption of a particular conception of the common good by the
wider society, particular policies can be advocated more generally as true and good
policies, since they have been tested and lived out within the politics of the local
community.
There will inevitably be dealings between local communities and both the state
and the wider market economy. Any local community will have to concern itself
with, and secure resources from, the nation state and national and international
markets. The question is whether this can be done at a price acceptable to the local
community.2
 There will also come times when such communities must align
themselves with a particular party in order to defeat such politically destructive
forces as those of imperialism, or Nazism, or Stalinist communism. 3 However, the
primary relations between the politics of the local community and contemporary
wider society, structured as it is to support the state and capitalism, will be one of
conflict, for 'the state and the market economy are so structured as to subvert and
undermine the politics of local community'.4
The basis of this conflict is clarified by Maclntyre's critique and response to the
economic order of advanced capitalism. It should be noted that Maclntyre is not
against a market economyper Se. Rather, as he puts it:
Market relationships can only be sustained by being embedded in certain types of local
nonmarket relationships, relationships of uncalculating giving and receiving, if they are to
contribute to overall flourishing, rather than, as they so often in fact do, undermine and
corrupt communal ties.5
In effect, Maclntyre is against any economic order that is structured to pursue the
goods of effectiveness to the exclusion and detriment of the goods of excellence. He
is thus as opposed to the centrally planned economies of Communist states as he is to
capitalism. However, the issue Macintyre does draw from Marx is the question of
the relationship between so-called free markets and the atomisation of society and
'DRA, p. 133





thus the eroding of local communities and ties of reciprocity. Maclntyre seeks an
economic order that is not inherently individualistic and unjust, but one that enables
reciprocal patterns of sociality characterised by justice (that is, people being treated
as they deserve according to their contribution) and generosity (that is, more than
justice requires is given). 6 While recognising that justice will always be imperfect,
he states:
Between independent practical reasoners the norms [of a just society] will have to satisf'
Marx's formula for justice in a socialist society, according to which what each receives is
proportionate to what each contributes. Between those capable of giving and those who
are most dependent and in most need of receiving - children, the old, the disabled - the
norms will have to satisf' a revised version of Marx's formula for justice in a communist
society, 'From each according to her or his ability, to each, so far as is possible, according
to her or his needs.'7
Maclntyre envisages (and at this point many would accuse him of being a
Luddite) an economic order based around small-scale producers. He states:
'Genuinely free markets are always local and small-scale markets in whose
exchanges producers can choose to participate or not.' 8 He recognises that such a
society probably could not achieve the levels of economic and technological
sophistication of advanced modernity. However, to refuse this is not irrational; it is
to opt in favour of a different conception of the common good. He states: 'The
conflict between the kinds of local community that I have been characterizing and
the international and national economic order is at the level of practice, as well as
that of theory, a conflict between rival conceptions of the common good.'9
Macintyre's call for a politics of the local community is not a call, as some have
supposed, for establishing communities that exclude dissent and are inherently
oppressive. Nothing Maclntyre envisages precludes the existence of individuals and
groups who hold radically different conceptions of the common good and who are
different from others in the community. Rather, Maclntyre thinks:
What will be important to such a society, if it holds the kind of view of the human good
and the common good that I have outlined, will be to ask what can be learned from such
dissenters. it will therefore be crucial not only to tolerate dissent, but also to enter into
rational conversation with it and to cultivate as a political virtue not merely passive
6 MaCe sees 'just generosity' as a central virtue for both oneself and others to flourish in
community. DRA. p. 122.
DRA, pp. 129-30.
Maclntyre, 'Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good', p. 249.
Maclntyre, 'Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good', p. 250.
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tolerance, but an active and enquiring attitude towards dissenting views, a virtue notably
absent from the dominant politics of the present.'°
Maclntyre substantiates this argument in Dependent Rational Animals where he
grounds toleration on the relationship between justice, practical rationality and the
virtues necessary for both. He makes the case that while the practices of giving and
receiving are exercised primarily in relation to members of one's own community
and social networks, justice requires extending this to those who are 'other' for two
reasons. First, we owe hospitality to the stranger in our midst, and second, we must
practice the virtue of misericordia: that is, the regard for the urgent and extreme need
of those outside one's immediate community." The practice of hospitality and what
is in effect neighbour love is learnt by due care of the disabled and dependent within
one's own community. It is through encounters with them that we discover errors
both in our own practical reason and in the norms of our community.' 2 Therefore, it
is through encountering diflërence - not the difference of some abstract 'Other' but
the particular differences of concrete persons - that errors in the shared deliberative
reasoning of any given community are discovered. And thus the community is better
able to transform its reasoning and practices so as to enable all its members to
flourish and all its relations, both within and with those outside the community, to be
characterised by just generosity. Conversely, Maclntyre recognises that the politics
of local community is not good per Se. He states: 'Local conmiunities are always
open to corruption by narrowness, by complacency, by prejudice against outsiders
and by a whole range of other deformities." 3
 These arise when the virtues of just
generosity and of shared deliberation are absent.
The politics of the local community seems to involve a threefold dynamic. There
is simultaneously a partial withdrawal from public debates as currently conducted, a
renewed emphasis on demonstrations of particular conceptions of the common good
in practice, and an engagement with the politics of local community wherein the
reform of practices and institutions can take place through rational debate between
rival communities of resistance. Within the societies of advanced modernity this
politics of the local community will take many forms. Embodiments of particular
'° Macintyre, 'Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good', 251.
DRA, pp. 123-28.
12 DRA, pp. 136-37.
13 DRA, p. 142.
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conceptions of the common good can be anything from a church, to household farms,
to schools, and businesses which do not subsume the goods of excellence to the
goods of effectiveness.' 4 Maclntyre states: 'We need to show as well as to say what
an adequate conception of justice amounts to, by constructing the types of
institutionalised social relationships within which it becomes visible." 5 However, to
construct such embodiments requires engaging in co-operative enterprises with those
whose point of view is very different. Thus, disagreements will be formulated in
concrete terms as we make and remake schools, clinics, workplaces, and other
institutions. Macintyre notes:
At this level, such disagreements will be local and specific, concerned with the ends and
thus the goods of particular types of policy, practice, and institution [...]. Thus, it is in
the actualities and complexities of practice that we shall be able to find opportunities of a
kind generally denied to us in the larger arenas of public debate. 16
Hence the politics of local community involves an active engagement with concrete
practices and institutions in a particular area with a constituent element of such
engagement involving embodying in a church, or some other association, the
particular conception of the common good we advocate.
Many theologians have cited this model both as a way of engaging with
modernity and as a way of resolving ethical disputes. This is because it recovers the
importance of the Christian community by placing it at the centre of distinctive
Christian witness and engagement with the contemporary context. We shall now
develop Maclntyre's implicit, normative model of relations between Christians and
non-Christians within the contemporary context. We can then assess whether this
attention to Maclntyre's work by a number of theologians is indeed justified.
4.3	 Maclntyre's conception of relations between Christians and non-
Christians
We have discussed how Maclntyre envisages different traditions to be
incommensurable, and how, given the right conditions this incommensurability
might be overcome. An example of this is a dialogue between Confucianism and
' Maclntyre excludes the tmily because 'the goods of family life are achieved in and with the goods
of various types of local community.' DRA, p. 134. He does not exclude households envisaged as
wider than the immediate or nuclear family.




 However, within the context of late modernity such conditions are
unlikely to prevail anywhere except at a local level and in a small scale way. Hence,
in the contemporary context it is necessary to establish communities of resistance
which together can engage in a rational form of local politics. For Maclntyre, the
Christian community can be just such a community of resistance.
There have been a number of attempts to describe how a Christian community, as
part of the wider tradition, might function as a community of resistance within the
contemporary context along the lines Maclntyre envisages. Rodney Clapp's
description of how Christians can engage in the American 'family values' debate
represents one such attempt.' 8 He analyses, via Maclntyre's substantive theories,
how the family values debate, structured as it is along the lines of liberalism (as
described by Maclntyre), denies the family any public status or role.' 9 Instead, the
contemporary context has restricted the role of the family to the realm of private
affection and moulded it to conform to patterns of 'economic exchange', notably
consumerism. He undertakes a genealogy of the 'nuclear' or 'traditional' family,
noting how that far from being 'natural', it emerges as a response to the demands of
industrialisation and capitalism. 2° Clapp suggests that to follow Maclntyre's
dynamic process of engagement initially entails deconstructing the dominant
narratives that shape our conception of the family. For Clapp, this means giving a
critique of what he calls the 'romantic myth'. 2 ' When engaging in debate about the
family, Clapp notes the importance of resisting the language of values and using the
language of virtues, while at the same time calling into question the paradigm in
which the family is discussed by both conservatives and liberals, neither of whom
question the incommensurable nature of the contemporary debate. However, simply
Alasdair Macintyre, 'Incommensurability, Truth and the Conversation between Confucians and
Aristotelians about the Virtues', in Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives, ed. by
Eliot Deutsch (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), pp. 104-22.
IX This is set out most explicitly in Rodney Clapp, 'From Family Values to Family Virtues,' in Virtues
and Practices in the Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics After Maclnlyre, ed. by Nancey Murphy
and others (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press, 1997), pp. 185-201.
19 Cf., Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward A Constructive Christian Social Ethic
(London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 155-74.
20 RJJ' Clapp, Families at the Crossroads: Beyond Traditional and Modern Options (Intervarsity
Press, 1993), pp. 54-66; p. 176. Clapp's analysis foreshadows Maclntyre's own critique of how the
romantic overvaluation of feeling and the reduction of human activity to economic activity has
become the predominate way of conceiving social relationships, especially the fumily. DRA, pp. 117-
l8;pp. 133-35.
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changing one's language is not enough. Clapp, again using Maclntyre's substantive
theory, conceives of the Christian family as a distinctive practice within the poiis of
the church: that is, within the institutional embodiment of the Christian vision of the
common good.22 The practice of family is itself part of the continuing argument
about what is the family within the Christian tradition. The practice is thus open to
revision and refinement in the light of the Christian conception of the ultimate good,
that is, communion with God, through Jesus Christ. Furthermore, like Maclntyre,
Clapp envisages the nurture of dependants, especially children, as schooling in the
virtues of hospitality. Such virtues are essential to the tolerance and openness to
strangers that underpins rational conversation between different traditions. 23
 Clapp
here provides a very clear example of how Maclntyre's theory might be used to
structure relations between Christians and non-Christians in relation to ethical
disputes within the contemporary context.
We can draw out three ways in which Maclntyre envisages relations between
Christian and non-Christians to be structured. At a fundamental level, both
Christians and non-Christians operate within a 'teleologically ordered [...] theistic
universe'. Within this universe natural law is the basic condition of rational
deliberation and just relations. Whether people adhere to natural law or not, it is
natural law which sets the context of relations between traditions. However, and this
brings us to the second aspect of relations between Christians and non-Christians
within Maclntyre's framework, natural law and beyond that, the understanding of the
universe as theistic, can only be arrived at from within a particular tradition. Thus
Maclntyre rejects natural theology or any notion of a universal rationality (although,
as we have seen, there is some ambiguity about this). The Christian tradition, and its
institutional embodiments, will encounter other traditions, each with its own
conception of the ultimate good. While Christianity will be partially
incommensurable with these other traditions, rational adjudication between them is
possible along the lines set out in Maclntyre's meta-theory. Maclntyre himself
provides a model of this adjudication process in his discussion of how Aquinas
synthesised Christianity with Aristotelianism. Relations between Christians and non-
21 Rodney Clapp, 'Why Christians Have Lousy Sex Lives', Regeneration Quarterly. 1.3 (1995), 7-10.
See also James McClendon's critique of romantic love: Ethics (Nashville: Abmgdon Press, 1986), pp.
133-39.
22 Clapp, Families at the Crossroads, p. 53; and pp. 114-32.
23 Clapp, Families at the Crossroads, pp. 133-48.
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Christians will be dialectical and agonistic as Christianity seeks to vindicate itself as
more rational and just than its rivals. Its relations will thus be inherently conflictual:
that is, they will be characterised by rivalry, even if they are not relations of enmity.
This clash of traditions is only possible at a local level within the contemporary
context because liberalism dominates public discourse and suppresses all other rivals,
including Christianity. Furthermore, the bureaucratic nation-state, and the dominant
economic order, actively militates against the faithful practice of Christianity, and
thus Christians qua Christians will find themselves in hostile relations with these
wider structures. This necessitates Christians forming an alternative polls within the
context of modem, liberal, capitalist nation-state, and local Christian communities
constituting communities of resistance. However, as communities of resistance they
wifi not seek their own welfare, but the 'welfare of the city' (that is the common
good), by (in the long term) enabling public debate to be more rational and the
practice of politics and economics to be truly just. While open to national and
international politics and economics, such a quest will of necessity operate at the
local level where just and rational deliberation between different conceptions of the
common good is still possible. As communities of resistance Christian communities
wifi preserve a form of life where true justice and rational debate may be known.
This activity is akin to how the monasteries preserved the same during the last 'dark
ages'.
4.4	 Critique of Maclntyre's response to the contemporary context in the
light of O'Donovan's theologically specified account of ethics
The question arises as to whether this model of how Christians relates to non-
Christians is true to the presuppositions of Christianity. In other words, given
O'Donovan's critique of the epistemological basis of Maclntyre's conception of
Christian thought and action, we must ask of Maclntyre's model whether it properly
takes into account the ground on which Christian ethical thought and action stand:
that is, does he pay sufficient heed to the self-revelation of God given in Jesus
Christ? it is our contention that while the model Maclntyre establishes of local
politics appears very compelling, it is inappropriate in the light of a theological
account of how Christians and non-Christians should relate when ethical disputes
arise. We shall now set out why this is the case.
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4.4.1 The church is more than just a tradition
As we saw in the last chapter, O'Donovan, while largely agreeing with
Maclntyre's diagnosis of the contemporary context, has a conception of Christian
thought and action and how it relates to non-Christian thought and action that is
explicitly formulated in response to the revelation of God given in Jesus Christ.
While acknowledging the role tradition plays in enabling people to know revelation,
O'Donovan understands there to be more involved than just tradition. It is at this
point that questions about ecciesiology arise.
Up until now we have been addressing the question, of how Christians resolve
ethical disputes with non-Christians in the contemporary context, in terms of how the
Christian tradition relates to other traditions. However, by moving toward the point
at which we must describe relations between Christians and non-Christians in
practical and explicitly theological terms, we must take account of ecciesiology.
Christians do not structure their relations with non-Christians simply in terms of how
the Christian tradition relates to other traditions. The primary category for thinking
about relations between Christians and non-Christians is 'the church', and the church
is more than a tradition. Furthennore, the terms 'the Christian tradition' and 'the
church' cannot be used as synonyms for each other. 'The church', of which
Christians are a part, makes a claim to be a way of being, it is an ontological
category, whereas the term 'tradition' is an epistemological term. As John Zizioulas
puts it:
The Church is not simpiy an institution. She is a 'mode of existence,' a way of being.
The mystery of the Church, even in its institutional dimension, is deeply bound to the
being of man, to the being of the world and to the very being of God. In virtue of this
bond [...1 ecciesiology assumes a marked importance, not only for all aspects of
theology, but also for the existential needs of man in every age.24
A properly theological account of how Christians relate to non-Christians with regard
to ethical disputes must take account of the role the church plays in such a process.
O'Donovan helps us determine the relationship between ecciesiology and how
Christians handle disputes with their neighbours. His ecciesiology relates directly to
his conception of Christian ethical thought and action and how it is distinct from
24 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 15.
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non-Christian action. On the basis of O'Donovan's work, we will analyse how,
within a theological framework, Christians relate to non-Christians, and the role of
the church in determining these relations, and thus how this contrasts with
Maclntyre's model of such relations. However, in order to analyse the relationship
between ecciesiology and how Christians manage disputes with their neighbours we
must first describe O'Donovan's ecciesiology.
4.4.2 O'Donovan's ecciesiology
It is necessary to establish a definition of what O'Donovan means by the term 'the
church' in order to analyse his conception of relations between Christians and non-
Christians and how this contrasts with Maclntyre's conception of 'local politics'.
O'Donovan has a threefold definition of the church. it is firstly, the invisible,
universal body of Christ, including all the elect, past and present. Secondly, it is the
pre-structural, visible, catholic church, made up of all those who profess the
Christian faith and order their lives toward God. O'Donovan states: 'The shape of
the pre-structured church, then, is the shape of the Christ-event become the dynamics
of a social identity'. 25
 Thirdly, it is the particular congregations and institutional
arrangements and orders that are expressions of this pre-structural, visthie reality.26
Any particular 'form' of the church has as its 'substance' the pre-structural catholic
church. Thus, we should expect these particular and multifarious orders to bear
generic 'marks' or 'badges' so they can be recognised as authentic signs: that is, as
having a genuinely 'catholic shape'. 27
 The first two dimensions of the Church are
creations of, and authorised by, the Holy Spirit. The third dimension is inspired by
and participates in the Holy Spirit, but is a fallen creation of humans as they seek,
drawn together by the work of the Spirit, to participate in God's life in a restored and
fulfilled creation, through the life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ.
Contingent and human churches (and their particular orders) are attempts to serve as
witnesses to, and recapitulations of, the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. In
short, the Church is the community of those redeemed and reconciled to God in
which everything is done for the sake of God (and in this lies its unity), through the
25 Desire, p. 171.
26 Cf. ODonovan, On the 39 Articles, pp. 90-96; Desire, p. 170.
27 Desire, p. 172.
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death and resurrection of Jesus Christ (its only head and authority) and in the power
of the Holy Spirit (its strength and guide).
The Church is not to be equated with the Kingdom of God: to do so would be to
espouse an over-realised eschatology. However, it is through the actions of the church
that human life and culture participate in their transformation or transfiguration. This
transfiguration is not a linear development through time in some bistoricist fushion,
but is a 'battle' between redeemed creation directed towards and anticipating its
perfection and rebellious and fallen creation. Neither is this transfiguration a
supplanting of what already exists; rather, it is a radical transformation of it. The
pattern for this transfiguration is given at the Last Supper: Christ did not provide
some alien token to remember and anticipate him by, nor did he take pristine grain
and grapes; instead, he took bread and wine, the products of human labour and
creativity and transformed them into an anticipation of their eschatological
fuffilment.28
4.4.3 Ecclesiology as a fundamental category in Christian ethics
We must now delineate how the church structures the life together and moral
thought and action of Christians. This is because the life together of Christians as the
church is central to truthful witness; it is thus a central element of how Christians
relate to their neighbours. As discussed in relation to Maclntyre, social practices are
constitutive of any traditioned ethics. They are thus one of the primary means by
which Christians encounter and engage their context. For example, while many
social practices - such as keeping the Lord's Day - are particular to Christianity,
they constitute a testimony to non-Christians of the actions of the Spirit.29 As the
church - a new and distinct community - encounters the world in a myriad of
different ways, social practices point to how Christ and the Spirit have reconfigured
and can yet reconfigure, disordered human relations into anticipations of their
eschatological fulfilment.
28 Mt. 26.26-9; Mk. 14.22-5; Lk. 22.15-20.
29 This is parallel to James McClendon's argument, for which the social practices of worship,
evangelism, establishing and maintaining community, and peacemaking (forgiveness and
reconciliation), conceived explicitly in terms of Maclntyre's framework, drive the church to engage
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The life together of Christians will take on a myriad of forms given that each
culture and period of history will provide different material for Christ and the Spirit
to transfigure. As noted above, no one shape, form or order can thus claim finality or
permanence. Rather, the church is always following after the Spirit. O'Donovan
states:
The ordering of the church's life follows its authorisation as a 'catholic' social reality by
the Holy Spirit. The catholic identity of the church derives from the progress of the
Spirit's own mission. It is therefore always larger than its ordered structures, taking its
shape from the new ground that the Spirit is possessing. It remains for the church's
structures to catch up with this mission, to discern what the Spirit has done, and to
construct such ordered links of community as will safeguard brotherly love.30
Tentativeness about speaking of any specific marks or order for the church must
be balanced with the need to describe the basic and generic shape of the Christian
community if it is to be recognised as bearing truthful witness to Christ. For
O'Donovan,, the generic shape is modelled on the Christ-event which he conceives as
the structuring principle for all ecciesiology. He states that the church 'recapitulates
the Christ-event in itself; and so proclaims the Christ-event to the world.'3'
O'Donovan summarises this dynamic thus:
Through the Spirit the church recapitulates the whole saving event, Advent, Passion.
Restoration and Exaltation. In Christ it is represented in the event; in the Spirit it
participates in it. These two aspects of the one relation to the representative act confer the
church's political identity upon it. Represented, it is authorised to represent Israel, the
people of the Kingdom [
... J. Participating, it is authorised to be the gathering nations,
finding the new world order in the rule of Israel's God.32
Given that the life together of Christians as the church is central to truthful witness,
the recapitulation of the Christ-event constitutes the basic shape of Christian moral
thought and action. Since such thought and action necessarily involves the life
together and social practices of Christians, Christian ethics necessarily involves the
church.
the fundamental power structures of the world and their disordered social practices. McClendon,
Ethics, pp. 160-86; PP. 209-39.
30 Desire, pp. 169-70.
31 Desire, p. 174. Douglas Farrow, in his extensive survey of ecciesiology affirms this, stating: 'The
ecciesial communion as such is the prophetic sign to the world that God has organized all things
around the one whom he has enthroned at his right hand. [...] It is the community of the
recapitulation.' Douglas Farrow, Ascension and Ecclesia: On the Sign/icance of the Doctrine of the
Ascension for Ecclesiology and Christian Cosmology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), pp. 32-33.
32 Desire, p. 161. Cf., Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II: 2, trans. by A. 1. Mackay and others,
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957), p. 512.
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O'Donovan identifies three basic moments to the form of the church, each of
which recapitulates a moment of the Christ-event. Each of these moments has a
corresponding social practice, which is in turn expressed in a sacrament. (It is
important to note that O'Donovan is not fixed on any particular number of
sacraments. He identffies four sacraments - baptism. eucharist, keeping the Lord's
Day, and the laying on of hands - however, this is a heuristic four, 'which helps us
trace the correspondence of the church's formal acts and observances to the shape of
the Christ-event'.) 33 First, in response to the Advent of Christ, the church is a
gathered community, exercising particular practices of community formation as
evidenced in the sacrament of baptism. Second, 'in response to the Passion of Christ
the church is a suffering community engaged in conflict with the principalities and
powers that Christ has overcome.' 34 This is experienced in the social practices of
trial and martyrdom and is expressed in the sacrament of the eucharist. Third, the
response to Christ's Exaltation is the gladness or rejoicing of the community as it
celebrates the recovery of the creation order. O'Donovan speaks of practices of
Christian morality as belonging to this aspect of the church's life together because it
springs directly from the vindication of God's rule. 35 And keeping the Lord's Day is
a sign of the church's resurrection gladness. 36 There is one further response to
Christ's Exaltation, that of the community empowered by the Spirit at Pentecost.
The response of the church is to be a community that speaks the words of God
through the practices of prophecy and prayer. O'Donovan suggests this is
symbolised in the laying on of hands which is a sign of the church's empowerment:
'By this formal means it prays for the gifts of the ascended Christ to be manifest in
the service and discipleship of its particular members.'37
In our view, O'Donovan conflates two distinct moments within his third mark,
Christ's Exaltation. It is our contention that moment three corresponds only to
Christ's resurrection. A fourth and distinct moment corresponds to Christ ascension
and the Pentecost event. We will argue later that this fourth moment is embodied in
the social practice of hospitality, which has as its corresponding sacrament feasting
Desire, p. 173. We understand a sacrament to be a ritual and symbolic enactment that draws
together the narratives and social practices of Christianity in a particularly dense locus of significance.
' Desire, p. 178.
35 Desire, p. 182.
36 Desire, p. 186.
" Desire, p. 190.
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and fasting. However, O'Donovan's overall impetus is correct. Each of these
moments, and its corresponding social practice and sacrament, structure the life of
the Christian community, which is formed in response to Christ and the Spirit, in a
particular way, so that it encounters and engages the world around it in a manner
shaped by these moments.38
4.4.4 Ecclesiology and resolving ethical disputes
Having defined what we mean by the term 'the church' and set out how the
church patterns and shapes the life together of Christians, we can now analyse how
the church qua church relates to its neighbours and how this pattern of relationship
contrasts with an account of such relations derived from Maclntyre.
Many contemporary Christian ethicists have sought to formulate the problem of
how Christians relate to and resolve disputes with non-Christians as one which
concerns an encounter between distinctive social realities: the meeting of the church
with the social realities of the 'nations'. 39 An example of this approach is the work
of Stanley Hauerwas. There is not the scope for a detailed account here, of
Hauerwas' extensive output. 4° Suffice to say that Hauerwas is a good bridge
between Maclntyre's approach to the problem of relations between Christians and
non-Christians and one that takes account of ecciesiology. We have already noted in
the last chapter the direct influence Maclntyre has on Hauerwas. Hauerwas follows
Maclntyre's account of the contemporary context and agrees that 'modern politics is
38 Cf., Barth's discussion of the twelve ministries of the church through which the church encounters
the world in speech and action as it participates in the mission of God to the world. Karl Barth,
Church Dogmatics, LV: 3, trans. by (1. W. Broiniley, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1962), pp. 864-901.
39 This does not denote the nation-state, but distinct non-Christian cultural-linguistic groups. For
example, Stanley Hauerwas uses the term in this way in the title of the following collection of essays:
Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1985).
Other examples are: John Howard Yoder, For the Nations: Essays Evangelical and Public (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997); and David Yeago, 'Messiah's People: The Culture of the Church in the
Midst of the Nations', Pro Ecclesia, 6 (1997), 146-171.
4°For an account of the development of Hauerwas' thought see Black, 'Towards an Ecwnenical
Ethic', pp. 12-17; and McClendon, Ethics, pp. 69-72. For a summary of his position see Fergusson,
Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics, pp. 48-79; Robert Jenson, 'The Hauerwas Project',
Modern Theology 8 (1992), 285-95; and Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, pp. 254-66.
For a systematic overview of his work see Samuel Wells, Transforming Fate into Destiny: The
Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1998). For a rare systematic
overview of his particular vision see Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in
Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); and idem, 'On Doctrine and
Ethics', in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine, ed. by Cohn Gunton (Cambridge:
Cambridge University. Press, 1997), pp. 21-40.
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civil war carried on by other means.' 41 More recently Hauerwas has criticised
Macintyre for maintaining a pagan, Aristotelian conception of the virtues; however,
it is clear that Maclntyre shapes several key elements of Hauerwas' thought.42
Fergusson sees a distinct shift in Hauerwas' work with the publication of The
Community of Character in 1981 where the concept of virtue is integrally related to
the social concept of a practice in a manner directly equivalent to Maclntyre.43
William Placher notes the influence of Maclntyre on Hauerwas' conception of how
stories shape communities. In contrast to Maclntyre, Hauerwas is explicitly
theological in his focus and has written extensively on the importance of the church in
Christian ethics. For Hauerwas, the church takes up the weapons of the Spirit and, in
constant conflict with its context, engages with the life of its neighbours non-
violently, participating in the civil war of modern politics as 'resident aliens'.45
Thus, Hauerwas states: 'Like [Macintyre] we believe we cannot and should not avoid
conflict. However, as Christians we simply cannot engage in armed conflict because
of our understanding of Christian discipleship. That is to say we are Christological
pacifists.'46
 For Hauerwas, if the church is involved in anything less than
antagonistic and conflictual relations with non-Christians it has become an instance
of civil religion. Hauerwas seeks to recover the basis, and witness of; a critical,
confessing church (of which the Anabaptist tradition is his primary model) within a
context where the 'Constantinian synthesis' (that is, the co-option of the church by
the political order) has broken down. 47 While the church is to be hospitable to the
strangers it finds itself amongst, the distance and difference between the church and
its neighbours means that its relations with non-Christians will always be conflictual.
An account like Hauerwas' is problematic not because conflict between Christians
and non-Christians is always wrong or bad, but because conflict is not the sine qua
AV, p. 253. For a parallel expression by Hauerwas' see: Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon,
Resident Aliens (Nashville: Abingdon, 1989), pp. 30-48; and The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 4-6.
42 For this criticism see Hauerwas, Christians Among the Virtues, pp. 61-69.
Fergusson, Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics, p. 52. For a detailed comparison of After
Virtue and A Community of Character see John Barbour, 'The Virtues in a Pluralistic Context',
Journal of Religion, 63 (1983), 175-82.
William Placher, 'Postliberal Theology', in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian
Theology in the Twentieth Century, ed. by David Ford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 343-56 (p. 349).
Ibid.; cf., Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 14-15; and pp. 114-15; and Stanley Hauerwas,
'No Enemy, No Christianity Preaching between "Worlds", in Sanctify Them in the Truth
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), pp. 191-200.
Hauerwas, Christians Among the Virtues, p. 192.
Stanley Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 9.
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non of relations between Christians and non-Christians.48 Hauerwas, along with
many others who emphasise the importance of ecciesiology to ethics, misconceive
the nature of the difference between the church and its neighbours and fail to account
for how the church is inherently both like and unlike those around it. Its likeness to
its neighbours is not only an issue of idolatiy and unfaithfiulness. While this is
sometimes the case, the church can often be like the world in good and generative
ways. It can also be unlike the world in negative and degenerative ways. This
dynamic must be accounted for theologically. It is our contention that the nature of
the difference between the church and its neighbours is only properly understood
eschatologically.
Hauerwas himself emphasises the importance of eschatology for ecclesiology and
ethics.49
 However, he never really develops an account of how eschatology relates to
the distinctiveness of Christians and how they relate to non-Christians. The roots of
this lie in the absence, in Hauerwas' ethics, of any account of the mission and person
of the Holy Spirit. This is a criticism he himself has admitted. For instance, he
accepts Reinhard HUtter's criticism that he lacks a properly pneumatological
eschatology. 5° HUtter argues this lack leads to a deficient ecclesiology in which
'God's presence and activity in the Holy Spirit is of no decisive importance for either
[Hauerwas'] ecclesiological construal or [his] ethical reflection' 5 ' Samuel Wells
(who has given the most systematic account of Hauerwas' work to date) also thinks
that Hauerwas requires a filler doctrine of the Holy Spirit. He argues this would
enable Hauerwas to account for how God's purposes are revealed and worked out
through people that do not call themselves Christian. Wells states:
This perception is desperately needed in Hauerwas' writing, lest Christians be paralysed
in their membership of other communities besides the Christian one. If the Church
48 We are not assuming that conflict is always, in some a priori way, negative and destructive.
Conflict can be a necessary and constructive part of both social transformation and the relationship
between two groups with incommensurable goals. The point at issue is whether the relationship
between Christians and non-Christians is either necessarily or normatively conflictual.
For example, see Stanley Hauerwas with Mark Sherwindt, 'The Reality of the Kingdom: An
Ecclesial Space for Peace', in Against the Nations, pp. 107-119.
° Stanley Hauerwas, 'What Could It Mean for the Church to Be Christ's Body? A Question without a
Clear Answer', in In Good Company: The Church as Polls, ed. by Stanley Hauerwas (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), Pp. 19-31 (pp. 29-30).
' Reinhard HUtter, 'Ecelesial Ethics, the Church's Vocations, and Paraclesis', Pro Ecclesiq. 2 (1993),
433-50 (p. 450). Cf., Cohn Gunton, 'The Church as a School of Virtue? Human Formation in
Trinitarian Framework', in Faithfulness & Fortitude: In Conversation with the Theological Ethics of
Stanley Hauerwas, ed. by Mark Theissen Nation and Samuel Wells (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000),
pp.211-31.
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genuinely intends to remain committed to communities other than itself, it must be
because it believes that there too God lives and reigns, and it wants to be where God is,
with the people he has made for his service.52
Mindful of this absence in Hauerwas' work, we seek to articulate how a
'pneumatological eschatology' shapes the church's distinctiveness and its relations
with its non-Christian neighbours.
It is our contention that Hauerwas' highly conflictual model of relations between
Christians and non-Christians illustrates the kind of model of relations that is derived
from Maclntyre's conception of how Christians and non-Christians are to relate in
practice. By contrast, a model derived from O'Donovan's conception of eschatology
and ecciesiology can account for both the church's distinctiveness from, and the
possibility of the church sharing its life together with, its neighbours. Thus, we shall
argue, it is not to Maclntyre but to O'Donovan we should turn for resources to think
about how Christians and non-Christians should relate in the contemporary context.
Eschatological distinctiveness is wholly different in kind from any difference or
similarity that arises as a result of tradition, ethnicity, family, culture, political
allegiance or other such human and earthly bonds. There is no clear dividing line
between the eschatological social reality constituted by Christ and the Spirit - borne
witness to by the church - and the social realities of the church's neighbours. The
Spirit is constantly bringing different social realities into relation in new ways so as
to enable the possibility that all may respond gratefully to what Christ has done and
be directed to the embrace of the Father. Those who have gratefully responded to
Christ and live faithful to that response must follow the leading of the Spirit rather
than their own arbitrary construction of what constitutes order. However, following
the Spirit might well mean copying a seemingly non-Christian social reality. For
example, Christ commends the faith of the pagan Centurion as against the
faithlessness of Israel (Mt. 8.5-13). Furthermore, this re-configuring work of the
Spirit constitutes a rebuttal of any single institution or set of social relations to claim
definitive status as the bearer of God's order. As Karl Barth notes: 'Between the
community and Christians on the one side and the rest of the world on the other,
there is a distinct yet not absolute, but only fluid and changing frontier.'53
52 Wells, Transforming Fate into Destiny, p. 98.
Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV: 3, p. 192.
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If we cannot map any clear dividing line between Christians and non-Christians
then there are a number of implications. One is that charting whether Christians and
non-Christians are agreeing or disagreeing with each other (and thus whether they
can or should attempt some kind of resolution) necessitates case by case evaluation
rather than either establishing a system for resolution as Maclntyre does, or resigning
oneself to conflict as Hauerwas does. Another implication is that, at the level of
social practice, we should expect to see both convergence and divergence of practice;
that is, the social practices of Christians will not, of themselves, always be distinctive
from the practices of non-Christians.
While no single institutional form or set of relations can claim finality of truthful
expression of God's order, we can say that the church is the place which bears
witness to relationship with God through the actions of Christ and the Spirit. It is
important to establish this in order to be clear about what makes the church
distinctive. It is our contention that, contrary to Hauerwas' position, it is not the
social practices of the church per se that distinguish Christians from non-Christians.
Instead, it is the nature of the relationship between the church and God that is
decisive in speciQying the church as different from other communities: that is,
distinctiveness lies in how God is present to and within the church. Distinctiveness
does not necessarily lie in what the church looks like or does. This is clarified and
affirmed in Paul's epistles. For example, in 1 Corinthians, Paul calls the Corinthians
to ensure that their institutional arrangements and social practices bear faithful
witness to the actions of Christ and the Spirit. He is concerned in the letter about
disunity and disorder in the life together of the community, especially in its public,
communal acts of testimony. For Paul. the church is the place where transfigured
relations should be experienced. 54 For this body, in Paul's eyes, has taken the place
of the Jerusalem Temple as the place where God resides by His Spirit. 55 The church
is a 'pneumatic place' where humans are incorporated into the ascended body of
' For a study in how Paul is addressing the degenerative relations of the Corinthian church and
calling them by a variety of means to a vision of generative sociality see Stephen Barton, 'Christian
Community in the Light of! Corinthians', SCE, !O.l (1997), 1-15.
See Barton, 'Christian Community', p. 34; James Dunn, Theology of Paul the Apostle (Edinburgh:
T&T Clark, 1998), p. 545; Gordon Fee, God's Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of
Paul (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), pp. 689-90; and for a discussion of how Jesus transcends
the Temple and in himself fulfils and replaces it see N. 1. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God,
(London: SPCK, 1996), pp. 432-38.
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Christ and experience and bear witness to the in-breaking new creation. 56
 As Gordon
Fee puts it in relation to Paul's discussion of how the church is the 'new temple' in
Ephesians 2:18-22: 'Here is the ultimate fulfilment of the imagery of God's presence,
begun but lost in the Garden, restored in the tabernacle in Exodus 40 and in the
temple in 1 Kings 8. It is God's own presence among us that marks us off as the
people of God and, in the language of Moses, is "what distinguishes [us] from all the
other people on the face of the earth" (Exod. 33:15). So not only do we have access
to the presence of God (v.18), but God himseif by the Spirit has chosen to be present
in our world in the gathered church.' 57
 Hence, the presence of God in the church
directly relates to the distinctiveness of the church from its neighbours. In short, it is
the ontology of the church (constituted by relations with God), and not its social
practices per Se, which make the church distinct as a community from other
communities. Christ and the Spirit are at work in all creation, and all may be
justified in Christ; however, before the parousia, it is given particularly to the church
to be the witness to, and the place of, transfigured social relations.58
There is a twofold aspect to how the ontology of the church constitutes its
specificity. The church is both fashioned out of the world, and hence is like the
world, and yet it is fashioned in response to the Word of God, and therefore, is unlike
the world. Barth clarifies this twofold dynamic when he states that:
God's omnipotent Word [...] cannot be hindered by the obvious secularity of all human
forms of society from creating within these a society which in the first instance is not
distinct from them, yet which is still this specific society, the people of God, the Christian
community, nor can it be prevented from maintaining, accompanying and ruling this
society as such. And, as it can use the secular possibilities of human speech, to establish
this particular society it can use the secular possibilities of social structuring, not
changing them essentially nor divesting them of their secularism, but giving to them as
they are a new meaning and determination. [...] This is what actually takes place in the
power of this Word. Intrinsically unholy possibilities in the structuring of man's life in
56 For an example of this in practice see Dunn's treatment of how the haustafein are reorganised in
response to Christ and the activity of the Spirit. James Dunn, 'The Household Rules in the New
Testament', in The Family in Theological Perspective, ed. by Stephen Barton (Edinburgh: T & I
Clarke, 1996), pp. 43-63. For a treatment consistent with Dunn's, but more radical in its implications
see John Howard Yoder, The Politics ofJesus, 2 edn (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), pp. 162-92.
Fee, God's Empowering Presence, p. 150.
58 This is not to say that those outside the church cannot, both consciously and unconsciously, bear
witness to Jesus Christ. For an account of such secular 'parables of the kingdom', and how Christians
might hear them, see Barth, Church Dogmatics, N: 3, pp. 110-35. For an assessment of Barth's
position see Nigel Biggar, The Hastening That Waits: Karl Barth's Ethics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993), pp. 147-61.
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society are sanctified and made serviceable to the gathering and upbuilding of the people
of God in the service of its commission and for the purpose of its election and calling.59
The reconfiguring of the Spirit enables the 'intrinsically unholy possibilities' of
human forms of sociality and language to become generative, proleptic disclosures of
eschatological patterns of human sociality. As stated above, there is no definitive or
single pattern of sociality that can be the bearer of God's order. Thus, throughout
human history, the church will necessarily take many forms and find itseff both like
and unlike all human cultures. Consequently, unlike (for example) Islam,
Christianity does not have a definitive language. Rather, it is free to make use of all
languages. And unlike (for example) Parsees, Christianity does not relate to only one
particular cultural-linguistic group. 6° Scripture bears witness to how God's action
draws a multiplicity of cultures into a single salvation history and elects a particular
people whose life together, while specific and particular, is constituted by the
transfiguring of other cultures. 6 ' Perhaps the most significant example of this
transfiguring process at work is David's act of using a city (created by Cain and, as
Augustine and others have argued, the paradigmatic embodiment of human
alienation from God), and moreover, a pagan city, Jebus, as the basis of Jerusalem, a
place where God's glory resided.62 To use a picture from the New Testament, the
water from stone jars becomes the wine at the wedding feast through the
transfiguring actions of Christ and the Spirit.
The eschatological specificity of the church means that Christians will be both
like and unlike non-Christians. The actions of Christ and the Spirit in transfiguring
'intrinsically unholy possibilities' means that relations between Christians and non-
Christians must necessarily involve Christians sharing in and enjoying non-Christian
social realities that have been transfigured. Furthermore, Christ and the Spirit act
beyond the church, and so non-Christians may well be enjoying the eschatological
Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV: 3, pp. 740-41.
60 Whether this runs counter to models of church-world relations based on George Lindbeck's thesis
concerning the cultural-linguistic model of doctrine is opaque. Cf, George Lindbeck, The Nature of
Doctrine (London: SPCK, 1984). Ills not the place of this thesis to explore this question.
"Heew tradition clearly borrod from the surrounding culture ile radically transforming it
Brueggemanns study of the prophetic tradition locates it firmly in the covenantal tradition of Moses.
However, he recognises the influence of the surrounding culture, such as the Canaanite phenomenon of
ecstasy echoed in 1 Samuel 10 and 19, on how Israel understood prophecy. Walter Brueggemann, The
Prophetic Imagination (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1978), p. 15. See also Jon Levenson, Creation and
the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988).
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anticipations of their social realities already, in which case, Christians can simply
join in what God is already doing. If non-Christians are not enjoying the
eschatological anticipations of their social realities, the church will need to bear
witness to what such anticipations may look like and present the opportunity for non-
Christians to participate in them. It will not always be clear whether any given social
reality is or is not 'Christian' per Se, since its status as an eschatological anticipation
is entirely dependent on the actions of Christ and the Spirit. It is, therefore, more
helpful to talk of the 'specificity' of the church, rather than its 'distinctiveness'. As
Yoder points out: 'To be "specific" is to belong to one's species, to befit one's kind.
That will not always involve being different [or distinct], although the cases where it
"makes a difference" will be the decisive ones.'63
We have already noted how the Christian tradition constitutes the concrete
accretion, in Scripture, social practices and doctrine, of redeemed humanity's
response to Christ, empowered by the Spirit. However, the church (as distinct from
the Christian tradition) is constituted by the living and active presence of God.
Therefore, in the light of our analysis of the church, we contend that to understand
whether Christians can resolve ethical disputes with their neighbours we must move
beyond Macintyre's conception of the problem in terms of how one tradition relates
to another.
4.5	 Resolving disputes does not involve philosophical vindication
Maclntyre's account of local politics envisages Christian communities
philosophically vindicating their vision of the common good. As we saw in the last
chapter, and as the move to ecclesiology emphasises, a distinctively Christian
approach to this issue cannot encompass resolving disputes via proving Christianity's
greater philosophical prowess. No amount of philosophical cogency can 'convert' a
non-Christian to the complete way in which Christians approach moral questions.
Such conversion is only possible by the whole person participating in distinctively
Christian patterns of thought and action: that is, thought and action directed to Jesus
Christ and empowered by the Holy Spirit. It is at this point that we can recover
62 JaUes Ellul, The Meaning of the City (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), pp. 94-97. See also, Ez.
16.
63 John Howard Yoder, 'A People in the World', in The Royal Priesthood: Essays Ecciesiological and
Ecumenical, ed. by Michael Cartwright (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), pp. 65-101 (p. 81, n. 19).
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something of Maclntyre's own substantive theory with its focus on practices and
virtue, both of which emphasise the embodied and participatory nature of moral
formation and decision-making. As the previous discussion of ontology suggests, it
is only by participation in direct relationship with God and patterns of sociality (that
is, social practices) that are faithful responses to, and orientated toward, God, that
non-Christians might come to accept the whole response of Christians to moral
issues. Conversely, through the participation of non-Christians (who are coming into
relationship with God) in Christian practices Christians will have their own approach
questioned. This questioning opens up established patterns of Christian sociality to
revision, and Christians' responses to moral issues to further specification. The
emphasis here is not on philosophical prowess but on the nature of the relationships
in which a person is participating. This is distinct from Maclntyre's meta-theory
because the point of 'conversion' from one tradition to another is not just an
'epistemological crisis', but also involves living in response to one's ontologically
changed relationship to God. The result of this change is that the person is able to
participate in communion with God, and the patterns of thought and action that are a
response to God.
The implications of this for Maclntyre's proposal for a particular kind of local
politics are as follows. Christians may share with Maclntyre the conviction that the
renewal of contemporary social, economic and political structures will emerge from
local reflection and local political structures. It even makes sense for Christians to
institute this renewal by building up particular and local political and social
embodiments of conceptions of the common good. This is in accord with
Maclntyre's statement that: 'We need to show as well as to say what an adequate
conception of justice amounts to, by constructing the types of institutionalised social
relationships within which it becomes visibIe.' To construct such visible
embodiments will require Christians to engage in co-operative enterprises with those
whose point of view is very different. However, this co-operation can never be
conducted either on the basis of a common philosophy or be seen as an opportunity
to prove the philosophical worth of the Christian tradition. Rather, Christians will
enter into such shared enterprises on the basis that they are participating in patterns
of thought and action directed to Christ through the Spirit.
Maclntyre, 'Community, Law and the Idiom and Rhetoric of Rights', p. 110.
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4.6	 Ad hoc commensurability or a dialectic of traditions?
Despite the emphasis on common enterprises, Maclntyre's vision of local politics
must, given his meta-theory, necessarily involve something like a jousting
tournament of competing communities of resistance. The Christian community
cannot participate in such a tournament. As already stated, the church is both
fashioned out of the world, and hence is like the world, and yet it is fashioned in
response to the Word of God, and hence is unlike the world. Therefore, despite their
distinctive criteria of moral evaluation, when it comes to moral actions and social
practices Christians will find themselves enjoying an ad hoc commensurability with
their neighbours. This ad hoc commensurability is grounded in the reality not only
of Christians sharing the same moral field as their neighbours, but also of the work of
Christ and the Spirit breaking the eschatological reality in among all people
eveiywhere. On the basis of O'Donovan's eschatology and ecciesiology stated
above, we shall now analyse what the implications of this ad hoc commensurability
are for relations between Christians and non-Christians.
4.6.1 The nature of the difference between Christians and non-Christians
We saw in the last chapter that Maclntyre was not amenable to an ad hoc
approach to relations between traditions. 1-us substantive account of how traditions
related demanded coherent traditions and systematic relations between them. We are
still left with the problem of how the church can be a distinctive community with its
own criteria of evaluation, while, simultaneously, many of its social and moral
practices converge with those of its neighbours. it is to this problem that we now
turn through an assessment of what eschatological specificity entails.
The life together of Christians is specific in a unique way. Prior to conversion, a
Christian might be similar to, or distinct from, their neighbour at any level of
identity. After conversion, any similarity or difference is called into question since
ethnic, familial, political and all other identities are relativised. A new distance
arises between the Christian and non-Christian. Hence the Biblical leitmotif of
Christians being 'aliens' and 'sojourners.' The metaphor 'sojourner' or 'perigrinus'
is a powerful one because it sums up central themes from scripture and expresses
some fundamental perspectives about the problem of the identity and difference of
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the People of God from their neighbours.65
 This sense of being a stranger is perhaps
best expressed in the term 'pilgrim'. Augustine summarises the implications of this
as follows:
The Church proceeds, a pilgrim, in these evil days, not merely since the time of the
bodily presence of Christ and his apostles, but since Abel himself, the first righteous man,
whom his impious brother killed, and from then on until the end of time, among the
persecutions of the world, and the consolations of God.67
The difference between Christians and non-Christians is at heart an eschatological
one. In the midst of the world in which Christians live, they are given a new home
that God has established. New birth commences the journey to this new home;
however, the journey does not lead away from where they live, it leads them to the
epicentre of their former home, for the house of God, although distinct from the
world, is bursting the bounds of, and being erected in the midst of; their old home.
The church is distinct from its culture, yet it belongs to its culture: it is in the world
but not of the world. As at Pentecost, the differences of indigenous cultures are not
erased but reconfigured into a unity given of the Spirit. 68 Differentiation and
distance from where we 'belong', or what determines our identity, no longer requires
an actual geographic move, as it did for Abraham and the Israelites in Egypt, nor a
cultural separation either from society, as it did for the Essenes, or within society as
the Pharisees proposed. 69
 Neither does it involve building a new home through force
of arms and the practice of a politics that is shaped by the 'principalities and powers'
as it did for the Zealots, nor the erasing of all existing patterns and traditions of social
life in order to start afresh, as various utopians have demanded. And lastly, it does
not involve simply performing the right rituals and saying the right words, while
settling for the status quo, as it did for the Sadducees. Rather, Genesis is
recapitulated so that out of the chaos comes a new creation. 70
 it is through the
65 Cf. Eugene TeSelle, 'The Sojourner: Neither a Citizen nor an Alien', Living in Two Cities:
Augustinian Trajectories in Political Thought (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 1998), pp. 45-
71.
For analyses of the church as a pilgrim see Geoffrey Preston, Faces of the Church: Meditations on a
Mystery and its images (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), pp.2 17-24.
67 Autine City of God, 18.51, trans. by Gerard O'Daly in Augustine's City of God: A Reader's
Guide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 159.
Cf. Michael Welker, God the Spirit, trans. by John Hoffmeyer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992),
pp. 232-33.
69 Marcus Borg, Conflict, Holiness and Politics in the Teachings of Jesus, Studies in the Bible and
Early Christianity (Lampeter: Edwin MelIen Press, 1972), p.57-61. Cf. N. 1. Wright, The Climax of
the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), p. 174.
° Cf., Edward Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1997), pp. 7-16.
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cosmogonic recapitulation of Jesus Christ that we are born again out of our existent
chaos and disorder: however, this very chaos, that is, our degenerate patterns of
sociality, is the very stuff of our new life. It is thus a departure-in-the-midst-of and
not a departure-from-the-midst-of a culture. In other words, being good, pure, holy
and moral cannot be secured either by withdrawal from our culture, or assimilation
to it. To withdraw from or to be assimilated by its cultural context is to deny what
the church is reconstituted from. Hence, we must neither deny our cultural
inheritance, nor over-freight it with significance. Neither can we deny the cultural
inheritance of others nor over-freight another's culture with significance. The
Christian cannot turn against her cultural background in self .hatred, neither can she
revel in it as the apogee of civilisation. Instead, as someone who has been through
the death and new birth of baptism and thus participates in the recapitulation of all
creation by Jesus Christ, the Christian finds herself in a relation with her neighbours
of both distance and belonging. In sum, the thought and action of the church and its
members, which proclaims and bears witness to the evangelium, is neither totally
alien to any culture (it is not inevitably incommensurable with other traditions) nor is
it simply another version of what they already know (it is not self-evident).
Therefore, when faced with moral problems, Christians will, depending on the
problem, find themselves at times converging with the social practices of their
neighbours, and at other times diverging from the practices of their non-Christian
neighbours.
4.6.2 The inherently ad hoc nature of the commensurability between the moral
and social practices of Christians and non-Christians
Relations between Christians and non-Christians must account for this
eschatological specificity and the patterns of life it entails. As Voif points out:
Christians do not come into their social world from outside seeking either to
accommodate to their new home (like second generation immigrants would), shape it in
the image of the one they have left behind (like colonizers would), or establish a little
haven in the strange new world reminiscent of the old (as resident aliens would). They are
not outsiders who either seek to become insiders or maintain strenuously the status of
outsiders [...] Christian difference is therefore not an insertion of something new into the
old from outside, but a bursting out of the new precisely within the proper space of the
old.7'
Miroslav Volt; 'Soft Difference: Theological Reflections on the Relation Between Church and
Culture in 1 Peter', Lx Auditu, 10 (1994), 15-30 (pp. 18-19). Cf. 'Epistle of Mathetes to Diognetus',
in Ante-Nicene Fathers, trans. by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, ed. by Alexander Roberts
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The church does not become a 'culture' in and of itself hence it is not one culture
among many. This is arguably a problem in John Paul Ii's description of a clash
between the 'culture of death' and the 'culture of life', wherein the 'culture of life' is
identffied with the church who are the 'people of life'. 72 It is definitely the mistake
Clapp makes. 73 For example, Clapp envisages the church as an ark - a separate and
enclosed entity - in the troubled waters of the contemporary context. 74 Instead, the
church, and its practices, is the paradigmatic sign of a given culture's redemption
through the sacrifice and priesthood of Jesus Christ. The church is to be a people
invested with the character of the gospel, which is simultaneously to bear witness to
how a given culture may be eschatologically fulfilled. 75 Therefore, Christians cannot
stand outside their environment, or against others, but must participate in their
culture and the enterprises of their neighbours as those transfigured. In this age, no
clear dividing lines can be identified between Christians and non-Christians; all such
division will only become clear on Judgement Day. There can be no strongly
delineated clash of cultures or civilisations; rather, questions about what to reject and
what to retain confront Christians constantly as they participate in God's
transfiguration of their context.76
An exposition of 1 Peter clarifies, and grounds in scripture, the point we are trying
to make about the inherently ad hoc nature of the moral and social commensurability
between Christians and non-Christians. 1 Peter, in referring to Christians as paroikoi
and James Donaldson, 10 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), I, pp. 25-30 (ch. 5); hereafter Ante-
Nicene Fathers is abbreviated to ANF.
72 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1995), p. 37; p. 142.
See Rodney Clapp, A Peculiar People. See also: David Yeago, 'Messiah's People'.
' Clapp, Families at the Crossroads, pp. 46-7. Similarly, in the light of a theological account of the
relationship between Christians and non-Christians, attempts to characterise this relationship in terms
of a 'clash of civilisations' or 'culture wars' are wholiy inappropriate. See Samuel Huntington, The
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996); James
Davidson Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
75 Robert Markus understands Augustine to have a similar conception of the church. He states we can
only draw a distinction between the 'world' and the 'church' eschatologically since in this age they are
coextensive. 'There is a real distinctive to be drawn between them, but it is eschatological rather than
sociological or historical. They are separable only in the final judgment, and their distinct - but not
separate - being here and now in the saeculum consists of the relation they bear to that judgment. So
in the last resort the Church is the world, the world reconciled to Christ.' Robert Markus, Saeculum:
History and Society in the Theology of Si Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970),
p. 123. Similarly, Hütter establishes a parallel relationship between eschatology, ecclesiology and
ethics in 'Ecciesial Ethics, the Church's Vocations, and Paraclesis', pp. 433-50.
76 A similar view is developed by William Werpehowski in 'Ad Hoc Apologetics', Journal of Religion,
66 (1986), 282-30 1.
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and parepidemoi (1 Pet 1.1; 2.11), understands them to be aliens and sojourners.77
There is a clear difference between those born again and the rest of society. The new
birth 'into the living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead' (1
Pet 1.3), creates a twofold distance: first, it distances one from the old way of life,
inherited from one's ancestors (1 Pet 1.18); second, it is a birth into a living hope,
and thus it distances one from the contingency of the present world in which all
human efforts ultimately end in death. This new birth does not mean, however, that
Christians are to withdraw from civic life. 78 Rather, they are to seek the welfare of
the city (1 Pet 2.1 ift). But in seeking the welfare of what, after their new birth, is a
place of exile, they do not encounter a uniformly evil world. Instead, these
sojourners meet a complex world that at times opposes, at times resists, at times
ignores and at times accepts the reality to which they bear witness through their life
together. There is no stark division between good and evil. For example, Satan is
not understood to have total control of everything outside the walls of the church.
Rather, the devil prowls around, looking for someone to devour (1 Pet 5.8). This
suggests that evil is not uniformly present, but is sporadic. It is a real and present
danger, but one is never quite sure where and how one will encounter it.
Furthermore, 1 Peter characterises the reaction of non-Christians in several ways.
The church will encounter evil people who persecute Christians and profane what is
holy (1 Pet 4.4; 12); it will meet people who are ignorant and foolish but who will be
silenced by Christian behaviour (1 Pet 2.15); it will meet people who know right and
wrong and are used by God (1 Pet 2.14); and finally it will meet those who see,
appreciate and are converted to the Christian faith (1 Pet 2.12; 3.1). It is thus
engaged in a constant series of congruent and incongruent encounters and relations
with other traditions and those of no distinct tradition and at a variety of levels from
For a review of the categories of 'alien', 'sojourner' and 'stranger' in post-exilic, New Testament
and early Christian literature and how use of these categories in I Peter is consonant with this wider
usage see Reinhard Feldmeier, 'The "Nation" of Strangers: Social Contempt and its Theological
Interpretation in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity', in Ethnicity and the Bible, ed. Mark Brett
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), pp. 241-270.
Bruce Winter, Seek the Welfare of the City: Christians as Benefactors and Citizens (Carlisle:
Paternoster Press, 1994), P. 19.
Contra Wayne Meeks in The Origins of Christian Morality, Winter draws a parallel between the
exiled Jews in Babylon and the advice given in I Peter. He states: 'The parallels between Jeremiah 29
and I Peter are compelling. [...] It is clear that as spiritual 'sojourners' and 'alien residents' they must
withdraw from the self-indulgent lifestyle of their contemporaries (2:11) and seek the wel1re of the
society in which they live. They were instructed to spend their days in this earthly city seeking the
blessing of its inhabitants (2:11 if).' Winter, Seek the Welfare of the City, p. 17.
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the intimacy of husband and wife (1 Pet 3.1) to the distance of political authority (1
Pet 2.13_14).80 Voif in his exegesis of 1 Peter states:
The world consists of a plurality of 'worlds'. The values of these worlds do not form tight
and comprehensive systems; they are not like balls that touch but do not connect. Rather,
each of these worlds consists of a mixture of partly self-consistent and partly disparate
practices and thought patterns. In addition, the worlds are in a permanent social
interchange which shapes values that are partly common to the interacting social worlds,
partly merely compatible, and partly contrary. An essential dimension of the interchange
is the struggle for social power. In this struggle, ethical persuasions and various interests
collide, not only between various parties, but also within one party or even within a single
person.81
There can be no simple affirmation or denial of this plural, unstable world. Nor do
strongly delineated church-world typologies of the kind set out by Richard Niebuhr
stand up. Rather, the church encounters a world that has a wide variety of reactions
to it and will structure its relations with the world in a myriad of different ways
ranging from withdrawal to being an active and public benefactor of the surrounding
society. 82 The church will also be confronted with a variety of problems and
situations which bring about these encounters, some old (for example, its relationship
to political authority) and some new (for example, how it regards having children via
IVF treatments). We can conclude that there will be ad hoc commensurability
between the moral and social practices of Christians and non-Christians even while
Christians are pilgrims among the patterns of life established by their neighbours.
A further implication of this move beyond tradition to ecciesiology, of the
affirmation of the 'evangelical' distinctiveness of Christians, and this theologically
grounded conception of ad hoc commensurability between Christians and non-
Christian social practices is that the church is not a community of resistance.
Maclntyre envisages local communities resisting the encroachments of capitalism
and bureaucracy. However, his vision is an essentially protological and retroactive
one. Essentially, Maclntyre sees local communities engaged in acts of preserving
what was. By contrast, the church recapitulates the future already given in Christ.
Therefore, the church offers no resistance to the contemporary context; instead, it
embodies in its life together the hope for a future already given. Only to resist the
encroachments of capitalism and bureaucratic structures would constitute a failure to
take who Jesus Christ is seriously enough, because only to resist is to fail to
° Volf 'Soft Difference', p. 26. See also RMO, p. 58 for a parallel exegesis of I Peter.
81 Vo11 'Soft Difference', p. 26.
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acknowledge the Lordship of Christ, the victory he has won, and the good news that
we may now live as those who really are free in Christ. The church must both affirm
what is good in the contemporary context, and bear witness to where the Spirit has
redirected to Christ what has a 'misdirected progress'.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter we have sought to assess whether Maclntyre's proposals for
responding to modernity might be utilised by Christians. By comparing and
contrasting Maclntyre's account with the account given by Oliver O'Donovan, we
concluded that what Maclntyre proposes is inappropriate for Christians to use in
structuring relations with their neighbours.
Maclntyre's response to the contemporary context is based on his first and second
order theory of traditions and how they relate. He proposes a particular form of local
politics as a means of enabling rational moral discourse within the constraints of
modernity. He envisages that participants in such local politics will inevitably come
into conflict with the wider structures of capitalism and bureaucracy, which, in
contrast to local politics, place the goods of effectiveness over and above the goods
of excellence. At the heart of his proposal is a vision of local communities that
embody particular visions of the common good. The communities will
simultaneously resist the encroachments of capitalism and bureaucracy and engage in
rational, tradition-guided debate with other communities as they construct
institutions of a local, common life such as schools, businesses and clinics.
Having established Maclntyre's proposals for engaging the contemporary context
we then analysed how Christians might follow these proposals. To this end we
assessed Rodney Clapp's programme for a Christian engagement with the
contemporary debate about the role of the family in society. We argued that Clapp's
work constitutes a model of how, following Maclntyre's prescriptions, Christians
might resolve disputes with non-Christians in the contemporary context.
We rejected Maclntyre's proposals because they were insufficiently shaped by
theological considerations. The primary problem was the critical difference between
82 Cf. Winter, Seek the Welfare of the City, pp. 2-3.
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conceiving relations between Christians and non-Christians in terms of a rivalry
between competing traditions and the eschatological shape to a properly Christian
understanding of such relations. In an attempt to formulate a theological framework
for understanding the shape and pattern of relations between Christians and non-
Christians we analysed O'Donovan's ecciesiology and how the church, and not
simply tradition, structures and determines Christian moral action. We then analysed
how ecciesiology relates to the possibility of resolving ethical disputes. We
concluded, in contrast to Maclntyre's position, that the line between Christians and
non-Christians was fluid and that relations between Christians and non-Christians
were not necessarily characterised by rivahy. This assessment of the theological
considerations relating to resolving disputes between Christians and non-Christians
brought into sharper focus the problem of how the church can be a specific
community with its own criteria of moral evaluation, yet have no clear dividing line
between its life together and the life of its neighbours. Contrary to Hauerwas'
position, we concluded that conflict between Christians and non-Christians over
moral issues is not inevitable; but neither is agreement.
To understand the nature of the difference between the church and its neighbours
we analysed how Christ and the Spirit transfigure human social reality. We
concluded that the specificity of the church lay not in its own distinctive social
reality, but in how God was actively present within the church. We concluded that
the differences between Christians and non-Christians are eschatological: as distinct
from differences based on human social realities such as family or ethnicity. This
understanding of eschatological specificity, and how God is present to the church,
pointed to how Christians are involved in relations of simultaneous distance and
belonging, with their non-Christian neighbours. This is because the church is to be a
people specified by its relationship with Jesus Christ, which is at the same time to
display a given culture's own most eschatological truth. Therefore, Christians cannot
stand outside their culture, or against it, but must participate in their culture and the
enterprises of their neighbours, as those transfigured. No clear dividing lines can be
drawn. Indeed, the life together of Christians is fashioned, by Christ and the Spirit,
out of the life together of their neighbours. Instead of clearly demarcated lines
separating Christians and non-Christians, questions about what to reject and what to
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retain confront Christians constantly as they participate in God's transfiguration of
their context. We clarified the implications of this through an exegesis of I Peter.
In conclusion, we cannot utilise the model of local politics and communities of
resistance Maclntyre sets out. Instead, we must develop a theologically specified
model of how Christians and non-Christians are to relate when ethical disputes arise.
While this model may well look similar to Maclntyre's, it wifi be different in vital
respects. The key differences relate to the way in which the church is more than just
a tradition. The church is a specific social reality, and yet its substantive specificity
lies in its being constituted by the eschatological anticipations of the social realities
of its neighbours (thus, its life is intimately related to the life of its neighbours). We
shall now seek to construct a model, not of how to resolve disputes between
Christians and non-Christians, but of how Christians are to relate to non-Christians
when ethical disputes arise. This model is based on the theological presuppositions
outlined in this and the last chapter.
Finally, what has emerged in this chapter is the contrast between Maclntyre, who
argues for the possibility of resolving ethical disputes between incommensurable
traditions, and yet whose account of normative relations between Christians and non-
Christians is characterised by rivalry, and O'Donovan, for whom there can be no
ultimate theoretical convergence, yet whose account of relations between Christians
and non-Christians can allow for a great deal of cooperation and similarity between
them at the level of social practices. It is contrary to expectation that Maclntyre, who
constantly calls attention to how morality is bound up with social practices, does not
give an account of the suasive capacity of social practices to mediate between
incommensurable traditions in and of themselves; instead, Maclntyre endeavours




Hospitality as the theological motif determining how Christians should relate
to non-Christians in the contemporary context when ethical disputes arise.
5.1	 Introduction
We have been addressing the possibility of resolving ethical disputes between
Christians and non-Christian in the contemporary context. To do this we assessed
whether Maclntyre can provide us with an account of the nature of the differences
between Christianity and other moral traditions, whether ethical disputes can be
resolved between Christians and non-Christians, and how Christians should relate to
their neighbours in the contemporary context. Having set out Maclntyre's
conception of the differences between Christians and non-Christians, and his
framework for how Christians can resolve disputes with their neighbours, we then
challenged his account by comparing it with that given by Germain Grisez. While
Grisez agreed with Maclntyre that disputes between Christians and non-Christians
are amenable to resolution, he does not consider resolving ethical disputes to be as
problematic as Maclntyre does. Resolving disputes is a relatively straightforward
process for Grisez, because, he contends, there is a universal form of rationality,
grounded on practical reason, by which different moral traditions can resolve ethical
disputes. However, we concluded that Grisez's account of the differences between
Christians and non-Christians with regard to ethical disputes was inadequate. We
then sought to challenge Maclntyre's work from a different perspective by asking
whether Macintyre's account of the differences between Christians and non-
Christians took sufficient notice of the depth of the differences between them. For
the purposes of this second challenge, we compared Maclntyre's work with that of
Oliver O'Donovan.
The central question that emerged through the comparison of Macintyre with
Grisez and O'Donovan was, how resolution of disputes between a Christian account
of ethics and those arising from other, substantially different traditions, can take
place, without compromise to the specificity of the former. On the basis of the
comparison between Maclntyre and O'Donovan we concluded that a theologically
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specified account of ethics cannot either normatively or systematically vindicate
itself against its rivals on the basis of its philosophical cogency. Yet this is what
Maclntyre proposes. The incongruence between Maclntyre's meta-theory of how
different traditions relate and O'Donovan's theologically specified account of the
foundation of Christian ethics, led us to reject Macintyre's meta-theory as
inadequate. However, what emerged from our assessment of O'Donovan's account
of ethics was the question of how, despite the lack of philosophical convergence,
Christians and non-Christians may share an ad hoc commensurability in relation to
their social practices. For O'Donovan, the acceptance of Christian criteria of moral
evaluation cannot be derived from any philosophical convergence between
Christianity and other traditions or from the ability of Christianity to vindicate
philosophically its criteria of moral evaluation. Rather, it is only by participation in
direct relationship with God and patterns of sociality (that is, social practices) that
are faithful responses to, and orientated toward, God, that Christians and non-
Christians may resolve their ethical disputes. To make this argument we assessed the
adequacy of Maclntyre's account of how different traditions relate in practice, and
whether this account was congruent with a theologically specified account of
relations between Christians and non-Christians as given by O'Donovan.
The focus on Maclntyre's practical suggestions for how Christians might relate
with their neighbours in the contemporary context clarified a number of problems.
These problems centred on how to give an account of the way in which Christianity
can retain its specific criteria of evaluation yet at the same time have an ad hoc
commensurability at the level of its social practices. We analysed how the tension
between the incommensurability of Christian criteria of moral evaluation, in relation
to those of other traditions, and the ad hoc commensurability of its social practices,
establishes an unexpected contrast. The contrast is that while Maclntyre argues for
the possibility of philosophical convergence, the model of practice he suggests is
necessarily characterised by rivalry and conflict, whereas for O'Donovan, for whom
there can be no normative or systematic theoretical convergence, the model of
practice his account gives rise to can allow for a great deal of cooperation and
similarity between Christians and non-Christians at the level of social practice.
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We analysed this contrast by comparing Maclntyre's conception of local politics
with O'Donovan's account of relations between Christians and non-Christians.
O'Donovan's account of relations between Christians and non-Christians was framed
within the terms of his ecclesiology. It was framed in terms of ecciesiology because,
while acknowledging the role tradition plays in enabling people to know revelation,
O'Donovan understands there to be more involved than just tradition. Christians do
not structure their relations with non-Christians simply in terms of how the Christian
tradition relates to other traditions. The primary category for thinking about relations
between Christians and non-Christians is 'the church', and the church is more than a
tradition. 'The church', of which Christians are a part, makes a claim to be a way of
being, it is an ontological category, whereas the term 'tradition' has no ontological
significance, only an epistemological one. O'Donovan helped us determine the
relationship between Christian ethics and ecciesiology, for his ecciesiology relates
directly to his conception of Christian ethical thought and action and how it is
distinct from non-Christian thought and action. We then analysed how, within a
theological framework, Christians relate to non-Christians, and thus how Maclntyre's
model of such relations is contrary to this.
We rejected Maclntyre's practical proposals for how Christians and non-
Christians should relate because they were insufficiently shaped by theological
considerations. The primary problem was the critical difference between a
conception of relations between Christians and non-Christians in terms of a rivalry
between competing traditions, and the eschatological shape to a properly Christian
understanding of such relations. Assessment of the theological considerations
relating to the resolution of disputes between Christians and non-Christians brought
into sharper focus the problem of how the church should be a specific community
with its own criteria of evaluation, and yet have no clear dividing line between its life
together and the life it shares with its neighbours. It is to this problem we now turn.
In the light of how this thesis has developed, this chapter is a response to a
number of issues that have transpired in the previous chapters. These issues are the
following, first, the inadequacy of Maclntyre's account of the relationship between
Christians and non-Christians. Second, the contrast between Maclntyre's meta-
theory for how incommensurable traditions can resolve ethical disputes that,
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however, in practice generates conflict, and O'Donovan's account of the inherent
incommensurability between Christian and non-Christian criteria of evaluation that,
in practice, leads to an ad hoc commensurability. Third, the need to formulate a
constructive account of how Christians should relate to their neighbours, that takes
into consideration O'Donovan's eschatology and ecciesiology. We shall now seek to
construct a model, not of how to resolve disputes between Christians and non-
Christians, but of how Christians are to relate to non-Christians when ethical disputes
arise. To do this we will analyse the motif of hospitality, how it differs from other,
contemporary ways of structuring difference, how it fits within a wider philosophical
discourse, and how it can be understood within a specifically theological framework.
On the basis of this analysis we will set out a model of the actual practice by which
Christians have, do and should relate to their neighbours in such a way that these
relations take account of the simultaneous continuity and radical discontinuity
between them.
5.2	 Hospitality as the organising motif of eschatological distance
The theological ground of the necessity of living 'betwixt and between' different
traditions is set out in O'Donovan's doctrine of eschatology. According to this
doctrine, while the Spirit makes present and available the restored and transformed
creation now, creation will not be fully restored and transformed until Christ returns.
The relationship between the ascended Christ and the Spirit, who makes Christ
present to humans while we await Christ's parousia, emphasises how Christians
exist between two ages. As we argued in the last chapter, the result of Christians
self-consciously living between this age and the next is that they are marked off from
non-Christians, not by race, or culture, or even by religion, but by their union with
Christ whose ascension marks a relativisation of this age and the inauguration of the
new age. To be true to the presupposition of their faith, Christians must accept this
situation of continuity and radical discontinuity with those around them. The
implication of this is that the church is simultaneously like and unlike its neighbours
in terms of its moral and social practices. The simultaneous similarity and
dissimilarity between Christian and non-Christian moral and social practices does not
mean we can make no generic statements about how Christians and non-Christians
should relate with regard to moral disputes. There is still a need for some rubric by
which to formulate and structure relations between Christians and non-Christians;
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that is, given that some of its neighbours will reject the church's response to moral
issues, while at the same time, other neighbours will either share or take up the moral
responses of the church (even though they may reject the belief on which that
response is based), we must ask what, theologically, is the best way to conceptualise
and organise relations between the church and its neighbours.
5.3 Hospitality or tolerance?
In contemporaly debate, analysis of how to cope with the fact of plurality and
relate with those with whom one disagrees is framed in terms of tolerance,
intolerance and freedom of expression and belief. A common assumption in the
literature relating to tolerance and pluralism is that tolerance and the willingness to
live with difference is a phenomenon that emerged in the West after the
Enlightenment.' However, the emphasis on the relative newness of tolerance as a
concept can be over-stated. 2 Discussions about questions of tolerance and freedom
of conscience have been a constant theme in the Christian tradition. Two notable
examples are Lactantius3 and Aquinas.4
 It was, however, with the Enlightenment -
and its search for a neutral arbiter between competing truth claims and a growing
emphasis on individual autonomy - that the notion of tolerance acquired increasing
prominence. The emphasis on tolerance is seen also as a direct reaction against the
allegedly religious wars of the post-Reformation era. 5
 Acceptance of difference (or
One of the most influential accounts of the view that tolerance and acceptance of diversity are recent
historical phenomena is that given by John Rawls's introduction to Political Liberalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. xxiii-xxvii. See also, John Horton, 'Toleration', in Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 429-433. For a
critique of Rawis's historical and conceptual reconstruction oftoleration see Will Kymlicka, 'Two
Models of Pluralism and Tolerance', in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. by David Heyd (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 81-105.
2 Nederman and Laursen argue that the conventional picture of how the principle of toleration
emerged in the West has been challenged by a considerable body of historical scholarship that
demonstrates both the longevity and diversity of approaches to tolerance. Caiy Nederman and John
Laursen, 'Difference and Dissent: Introduction', in Dfference and Dissent: Theories of Toleration in
Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. by Caiy Nederman and John Laursen (London: Rownian &
Littlefield, 1996), Pp. 1-16.
Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, trans. by William Fletcher, ed. by
Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, 10 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), VII, Pp. 9-223 (bk.
V. ch. 19-21)
4 Summa Theologica Il-Il, Qu. 10-12.
For example, see John Horton and Susan Mendus, 'Introduction', in Aspects of Toleration:
Philosophical Studies, ed. by John Horton and Susan Mendus (London: Methuen, 1985), pp. 1-15 (pp.
1-2). However, Michael Howard argues that the wars of the sixteenth century resulted from the
breakdown of the established political order and the emergence of nation-states. Michael Howard,
The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order (London: Profile Books, 2000),
pp. 14-19.
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diversity), and the advocacy of toleration as a good, are now seen as the pre-eminent
way of thinking about how those who disagree with each other should relate.
Tolerance involves the willingness to accept differences (whether religious,
moral, ethnic or economic) of which, at whatever level, one might, as an individual
or as a community, disapprove.6 For a person or group to be tolerant, three
conditions must be met. First, there must be some conduct about which one
disapproves, even if only minimally or potentially. Second, although such a person
or group has power to act coercively against, or interfere to prevent, that of which
they disapprove, they do not. Third, not interfering coercively must result from more
than acquiescence, resignation, indifference or a balance of power. One does not
tolerate that which one is not concerned about; nor is it tolerance simply to accept
what one cannot, or is not willing to, change (either because one lacks power to
effect change or because, for whatever reason, one fears to use one's power). Horton
notes that toleration is particularly important and problematic when it involves a
principled refusal to prohibit conduct believed to be wrong. He states: 'This gives
rise to the so-called 'paradox of toleration' according to which toleration requires
that it is right to permit that which is wrong.'7
Following our assessment of Maclntyre's account of how incommensurable
traditions may resolve ethical disputes, we concluded that there was no systematic
way for Christians to resolve ethical disputes with non-Christians. Hence, the
question arises as to how Christians are to relate to those with whom they disagree.
The concept of tolerance constitutes one of the primary, contemporary ways in which
this question has been addressed. However, we shall argue that it is not tolerance,
but the practice of hospitality that constitutes the best way to address the question of
how Christians are to relate to those with whom they disagree.
6 It is related to, but distinct from, notions of freedom of belief. Put simply, only to tolerate something
falls short of and does not necessitate granting or advocating freedom of expression to the action or
belief tolerated.
Horton, 'Toleration', p. 431.
-181-
There is not the scope here for a full analysis of tolerance as a concept and a
thorough consideration of its use within the Christian tradition. 8
 We have made
reference to tolerance in order to situate our consideration of hospitality as the best
way for Christians to conceive of relations with those with whom they disagree in
debates about how such relations are conceived at present. It suffices to say that the
concept of tolerance does have a long pedigree in the Christian tradition. We have
already noted the work of Lactantius, but another early example is Tertullian. 9 Both
of these writers discuss the issue of religious freedom, sharing the view that belief is
a matter of free will, and that faith cannot and should not be secured through
coercion. From the Protestant Reformation onwards interest in the concept of
tolerance intensified, especially as it related to the question of religious diversity. In
the modern period, the increase of relations between Western Christianity and other
faith traditions, initially as a result of colonial expansion and then as a result of
increased immigration, gave a renewed impetus to the question of religious tolerance.
Subsequently, the increasing cultural diversity in democratic societies and
substantive ethical disagreement between Christians and non-Christians, for
example, over abortion and homosexuality, have led to assessments of how tolerance
relates to the problem of ethical disputes.'°
The theological justifications for tolerance are varied. One of the most striking
theological defences of tolerance was given by the Anglican, Mandell Creighton,
who saw it as condition of evangelical witness. After an account of how tolerance
developed in the West, Creighton reflects on the need for tolerance to have a
theological foundation, without which its exercise could easily become distorted."
For Creighton, the only sure basis for tolerance is theological. Furthermore, in
Creighton's view, tolerance is part of the fhithful witness of the church to the truth it
has received from God. He states:
The forbearance, the equitableness, the fairmindedness of Christ, - surely this should be
the spirit of the Christian life, and this is what the Christian means by tolerance. It comes
For a review ofjustifications given by theologians for using the notion of tolerance in determining
relations between Christians and non-Christians see Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics, pp.
178-88.
See Tertullian's Apology and 'Letter to Scapula'.
'° See for example, Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (London:
Nisbet & Co, 1945), pp. 84-104.
Mandell Creigliton, Persecution and Tolerance (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895), pp. 115-
16
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from the confidence of an assured hope, from the outlook on a vast horizon. The
kingdom of heaven was to begin on earth; it has its place here and now, and before its
contemplation the petty activities of actual life fall into due proportion. 'The Lord is at
hand'; that is the great motive for forbearance.12
However, Creighton's analysis of the theological basis of tolerance in the light of the
hope humans have in Christ is unusual. For the most part, the advocacy of tolerance
is grounded in either an inherent capacity of humans as created in the image of God
(for example, free will) or the fallibility and flnitude of humans resulting from both
their created and fallen nature.
Most defences of tolerance follow three, not specifically theological, arguments.'3
The first approach to tolerance centres on concern about human fallibility and the
limits to human knowledge. However, the concern about human fallibility should
not be seen as a form of relativism. Indeed, as Jay Newman argues, a certain kind of
relativist is actually opposed to the concept of tolerance.' 4 Neither does a concern
about human fallibility imply that the tolerant person is completely sceptical about
the possibility of knowing the truth about a particular question or issue. However, it
can imply a limited scepticism that maintains belief in an ultimate horizon of truth
which differing positions may shed light on. For example, Reinhold Niebuhr, for
whom 'complete scepticism represents the abyss of meaninglessness',' 5 contends, in
relation to religious toleration, that while each religion should seek to proclaim its
'highest insights', it should preserve a 'humble and contrite recognition of the fact
that all actual expressions of religious faith are subject to historical contingency and
relativity." 6
 In his view: 'Such a recognition creates a spirit of tolerance."7
Arguments for tolerance on the pragmatic grounds of human faffibility can take a
variety of forms.' 8
 These include the view that neither party has complete possession
of the truth, truth will benefit from free investigation, and certainty in religious
questions is difficult to achieve.
12 Creighton, Persecution and Tolerance, p.135.
13 The tripartite division set out here is heuristic. In practice, the three kinds of argument for tolerance
frequently over-lap.
'4 Jay Newman, Foundations of Religious Tolerance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p.
22.
' Reinhold Niebuhr, The Test of Tolerance, in Religious Pluralism in the West, pp. 28 1-96 (p. 293).
16 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light, p. 88.
17Ibid.
An earlier justification of tolerance on the grounds of the fallibility of human knowledge appears in
Pierre Bayle, Treatise on Universal Tolerance (1686). For an account of Bayle's thought see Preston
King, Toleration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976), pp. 90-99.
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A second way of approaching the issue of tolerance seeks procedures that are
tolerant. This is to say that arguments for limits to intervention and coercion are
invoked when someone has power to change another's behaviour of which they
disapprove. Procedural arguments are generally advocated in relation to the exercise
of judicial and political authority. John Locke's An Essay on Toleration is an
example of this approach. 19 Bernard Williams calls this model of tolerance 'liberal
pluralism' and describes it thus:
On the one hand, there are deeply held and differing convictions about moral or religious
matters, held by various groups within society. On the other hand, there is a supposedly
impartial state, which affirms the rights of all citizens to equal consideration, including an
equal right to form and express their convictions.20
As we have already argued, via Maclntyre's genealogy of liberalism, and his critique
of the modern state, the quest for neutral procedures based on reason has failed. The
modern state is itself intolerant. As Maclntyre puts it: 'The modem state is never
merely a neutral arbiter of conflicts, but is always to some degree itself a party to
social conflict, and [...] acts in the interests of particular and highly contestable
conceptions of liberty and property.' 2 ' Thus, the foundation of, and procedures for,
securing modem notions of tolerance has proved, in Maclntyre view at least, sell-
defeating.22
 However, the degree to which a political authority can or cannot be
tolerant, and whether or not a state can be neutral between rival conceptions of the
good, is not central to this thesis. While these questions are important, our primary
concern is with how tolerance can shape relations between Christians and non-
Christians, and not with whether or not the state can act as a neutral arbiter between
incommensurable moral standpoints.23
19 John Locke, An Essay on Toleration, in Locke: Political Essays, ed. by Mark Goldie (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), Pp. 134-59. For an assessment of Locke's account of toleration
see Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (London: MacMillan, 1989), pp. 22-43.
20 Bernard Williams, 'Toleration: An Impossible Virtue', in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. by
David Heyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 19-27 (p. 22).
21 Alasdair Maclntyre, 'Toleration and the Goods of Conflict', in The Politics of Toleration: Tolerance
and Intolerance in Modern	 ed. by Susan Mendus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1999), pp. 133-155 (pp. 138-39).
22 For an assessment of the five dominant 'regimes of tolerance' and what they exclude see Michael
Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 14-36.
Putting to one side questions about the relationship between political authority and tolerance does
not constitute an implicit acceptance of'liberal pluralism' as the necessary context of relations
between Christians and non-Christians. It does constitute a recognition that in the West it is the
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The third approach seeks to argue for tolerance as a substantive good. The
arguments for tolerance in On Liberty by John Stuart Mill are an example of this
approach. However, framing analyses of how one should live with difference in
terms of tolerance as a substantive good, as distinct from a merely instrumental one,
is conceptually problematic. As Bernard Williams comments: 'The difficulty with
toleration is that it seems to be at once necessary and impossible.' 24
 He points out
that there is a difference between pragmatic tolerance and tolerance as a substantive
value. Tolerance as a substantive value is based on a particular conception of the
good: that is, the good of individual autonomy. This leads to the following problem:
'The practice of toleration cannot be based on a value such as that of individual
autonomy, and also hope to escape from substantive disagreements about the
good.'25 Those who disagree with the liberal conception of the good will necessarily
reject liberal conceptions of toleration and, as Maclntyre argues, they will reject
liberal conceptions of rationality on which the particular good of toleration is based.
There is a ffirther conceptual problem with arguments for tolerance as a substantive
good based on notions of human autonomy; it is a problem that lies at the heart of the
so-called liberal-communitarian debate. As Susan Mendus puts it: 'We need to
understand how people are interdependent as well as independent. We need to
explain how autonomy is formed, not solely from the internal nature of individuals,
but also from the nature of the society in which they find themselves.'26 To ground
arguments for tolerance on individual autonomy is to ignore the ways in which an
individual is embedded within a wider community of relations.
it is our contention that tolerance - whether understood in pragmatic or procedural
terms or as a substantive good - is inadequate to address the question of how
Christians should relate to those with whom they disagree and who have a different
conception of the good. While it has been part of the tradition, the notion of
tolerance has not been the primary way in which the question of how Christians
should relate to those with whom they disagree has been conceived. The emphasis
on tolerance since the Enlightenment has over-shadowed the notion and practice of
liberal democratic polity, in one form or another, that is the present context within which Christians
and non-Christians have to relate to each other.
u Bernard Williams, 'Tolerating the Intolerable', in The Politics of Toleration, pp. 65-75 (p. 65).
Williams, 'Tolerating the Intolerable', p. 73. Cf Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 154-168.
26 Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, pp. 67-68.
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hospitality within Christianity and how hospitality has shaped the ways in which
Christians relate to those with whom they disagree. Furthermore, we shall contend
that not only has hospitality more antecedents in Christian social practices than
tolerance, but also that as a practice it is founded on more explicitly biblical and
theological imperatives. This is to say, even if we took into account pre-
Enlightenment conceptions of tolerance within the Christian tradition, it is our
contention that hospitality constitutes a more specifically Christian way of thinking
about and organising relations with non-Christians.
The following restatement of hospitality as a way of dealing with the problems
posed by ethical disputes between Christians and non-Christians challenges the
contemporary emphasis on tolerance. Nederman and Laursen state: 'One stimulus
to enlarging the horizons of current toleration theorists may well be a careful
examination and appreciation of how earlier thinkers dealt with similar issues
concerning the diversity of human conviction and action.'27
 The analysis and
assessment of hospitality within the Christian tradition is, we shall contend, precisely
the kind of exercise that Nederman and Laursen call for; that is, it provides a
corrective to the narrow focus on tolerance as the horizon of thought about how
Christians are to relate to non-Christians in relation to ethical disputes.
5.4 Hospitality as the central practice determining relations between
Christians and their neighbours
Hospitality is not an essentially domestic and apolitical kind of action. A number
of philosophers have conceived of hospitality as a political practice, among them is
Immanuel Kant, arguably the most influential Enlightenment thinker. Kant accorded
hospitality (or in German 'hospitalitat') a central significance in his account of how
people from different cultures can 'enter into mutual relations which may eventually
be regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a
cosmopolitan constitution'. 28 Maclntyre, who as we have seen is a trenchant critic of
the Enlightenment, also places hospitality at the centre of his account of what
constitutes the good society.29 Both thinkers realise that, for a society to avoid being
engulfed by deadly conflict, hospitality of strangers is required in order for a society
27 Nederman and Laursen, 'Difference and Dissent: Introduction', p. 12.
28 Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', p. 106.
29 DRA.,pp. 122-128.
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to be maintained and humans to flourish. Other philosophical treatments of
hospitality can be found in Emmanuel Lévinas 3° and Jacques Derrida, 3 ' both of
whom emphasise the relationship between hospitality and identity.
That both Kant and Maclntyre cite hospitality as an important political practice
raises the question of whether they are talking about the same thing. Kant sees
hospitality as a 'natural right' possessed of all humans 'by virtue of their right to
communal possession of the earth's surface'. 32 He distinguishes the 'natural right of
hospitality' from the 'right of a guest'. The guest makes a claim upon one to
'become a member of the native household for a certain time'. 33 By contrast, a
stranger may only claim a 'right of resort': that is, the right to enter into relations
with other inhabitants of the land or community. The converse of this is that the
visitor may only attempt to enter into relations. It is on this basis that Kant gives a
critique of the inhospitable and oppressive behaviour of the 'commercial states' that
conquered, rather than merely entered into relations with, foreign countries and
peoples, for example, the British in India. 34 However, Kant's conception of the
hospitality we owe the stranger appears somewhat constricted when compared with
Maclntyre's.
Like Kant, Maclntyre sees hospitality as a universal practice. It is central to the
proper functioning of any society. He states:
It is important to the functioning of communities that among the roles that play a part
in their shared lives there should be that of 'the stranger', someone from outside the
community who has happened to arrive amongst us and to whom we owe hospitality,
just because she or he is a stranger.35
However, instead of grounding it in notions of a universal possession like Kant, he
grounds it in a universal capacity: that is, the virtue of misericordia. He understands
misericordia to denote the capacity for grief or sorrow over someone else's distress
just insofar as one understands the other's distress as one's own. it is not mere
° For example, Emmanuel Lévinas, 'Responsibility for the Other', in Ethics and Infinity, trans. by
Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985).
31 For example, Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality, trans. by Rachel Bowiby
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).





sentiment; instead, it is sentiment guided by reason. Following Aquinas' definition
of the term, he states: 'Misericordia is that aspect of charity whereby we supply what
is needed by our neighbour and among the virtues that relate us to our neighbour
misericordia is the greatest.' 36 For Maclntyre, to understand another's distress as
one's own is to recognise that other as a neighbour, whether they are family, a friend,
or a stranger. Thus, misericordia directs one to include the stranger within one's
communal relationships. It is thus the basis for extending the bounds of one's
communal obligations, and thereby including the other in one's relations of giving
and receiving characterised by just generosity. Therefore, in contrast to Kant's
conception of hospitality, there is no such calculating and restricted understanding in
Maclntyre's account. What transpires by briefly comparing and contrasting
Maclntyre and Kant's conception of hospitality is that the implications of what they
mean by hospitality are very different. Thus, while hospitality can be seen as a
generic term, clearly it does not have a universal definition.
The practice of hospitality has been central to most cultures. However, following
our previous analysis of Maclntyre and O'Donovan, we hold that hospitality can only
be understood within a particular tradition, and that difièrent traditions will have
different forms of hospitality. Thus, living with those who are different, and framing
relations with those who are different in terms of hospitality (rather than tolerance)
entails understanding hospitality in the light of one particular tradition. it is the aim
of this chapter to assess the conception of hospitality within the Christian tradition
and then see how this conception of hospitality may shape relations between
Christians and non-Christians with regard to ethical disputes.
5.5 A theologically specified account of hospitality
We have seen how the church seeks to follow after the Spirit who is constantly
transfiguring the world. In its life together the church will bear witness to this
transfigured reality. However, the dividing line between the church and its
neighbours is always changing and no form of human sociality can claim finality or
permanence. Rather, the church must constantly follow after the Spirit and
recapitulate the Christ-event. However, reflection on resolving concrete ethical
disputes does require a normative model of relations between Christians and non-
36 DRA,p. 125.
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Christians that furnishes us with a stronger basis for critical reflection on the present
practice of the church in its relations with its neighbours.
The focal term for our conception of relations between the church and its
neighbours is 'hospitality'. We shall now define what we mean by this term and how
it serves to organise and shape a Christian response to disputes between the church
and its neighbours. Our proposal will be constructed both on the basis of the
theological reflection already done and through engaging in further exegesis of the
Bible. This is because scripture both provides the warrant for our model and best
articulates it. We consider the motif of hospitality to be a root metaphor and practice
embedded in the Christian tradition that encapsulates its crucial elements with regard
to how the church relates to its neighbours. This term is not used here to denote an
abstract ideal, principle or middle axiom; rather, the term 'hospitality' arises out of
the witness of scripture and the social practices and doctrines of the Christian
tradition. Use of this motif is thus in line with the model for tradition-situated
reflection and deliberation set out in previous chapters.
Importantly, the motif of hospitality maintains the key eschatological tensions of
Christian specificity. It does not force a harmony either through abstraction: that is,
the term does not dissolve the eschatological tension by appealing to some universal
principle (love, justice, etc.); neither does it demand that Christians enter into
relations with their neighbours on the basis of a rivahy between competing traditions.
Rather, the motif highlights the central and substantial concerns we have been
discussing; that is, it allows for Christians to retain their specific criteria for
evaluating the veracity of moral claims, while at the level of moral practice
experiencing both continuity and discontinuity with their neighbours. It is important
to note that we do not claim that the practice of hospitality precludes Christians
relating to non-Christians via any form of philosophical argument; however, we
contend that such forms of argument can neither be normative nor determinative of
how Christians should relate to non-Christians.
We wifi now argue that the concrete and generic pattern of normative relations
between the church and its neighbours is defined by the Scriptural motif of
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hospitality and embodied in the social practice of hospitality which follows the
pattern set out in Scripture.
5.5.1 The scriptural definition of hospitality
We shall begin by reflecting on scripture in order to define what we mean by
hospitality and to discern the nature of the church's hospitality towards its
neighbours. We shall then move on to address how the social practice of hospitality
fits within a broader theological discussion. We turn now to what is arguably the
paradigmatic vision of God's hospitality in the New Testament: Luke 14.15-24. It is
through discussing the parable of the Great Banquet set out in Luke 14 that we shall
define what we mean by hospitality.
There is a cycle of feasting parables and motifs within Luke's Gospel all of which
form part of the justification for why Jesus is a guest of; and a host to, 'tax collectors
and sinners'. 37
 This cycle begins with Luke 14 and culminates in the banquet at the
end of the Prodigal Son parable in Luke 15.38 This table fellowship with sinners, and
the reconfiguring of Israel's purity boundaries which this hospitality represents,
signifies the heart of Jesus' mission. Jeremias notes that Jesus' eating with 'sinners',
Is
an expression of the mission and message of Jesus (Mark 2.17), [these] eschatological
meals [are] anticipatory celebrations of the feast in the end-time (Matt. 8.11 par.), in
which the community of the saints is already being represented (Mark 2.19). The
inclusion of sinners in the community of salvation, achieved in table-fellowship, is the
most meaningful expression of the message of the redeeming love of God.39
Jeremias is not alone in New Testament scholarship in emphasising Jesus' open
commensality. While he (and Kenneth Bailey) may represent the so-called 'second
quest' for the historical Jesus, even those in the 'third quest' (N. T. Wright, Markus
an analysis of this meal cycle see Arthur Just, The Ongoing Feast: Table Fellowship and
Eschatology at Emmaus (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1993), pp. 165-95. For an
analysis of the term 'sinners' in the gospels see N. 1. Wright, Jesus and the Victoiy of God, Christian
Origins and the Question of God (London: SPCK, 1996), pp. 264-68. For an assessment as to why
tax collectors were singled out as a category for reprobation see Marcus Borg, Conflict, Holiness and
Politics in the Teachings ofJesus (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1972), pp. 83-86.
Borg sees the related parables of the lost sheep, the lost coin and the prodigal son as both a defence
of Jesus' actions and an invitation to join in the celebration of the return of the outcasts to the People
of God. Conflict, Holiness and Politics, p. 91.
39 J. Jeremias, New Testament Theology, p. 115. Quoted in Kenneth Bailey, Poet and Peasant and
Through Peasant Eyes: A Literary-Cultural Approach to the Parables of Luke (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1983), p. 143.
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Borg, and Edward Sanders) and those of a very different view to the 'third quest' (for
example, Dominic Crossan) emphasise this aspect of Jesus' ministry. As N. T.
Wright points out: 'Most writers now agree that eating with 'sinners' was one of the
most characteristic and striking marks of Jesus' regular activity. [...j Jesus was, as it
were, celebrating the messianic banquet, and doing so with all the wrong people.'4°
The great banquet depicted in Luke 14:15-24 is the high point of this cycle
(although it is often over-shadowed by the story of the Prodigal). 4 ' However, it
needs to be set within the broader context of Jesus' ministry. The images of feasting
and hospitality are abundant and vivid. 42 Among many there are: the wedding at
Cana, Dives feasting while Lazarus starves at his gate, the joyous meal at Jericho
with Zacchaeus, the woman washing Jesus' feet, Jesus washing his disciples' feet,
the last supper, and the meals enjoyed with the risen Jesus. At various points his
stories and actions challenge the religious, political, economic and social authorities
of his day. Through his hospitality, which has as its focal point actual feasting and
table fellowship, Jesus turns the world upside down.
There is both continuity and departure from the pattern of hospitality established
in the Old Testament. The elements of continuity are very strong. God commanded
his people to provide hospitality to strangers: 'The alien who resides with you shall
be to you as the citizen among you; you shall love the alien as yourself; for you were
aliens in the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God (Lev 19.33-4).' The command in
Leviticus 19 was echoed in a range of other legislation. The tithe, for instance, is
fundamentally a command to be hospitable on a lavish scale (Dt 12:17-19). Again.
the commands concerning harvesting are demands that hospitality be observed: one
who harvests a field must not seek to maximise his harvest, but must leave the
gleanings for those who are in need (Dt 24.19-22). Stories of hospitality constitute a
leitmotif throughout the Old Testament; for example, Abraham and Sarah
entertaining angels, Abigail placating David, and the widow of Zarephath caring for
Wright, Jesus andthe Victory of God, p.431. For a discussion of the different 'quests' for Jesus see
Jesus and the Victory of God, pp. 3-124. CL, Borg, Conflict, Holiness and Politics, p. 79.
41 Just sees the Great Banquet parable as the climax of the meal cycle. Just, The Ongoing Feast, p.
178.
42 For a treatment of the theme of hospitality in Luke-Acts see John Koenig, New Testament




 At times this hospitality is not only offered but also demanded, as when Lot
insists the Angels spend the night with him (Gen 19.1-3). At other times it is
extended to enemies as a sign of the reconciling work of God, as when Isaac made a
feast for Abimelech (Gen 26.26-31), or Elisha mediated a peace between the
Arameans and the Israelites (2 Kings 6.8-23). It is linked with the renewal of
creation (Ecc 10.16-17), and ultimately it comes to include all creation and all the
nations at the messianic banquet, as depicted and anticipated in the prophets.45
Jesus' ministry draws together all these elements, intensifies their application, and
inaugurates their fulfilment.
Alongside this continuity, there is discontinuity. 46
 There is much in the Old
Testament that emphasises how Israel is not to entertain its neighbours or have
contact with those who are unclean. There are the numerous purity rituals set out in
the Torah,47 and most significantly, we cannot ignore all the material relating to the
conquest of those already living in Canaan in Joshua and elsewhere. There is also
the connection between being faithless to God and marrying foreign women
expressed in both Nehemiah and Ezra. 48 It seems Israel is constantly in danger of
being overwhelmed by pollution and sin (the two being distinct) and must constantly
protect itself in order to maintain itself as holy and distinct among the nations.
Jesus does not resolve the tension between hospitality and holiness present in the
Old Testament, but he does relate these two imperatives in a particular way. Jesus
relates hospitality and holiness by inverting their relations: hospitality becomes the
means of holiness. Instead of having to be set apart from or exclude pagans in order
to maintain holiness, it is in Jesus' hospitality of pagans, the unclean, and sinners that
Gen. 18; 1 Sam. 25; 1 Kings 17.18-24.
' For an exegesis of this passage in relation to hospitality see Eugene Rogers, Sexuality and the
Christian Body (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 257-60. Rogers contrasts the hospitality of Abraham
with the violent inhospitality of the Sodomites.
Texts relating to the messianic banquet include: Is. 25, 54; Ez. 39; and Joel 2-3. For an analysis of
Israel's relationship to the land see Walter Brueggemann, The Land (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1977); and for a assessment of the prophetic texts in relation to the messianic hope see idem, Hopeful
Imagination: Prophetic Voices in Exile (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986).
For a study of the diversity of view on the issue of the treatment of strangers in the Old Testament
see Daniel Smith-Christopher, 'Between Ezra and Isaiah: Exclusion, Transformation, and Inclusion of
the "Foreignert' in Post-Exilic Biblical Theology', in Ethnicity and the Bible, ed. Mark Brett (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1996), pp. 117-142.
For an assessment of the relationship between Israel's holiness, the Temple cult and Israel's
distinctive identity in relation to other nations see Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 3 vols., Anchor
Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1991), III.
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his own holiness is shown forth. Instead of sin and impurity infecting him, it seems
Jesus' purity and righteousness somehow 'infects' the impure, sinners and the
Gentiles. As Borg puts it: 'In the teaching [and practice] of Jesus, holiness, not
uncleanness was understood to be contagious.' 49 For example, the haemorrhaging
woman has only to touch Jesus and she is healed and made clean. 50
 Instead of Jesus
having to undergo purity rituals because of contact with the woman, as any other
rabbi would, it is the woman who is 'cleansed' by contact with him. 5 ' There is a
similar dynamic when Jesus touches lepers, the dead, the blind, the deaf and dumb,
or partakes of a meal with a tax collector. In discussing these acts N. T. Wright says:
'This means that Jesus' healing miracles must be seen clearly as bestowing the gift of
shalom, wholeness, to those who lacked it, bringing not only physical health but
renewed membership in the people of YHWII.' 52 Wright goes further and argues
this holiness/wholeness was shown forth in Jesus' hospitality.
Jesus' speech and action announces a form of hospitality that, to some of his
contemporaries, is shocking in relation to certain Old Testament precedents. Thus,
his hospitality brings him into conflict with the custodians of Israel's purity, both
self-appointed (the Pharisees, Zealot-types etc.) and actual (the Temple authorities).
Borg contends that this conflict between Jesus and his contemporaries is about the
shape and purpose of the people of God which is itself part of a wider debate about
the response of Judaism to Roman political power and the encroachment of
Hellenistic culture. 53
 Through his hospitality Jesus rejected, and presented an
alternative to, every other post-exilic programme for Israel's internal reform and
quest for holiness. For all of these were based on the exclusion of 'sinners',
separation from the 'world' (that is, Gentile uncleanness and rule), and solidarity
formed by defining Israel's identity through opposition to sinners and Gentiles.
Jesus rejected also co-option by, and assimilation to, the pagan hegemony, and
capitulation to sin. Rather, he advocated participation in the kingdom of God as
enacted in his table-fellowship.
Josh. 23:11-13; Ez. 10:2-4, 10:10; Neh. 13:26-27.
' Borg, Conflict, Holiness and Politics, p. 135.
° Mk. 5:25-34; Lk. 8:43-48.
Borg, Conflict, Holiness and Politics, p. 135-6.
Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, p. 192; cf., Borg, Conflict, Holiness and Politics, p. 93.
Borg, Conflict, Holiness and Politics, pp. 2-4.
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Jesus' hospitality is not to be isolated to himseffi he calls his disciples to 'Go and
do likewise' (Lk 10.37). And, in accordance with Jesus' command, Christians have
sought to mirror Jesus' pattern of hospitality. Although it is probably mistaken in its
exegesis of the passage, Christians have constantly made use of the story of the great
judgement given in Matthew 25.31-46 as a spur to follow Christ's call to 'Go and do
likewise'. Christine Pohi goes so far as to say: 'This has been the most important
passage for the entire tradition on Christian hospitality. "I was a stranger and you
welcomed me" resounds throughout the ancient texts, and contemporary practitioners
of hospitality refer to this text more often than to any other passage.' 54
 Pohl herself
thinks that the term 'stranger' is to be equated with the vulnerable. She states: 'This
passage sets up a fundamental identification of Jesus with "the least of these" and
personally and powerfully connects hospitality toward human beings with care for
Jesus.' 55
 However, many scholars argue that 'the least of these' does not refer to the
poor and vulnerable, but to receiving the Gospel's messengers.56 Nevertheless, the
priority of providing hospitality for the vulnerable stranger is, Carig Keener notes,
entirely consonant with the Jesus tradition (e.g. Mk 10:21; Lk 16:19-25) and biblical
ethics as a whole (Ex 22:22-27; Prov 17:5; 19:17; 2 1:13). Jewish lists of loving works
include showing hospitality and visiting the sick, though not visiting prisoners. Such acts
were found praiseworthy on the day of Judgement (2 Enoch 63:1-2; b. Ned 39b-40a). [...]
One could thus understand Jesus' disciples as bringers of healing (10:8), caring for the
least.57
5.5.2 Exegesis of the parable of the Great Banquet
We turn now to an exegesis of the Great Banquet parable in order to elucidate our
understanding of the hospitality motif. We have focused on Luke's rendering of the
Great Banquet parable, but many of the same points could be made in relation to
Matthew's version. We opted for Luke's version because of how the parable forms
part of a wider development of the motif of hospitality throughout Luke-Acts.
There is a parallel between the messianic feast depicted in Isaiah 25.6-9 and the
Great Banquet parable told by Jesus in Luke 14.15-24. It is something akin to this
Christine PohI, Making Room: Recovering Hospitalily as a Christian Tradition (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1999), p. 22.
Ibid.
See Graham Stanton, A Gospelfor a New People (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992), pp. 207-230; and
Craig Keener, A Commenta,y on the Gospel ofMatthew (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), p. 604-606.
Keener, A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, p. 605.
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messianic banquet that the pious guest had in mind when he exclaimed: 'Blessed is
anyone who will eat bread in the kingdom of God!' (v.15). In Isaiah all the nations
are envisaged as participating in the banquet and without even bringing gifts to
honour Yahweh. The text contrasts God who swallows up death with the
participants, from all nations, who swallow rich food and rejoice. Bailey points to
the differences between this treatment of the messianic feast and how it is portrayed
in the intertestamental period: in Enoch I the gentiles are excluded, and the Qumran
community adds to this by rejecting all Jews who are unrighteous or physically
blemished.5 By contrast, the Isaiah presentation is re-affirmed in Luke. This
reaffirmation is initially made in Luke 13.28-34 where Jesus declares that 'people
will come from east and west, from north and south, and will eat in the kingdom of
God. Indeed, some are last who will be first, and some who are first will be last' (Lk
13.29-30). If Enoch and Quniran indicate the expectation of Jesus' contemporaries
concerning the messianic feast, then the parable Jesus tells in response to the pious
guest challenges and reconfigures these expectations.59
The parable of the Great Banquet portrays a time when the banquet is ready (Lk
14.17); that is, when Jesus has inaugurated the eschaton. The invitation to this
formal dinner is sent out to the host's peers. The invitation is met by insulting
excuses that in effect are rejections.6° These rejections are a self-conscious and
systematic exclusion of the host by his peer group. Such rejection is not just a matter
of a dented reputation: political power, economic well-being and, in the context of a
shame culture, social identity, rested on maintaining one's prestige and honour.6'
Therefore, these 'guests' are not just rejecting the host's invitation, but they are
portrayed as active enemies of the host.
The call to participate in the kingdom of God relativises all social, economic,
political and natural commitments, and not just those of the elite. This is confirmed
in the following section (Luke 14.25-33) which can be read as an elaboration on the
preceding parable. As Bailey summarises it:
Bailey, Peasant Eyes, p. 91.
Cf., Koenig, New Testament Hospitality, p. 17.
60 Bailey, Peasant Eyes, p. 96-9. See also Borg, Conflict, Holiness and Politics, p. 80.
Willi Braun, Feasting and Social Rhetoric in Luke 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), pp. 110-11. It should be noted that Braun emphasises the Greco-Roman context, as distinct
from the Jewish context, of Luke-Acts.
-195-
The parable says that as they reject Jesus (with these unacceptable excuses) they are
rejecting the great banquet of salvation promised by God in Isaiah, that is, in some sense,
even now set for them through the presence of Jesus in their midst. But not only do they
reject the host, they also prefer other things.62
Thus, there is no simple rejection of Jesus. Rather, to refuse God's generosity is to
prefer and attend to some other god or power. Likewise, acceptance of the invitation
demands whole-hearted devotion: you must leave what you are doing and your
present concerns, and without tarrying, you must go and participate fully in the
banquet.63 The invitation is a command and the command is an invitation.
The next part of the parable concerns the invitation to the outcasts. The host's
anger is normal, but his response is not. Instead of seeking vengeance he makes the
banquet open to outcasts: 'Go out at once into the streets and lanes of the town and
bring in the poor, the crippled, the blind, and the lame' (Lk 14.21). Braun reads this
as the point of conversion of the host, the central character in this story. By inviting
outcasts the host steps outside the accepted patterns of competitive social relations
that preserve honour and prestige among the eite.M And instead of resorting to
strategies of vengeance as would be expected, he inverts and subverts the existing
patterns of social stratification and the moral order. By breaking with the
'ostentatious and agonistic rituals of dinner', 65 and not resorting to violence in order
to preserve his name, the host reconfigures the existing degenerate patterns of human
sociality and breaks the cycle of what René Girard has called 'mimetic rivalry'.66
Instead of securing his identity, reputation, and economic well-being through
mimesis of the conventional moral, social and economic norms, he rests them on
identifying with the poor and outcasts. There is thus a conversion from one pattern
of relating to another, and with this conversion the world itself is turned upside
down. The final statement of the parable underscores this: the host severs himself
completely from those with whom he previously sought table fellowship and, by
62 John Nolland, Word Biblical Commenlaiy: Luke 9:21-18:34 (Texas: Dallas, 1993), p. 99.
63 Cf., Jesus calling Peter, Andrew, James and John from their fishing nets (Mt. 4:17-23; Mk. 1:14-20;
Lk. 5:1-11).
"Braun, Feasting, p. 105.
65 Braun, Feasting, p. 106.
René Girard, 'Mimesis and Violence', in The Girard Reader, ed. by James Williams (New York:
Crossroad Publishing, 1996), pp. 9-19. See also: Gil Bailie, Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the
Crossroads (New York: Crossroad, 1997), pp. 111-132. For a summazy and critique of Girard's work
in general see Gerard Loughlin, 'René Girard (b. 1923): Introduction', in The Posimodern God: A
Theological Reader, ed. by Graham Ward, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997), pp. 96-104.
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implication, expresses loyalty to those who now surround him (Lk I 4.24).67 1
reconfiguring is brought into sharp focus when the context in which Jesus tells this
parable is understood to be not just a simple meal, but also a symposium
characteristic of the Mediterranean world of Luke's time.68 Jesus is the sage or
teacher who is calling for the reigning symposium rules to be supplanted: the usual
virtues are inverted - humility not pride is exalted (Lk 14.10) - and the usual guests
prove unworthy and instead it is the 'poor, the crippled, the lame, and the blind' who
are honoured (Lk 14.1 114).69
The identity of the outcasts themselves is significant. They are from the
surrounding area, and so are part of the community, but are excluded from
participating in the life of that community. 7° Thus a contrast is drawn between the
notables of the world who both expect to be invited yet refuse the invitation, and
those who do not consider themselves worthy or who are considered by others to be
worthless, yet who are invited and accept. There is a dramatic asymmetry at work
here. Those who accept have nothing to bring. Braun notes that the language itself
maximises the sense of distance between the host and these guests. He states: 'This
social awareness evident in the choice of invitational vocabulary indirectly yet
unmistakably discloses the distance that separates these two parties.' 7 ' The host is in
no way indebted to them and they cannot respond in kind; that is, they are
undeserving guests, most probably either shocked or distrustful that such an
invitation has been extended to them.
The emphasis on inviting the poor and needy and the contrast with other patterns
of hospitality has been consistently echoed throughout the Christian tradition. It is
the emphasis on inviting the outcast which has time and again distinguished
Christian hospitality from other kinds of hospitality. For example, Lactantius
criticises classical philosophers who tied hospitality to advantage. He argues:
'Hospitality is a principle virtue, as the philosophers also say; but they turn it aside
67 Braun, Feasting, p. 122 & p. 131.
Braun, Feasting, pp. 43-61.
69 This draws attention to the difference between classical, aristocratic virtue and Christian virtues,
and between Socratic dialectic and Christian rhetoric, and the kind of peace each envisages. See
Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 327-32 & pp. 359-64.
° Cf. Macintyre's discussion of hospitality to, and misericordia for, the stranger as central virtues for
human flourishing in community: Dependent, pp. 122-28.
" Braun, Feasting, p. 97.
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from true justice, and forcibly apply it to advantage.' 72
 He then goes on to criticise
Cicero in particular, stating, 'He has here committed the same error [
...
J, when he
said that we must bestow our bounty on "suitable" persons. For the house of the just
and wise man ought not to be open to the illustrious, but to the lowly and abject.'73
Greek and Roman views of hospitality emphasised reciprocity and the use of
hospitality within a client-patron relationship from which both parties gained social,
political and economic advantage. 74
 For Lactantius, and other Christian writers,
Christians were deliberately to welcome those who could offer little in return and
from whom little prestige could be gained. The views of Lactantius help explain the
parable of the Great Banquet and illustrate how the conception of hospitality given in
the parable has been consistently echoed in the Christian tradition.
The last section of the parable intensifies the way in which the marginalized are
included in the feast. The invitation to the celebration, which is at hand, is now
extended to those outside the community. 75
 Bailey envisages Jesus as having the
mission to the Gentiles at the heart of his ministry. He states:
Luke's interest in the gentiles is unmistakable. [...] The genealogy [of Jesus] is traced to
Adam (Luke 3.38) and not to Abraham (MaU 1.2). The quotation from Isaiah 40.3-5 in
Luke 3.6 includes the phrase, 'And all flesh shall see the salvation of God,' and the
commission of the disciples at the end of Luke specifically mentions the gentiles
(24:47).76
The passage Jesus uses to declare his ministry makes this explicit. 77
 Furthermore,
this announcement is supplemented by reference to Elijah going out of Israel to help
the gentile woman of Zarephath and Elisha ministering to the gentile Naaman who
comes into Israel because he is attracted to what God is doing through Elisha (Lk
72 Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, p. 176.
Ibid.
Winter, Seek the Welfare of the City, pp. 45-60. Winter emphasises how Paul, in the letters to the
Thessalonians, criticizes and seeks to re-constitute the classical practice of the patron-client
relationship. For a study of client-patron relations in the ancient world see Moses Finley, The Ancient
Economy, 2' edn (London: Hogarth, 1985).
Bailey argues that to justi something akin to the Inquisition or the Crusades on the basis of the
statement 'Go out into the roads and lanes, and compel people to come in, so that my house may be
filled (v.23)' is an incorrect interpretation. Rather, the statement is meant to indicate the asymmetric
and unexpected character of the invitation. The servant must persist in actively persuading the
astounded and incredulous strangers that the invitation is genuine until he has drawn the strangers into
the banquet. Bailey, Peasant Eyes, p. 108. Ford goes further, and reads this parable as an explicit
rejection of contemporary Jewish notions of 'holy war', especially those linked with the messianic
banquet. Massyngbaerde Ford, My Enemy is My Guest: Jesus and Violence in Luke (New York:
Orbis, 1984), pp. 102-5.
76 Bailey, Peasant Eyes, p. 102.
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4.25-27). The parable of the Great Banquet illuminates this dynamic. There is a
simultaneously centrifugal and centripetal mission visualised: the servant is to go out
so that others, whether outcasts or outsiders, can be drawn in. Bailey draws parallels
to other passages in Luke: 'Again, as in Luke 4.16-30, the centripetal and the
centrifugal forces of mission are set side by side. The city on the hill sends light out
to all the world, and the lamp is seen only by those who are in the house.'78
However, this dynamic is not restricted to Luke's Gospel. Parallels can be drawn
with Jesus' encounter with the Syrophoenician woman depicted in Matthew 15.2 1-28
and Mark 7.24-30. We can also add the story of the Centurion who calls on Jesus
to heal his servant (Mt. 8.5-13): while Jesus was going about his ministry, this man
comes to him. Furthermore, this soldier was not only a gentile, but also an
oppressor, yet Jesus cites him as an example of faithfulness; that is, he is a true
participant in the people of God. 8° These stories represent faithful responses (by
outsiders) to the servant Lord who went out in their midst (meaning that he both
literally walked around and that he departed from the accepted conventions of his
day) so that the excluded might be included. They respond to the Lord as servant
who exorcises creation, transforms their social, political and economic structures,
and establishes a community of those who are to carry on this ministry, in his name,
until he comes again. This going out and reconfguring the existent order so that it
becomes a feast, that is, a place of generative, fruitful relations, applies whether the
context is first century Palestine or the remnants of Christendom on the cusp of the
third millennium.
In summary, the parable of the Great Banquet articulates the nature and proper
form of the church's relations with its neighbours. The church is to participate
actively in the life of the world as slaves and envoys of the true King, in a manner
akin to Jesus, extending an invitation to those, like they were previously, who are not
worthy guests, who are marginalized in the wider society, who do not consider
themselves invited, and who have not even heard there is such a banquet available.
Some will reject the invitation, others will accept, and some will need
Lk. 4:16-19.
78 Bailey, Peasant Eyes, p. 107.
Ibid.
80 Flays sees this dynamic at work throughout Mark's gospel. Richard Hays, The Moral Vision of the
New Testament: A Contemporaiy Introduction to New Testament Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1996), pp. 89-90.
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encouragement to believe that such an invitation includes them. The invitation is not
to revelry or idolatry, but to the messianic feast that has already begun. Like Jesus,
the speech and action of the church is simultaneously centrifugal - they go out into
the world - and centripetal - the world is drawn into participating in the banquet.
Thus, the church, like Jesus, neither separates itself from the world nor becomes
assimilated to the world.
5.5.3 Hospitality as the social practice which summarises and structures
relations between the church and its neighbours
The parable of the Great Banquet explains how we are to provide hospitality to
our enemies in the midst of them. It summarises what Christ embodies in his life and
ministry whereby he was the journeying guest/host. The very situation of the Great
Banquet parable in the Lukan travel narrative emphasises this. As Jesus travels to
Jerusalem where he is the rejected guest who in turn becomes the gracious, crucified
host, he tells this story of the hospitality he offers amid the rejection he receives.
Moessner sees Christ's embodiment of the journeying guest/host as exemplified in
the Emmaus road encounter: 'What is primary to the Emmaus episode and may be
regarded as the interpretative key for all the meal scenes in Luke is the recognition of
the journeying guest who is revealed at table as the Lord (v.35) and as Lord, the host
of the banquet in the kingdom of God.' 8 ' He notes how Jesus journeyed with
Cleopas and his friend on the road they were travelling, in dialogue with them about
the kingdom of God. Jesus was then a guest at their home, who then became their
host at the meal. At this meal strangers became friends and Jesus was understood to
be the risen Lord. After this event these two disciples went out, leaving their home,
journeying to the very heart of their social, political, and economic world -
Jerusalem - in order to bear witness, with others, to the risen Christ.
Peter's meeting with Cornelius exemplifies how the church, as it follows after
Jesus Christ, is itself a journeying guest/host and as such, this story portrays a picture
of how Christians should relate to their neighbours. In Acts 10 we read first of the
Spirit's work in the life of the Roman soldier Cornelius (Acts 10.1-8) signifying that
God is already at work in the world drawing all things to him. The Spirit then gives
Peter a vision of many varieties of food (Acts 10.9-16). It is a kerygmatic vision
David Moessner, Lord of the Banquet: The Literary and Theological Sign/icance of the Lukan
Travel Narrative (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), p. 184. Cf Just, The Ongoing Feast, p. 261.
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which echoes Jesus' call to Peter to love him and feed his sheep. It is a eucharistic
vision of feasting wherein sacrifice, in this instance of animals, bears witness to a
'clean' or restored creation order represented by the four-cornered sheet and the
cornucopia that fills it. 82 After three repetitions, this restored order, in a manner
parallel to the ascension, is then taken up to heaven. This vision emphasises that
Christ has fulfilled the law and restored creation, and we are made clean in and
through the ascended Christ. There is no longer any need for the People of God to
distinguish themselves by purity rituals, such as not eating certain food, or avoiding
the company of pagans and sinners. Our purity resides in Jesus Christ alone, not in
any of our actions. Nothing can separate us from him (Rom. 8.3 5-9), and he has sent
his Spirit through whom we participate in Christ's purity, and by which we are
empowered to live according to this already established righteousness. Thus, contact
with the pagan Cornelius will not 'infect' Peter; rather, Cornelius will be made whole
and enabled to participate in the People of God through contact with Peter.
Peter is subsequently instructed to go with the men sent by Cornelius who lead
him to where, in his immaturity, he would not want to go. After providing these
strangers with hospitality (Acts 10.23), he journeys with them, along with some
fellow believers, to Cornelius. At their meeting there is no demand that Cornelius
bow to Peter (i.e., those 'outside' the church bow to those 'inside'), they meet as
equals, equally empowered by the Spirit to receive, through their encounter with
each other, a fresh encounter and understanding of God. However, Peter, who is the
guest of Cornelius at this point, becomes the host. It is he who interprets Cornelius's
encounter with God, recognising that God is at work outside the church (Acts 10.34-
5), then framing Cornelius's experience in reference to the Gospel (Acts 10.34-43).
As D'Costa says, the 'riches of the mystery of God are disclosed by the Spirit and are
measured and discerned by their conformity to and in their illumination of Christ.
[...] In this sense, Jesus is the normative criteria for God, while not foreclosing the
ongoing self-disclosure of God in history, through the Spirit.' 83 After this
Christocentric naming of Cornelius's encounter with God, the Spirit is poured out on
the Gentiles (Acts 10.45) and the church, represented by its practices (that is,
82 Cf., Ian McDonald, The Crucible of Christian Morality (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 19-20.
Gavin D'Costa, 'Christ, the Trinity, and Religious Pluralism', in Christian Uniqueness
Reconsidered. The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. by Gavin D'Costa (New York:
Orbis Books, 1996), pp. 16-29 (p. 23). Cf., Fergusson, Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics,
pp. 166-7.
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baptism) and the presence of the Jewish believers, is reconfigured by the Spirit; and
Peter and Cornelius live out this new understanding of who God is through
Cornelius' hospitality toward Peter. Thus, a reciprocity, or a giving and receiving
from each, of a new understanding of who God is revealed to be by Jesus Christ, is
matched by a giving and receiving of hospitality.TM
It is no coincidence that this encounter is followed by an account of the mission to
the Gentiles and the subsequent dispute about circumcision: a dispute that centred on
what it meant to be in but not of the world. The book of Acts proposes that by going
out to the world, and actively participating in it, Peter was able to enjoy greater
communion with God. For a central dynamic of the church's neighbour relations, as
articulated in this encounter, is that going out is the way of coming home. It is not
just that Christians are to seek the welfare of the city, even though that city be
Babylon (Jer. 27.9), but it is in the very act of going out to seek Babylon's welfare
that they enjoy table fellowship with God: that is, holiness or purity is defined by
communion with God (and not by separation from sinners and pagans) and
communion is enjoyed by seeking the welfare of the poor, the impure and pagans.
Furthermore, through going out to these people the life of the nations itself becomes
transfigured into a proleptic celebration of the messianic banquet. Dulles captures
the rhythm of this single movement well when he says:
The Church's existence is a continual alternation between two phases. Like systole
and exhalation in the process of breathing, assembly and mission succeed each other
in the life of the Church. Discipleship would be stunted unless it included both the
centripetal phase of worship and the centrifugal phase of mission. 85
This single, simultaneously centripetal and centrilligal movement, is how the church
is to remain righteous, holy and faithful to God's call when it is surrounded by
enemies who wish to conquer and co-opt it and temptations and idolatries which
threaten to seduce it. Equally, this centripetal and centrifugal movement is how the
church ensures that it does not turn its back on its neighbours and deny that which it
should accept from them.
' For a parallel interpretation cf., Lesslie Newbigin, The Open Secret: An Introduction to the
Theology of Mission, rev. edn (London: SPCK, 1995), pp. 59-60; and Hays, The Moral Vision, p. 440.
Avery Duties, Models of the Church: A Critical Assessment of the Church in all its Aspects, 2'' edn
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1989), p. 220.
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In this encounter between Peter and Cornelius we see the Spirit at work outside
the church, calling the church out from its settled place in order to follow God's
mission to the world. Peter who is the guest of Cornelius becomes the host. But then
the lives of both Peter and Cornelius are transfigured by the Spirit such that they both
have to re-order their lives and their life together so that they embrace, and do not
exclude each other. The re-ordering of their lives, so that it becomes a life together,
is founded on their obedience to God whose self-revelation in Jesus Christ
constitutes the criterion for evaluating what and whom to accept. In turn, the process
whereby their patterns of life are transformed, and a new pattern emerges, bears
witness to God's kaleidoscopic order. However, this new pattern of life formed in
response to Jesus Christ neither erases nor destroys nor abandons all previous
patterns of life. For example, Cornelius does not have to become a Jew. Instead, the
decision as to whom to accept and whom to reject is evaluated in relation to whether
or not the person bears witness to Jesus Christ. Thus, a measure of the hospitality of
the church is how people are bound together and what boundaries are maintained or
re-established between people. Truthful and generative binding and separating is a
work of the Spirit as he directs all things towards their eschatological fulfilment.86
The book of Acts continues Jesus' journey, with the church recapitulating this
guest/host dynamic of Jesus in its relations with the world. Moessner states: 'Thus
the "Acts of the Apostles" are actually the stories of the journeying of the people of
God whose leaders imitate their Prophet Messiah in proclaiming the glad tidings of
the Kingdom.' 87 In effect, the verse Leviticus 19.33 is inverted. Far from the people
of God being settled in the land and providing hospitality to strangers, the people of
God are the sojourners in the world. Yet even though they are sojourners, Christians
are to provide hospitality to the world. The church is not to be entertained by the
degenerate forms of human sociality and thought enjoyed by the world. Rather, the
church is to invite the world to participate in generative patterns of thought and
action, and bear witness in its life together to the possibility of such patterns. Thus
the church, through the social practice of hospitality, is to host the world as it
journeys through the midst of the world, bearing witness to the world's own
eschatological possibilities. It is the Christocentric performance of hospitality that
Cf., Yoder, 'Binding and Loosing', in The Royal Priesthood, pp. 323-58.
87 Moessner, Lord of the Banquet, p. 296.
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furnishes the world with the concrete, non-Utopian vision of 'just generosity' that
Macintyre sees as essential for human flourishing.88
5.5.4 Hospitality within the Christian tradition
The paradigm of hospitality set out in the biblical texts analysed above has
informed the thinking and practice of the church throughout its histoiy. From its
earliest writings, right through to contemporary Christian practice, we see evidence
for the centrality of hospitality as the practice that determines how Christians relate
to their neighbours.
The Didache is an early example of both the exhortation to hospitality as an
important Christian discipline and the tensions within the practice of hospitality. In
an echo of Matthew 5.2, the Didache admonishes Christians to 'Give to anyone that
asks you, and demand no return; the Father wants His own bounties to be shared with
all.' 89
 The document calls on Christians to be open-handed in their hospitality,
especially towards the poor. 9° However, it tempers the exhortation to generosity
with discernment by setting out a number of ways in which those who would abuse
Christian hospitality, and those who threatened the life together of the community
(for example, by their false teaching), can be discouraged. 9 ' The Didache represents
an attempt to control abuses of hospitality while simultaneously encouraging its
practice. 92 We see in the Didache a tension within the Christian tradition of
hospitality that surfaces time and again; that is, the tension between recognizing
Jesus in every stranger and the prudential consideration of discriminating between
deserving and undeserving strangers. 93
 However, the very existence of documents
that attempt to address the problem of the abuse of hospitality points to how, in the
early church at least, hospitality was considered a nonnative and necessary practice.
88 DRA, p. 126.
89 Didache 1.3.
Didache 4.5
Simon Tugwell, The Apostolic Fathers (London: Geoffley Chapman, 1989), pp. 1-5, 8-9.
Pohi, Making Room, p. 147.
Cf., Constitutions of the Holy Apostles, in ANF, trans. by William Fletcher, ed. by Alexander
Roberts and James Donaldson, 10 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), VII, pp. 3 84-508 (p. 397);
Benedict, The Rule of St Benedict, trans. by Timothy Fry et al (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), ch.
53; and see POhI, Making Room, pp. 93-94 for comments by Luther and Calvin on the problem of
discriminating between deserving and undeserving strangers.
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Fears about the abuse of hospitality were not just focused on how guests might
take advantage of it. There is also a strong emphasis in the tradition on admonishing
hosts not to use hospitality to gain advantage. We have already noted that many of
the Church Fathers emphasise that Christians were deliberately to welcome those
from whom little prestige could be gained. For example John Chrysostom wrote:
Wherefore God bade us call to our suppers and our feasts the lame, and the maimed, and
those who cannot repay us; for these are most of all properly called good deeds which are
done for God's sake. Whereas if thou entertain some great and distinguished man, it is
not such pure mercy, what thou doest: but some portion many times is assigned to thyself
also, both by vain-glory, and by the return of the favor, and by thy rising in many men's
estimation on account of thy guest.94
Within the Christian tradition the stranger to be welcomed is consistently defined as
someone who lacks any resources to support themselves. The stranger is someone
who lacks a 'place' in society because they are detached or excluded from the basic
means of supporting and sustaining life - family, work, polity, land and so on - and
are thus vulnerable. Pohi states: 'Through most of its history, the Christian
hospitality tradition has expressed a normative concern for strangers who could not
provide for or defend themselves.' 95
 For example, in 1785 a group of Methodists
founded the Stranger's Friends Society in London to aid the new class of urban poor.
John Wesley described the Society as 'instituted wholly for the relief not of our
society, but for the poor, sick, friendless strangers'. In other words, following the
parable of the Good Samaritan, the answer given to the question: 'who is my
neighbour?' (Lk 10.29) has been that the neighbour to be welcomed is the 'friendless
stranger'. Hence, what constitutes the abuse of hospitality by hosts is defined in
terms of whether their hospitality ignores the vulnerable and friendless stranger.
The emphasis on welcoming the vulnerable stranger points to how Christian
hospitality is often not simply a question of entertaining a stranger. To entertain a
stranger implies the life of the host is relatively unaffected by the encounter.
However, to accommodate (in the sense of adapt to and make space and time for) or
John Chiysostom, 'Homily 20 on 1 Corinthians', Epistles of Paul to the Corinthia pLs,
 in Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers, trans. by Talbot Chambers, ed. by Philip Schaft First Series, 14 vols.
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), XII, pp.11 1-118 (p. 117). Hereafter Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
is abbreviated to NPNF.
Pohi, Making Room, p. 87.
Wesley, Works of John Wesley, vol 4: Journals (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979), p. 481.Quoted in Pohi, Making Room, p. 88.
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host (in the sense of sacrificially offer oneself for) the stranger carries the implication
that making room for the stranger requires the host to change their pattern of life. An
emphasis on the readiness to change one's life in order that the vulnerable stranger
may be accommodated is a constant theme in the tradition. Perhaps the most radical
example of changing one's pattern of life in order that the vulnerable stranger might
be accommodated is The Rule of St Benedict. Benedict's rule, and the forms of
monasticism it inspired, sought a form of life in which humility and obedience were
the means by which love of God and neighbour were accomplished. Benedict wrote:
'Renounce yourself in order to follow Christ.' 97 The renunciation he calls for is in
order that the monk may 'relieve the lot of the poor, clothe the naked, visit the sick
and bury the dead.' 98 For Benedict, hospitality of vulnerable strangers was directly
linked to a readiness to change one's self-willed and pride-filled pattern of life in
order that worship of God, and love of one's neighbour, might come first. To do this
required training in 'a school for the Lord's service' and could not be achieved
alone.99 However, hospitality of vulnerable strangers was not simply the response of
individual monks resulting from their training in the monastery. It was also part of
the witness of the whole community. Echoing Matthew 25.35 Benedict writes: 'All
guests who present themselves are to be welcomed as Christ, for he himself will say:
"I was a stranger and you welcomed me." Proper honor must be shown to all,
especially to those who share our faith and to pilgrims."°° Special provision for
accommodating guests was made and this provision was central to the common life
of the monastery which was, as Banner argues, designed to bear witness to the true
peace of the City of God characterised by love rather than enmity.'°1
By the fourth century, more institutional, systematic and corporate forms of
hospitality began to emerge. For example, John Chiysostom, acting in his capacity
as Bishop, was instrumental in founding a number of hospitals in Constantinople.'°2
These corporate forms of hospitality were often a response to particular crises. For
Benedict, The Rule, Ch. 4, p. 12.
98Ibid.
Banner notes how Benedict, in contrast to the Desert Fathers, resolves the tension between
communal and eremitic forms of monasticism in flivour of the communal. Michael Banner, "Who
are my Mother and my Brothers?': Marx, Bonhoeffer and Benedict and the Redemption of the
Family', in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, pp. 225-51 (pp. 235-23 8).
100 Benedict, The Rule, Ch. 53, p. 51.
101 Banner, "Who are my Mother and my Brothers?", p. 241-44.
'°2 Tothy Miller, 'Hospital: Medieval and Renaissance History', in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. by
Warren Reich (New York: MacMillan, 1995), pp. 1160-1163 (p. 1160).
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example, Gregory Nazianzens praises Basil of Caesarea for founding hospitals that
cared for the sick and poor after a terrible famine.' 03
 However, John Chrysostom
constantly refers to the need for individual Christians to practice hospitality as well.
In his forty-fifth sermon on the Acts of the Apostles, after a meditation on Matthew
25.39-42 and Abraham welcoming the Angels to his table, Chrysostom states: 'Make
for yourself a guest chamber in your own house: set up a bed there, set up a table
there and a candlestick. [...] This do: surpass [the Church] in liberality: have a room
to which Christ may come, say "This is Christ's cell; this building is set apart for
Him." 04
 For Chrysostom there is both the hospitality undertaken by the Church
itself and that undertaken by individuals within the church. He sees both as
necessary. What Chrysostom's sermon points to is the tension between the
institutional and corporate nature of some instances of Christian hospitality, needed
to address a certain scale of need, and how these instances can appear to obviate the
continuing responsibility for personal, particular and non-institutional hospitality by
all Christians.'05
The practice of hospitality has continued to be a mark of Christian witness right
up to the present day. Calvin expressed anxiety about the loss of hospitality as a
normative practice. Referring to the practice of hospitality, he states: 'This office of
humanity has [...] nearly ceased to be properly observed among men'.106
Furthermore, he says of hospitality to refugees in Geneva: 'No duty can be more
pleasing or acceptable to God'. 107
 As Calvin's response to those Protestants fleeing
persecution indicates, hospitality has formed part of the church's faithful response to
new social, political and economic developments and to particular historical crises.
For example, while many Christians singularly failed to respond to the persecution of
the Jews by the Nazis, the response of those that did act faithfully was characterised
103 Gregory Nazianzen, Panegyric on St Basil, in NPNF, trans. by Charles Brown and James Swallow,
ed. by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, Second Series, 14 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), VII, pp.
395-422 (p. 407).
'°4 iohn Chrysostom, Homily 45 on The Acts of the Apostles, in NPNF, ed. by Philip Schaff 14 vols.
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), VI, pp. 272-77 (p. 277).105 For an example of how both the tension between institutional and personal hospitality and between
recognizing Jesus in the stranger and the need to discriminate were successfi.illy negotiated, see the
assessment of care for the sick, pilgrims and urban poor in medieval Paris centred on the Cathedral of
Notre Dame in Richard Sennett, Flesh and Stone: the Body and the City in Western Civilization
(London: Faber and Faber, 1994), pp. 173-83.106 John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Hebrews (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1948), p. 340. Quoted in Pohi, Making Room, p. 36.107 John Calvin, Commentary on the Prophet Isaiah, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), p. 484.Quoted in Pohi, Making Room, p.6.
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by the practice of hospitality. A striking example is the stoly of the Protestant
village of Le Chambon whose members, in their homes, and at great personal cost,
protected thousands of Jews, and ensured their escape from the death camps.'° 8 The
work of Jean Vanier and the care given to those with severe learning disabilities in
the L'Arche communities is another, more contemporary example of the link
between Christian witness and hospitality.'°9 In a very different area of activity, the
work of the Sant'Egidio Community in resolving the civil war in Mozambique
through welcoming and reconciling hostile neighbours is yet another example of how
hospitality shapes the response of Christians to 'strangers' in relation to social and
moral problems."°
This brief review of ways in which hospitality has been conceived and practiced
emphasises the centrality of hospitality within Christianity. Its centrality is further
underlined by the way in which a concern for the proper practice of hospitality
occurs in both exhortations to faithful witness and Christian renewal movements; for
example, monasticism)" The above historical review also helps claritr how
hospitality shapes relations between Christians and their neighbours. The neighbour
is understood, within the Christian tradition, to be a stranger; moreover, the stranger
is not simply someone who is different, instead, there is a consistent and special
concern for the vulnerable stranger, for example, the poor, the sick, and the refugee.
However, care for the vulnerable stranger is not without its problems. A number of
tensions have emerged within the practice of hospitality. There is the tension
between greeting every stranger as Christ and discerning who would genuinely
benefit from care, the tension of establishing institutional and corporate forms of
hospitality and the need for hospitality to be personal, particular and practiced by
every Christian, and finally, the tension between provision and the capacity to
provide wherein the integrity and resources of the community can be overwhelmed
108 For an account of what happened in Le Chambon see Philip Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed,
(New York: Harper & Row, 1979).
'° For an account of the L'Arche communities see Jeanne Hinton, Communities (Guildford: Eagle,
1993), pp. 108-121; Jean Van icr An Ark for the Poor: The Slory of L 'Arche (New York: Crossroad,
1995).
° For an account of the critical role the Sant'Egidio community played in the 1993 peace settlement
in Mozambique see Andrea Bartoli, 'Mozambicans Mediating through Third Parties: Successful
Sergies and the Role of the Community of Sant'Egidio', (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace,
forthcoming).
' PohI notes that a critique of lax hospitality and a call for its proper practice was also part of the
Protestant Reformation. PohI, Making Room, p. 52.
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by the abuse of, or extensive need for, hospitality." 2 Despite these tensions, the
practice of hospitality is a recurring and consistent activity throughout the Christian
tradition and it is an activity shaped by response to the words and actions of Jesus
Christ, given in Scripture, as Christians seek to bear faithful witness to God's
hospitality of both them and their neighbours.
So far, we have deliberately resisted giving a formal definition of hospitality and
have instead used the biblical material, and the history of the Christian tradition, to
describe what the Christocentric performance of hospitality involves. As stated at
the beginning of this chapter, the aim has been to see how the Scriptural motif of
hospitality portrays a concrete and generic pattern for relations between the church
and its neighbours. We shall now seek to define how hospitality, within the
Christian tradition, can be understood within a doctrinal framework in order that we
may clarit' what we mean by the term.
5.5.5 The doctrinal framework within which hospitality as a social practice is
situated
As a motif and social practice hospitality 'helps us trace the correspondence of the
church's formal acts and observances to the shape of the Christ-event'." 3 While all
the moments of the Christ-event are crucial to the proper mapping of ethics and
evaluating moral problems, we will argue that hospitality - as instantiated in the
Scriptural motif and practiced within the tradition - is the 'mark' by which we can
identif' properly Christian relations between the church and its neighbours: that is,
relations which correspond to and recapitulate the Christ-event. As noted earlier in
the discussion of O'Donovan's ecciesiology, recapitulation of the Christ-event is the
structuring principle for all ecclesio logy, including how the church relates to those
around it. It is our contention that hospitality is the social practice that corresponds
to the church's recapitulation of Christ's ascension and the sending of his Spirit at
Pentecost. This is to modif' O'Donovan's schema slightly. O'Donovan includes in
a single moment Christ's resurrection, ascension and Pentecost. We see these as two
discrete moments rather than as a single one. Resurrection is a moment in itself as is
the single movement of Christ to the right hand of the Father and the subsequent
sending of the Spirit to commission the church. Relations between the church and its
112 As we shall see, each of these tensions occurs in assessment of hospice care.
" Desire, p. 173.
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neighbours are properly situated in this latter moment because it is this moment that
establishes the church and sets up the eschatological tension central to Christian
specificity and how the church relates to its neighbours. At his ascension Christ's
rule over 'the nations' is inaugurated and his 'kingdom' established. Thus the
eschatological fulfilment of creation (restored at Christ's resurrection) is achieved.
However, the ascension means Christ is not present on earth and this eschatological
fulfilment is not yet fully present. However, at Pentecost the Spirit makes
participation in the ascended Christ possible and inaugurates the eschaton. The
church bears witness to this possibility in its life together, while such witness-bearing
inherently draws its neighbours into its common life.
At the heart of this doctrine is the eschatological tension between the reality that
the eschaton has been inaugurated, but has not yet been made fully manifest. The
church in its thought and action must take account of this tension. However, as
Douglas Farrow describes at length, the church too often seeks to relieve this tension
either by grasping at heaven in its own strength (thereby ignoring the actions of
Christ and the Spirit), or by positing an over-realised eschatology (thereby forgetting
Christ's absence), or even by a false pessimism (which over-emphasises Christ's
absence and ignores the Spirit)." 4
 By contrast, true 'ecciesial being' balances the
presence and absence of God." 5
 The church, despite its sinfulness, participates
through the Spirit in God's life, yet also waits expectantly for the full disclosure of
that life with God at the paro usia.
Hospitality is the social practice that structures relations between Christians and
non-Christians in such a way that it recapitulates the ascension and Pentecost
moments of the Christ-event. While hospitality per se is a good of creation (ordered
as it is to the good of human community), specifically Christian hospitality is
inaugurated at Pentecost and bears witness to the eschaton and corresponds to the
tension at the heart of the eschaton, whereby it is established but not yet fully
manifest. As an eschatological social practice, Christian hospitality is inspired and
empowered by the Holy Spirit, who enables the church to host the life of its
114 Farrow, Ascension, pp. 87-254.
Farrow thinks this balance is played out most clearly in the eucharist. See: Farrow, Ascension, p.
150.
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neighbours without the church being assimilated to, colonised by, or having to
withdraw from its neighbours.
According to O'Donovan's schema each social practice that corresponds to a
moment in the Christ-event has an accompanying sacrament. The accompanying
sacrament embodies and symbolises how the church is recapitulating the Christ-
event. It is our contention that the sacrament which accompanies the practice of
hospitality is the single movement of feasting and fasting.
5.5.6 Feasting and fasting as the sacrament of hospitality
The church, in its moments and ministries of recapitulation, has always taken
seriously the feast (or festival) and fasting as definitive in, and interpretative of, the
shaping and expression of the Christian life. We contend that such feasting and
fasting is the sacrament of the practice of hospitality; that is, feasting embodies a
proleptic disclosure of the eschaton, while fasting ensures the eschatological tension
is held. Apart from its instantiation of the sacrament of hospitality, we may well ask
what relevance the analysis of feasting and fasting has to Christian ethics. it is our
contention that the framework of feasting and fasting we will set out provides us with
a lens through which to assess whether particular forms of life together undertaken
by Christians bear faithful witness to Jesus Christ.
We have already seen in relation to the Scriptural description of hospitality how
actual banquets and feasts are a feature of the practice of hospitality. In addition, the
Christian tradition has always marked its anticipation of the eschaton/messianic
banquet by feasts and festivals. These take many forms. They range from the
catholic feasts that celebrate the central events of Christ's life, such as Christmas,
Easter and Ascension, to the feast days of local saints.
These feasts bear witness to the messianic feast that transforms the world of
everyday work by breaking it open to new and true life." 6 Feasting, which
celebrates the messianic feast, functions to create a space for true freedom and
I 16 For a history of the development of patterns of feasting in the Christian liturgical year see Adolf
Adam, The Liturgical Year, trans. by Matthew O'Connell (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1990),
pp. 23-3 1.
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anticipates the time when this freedom will be fully established)' 7 Feasts encompass
and draw in every aspect of human sociality. Indeed, the feast envisaged, for
example, in the parable of the Great Banquet allows no scope for this spiritual
freedom to be etherealised or interiorised. As David Ford puts it: 'All the senses are
engaged in a good feast. We taste, touch, smell, see, hear. Salvation as health is here
vividly physical. Anything that heals and enhances savouring the world through our
senses may feed into a salvation that culminates in feasting." 8 To be drawn into the
messianic feast, anticipated now in the feastings of the church, every area of life and
every person must be transfigured. However, no new totality is created. There can
be no overview or single principle that orders the feast. The myriad of
conversations, encounters and exchanges, which in turn generate surplus to be
exchanged, cannot be contained or directed. Neither is there a single pattern to
conform to: each person has a gift, and each exchange takes place between distinct
and unique persons whose particularity is established and enhanced through these
exchanges. Thus, feasts and festivals are ways to anticipate and respond to the in-
breaking messianic age that initiates true freedom and generates transfigured patterns
of human sociality.
Before the parousia, the sacrament, which embodies hospitality, has a double
aspect: that is, feasting requires and is complemented by fasting. To embody
hospitality through feasting alone would deny the absence of Jesus Christ and the
cruciform nature of discipleship. Christians cannot ignore the words of invitation by
which Christ invites them to enjoy his hospitality: 'If any want to become my
followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me' (Mk.
8:34; cf., Mt. 16:24; Lk. 9:23). Neither can they ignore the reality that: 'the whole
creation has been groaning in labour pains until now; and not only the creation, but
we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly while we wait for
adoption, the redemption of our bodies' (Rom. 8.22-23). Moltmann states:
The coming of Christ is looked for to bring the perfection of freedom to the whole of
enslaved creation (Rom 8.19). In worship and in the eucharist men are taken up into this
eschatological process of the setting free of the world to be the kingdom of glory. They
celebrate this freedom in eschatological rejoicing and bring it into the world by taking up
their crosses. The recollection of the suffering of the crucified rules out a view of the
" 7 Jurgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit (London: SCM, 1977), pp. 2 74-5.
118 David Ford, Self and Salvation: Being Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), p. 267.
-212-
feast as an escape from the painful conditions of earthly life. [...] Hope in the risen Christ
rules out mere lamentation over this suffering without hope or denouncing its causes
without joy. [...] Joy at the presence of freedom through reconciliation is thus mixed with
pain at the presence of unfreedom and hope of the world's release from it.19
Fasting is a way of embodying the pain of taking up our cross and physically
entering into the expectation and longing for the full disclosure of God's rule.
Feasting and fasting correspond to the different aspects of the eschatological tension:
Christians both celebrate and invite others to participate in the resurrection hope, yet
we wait for the fuffilment of that hope. There can be no true feasting without fasting:
this would be to forget Christ's absence. Neither can there be true fasting without
feasting: this would be to deny the freedom available now through the actions of
Christ and the Spirit.
The church in its liturgical year has recognised the intrinsic link between feasting
and fasting. Thus, a period of fasting precedes the feast of Christmas and Lent
precedes Easter.' 2° Even within each week, there have traditionally been days of
fasting, and Sunday, the feast-day. Hence, in its ordering of time itself the Christian
tradition has sought to mark the eschatological tension.
Without being bounded by fasting, the feast can quickly descend into Satumalia
or carnival. Parallels can be drawn between conceptions of carnival and the
messianic feast. Within Christian practice the carnival has played a prominent part;
for example, the tradition of holding carnivals before or on Shrove Tuesday that still
continues. Mikhail Bakhtin even suggests that during the medieval era carnivals
reconfigured official feasts that consecrated injustice.' 2 ' However, the semi-
sanctioned use of carnival within the liturgical year should not blind us to how it
contrasts with Easter. Most obviously, Shrove Tuesday is not disciplined by a prior
period of fasting.' 22
 This may seem trivial, but it points to the twofold rejection that
119 Jurgen Moltmann, 'The Liberating Feast,' Concilium, 10.2 (1974), 74-84 (p. 79). Cf., idem, The
Church in the Power of the Spirit, pp. 112-13.
' 20 On the relationship between Lent and Easter and Advent and Christmas, see Adam, The Liturgical
Year, pp. 91-94; pp. 130-132
121 For a discussion of carnival, and Bakhtin's theory in particular, see John Docker, Postmodernism
and Popular Culture: A Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 168-244;
see also Peter Stallyftass and Mon White; The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (London: Methuen,
1986). Stallybrass and White develop Bakhtin's theory of carnival.
122 From a theological perspective, the problem with contemporary forms ofcarnival is that they are
not disciplined by the subsequent cycle of thsting and feasting given in Lent and Easter. Indeed, they
absolutize the carnival as the pre-eminent form of life together. In extending the fool's reign beyond a
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lies at the heart of all forms of the carnivalesque. First, carnival denies Christ's
affirmation of creation as good by contravening human limits (for example, through
celebrating gluttony and excess) and over-turning the established social order (for
example, by celebrating anarchy).' 23
 Second, carnival constitutes a rejection of the
future given by God (for example, by celebrating immediate gratification and
reward). Bakhtin could well be right: carnivals can serve to disrupt an unjust social
order. However, the manner of this disruption is wholly different in kind from the
eschatological disruption of the messianic feast. Indeed, the treatment of carnival in
literature (for example, in Rabelais's Garganrua and Pantagruel, or Goethe's Italian
Journey) and its depiction in art (for example, in the pictures of Hieronymus Bosch)
suggests carnival is to be equated with a demonic parody of the messianic feast. In
contrast to the messianic banquet which enables generative, transfigured patterns of
human sociality, marked in this age by feasting and fasting together, the Saturnalia or
carnival is degenerate.'24
In addition to its being the instantiation of the sacrament of hospitality, the
sacrament of feasting and fasting provides us with a lens through which to analyse
many forms of life together undertaken by Christians. The sacrament of feasting and
fasting thereby provides a means by which to assess whether or not particular forms
of Christian life together constitute a faithful witness to Jesus Christ. An example of
such an assessment might lie in a consideration of the monastic life as advocated by
St Benedict; which fails to take sufficient account of the need for both feasting and
fasting. St Benedict's 'little rule' has been a widely influential pattern of life since
its inception in 530. However, while making worship central, the pattern of life
together advocated by Benedict appears to have no place for feasting. He states:
'The life of a monk ought to be a continuous Lent." 25
 This sentiment is reflected in
the rest of his rule: despite detailed prescriptions regarding the food and drink
appropriate for monks, he gives no account either of how monks are to feast or what
day, the lordship of misrule becomes a tyranny that menaces the just ordering of society.
Contemporaiy patterns of consumensm could be seen as an example of this, as could many post-1789
?ohjtical revolutions.
23 We are not suggesting that the established social order is always right or just: all social orders are
in need of transfiguration. It is rather that carnival seeks to over-turn and erase all anterior forms of
human sociality and tradition.
124 It must be recognised that much feasting and fasting wholly !üils to bear witness to the messianic
feast. However, the ineptitude and iniquity of much Christian feasting should not tempt us to
entertain its demonic parody as somehow better.
125 Benedict, The Rule, p. 49.
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to do on feast days. Furthermore, there is nothing in the ascetic life he proposes
which indicates that Christians can enjoy in the present age the resurrection life of
Christ. While there is much to commend in the 'school for the Lord's service'126
which St Benedict envisages, the curriculum of this school is too narrow. The lack
of any account of feasting points to the loss of the eschatological tension that is so
central to the Christian life. This critique of St Benedict's Rule is but one instance in
which the sacraments of feasting and fasting can be used as a key to analyse patterns
of life together which seek to bear faithful witness to God.
Following our previous analysis of Maclntyre and O'Donovan, we hold that
hospitality can only be understood within a particular tradition and different
traditions will have different forms of hospitality. In this chapter we have sought to
assess the practice of hospitality within the Christian tradition and then see how this
conception of hospitality both describes and defines the way Christians should relate
to their neighbours with regard to ethical disputes. Our assessment reveals that the
hospitality of the church enables it to both be a guest and host of the life of its
neighbours. This guest-host dynamic constitutes a recapitulation of the ascension
and Pentecost moments of the Christ-event. Christian hospitality is inaugurated at
Pentecost, bears witness to the eschaton, and corresponds to the tension at the heart
of the eschaton, whereby it is established but not yet fully manifest. As an
eschatological social practice, hospitality is inspired and empowered by the Holy
Spirit, who enables the church to host the life of its neighbours without the church
being assimilated to, or colonised by, or having to withdraw from the life of its
neighbours.
5.6	 Hospitality and tolerance contrasted
It is instructive to draw a contrast between Christian hospitality and the
conception of tolerance we outlined earlier. There is no clearly identifiable concrete
social practice with which tolerance can be identified. Markham argues America
itself constitutes an embodiment of tolerance derived from Christian
commitments.' 27 He states: 'The American democratic experiment can take much of
the credit for showing the world that it is possible to be committed to both truth and
plurality. Tolerance is an American virtue affirmed in the First Amendment and
126 Benedict, The Rule, p. 5.
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celebrated in its cities.' 128
 However, a brief reflection on the violent disputes over
abortion, endemic racial conflict, and the periodic violent upheavals in American
cities over issues as diverse as police treatment of African-Americans and global
capitalism, should serve as a warning against using the American experience as an
embodiment of tolerance. What America most truly represents is how difficult it is
to translate a commitment to tolerance as either a pragmatic policy, or a substantive
value, into concrete social practices. For example, the problems surrounding
affirmative action policies, wherein to counter intolerance (that of racism) an
intrinsically intolerant policy is employed (one which causes reverse discrimination),
illustrates how difficult it is actually to establish tolerance in practical ways.' 29
 By
contrast, while the Christian commitment to hospitality has often been ignored, it has
also been consistently invoked and acted upon in relation to the treatment of the
socially excluded and, moreover, the diverse and wide-ranging legacy of its practice,
for example, in hospitals, the provision of asylum for refugees, and the work of
groups such as the Salvation Army, demonstrates how hospitality has become a
concrete social practice in many different ways.
We have already noted that when tolerance is a substantive value it is based on a
particular conception of the good: that is, the good of individual autonomy.' 3° The
good of individual autonomy necessarily places the good of the individual before that
of other persons and provides little warrant for moving beyond the individual good
and seeking the good of others. Markham recognises that a commitment to tolerance
can only guarantee a minimal level of social peace. He states: 'We need to move
beyond tolerance, to active engagement and concern in the life of others, to dialogue,
to collaborative truth-seeking and the enrichment of life through the insights of
others."3 ' By contrast, inherent within the Christocentric performance of hospitality
is the call to welcome the stranger: that is, within the Christian practice of hospitality
there is the imperative to enter into relationship with, and accommodate, those who
are different.
127 Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics, pp. 83-126.
12S Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics, p. 188.129 See John Edwards, When Race Counts: the Morality of Racial Preference in Britain and America
(London: Routledge, 1995); Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public
Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
130 Williams, 'Tolerating the Intolerable', p. 73.
-216-
The move beyond mere acceptance of a stranger's existence is not simply a move
actively to welcome a stranger, but is a move actively to welcome those with the
least status. The imperative to welcome the weak and the vulnerable serves as a
constant reminder to see and hear those members of society who are most easily
marginalized, oppressed and rendered invisible. As we shall see in our discussion of
euthanasia, in contemporary society the suffering-dying are a good example of those
who are likely to be neglected or oppressed because they lack the means to protect
themselves. Other examples include the homeless and the severely disabled. By
contrast, tolerance involves no equivalent imperative to attend to and actively help
those without a place or a voice in society; indeed, a tolerant society can be deeply
oppressive for many of its members.
A good illustration of the contrast between tolerance and hospitality in relation to
protecting and aiding the vulnerable is the issue of immigration. In an analysis of the
debate surrounding Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech in 1968, Markham
notes that the response of the churches called for integration, but failed to take
account of any notion of tolerance. Markham states that tolerance 'does not require
complete integration and acceptance, which is why many Christians are unhappy
with it." 32
 He goes on to say:
But toleration accommodates Powell's realism. [...] Tolerance is a call for different
communities to live together in peaceful coexistence. It is true that these communities
will disagree about religion; and there are numerous differences in tenns of history and
custom; but these different communities need to discover tolerance as the half-way house
between whole-hearted acceptance and outright hostility.'33
Markham is not alone in advocating tolerance as the principle governing the
reception of immigrants. John Locke, on the basis of an economic rationale, rather
than a theological one, similarly appeals for the tolerance of refugees.' 34
 However,
in the light of our theological account of hospitality, neither Markham's nor Locke's
advocacy of tolerance as a 'half.way house' will suffice. The church has no place
accommodating Powell's 'realism'. As the story of the encounter between Peter and
Cornelius ifiustrates, and Paul constantly emphasises, Christ breaks down the barriers
'' Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics, p. 188. Markham provides no justification for why there
is a need to move beyond tolerance.
132 Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics, p. 69.
' Ibid.
' John Locke, 'For a General Naturalisation', in Locke: Political Essays, pp. 322-26.
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between different races and nations. The Church has no stake in preserving the kind
of unity Powell advocated, one based on language or race. Instead, the unity the
Church seeks to bears witness to is the eschatological unity given by the Spirit at
Pentecost.' 35
 Neither should the churches have adopted tolerance as the principle
governing their response to refugees and immigrants as Markham and Locke
advocate. Christ's demand is for hospitality toward the stranger and not, as the
principle of toleration allows, mere acceptance or 'peaceful coexistence'.136
Christian hospitality requires the active welcome and making a place for immigrants
(whether these immigrants accept Christianity or not) and this hospitality includes
the support of public policies that echo Christ's imperative to make a place for the
stranger.'37
Christians are not only commanded to welcome the vulnerable stranger, but to see
the vulnerable stranger as representing Christ. The ground of welcoming strangers is
Christ himself To warrant hospitality the stranger neither has to be deserving in
some way, nor do they have to earn the right to it, nor must they possess some innate
capacity that renders them worthy of acceptance among the human community, nor
is welcome dependent on a well meaning humanitarian impulse on the part of the
giver. To be a recipient of Christian hospitality one does not have to do or be
anything; one's status as a guest is received as a freely given gift from Christ.
Conversely, hospitality of the stranger constitutes part of the church's witness to the
Christ-event, especially the hospitality each sinner has received from God in and
through Christ. The call to welcome strangers as if they were Christ contrasts with
the commitment to tolerance as a substantive good, founded as it is on a commitment
to the good of individual autonomy.' 38
 As we shall argue in relation to the issue of
euthanasia, placing a value on human autonomy in no way guarantees the acceptance
of the vulnerable stranger. In many instances it can lead to the neglect and
Welker, God the Spirit, pp. 232-3 3.
136 Maurice Cranston counts it as a merit that Locke appealed for tolerance of Huguenot refugees.
However, while it is to the credit of Locke that he did not share the xenophobia of his peers, his
essentially utilitarian arguments still constitute a singular thilure of Christian vision. See Maurice
Cranston 'John Locke and the Case for Toleration', in On Toleration, ed. by Susan Mendus and
David Edwards (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 101-21 (pp. 114-15).(31 The tragedy is that most churches singularly fulled to live in accord with the realism of the Gospel
and followed a làlse account of reality as exemplified by Enoch Powell. For example, see the account
of the racially motivated rjection of Afro-Caribbean Anglican immigrants in Anglican churches in
London in C. S. Hill, West Indian Migrants and the London Churches (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1963).
' Williams, 'Tolerating the Intolerable', p. 73.
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oppression of those who are not autonomous, for example, the unborn and the
terminally ill.
Tolerance can, by its very commitments, be oppressive. The contrast between
Porphyry and Lactantius illustrates how this oppression comes about. In addition to
being a disciple of Plotinus, Porphyry provided philosophical legitimation to
Diocletian's policy of repressing Christianity in the work now known as Against the
Christians.' 39 Robert Wilken states: 'Porphyry was an exponent of an inclusive
religious outlook that held that there were many ways to God; he even attempted to
find a way of integrating Christ into the pantheon of Romans gods by honouring him
as a sage." 4° However, his very commitment to a demythologised polytheism
formed the basis of his opposition to Christianity's claim to have found the true way
to God. 14 ' In Porphyry's view, those people who made such an exclusive claim were
opposed to and threatened the Roman religio-civil order and thus they were
unpatriotic and should be punished accordingly.' 42
 For example, in his attack on
Christian baptism, Porphyry states: '[The Christians] would bring us a society
without law. They would teach us to have no fear of the gods." 43
 By contrast,
Lactantius, a contemporary of Porphyry, believes Christianity to be the only way to
God and that its way has been definitively revealed in Jesus Clirist.' it is on the
basis of specifically Christian claims that Lactantius argues against the use of
coercion. Lactantius held that coercion was inimical to true religion as instantiated
in the Christian faith. He states:
There is no occasion for violence and injury, for religion cannot be imposed by force; the
matter must be carried on by words rather than by blows, that the will may be affected.
[... J For true religion is to be defended, not by putting to death, but by dying; not by
cruelty, but by patient endurance; not by guilt, but by good faith: for the former belong to
' 39 0n1y fragments exist of Porphyry's original writings. Following Harnack, Joseph Hoffman's text
ofAgainst the Christian's uses Marcarius Magnes's Apocriticus as the primary source for Porphyry's
text. For a discussion on the text and the controversy surrounding it see Joseph Hoflinann, ed. by,
Porphyry's Against the Christians: the Literary Remains (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994),
pp. 21-23; 164-66.
° Robert Wilken, 'In Defense of Constantine', First Things, no. 112 (2001), 36-40 (p. 38). See also,
Hoffinann, Porphyry's Against the Christians, p. 169.
' 41 Hoffmann argues that Porphyry viewed the gods as symbols of the powers operating in and
through nature and understood religious myths as parables of philosophical truth. Hoffinann,
Porphyry's Against the Christians, pp. 160-61.
142 Hoffinann, Porphyry's Against the Christians, pp. 18-19.
' Hoffinann, Porphyry's Against the Chrisans, p. 81.
144 Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, pp. 105-7. For an account of the historical relationship between
Lactantius and Porphyry see Elizabeth Digeser, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantiuc and
Rome (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).
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evils, but the latter to goods; and it is necessaiy for that which is good to have place in
religion, and not that which is evil.'45
It is no coincidence that Lactantius counted hospitality as a principal virtue and
associated its practice with the exercise of true justice and the ordering of relations
between Christians and strangers (notably, the destitute, orphans, widows, captives,
the sick and the dead in need of burial). It is the very demand for a pragmatic
tolerance, instantiated in a policy of an inclusive civil religion, that leads Porphyry to
support persecution of those he views as threatening the Roman religio-civil order.
By contrast, it is the specffic claims of Christianity, and its related practices, that
grounds Lactantius' advocacy of freedom of conscience in matters of religion.
5.7 Summary
We have defined hospitality as a Christian social practice that recapitulates the
ascension/Pentecost moment of the Christ-event. As a social practice hospitality has
been central to shaping relations between the church and its neighbours and has taken
many forms in the Christian tradition. Care for the sick and the poor, hospitality to
strangers, educational initiatives, and peace-making endeavours are all examples of
ways in which the church hosts the life together of its neighbours and enables that
life to bear witness to its eschatological possibilities. Many of these initiatives are
responses to moral problems the church is confronted with. Some of these problems
are old and some arise from new questions. The church will develop patterns of
thought and action in response to such moral questions (as it does in response to
questions that are not specifically moral). However, the response of the church is not
developed in isolation from the life together of its neighbours. As it develops its
response, the church will be engaged with the life of those around it, who will
inevitably be involved with and inform its discernment. In its interaction with the
life of its neighbours, the church will also seek to establish patterns of sociality
which bear witness to how a particular moral issue is transfigured by the actions of
Christ and the Spirit. The patterns of thought and action that constitute the response
of the church to a particular issue are constantly open to further specification in the
light of who Jesus Christ is. Such specification and alignment is a constant and ever-
present task (one that will often involve Christians testing their claims against the
claims made by other traditions). Furthermore, and as the exposition of 1 Peter in the
Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, pp. 156-57.
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last chapter clarified, some of its neighbours will participate in the church's response
to the issue, some will reject it, some will ignore it, and some will actively oppose it.
Mediating disputes over moral problems which confront Christians and non-
Christians is never simply a question of each accommodating the other's view, nor of
compromise between two positions, nor of rivalry as one tradition seeks to vindicate
its answer against the answer given by other traditions. The only criterion by which
the church can accept or reject the thought and action of its neighbours is whether
such action accords with thought and action directed to God. The only response the
church can make to moral problems is to bear witness to their resolution in and
through Jesus Christ and to invite its neighbours to participate in those patterns of
thought and action that bear witness to this resolution. At times this invitation will
involve the church changing its pattern of life together as it discerns in the life of its
neighbours patterns' of thought and action that bear more truthful witness to Jesus
Christ.
Retaining Jesus Christ as the criterion of evaluation and advocating hospitality as
the form of engagement is not to deny the possibility of conversation or
philosophical argument with non-Christians. This is so for four reasons. Firstly, it
sets up the possibility of real conversation wherein, as Stout says, theologians will
have something distinctive to contribute. Secondly, it ensures that the conversation
is not shaped decisively by one or other of the church's conversation partners.147
Thirdly, faithful witness to its own presuppositions depends on the church reaching
out to and entering into conversation with the thought and action of non-Christians.
Fourthly, the church embodies the eschatological possibilities of its neighbours' life
- thus, through the actions of Christ and the Spirit, the life of the church intrinsically
involves the life of its neighbours. In short, retaining Jesus Christ as the criterion of
evaluation and advocating hospitality as the form of engagement necessarily directs
the church into conversation with its neighbours; that is, to the 'action of living or
having one's being in, among' its neighbours. 148
146 Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, pp. 175-78.
See also Luke Bretherton and John Casson, 'Politics in Denial', Demos Quarterly, no. 11(1997),
35-36.
148 
'Conversation', SOED [on CD-ROM].
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We shall now examine this process in relation to the issue of care for the
terminally ill, and whether euthanasia is an appropriate form of care. This will
enable us to analyse how the social practice of hospitality shapes relations between
Christians and non-Christians with regard to a particular ethical issue.
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Chapter Six
The question of what constitutes good care for the suffering-dying
as a case study.
6.1	 Introduction
To further understand how the social practice of hospitality may determine the
relationship between Christians and non-Christians with regard to moral problems,
we will analyse how hospitality shapes a response to a particular dispute. The ethical
dispute we will address is whether euthanasia is an appropriate response to the
terminally ill or, as Paul Ramsey calls them, the 'suffering-dying'. As Ramsey puts
it: 'The claims of the "suffering-dying" upon the human community are quite
different from the claims of those who, though suffering, still may live, or who are
incurably ill but not yet dying."
We will focus on the question of whether or not euthanasia is an appropriate
response to the suffering-dying; that is, whether the act of euthanasia can,, in certain
circumstances, constitute good care for the suffering-dying. We will focus on the
question of whether euthanasia can constitute good care for the suffering-dying
because the debate surrounding this question is a paradigmatic instance of the
problem first identified by Maclntyre: that is, the problem of whether we can come to
common judgments over a particular moral question when there appear to be
radically divergent ways of thinking about that issue and no common tradition that is
authoritative for determining moral judgements.
The issue of euthanasia and treatment of the suffering-dying is highly contentious
in Britain. There have been a number of attempts to legalise voluntary euthanasia
and there is periodic public debate about the issue both in response to proposed
Parliamentary Bills and particular cases; for example, in response to the conviction
for manslaughter of Dr Nigel Cox in 1992 .2 Although voluntary euthanasia remains
Paul Ramsey, 'On (Only) Caring for the Dying', in The Essential Paul Ramsey: A Collection, ed. by
Paul Ramsey and others (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), Pp. 195-222 (p. 209).
2 Dr Cox was convicted of manslaughter at Winchester Crown Court for the killing of Lillian Boyes.
For a summary of the case see Peter Singer, Rethinking L!fe and Death: The Collapse of Our
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illegal, that it will remain so for much longer is not certain. The most serious recent
parliamentary consideration of euthanasia was conducted by the House of Lords'
Select Conimittee on Medical Ethics established in 1993 to consider the issue. 3 This
Committee unanimously agreed there should be no change in the current law.
However, since 1994 there has been a continued campaign to legalise voluntary
euthanasia. There are also a number of other factors that combine to create a climate
more amenable to such a campaign. These factors are the following: the advance in
healthcare technology that enables more people to live longer who would otherwise
have died at a much earlier stage of an illness; the practice and subsequent statutory
backing for doctors to use euthanasia in the Netherlands since 1993 (and further
strengthened in 2001) which sets a precedent for other European countries; 4 the
political pressure to restrict public healthcare expenditure and ration resources; 5 and
the demographic shift in Western Europe whereby the numbers of those retired will
exceed those in paid employment leading to a reduction of tax revenue with a
simultaneous increase in the need for public expenditure.6
Despite the ruling of the House of Lords' Select Committee in 1994, there is no
prevailing consensus and the rights or wrongs of euthanasia, like those of abortion,
are vigorously contested. 7 Given the conflict over whether euthanasia constitutes
good care for the suffering-dying, the contemporary debate surrounding euthanasia
lends itself to being a test case for an assessment of our constructive proposal for
how Christians are to relate to non-Christians when faced with a dispute about what
is the right answer to a particular moral problem.
Traditional Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 139-40. Singer cites similar land-
mark cases from Canada, Australia and America, Rethinking Life and Death, pp. 133-142.
Proposals to legalise voluntary euthanasia have come before House of Lords in 1936, 1950, 1969
and 1994.
In 1993, with the support of the Royal Dutch Medical Association, the Dutch Parliament voted to
allow voluntary euthanasia for the incurably ill. On April 1 1th, 2001 the Dutch senate gave approval
to a bill formally legalising euthanasia. Strict conditions still apply to the use of euthanasia; however,
under the 1993 law euthanasia remained a criminal offence in the penal code, whereas the 2001 law
formally legalises euthanasia.
David Clark and Jane Seymour, Reflections on Palliative Care (Buckingham: Open University
Press, 1999), p. 52-52. Beauchamp perceives this kind of view to be behind what he calls the
'slippery slope' argument against euthanasia: Tom Beauchamp, 'Introduction', in intending Death:
The Ethics ofAss isted Suicide and Euthanasia, ed. by Tom Beauchamp (New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1996), 1-22 (pp. 14-15).
6 Eutha,iasia Clinical Practice and the Law, ed. by Luke Gormally (London: The Linacre Centre for
Health Care Ethics, 1994), pp. 32-33. Cf., Stanley Hauerwas, Naming the Silences: GocL Medicine,
and the Problem of Suffering (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993), p. 103.
For an account of how opinions are divided and the contentious nature of the debate about
euthanasia see Ronald Dworkin, L?fe's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and Euthanasia
(London: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 179-83.
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6.2 What is euthanasia?
Before proceeding with an analysis of why euthanasia is contested as a response
to the suffering-dying we must define what we mean (and do not mean) by the term
'euthanasia'. This is in itself problematic. As John Finnis states: 'The term
euthanasia has no generally accepted and philosophically warranted core of
meaning.' 8
 As a result of the imprecision and lack of a widely accepted definition,
we must define what we mean by the term 'euthanasia' with great care.
Paul Ramsey notes that the term 'euthanasia' stems from the Greek for a 'good
death': that is, a death without suffering. 9
 However, the term has come to denote the
deliberate and intentional killing by act or omission of a person whose life is
considered not to be worth living.' 0
 This shift is reflected in how John Finnis defines
euthanasia. He states, it is the 'adopting and carrying out of a proposal that, as part
of the medical care being given someone, his or her life be terminated on the ground
that it would be better for him or her (or at least no harm) if that were done. 11 John
Harris, in his debate with Finnis about the moral legitimacy (or otherwise) of
euthanasia, uses the term 'euthanasia' to mean 'the implementation of a decision that
a particular individual's life will come to an end before it need do so - a decision that
a life will end when it could be prolonged'.' 2
 However, neither of these brief
definitions of the term 'euthanasia' tells us much about either what kind of action is
involved, or how this kind of action is to be distinguished from many of the other
justifications given for ending an individual's life.
Grisez and Boyle set three conditions for an act to qualifi as an act of euthanasia.
These conditions are the following: the patient (the one being killed) either is
Finnis, 'A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia', in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical
and Legal Perspectives, ed. by John Keown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 23-
35 (p. 23).
Ramsey, 'On (Only) Caring for the Dying', p. 215.
° For a history of attitudes toward suicide and euthanasia in the classical and Christian traditions and
the development ofcontemporary calls for the legitiinisation of euthanasia from the nineteenth
century onwards see Hugh Trowell, Euthanasia: The Unfinished Debate on Euthanasia (London:
SCM Press, 1973), pp. 1-22.
' Finnis, 'A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia', p. 24. Cf., John Paul II, 'Euthanasia:
Declaration of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (May 5, 1980)', in On Moral
Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics, eds. Stephen Lammers and Allen Verhey, 2id
edn (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 650-55 (p. 652).
'2 lohn Harris, 'Euthanasia and the Value of Life', in Euthanasia Examined, pp. 6-22 (pp. 6-7).
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suffering and dying, or is suffering irremediably; the agent (who does the killing)
sincerely believes that the patient would be better off dead: that is, that no further
continuance of the patient's life is likely to be beneficial for the patient; and lastly,
the agent deliberately brings about the patient's death in order that the patient shall
have the benefit of being better off dead: that is, they shall no longer suffer.' 3 Tom
Beauchamp outlines a similar list of conditions for a death to be considered an act of
euthanasia. The conditions he sets are the following:
(1) The death is intended by at least one other person whose action is a contributing cause
of death; (2) the person who dies is either acutely suffering or irreversibly comatose (or
soon will be), and this condition alone is the primary reason for intending the person's
death; and (3) the means chosen to produce the death must be as painless as possible, or a
sufficient moral justification must exist for a more painful method.'4
These conditions help us to distinguish the action of euthanasia from others types of
action that involve bringing about an individual's death, for example, self-defence
and capital punishment.
From the definitions given so far and from these two sets of conditions given by
Grisez and Boyle and Beauchamp, a picture emerges of who is the subject of
euthanasia. It seems that to bring about the death of someone and to describe it as an
instance of euthanasia is to bring about the death of an individual who is a patient
(and is therefore, in some way, claimed to be a subject of medical care), who is
innocent (that is, the reason for bringing about their death is not in response to any
criminal, bad or immoral action by the individual), and whose death is considered to
be a benefit (or at least no harm) to the individual. We can conclude that the subject
of euthanasia is an innocent patient for whom death is considered preferable to
suffering.
In relation to the status of the action of the agent administering euthanasia, Dan
Brock states: 'The claim that any individual instance of euthanasia is a case of
deliberate killing of an innocent person is, with only minor qualifications, correct."5
He goes on to say: 'Unlike foregoing life-sustaining treatment, commonly
13 Gennain Grisez and Joseph Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the
Euthanasia Debate (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), p. 139. Cf., Gilbert
Meilaender, 'Euthanasia and Christian Vision', in On Moral Medicine, pp. 655-666 (j). 656).
'' Beauchamp, 'Introduction', p. 4.
Dan Brock, L!fe and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), P. 208.
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understood as allowing to die, euthanasia is clearly killing, defined as depriving of
life or causing the death of a living being.' 16 Brock makes the further distinction
between euthanasia and forms of treatment that foreshorten the life of the patient:
While providing morphine for pain relief at doses where the risk of respiratory depression
and an earlier death may be a foreseen but unintended side effect of treating the patient's
pain, in a case of euthanasia the patient's death is deliberate or intended even if [...] the
physician's ultimate end [is to respect] the patient's wishes.17
The distinctions Brock makes between euthanasia and foregoing treatment and
treatment that unintentionally foreshortens life are important and need explaining
further in order that we can be clear exactly what we mean by the term 'euthanasia'.
We must distinguish the action of euthanasia from letting die and foregoing
treatment. Critical to making these kinds of distinction is the principle of double
effect. it is this principle that allowed Brock to make the distinction, in the above
quotation, between a 'foreseen but unintended side effect' and deliberately causing
the death of a patient. The principle of double effect makes the claim that a single
act can have two effects or consequences one of which is foreseen but not intended,
the other of which is deliberately intended. Where these effects have a moral import,
it is the deliberately intended effects that are decisive in determining the moral
significance of the act (although the agent may also be held responsible for the
foreseen but unintended effects). Beauchamp outlines four conditions that must be
satisfied for an act to be morally permissible despite one or more bad effects. These
conditions are the following: first, the act must be morally good or morally neutral,
independent of its effects; two, the agent must intend the good effect only. The bad
effects can be foreseen and permitted, but not intended; third, the bad effects must
not be a means to the good effect (that is, one cannot do bad that good may come of
it); and fourth, the good effect must proportionally outweigh the bad effects.'8
Critics of this principle tend to focus on the second condition, calling into question
both whether there is a morally relevant diflèrence between foreseeing and intending,
and whether, if a doctor foresees an effect, he is not morally responsible for it. There
is not the space to engage with these criticisms here; however, these criticisms tend
to ignore the long tradition of nuanced moral language that allows precisely for
16 Ibid.
' Ibid.
Beauchamp, 'Introduction', p. 12.
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distinctions between intended and foreseen effects, as well as between intention,
desire and motivation.' 9 Suffice to say, it is use of the principle of double effect that
allows euthanasia to be distinguished from, for example, the administering of
analgesic drugs to relieve pain even if the administering of these drugs shortens the
life of the patient concerned.20 The morally significant factor is the intention of the
agent; for example, both martyr and suicide recognise in advance that the result of
their choice and act will be death; however, the martyr does not aim at death. 2 ' As
Pellegrino points out, however:
The moral quality of accidental [or foreseen but unintended] effects depends on the
degree to which we foresee their probability or avoidability. The more certain, the more
probable and the more avoidable the accidental effect, the more carefully must the moral
quality of the act be assessed.22
However, as Pellegrino goes on to say: 'We are responsible for the whole event but
culpable only for those parts of it we intend.'23
By focusing on the question of intention not only can we distinguish euthanasia
from acts which foreshorten life, but also, from those acts that constitute foregoing
treatment or 'letting die'. This distinction has sometimes been made on the basis of
the distinction between acts of omission and acts of commission. However, as both
Finnis and Harris point out, there is 'no morally relevant distinction between
employing deliberate omissions [...] in order to terminate life ('passive euthanasia')
and employing 'a deliberate intervention' for the same purpose ('active
euthanasia').' 24 In other words, if the intention is to kill the patient, then it is morally
irrelevant whether it is by an act of omission or an act of commission.
'9 For an analysis of how and why intention counts see: Finnis, 'A Philosophical Case Against
Euthanasia', pp. 25-30. For an account of how intention relates to its effect, how it is distinguished
from desire and motivation, and how the concept of intention has been used in moral philosophy see
Edmund Pellegrino, 'The Place of Intention in the Moral Assessment of Assisted Suicide and Active
Euthanasia', in Intending Death, pp. 163-183.
20 (Iijse; Ljfe and Death, p. 141.
21 Meilaender, 'Euthanasia and Christian Vision', p. 656-57. For an account ofthe difference between
suicide and martyrdom see Michael Banner, 'Christian Anthropology at the Beginning and End of
Life', in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, pp. 47-85 (pp. 7 1-76).
Pellegrino, 'The Place of Intention', p. 166.
23 Ibid.
24 Finnis 'A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia', pp. 25; John Harris, 'The Philosophical Case
Against the Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia', in Euthanasia Eramined, pp.36-45 (p. 36). See
also Gormally, Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law, pp. 46-48.
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If it is the case that the patient's disease or injury or condition is the cause of
death and neither the patient nor physician intended the patient's death then it is not
an instance of euthanasia but of 'letting die'. However, there are many cases in
which it would be specious to say that when technology is removed (for example, a
respirator) a natural death occurs. If the patient's death is intended by removing the
technology and occurs not merely by natural causes, then, as Beauchamp argues:
'The patient's decision and the physician's intentional action play an important
causal role in the outcome in the circumstance in which death occurs.' 25
 For
example, to withhold nutrition and hydration so that a patient starves to death is both
a necessary and a sufficient condition of death by starvation at the time death occurs.
Correspondingly, if the patient is suffering from a condition such as severe brain
damage or cancer, these conditions (the reason for refusing treatment) are neither a
necessary nor a sufficient cause of death by starvation. They are not the cause of
death as it occurs and when it occurs.26
 Therefore, we can see that it is the intention
of the parties involved that is crucial in distinguishing natural causes of death, letting
die and euthanasia.
It is important to clari1' that what is physically possible (for example, keeping a
patient alive) is not always ethically necessary. There is enormous scope for
discretion when it comes to withdrawing or withholding treatment and allowing a
patient to die while continuing to care for (rather than attempting to cure) the patient.
The omission of life-sustaining treatment which a person has refused or which a
physician for some other reason has no duty to provide is not necessarily an instance
of euthanasia. In Ramsey's view, in just or only omitting treatment (as distinct from
omitting treatment with the intention of causing death): 'We cease doing what was
once called for and begin to do precisely what is called for now. We attend and
company with him in this, his very own dying, rendering it as comfortable and
dignified as possible.' 27
 Thus, the omission of treatment does not include denying
care we owe all humans, whether living or dying, for example, providing sufficient
food and water to someone in a persistent vegetative state.
25 Beauchamp, 'Introduction', p. 5.
26 Thud
27 Ramsey 'On (Only) Caring for the Dying', p. 218.
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Omitting life saving remedies and letting a patient die has sometimes been
justified on the grounds of the distinction between ordinaiy and extraordinary
treatments. However, it is not clear whether defining what constitutes ordinary and
extraordinary treatment and drawing a line between them is of moral significance.
For example, Peter Singer cites the question of whether the employment of a
respirator constitutes ordinary or extraordinary care. He makes two points: 'Firstly,
the very description of the respirator as 'extraordinary' depends on a judgment
already having been made to the effect that it is not worthwhile prolonging the life of
a patient in [a persistent vegetative state].' 28 For Singer, the attempt to claim factual
specificity for the distinction between extraordinary and ordinary care masks a prior
moral judgment. He states: 'Labelling a means of treatment as 'extraordinary' serves
to disguise a judgment about the quality of life of the patient on whom the means of
treatment is being used.' 29 Singer's second point is that the distinction between
extraordinary and ordinary means can disguise, but cannot ultimately conceal, the
fact that it is intention that is the critical issue not the means used to carry out the
intention. Singer gives the example of the Tony Bland case as one that clarifies the
issue. In the Bland case the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary was not
used and it was admitted that the intention of the doctors in withholding nutrition and
hydration was to bring about the death of an innocent human being. °
By focusing on the question of intention the distinction some make between
assisted suicide and euthanasia is shown to be morally irrelevant. While there may
be a practical distinction, there is no moral distinction between euthanasia and
assisted suicide. In assisted suicide the action of the person whose death is brought
about must be the final cause of death (the final link in a causal chain leading to
death), whereas in euthanasia the final cause of one person's death must be another
person's action. However, as Beauchamp points out, both assisted suicide and
euthanasia involve some form of assistance in bringing about another's death.3'
Furthermore, in both assisted suicide and euthanasia, it is the intention of those
directly responsible for the causal chain leading to death that is morally significant,
and not the final cause of death.
2 Singer, Rethinking L?fe and Death, p. 7!.
Singer, Rethinking Life and Death, p. 72.
° Ibid.
31 Beauchamp, 'Introduction', p. 4.
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Having defined what we mean by euthanasia in broad terms and distinguished
euthanasia from a variety of other similar and related kinds of action, we must now
distinguish the different types of euthanasia that are said to occur. Harris
distinguishes various kinds of euthanasia, stating that if a patient has consciously
decided to end their life or has expressly approved of the decision by another to end
their life, that is called voluntary euthanasia. He goes on to say: 'Where the
individual concerned does not know about the decision and has not consciously and
expressly approved it in advance, I will call this non-voluntaiy euthanasia even
where he or she is believed or presumed to be in accord.' 32 Furthermore, if the
patient is competent to give informed consent and does not give it, or if the agent
assumes the patient would not consent if competent, then the act of euthanasia is
involuntary. 33 Those who advocate legalisation of euthanasia support voluntary and
nonvoluntary euthanasia (for example, of anencephalic infants), but there is a
widespread consensus against involuntary euthanasia. 34 For the purposes of this
chapter, these different types of euthanasia are not significant. We are concerned to
focus on euthanasia as a broadly defined type of action denoting the deliberate and
intentional killing by act or omission of an innocent person whose life is considered
not to be worth living, and whether this kind of action should be considered good
care for the suffering-dying.
Brock identffies the moral problem with the proposal that euthanasia constitutes a
form of good care for the suffering-dying. He states: 'If the deliberate killing of an
innocent person is wrong, euthanasia would be nearly always impermissible.' 35 So
the question is raised as to whether medical care and practice may, in certain
circumstances, legitimately involve the deliberately killing of the innocent, or is it
'always impermissible' in medicine?
32 Harris, 'Euthanasia and the Value of Life', pp. 6-7.
Brock, Life and Death, pp. 108-09. For a summary of the critique of distinctions between voluntary
and involuntary euthanasia see Banner, 'Christian Anthropology', pp. 69-70.
' Nigel Biggar notes: 'If any doubt remains about the centrality of the value of individual autonomy
to the public debate, then the complete absence of any effective public promotion of involuntary or
compulsory euthanasia should help to dispel it.' Nigel Biggar, 'God, the Responsible Individual, and
the Value of Human Life and Suffering', SCE, 11.1(1998), 28-47 (p. 29, n.1)
Brock, Life and Death, p. 208.
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63 May the practice of medicine legitimately encompass the deliberate killing
of the innocent?
Albert Jonsen states:
The contemporary proposals for assisted suicide or medical killing are, in essence,
proposals to inaugurate a social practice. It is misleading, I think, to say that they have
the intention of alleviating pain; this is a motive, not an intention. The intention is the
innovative moral practice itself [...] whereby medical care, already accepted as a moral
good, is given an expanded defmition of its task and practitioners are charged with a
responsibility they have not previously had. The proposal is to endorse medical killing as
a practice integral to the practice of medicine.36
The question we will address in this section is whether Jonsen is right or whether,
contrary to Jonsen's statement, the action of euthanasia is consonant with the history
and tradition of medical practice. It is important to address this question in order to
understand what is driving the call for euthanasia: the internal logic and coherence of
medicine itself; or some other factor external to medicine. We must be clear about
the source of what is driving the call for euthanasia in order to identify the real point
of conflict between Christians and non-Christians over what constitutes good care for
the suffering-dying. There are many instances of conflict between Christians and
non-Christians that result from either confusion about, or misunderstanding of, the
real point at issue. Therefore, we must identify whether the point at issue is the
nature of medicine itself or something else. If the point at issue does not arise within
medicine itself, but is driven by something else, then we can proceed to identify and
assess what that 'something else' might be.
it is legitimate to call medicine a 'practice' in Maclntyre's sense of the term. It
has rules and technical skills, and certain virtues are required for its proper
performance. Furthermore, there is a tradition in which medicine is situated and this
tradition involves an on-going conversation about what constitutes good medicine.
This conversation and tradition is itself situated within a wider narrative about what
the good of human life is. The roots of the Western medical tradition lie in ancient
Greece, notably in those physicians who followed the Hippocratic Oath and in the
philosophers who gave a theoretical account of medicine. Georgios
Anagnastopoulos states:
36 Albert Jonsen, 'Criteria That Make Intentional Killing Unjustified', in Intending Death, pp. 42-53
(p. 51).
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The ancient Greek philosophical tradition is in complete agreement with what we fmd in
the extant writings from the Hippocratic medical tradition. Plato and Aristotle see
medicine as a practical/productive science that seeks to understand a certain subject
matter as well as realize a certain end, i.e. health.37
Anagnastopoulos points out that according to Plato, medicine "is the science of
health" (Charinides 165d) or "the science of health and disease" (Republic iv 438e)
and according to Aristotle "the science of things connected with health"
(Nichomachean Ethics vi lO.1143a3) or "science of producing health" (Topics ii
3.110b18-19).' 38 Anagnastopoulos counters the claim made by Ludwig Edeistein
that the Hippocratic Oath reflected merely the belief of a fringe Pythagorean sect
and is not representative of either the practice or views of the mainstream of medical
practitioners in the ancient Greek world. 39
 Instead, Anagnastopoulos argues that the
Hippocratic Oath is indicative of, and consistent with, not only ancient Greek
medical practice, but also with the views and practice of physicians over many
centuries. Allen Verhey's view concurs with that of Anagnastopoulos. Verhey
states that the point of the Hippocratic Oath:
was not that one would fail to be a good Pythagorean if one violated these standards,
although that is true enough, but rather that one would fail to be a good medical
practitioner. The good medical practitioner is not a mere technician; he is committed by
the practice of medicine to certain goods and to certain standards.40
What are the goods and standards that medicine pursues as a practice with
standards of excellence implicit in it? As already stated, Plato and Aristotle viewed
the telos of medicine as health. Anagnastopoulos notes that: 'The essentialist
conception of the goals of medicine that Plato and Aristotle expound does not allow
for any considerations other than the health of the patient to determine physicians'
actions.'41
 The Hippocratic Oath identifies the chief good as seeking 'the benefit of
the sick' and keeping the patient from harm and injustice. 42
 For the Hippocratic
37 Georgios Anagnastopoulos, 'Euthanasia and the Physicians Role: Reflections on Some Views in the
Ancient Greek Tradition', in Bioethics: Ancient Themes in Contemporaiy Issues, ed. by Mark
Kuczewski and Ronald Polansky (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 251-90 (p. 258).
Ibid.
39 Anagnastopoulos, 'Euthanasia and the Physician's Role', pp.261-66. Anagnastopoulos argues that
the central thesis of Pythagorean beliefs were also central to those of many later philosophers, notably
Plato and Aristotle. Cf., Ludwig Edelstein, 'The Hippocractic Oath: Text, Translation, and
Interpretation', in Cross Cultural Perspectives in Medical Ethics, ed. by Robert Veatch (Boston: Jones
and Bartlett, 1989), pp. 6-24.
4° Allen Verhey, 'The Doctor's Oath - and a Christian Swearing It', in On Moral Medicine, pp. 108-
119(p. 111).
4° Anagnastopoulos, 'Euthanasia and the Physicians Role', p. 271.42 
'The Hippocratic Oath', in on Moral Medicine, p. 107 (p. 107).
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Oath, seeking the benefit of the sick in a way that causes them no harm or injustice
inherently involves a number of other related ends, for example, confidentiality.
Verhey comments that because
the ends intrinsic to medicine are to heal the sick, to protect and nurture health, to
maintain and restore physical well-being, limits could be imposed on the use of skills
within the practice. The skills were not to be used to serve alien ends, and the destruction
of human life - either the last of it or the first of it [i.e. euthanasia or abortion] - was seen
as an alien and conflicting end.43
It is our contention, in accord with what Verhey and Anagnastopoulos argue, that the
intentional killing of innocent life is antithetical to the proper practice of medicine.
Therefore, the call for euthanasia is not consistent with the internal logic and
coherence of medicine itself
If the goal of medicine is health then the question arises as to what do we mean by
the term 'health'? Grisez furnishes us with a good working definition. He states
health is 'well-integrated, harmonious, psychosomatic functioning'. 45 By
implication, the term 'health' does not include the totality of human well-being, nor
should it be reduced solely to biological or somatic functionality. Grisez points out
that while health is a good in itself, it is also an instrumental good: that is, it is a
'more or less important condition for the intellectual, moral and cultural fuffilment of
the person'.46 However, without a clear idea of what human fuffihnent consists of
we cannot say what health seeks and thus we cannot say what constitutes good
health. it is at this point that we can begin to see why euthanasia could come to be
considered a form of good care for the suffering-dying.
For Maclntyre, since the Enlightenment, it is precisely any sense of what human
fulfilment consists of that has been lost. The loss of any wider telos for human life
means that any sense of what medicine as a practice is trying to achieve in seeking
the 'health' of a patient is lost and medicine either over-reaches itself (and denies its
proper limits) or it stops short of that which it should properly undertake.
Verhey, 'The Doctor's Oath - and a Christian Swearing It', p. 111.
Pellegrino argues that to act against the good of medicine and repeatedly intend the death ofpatients
not only affects the virtues necessaiy to be a doctor, but compromises the virtues of medicine itself
and 'if enough moral agents in a society have wrong intentions about killing in the medical context the
attitudes of the whole profession and society will be affected with a disvaluation of human life itself'
Pellegrino, 'The Place of Intention', p. 166.
LCL, p. 519.
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To seek a patient's well-being is to presuppose some framework of meaning
already in place. When such a framework is absent for either the patients or
physicians or both, then clinical medicine, however scientifically well-founded its
judgments, can enhance a patient's well-being only by accident. According to
Macintyre, it is precisely notions of the human good and narratives which make
sense of life within a wider framework of meaning that modernity undercuts, and in
the process it renders the very notion of 'sound clinical judgement' problematic. It
renders them problematic because medicine lacks any ability to ground questions
about what constitutes 'better' or 'worse' treatments for any particular patient.47
Medicine now shares the irrationality of modernity since it is situated both within the
Enlightenment narrative about unlimited progress through technical mastery of
nature and economic growth, and the liberal tradition which vaunts individual
autonomy and denies the possibility of any ultimate human good. 48
 By being
situated thus, medicine becomes incoherent as a practice. Crucially, a proper
understanding of what constitutes 'health' becomes unobtainable. As a result, rather
than seek the benefit of the sick and keeping the patient from harm and injustice, as
the Hippocratic Oath exhorts, medicine has, in many instances, become unjust and
oppresses the weak. The loss of a wider notion of the human good has rendered
medicine itself incoherent and it is this incoherence that enables the proposal
suggested by Albert Jonsen, namely that we should 'endorse medical killing as a
practice integral to the practice of medicine', even to be considered.49
We conclude that it is developments external to medicine that have allowed an
action - euthanasia - that is essentially alien to the good practice of medicine to be
seen as a legitimate part of medicine. Therefore, to understand why euthanasia is
LCL, p. 521.
47 See Alasdair Macintyre, 'Can Medicine Dispense with a Theological Perspective on Human Nature',
in Knowledge, Value and Belief; ed. by T. Engethart and D. Callahan (Hastings-on-Hudson: Institute
of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, 1977), pp. 25-43; and idem, 'Patient as Agent', in
Philosophical Medical Ethics: its Nature and Signflcance, ed. by Stuart Spicker and H. Tristram
Englehardt (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977), Pp. 197-212. See also, Stanley Hauerwas, 'Salvation and
Health: Why Medicine Needs the Church', in On Moral Medicine, pp. 72-83 (pp. 77-78).
48 Clear and obvious parallels can be drawn between the general points Macintyre highlights for
opprobrium in his critique of the contemporary context and the particular issues surrounding calls for
euthanasia. In short, Maclntyre's critique is directed at exactly the kinds of positions taken by those
who call for the legalisation of euthanasia. Such positions represent a paradigm case of what
Maclntyre takes to be the irrationality and miasma prevalent in modem moral discourse.
Jonsen, 'Criteria That Make Intentional Killing Unjustified', p. 51.
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considered a form of good care for the suffering-dying, and why this view is
incommensurable with a Christian account of what good care for the suffering-dying
consists of, we must look beyond medicine and attend to the philosophical
presuppositions of those who endorse euthanasia.
6.4 Philosophical premises that endorse euthanasia
To understand why euthanasia is considered good care for the suffering-dying we
must situate calls for euthanasia within wider philosophical trends. Perhaps the most
influential of these philosophical trends is the increasing emphasis on individual
human autonomy as something that determines what is good or in the best interests
of a person. For example, R. G. Frey, in his case for legalising voluntary euthanasia,
states: 'Control over our own life is one of the most important goods we enjoy. [...]
it is our life and how we live it and what we make of it is up to us.' 50 Dan Brock
defines autonomy as 'the freedom to decide for ourselves as we see fit what direction
our life will take, even when others may with good reason disagree.' 51 The freedom
to choose is framed in terms of the 'rights' of the patient. These rights, which
'belong' to the patient, protect the patient's ability to exercise her freedom of choice
and her interests as against, say, the interests of the medical profession or the wider
community. This shift toward emphasising the autonomy of a patient in medical
decisions is such that Brock now notes:
A common model of the doctor-patient relationship is one in which the doctcw is viewed
as the agent of the patient and who is to act in the interest and for the welfare of the
patient alone. The physician should adopt what has been called a patient-centred ethic.52
A good example of how the notion of autonomy is employed in supporting
arguments for euthanasia is that set out by Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin takes it to be
'generally agreed' that 'adult citizens of normal competence have a right to
autonomy, that is, a right to make important decisions defining their own lives for
themselves.' 53
 Dworkin recognises that the notion of autonomy is far from simple.
For example, he asks when the right to autonomy is lost and 'why we should ever
respect the decisions people make when we believe that these are not in their
° It G. Frey 'Distinctions in Death', in Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide: For and Against
ed. by Gerald Dworkin and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.17-42 (p. 17).
Brock, Essays in Biomedical Ethics, p. 107. Cf. Gormally, Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the
Law,p. 130.
Brock, Essays in Biomedical Ethics, p. 117. For an assessment of different models of patient-carer
relations see Randall and Downie, Palliative Care Ethics, pp. 25-39.
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interests'?54
 After dismissing what he terms the 'evidentiary view of autonomy'
(that is, the claim that we should respect an individual's decisions because that
person generally knows his own best interests), 55
 Dworkin makes a case for what he
calls the 'integrity view of autonomy'. Dworkin states that 'the value of autonomy,
on this view, derives from the capacity it protects: the capacity to express one's own
character - values, commitments, convictions, and critical as well as experiential
interests - in the life one leads.' 56
 Dworkin goes on to say:
Recognizing an individual right to autonomy makes self-creation possible. [...] We allow
someone to choose death over radical amputation or a blood transfusion, if that is his
informed wish, because we acknowledge his right to a life structured by his own values.57
Dworkin here is clearly not suggesting that the moral worth of what we choose is that
which is important, but rather, the moral worth lies in the act of choosing and
ascribing value to something. 58
 When the capacity to choose is impaired, the value
of the life is endangered because self-creation is restricted.
One implication of Dworkin's view of autonomy is that human beings are not
equal in possessing basic dignity. Human life has value insofar as the person whose
life it is is in a position to value things and projects and activities and does value
them. The requirement that a person possess certain abilities in order to possess
dignity underlies the distinction Dworkin makes between 'biological life' and
'human life'. For Dworkin, 'human life' is constituted by 'personal choice, training,
commitment and decision'. 59
 On this account those who cannot generate choices,
commitments or decisions can no longer be counted as possessing 'human life'.
Thus, to deny them 'biological life' is not to kill them; rather, it is not to prolong a
form of life no longer worth living. Mary Warnock makes a similar distinction
between 'simply being alive' and 'the specifically human consciousness of having a
Dworkin, Life's Dominion, p. 222.
54 Dworkin, Ljfe's Dominion, p. 222-23.
Dworkin, Life's Dominion, p. 223-24.
56 Dworkin, Life's Dominion, p. 224.
" Ibid.
For a critique of the view that value resides not in what we decide, but in that we decide see Biggar,
'God, the Responsible Individual, and the Value of Human Life and Suffering', pp. 30-3 1. His
critique is derived from Maclntyre's critique of the liberal view of the self: AV, chs 2, 3.
Dworkin, Life's Dominion, p. 69.
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life to lead'.6° Only those who possess 'fully human consciousness' have value or
dignity.
The corollary of the view that an individual's ability to make decisions and
exercise choice is determinative of her human worth is that her choices should be
determinative of what constitute good care. This is to say, the patient's autonomy -
their choice - takes precedence over medical possibility, the judgement of those
medical practitioners involved, and the concerns of the family and wider community
of the patient. Therefore, if the patient expresses her will in a choice for euthanasia
(speciI'ing under what conditions this choice is to be applied in a 'living will') the
doctor and family are morally obliged to follow the patient's prior choice, even if the
patient is currently no longer able to exercise that choice. Moreover, Dworkin states
that: 'A competent person's right to autonomy requires that his past decisions about
how he is to be treated if he becomes demented must be respected even if they
contradict the desires he has at that later point.' 6' Dworkin calls this 'precedent
autonomy'.
We have pointed to how the notion of autonomy is employed to legitimise the
action of euthanasia as morally licit. However, a notion of autonomy like Dworkin's
does not fully justiI, or give decisive weight to, the conception of euthanasia as
good care for the suffering-dying. There are many actions which may be warranted
on grounds of autonomy that would not thereby be considered good actions, for
example, smoking cigarettes. There are, thus, two further factors, that combine
together with the conception of autonomy (and its concomitant, the dualistic divide
between human and biological life) outlined above, to give weight to the idea that
euthanasia is a form of good care for the suffering-dying.
The first of these other factors is the contemporary conception of death. William
May draws attention to how, in contemporary Western culture, death is both hidden
away and on prominent display. He states: 'On the one hand death is a taboo subject,
the unmentionable event; on the other, death (and violence) is an obsession at every
60 Mary Warnock, The Uses of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), PP. 22-23. James Rachels
makes a parallel distinction between the 'biographical' dimension of human life and the merely
'biological' dimension: James Rachels, The End of L(fe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986), pp.
5. See also, Singer, Rethinking Life and Death, p. 80.
61 Dworkin, Lfe 's Dominion, p. 228.
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level of our culture.' 62 Death's concealment, whether it is in hospitals or the hushed
tones of polite conversation, excludes death from on-going human community. Yet
precisely at the point of its concealment there is an obsession with violent death
manifested in the 'pornography of death' that so many contemporary films, books,
computer games and television programmes display. 63 Like all forms of
pornography, the pornography of death objectifles the action and abstracts it from its
proper human response; that is, grief. Popular advocates of euthanasia, for example,
Derek Humphry, seek to challenge the contemporary taboos surrounding death.
Humphiy states that the 'right-to-die credo [...] aims to share the dying
experience.' TM However, it is our contention that the concealment of death and the
concomitant obsession with violent death are embodied in the action of euthanasia.
Euthanasia is an act which both excludes death (by hurrying it on in order to get it
over with) and inflicts violence on the body (by denying the body its own time and
pace of death). Furthermore, Humphiy's need to insist that, for example, assisted
suicide, should only be done by those who have 'a bonding of love or friendship, and
mutual respect' with the patient is evidence of the rarity of what he calls 'self-
deliverance' being situated in a 'bonding of love'. 65 More often than not, assisted
suicide and euthanasia represent an abstraction of death from the bonds of human
community in their refusal of dependence on others and the claims for on-going
care.66
Whether death is viewed with horror or as 'natural' and inevitable, death stifi
represents the termination of an individual's direct involvement in all that they value.
Many advocates of euthanasia take the view that if death cannot be defeated, then it
can at least be painless, planned and dignified, so that the random encroachment of
death is defied and the last word of a human is self-assertion. Furthermore, given the
inevitability of death there comes a point for every human when medical care cannot
cure the patient and extending the patient's life becomes fl.itile. In effect, death is the
point at which medicine reaches its limit. At this point the patient is in danger from
one of two eventualities. These are, over-treatment or neglect. The former
62 May, The Sacral Power of Death', p. 199.
63 Ibid.
Derek Humphry, Final Exit, (Eugene, OR: Hemlock Society, 1991), p. 54.
65 Humphry, Final Exit, p. 33.
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constitutes a perpetuation of suffering through medical treatment that is intrusive and
unnecessaiy in the light of death's inevitability. The latter exacerbates suffering
unnecessarily by abrogating any care at all so that the patient is left to die a painful
and degrading death because medicine can no longer cure the patient. Given that
pain is considered an affront to human dignity euthanasia emerges as the most loving
response given these two other possible ways to respond to the suffering-dying.67
Dworkin is representative of those who present euthanasia as the optimum way of
avoiding either over-treatment or neglect of the suffering-dying.68
While contemporary attitudes about death are an important factor, they are less
significant in legitimising euthanasia than the second factor; that is, contemporary
attitudes to suffering. Within modernity illness, pain and suffering are pointless: that
is, they can play no role in helping us live our lives well. O'Donovan notes that
suffering has become uninteffigible in contemporary society because it is a society
orientated toward the individual and the exercise of the individual will. He states:
'The role society, on earth and in heaven, could play in justiI,ring the individual's
suffering is removed. The late-modem age, accordingly, is in perpetual rebeffion
against the "pointlessness", the "waste" of suffering.' 69 Both the valuing of
compassion over wisdom and the resort to technological means to 'solve' (meaning
to 'eliminate') any perceived suffering exacerbates this. O'Donovan points out that
within the logic of modernity, and spurred on by compassion, suffering in any form
must be eliminated through technical means. 70 As Hauerwas notes in relation to
O'Donovan's insight: 'Illness is an absurdity in a history formed by the commitment
to overcome all evils that potentially we can control.'7'
Those who advocate euthanasia view a planned and regulated death as preferable
to one that involves suffering. Indeed, assisting someone to die is considered an act
of mercy when she is suffering in her dying, because the quality of human life is
By contrast, Christians countenance death each time they come before the communion table and
seek to abide and lament with the dying and provide such care as is needed. As we shall see, this
aJ)proach is embodied in hospice care.
Banner, 'Christian Anthropology', pp. 77-82.
68 Dworkin, Life's Dominion, pp. 182-83.
69 Desire, p. 276.
° Begotten, pp. 3-12.
71 Hauerwas, Naming the Silences, p. 63. Cf. Dennis Sansom, 'Why Do We Want to be Healthy?
Medicine, Autonomous Individualism, and the Community of Faith', in On Moral Medicine, pp. 262-
266.
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more important than life itself The assumption behind this is that certain forms of
life are not worth living, either because they do not constitute human life, or because
the quality of life is so impaired as to make death preferable. An example of the
former is someone who has no higher brain functions but is 'biologically' alive. This
is thought to be a non-human form of life. An example of the latter is someone who
is considered to be fully human, but is enduring great pain.
6.5 Relating autonomy, death and suffering within a theological account of
good care
Christians have a view of autonomy, death and suffering that diverges completely
from that of those who seek to have euthanasia recognised as part of good medicine.
We shall now clariIy the roots of the incommensurability between the view of
Christians and the views of those who advocate euthanasia by analysing why,
according to the logic of their own tradition, Christians reject the central assumptions
that underpin arguments for euthanasia: that is, the preference for death over
suffering and the move to emphasise patient autonomy. Moreover, we shall contend
that, in contemporary society, the suffering-dying are an instance of the vulnerable
stranger whom Christ admonishes the church to welcome.
The modem view of suffering contrasts directly with Christian approaches to
suffering. For Christians the question is not whether suffering has a point in and of
itself Instead, the experience of suffering is located in a wider framework and
narrative in which suffering has a place. John Paul II sunimarises an approach to
suffering that seeks to locate it within a wider framework of meaning, when he
states:
According to Christian teaching [...] suffering, especially in the fmal moments of life,
has a special place in God's plan of salvation. It is a sharing in the passion of Christ and
unites the person with the redemptive sacrifice which Christ offered in obedience to the
Father's will.72
However, as Nigel Biggar points out, the notion of suffering at work in the above
statement (and elsewhere in John Paul II's treatment of suffering) as somehow
redemptive is too broad.73
 After giving a critique of John Paul II's conception of
suffering, Biggar concludes:
72 JO Paul II, 'Euthanasia', pp. 652-53. See also: Evangelium Vitae, p. 123.
Biggar, 'God, the Responsible Individual, and the Value of Human Life and Suffering', pp. 42-46.
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It is possible [...] to regard human suffering as redemptive, but only of a certain kind;
namely, the compassionate and forgiving suffering of injury. Other kinds of human
suffering - such as tenninal illness and chronic pain - cannot be regarded as redemptive
in the strong sense of imitating the compassion and forgiveness of God in Christ.74
Biggar points out that this is not to say that terminal illness and chronic pain cannot
be 'redemptive' in a weaker sense. For Biggar, the kind of suffering involved in
terminal illness can be 'redemptive' as part of both a duty to endure it for the sake of
fulfilling a responsibility (for example, reconciliation with an estranged family
member), and as part of Christian witness. With regard to this latter point, Biggar
states:
A life is valuable not only for what it builds, but also for what it says. So in the faithful,
hopeful, charitable manner of my suffering I may be able to demonstrate salvific truths
about, for example, the contingent value of the human individual, the gracious goodness
of God, and the humanising prospect of eternal life.75
But witnessing to truths such as these is not the same as saying the suffering endured
in, for example, chronic illness, is redemptive in any strong sense (that is,
constituting a witness to or participation in God's redemption of humanity).
Situating suffering within the narrative framework of the Gospel does not bind one to
say that suffering is redemptive in a strong sense. However, situating suffering
within the Gospel narrative can enable men and women to abide patiently in, and
bear patiently with, suffering: by enabling them to interpret their experience within a
framework that does not make suffering pointless or meaningless.
Situating suffering in the narrative of the Gospel does not eliminate the need for
aftempts to alleviate it. Meilander clarifies why this is the case when he states:
The principle that governs Christian compassion is not 'minimize suffering'. It is
'maximize care.' Were our goal only to minimize suffering, no doubt we could
sometimes achieve it by eliminating sufferers. But then we refuse to understand suffering
as a significant part of human life that can have meaning or purpose. We should not, of
course, pretend that suffering in itself is a good thing, nor should we put forward claims
about the benefits others can reap from their suffering. [...] The suffering that comes is an
evil, but the God who in Jesus has not abandoned us in that suffering can bring good from
it for us as for Jesus. [... J Our task is therefore not to abandon those who suffer but to
'maximize care' for them as they live out their own life's story. We ought 'always to
care, never to kill.'76
Biggar, 'God, the Responsible Individual, and the Value of Human Life and Suffering', p. 46.
' Ibid.
76 Gilb Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primerfor Christians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), pp. 65-66.
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He goes on to point out that if suffering cannot be relieved, we must remember that
even God does not really 'solve' or take away the problem of suffering; rather, God
lives and bears with suffering. Within such an approach to suffering the idea that we
can balance or calculate how much suffering is preferable to death in order to make
medical decisions is wholly mistaken.
The basis of this Christian conception of suffering is a particular vision of life and
death. The Christian vision of life and death is wholly different in kind to that
embodied in the action of euthanasia. The Christian lives in response to Jesus' call
to seek not life for its own sake, but to seek first the kingdom of God (Mt. 6.33).
Karl Barth puts it thus: 'Life is no second God, and therefore the respect due to it
cannot rival the reverence owed to God.' 77
 Barth points out that the respect owed to
life as a good in itself has as its limitation 'the will of God the Creator Himself who
commands it, and the horizon which is set for man by the same God with his
determination for eternal life.' 78
 What Barth says points also to how Christians
understand the basis of their life: it is not their own but received as a gift and loan
from God which can only be fuffilled in communion with God. Thus Christians seek
to live within these limits, recognising that between these limits lies the sphere of
true freedom. They bear their life in trust for a certain time. They are neither to
prolong, nor protect, nor seek its fulfilment, at all costs. In Christianity, life is a
good, but it is not the greatest good.
The approach to life outlined above determines a particular conception of death.79
As noted previously, advocates of euthanasia see death as the termination of all
human goods and to be accepted as inevitable; and in its inevitability, death is
considered 'natural'. Euthanasia encapsulates this approach to dying in its shrill
indifference to death. By contrast, Christianity views death as a deeply ambivalent
phenomenon. For Christians, death is an evil, but it is not the greatest evil humans
can suffer. Death is both a proper limit established by God, and an enemy God
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III: 4, trans. by A. T. Mackay and others, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1961), p. 342. For a critique of those who make the 'sanctity of life' an idol and ideology see
Hauerwas, Suffering Presence, pp. 91-93.
Ibid.
79 1n this assessment of the Christian conception of death we put to one side the question of how
different conceptions of death relate to the empirical criteria that determine when death has occurred.
For a discussion of this relationship see Hauerwas, Suffering Presence, pp. 89-99.
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defeats. This ambiguity brings to the fore the seeming contradiction at the heart of
the Christian vision of life. As Meilander puts it:
We are created from the dust of the ground - fmite beings who are limited by biological
necessities and historical location. We are also free spirits, moved by the life-giving
Spirit of God, created ultimately for communion with God - and therefore soaring
beyond any limited understanding of our person in terms of presently 'given' conditions
of life.80
The ambivalence toward death is manifested in the Bible by the tension between
Ecciesiastes and Romans. Paul Ramsey, after an extended meditation on the
understanding of death in Ecclesiastes, concludes that while dying is part of life, it is
always an indignity. Ramsey states:
So the grandeur and misery of man are fused together in the human reality and experience
of death. To deny the indignity of death requires that the dignity of man be refused also.
The more acceptable in itself death is, the less the worth or uniqueness ascribed to the
dying life.81
As Ramsey points out, death is an indignity which causes us to 'number our days'
and probe the depths of life while there is still time. 82
 For Ramsey, Ecclesiastes
leads us to conclude that without death human life would be a condition of endless
boredom. However, the vision in Ecciesiastes does not exhaust the Christian
conception of death. As O'Donovan argues, Ramsey underplays the evangelical
proclamation of the resurrection. 83
 It is this proclamation that forms the foundation
of Paul's understanding of death set out in Romans. For Paul, the dominion of death
(and sin) has been broken by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, so that death
is no longer an enemy that sets the limit of our life. As Paul writes: 'For the law of
the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the law of sin and of death'
(Rom. 8.2). As O'Donovan notes: 'The Christian GospeI, therefore, proclaims a
reconciliation of humanity with mortality, for it proclaims that eternal life is present
here and now, even under the conditions of mortality.' 84
 Hence, as Paul phrases it:
'Christ will be exalted now as always in my body, whether by life or by death' (Phil.
1.20).
80 Meilaender, Bioethics, p. 4.
Ramsey, 'The Indignity of "Death with Dignity"', p. 237. For a critique of this article see Oliver
O'Donovan, 'Keeping Body and Soul Together', in On Moral Medicine, pp. 223-238.
82 Ramsey, 'The Indignity of "Death with Dignity"', p. 240.83 O'Donovan, 'Keeping Body and Soul Together', p. 228.
4 ODonovan, 'Keeping Body and Soul Together', p. 226.
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It is the resurrection that should properly determine the Christian understanding of
death. 85
 Death, which formerly deprived us of future possibilities, can do so no
more. After the resurrection we may now live in the security that 'neither death, nor
life, nor angels, nor rulers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor
height, nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from
the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord' (Rom. 8.38-39). O'Donovan states that
'resurrection unmasks the pretensions of death to be a Last Thing, by superseding it
as a Later-than-last Thing, and so demonstrating that it was never more than a
penultimate thing.' 86
 Thus death no longer determines life's dignity; now it is the
new life we have in Christ that establishes the value of human life. This is not to say
that life has no limit; rather, as the earlier quotation from Barth indicates, its limit is
now the eschatological horizon. it is this telos for human life that gives life its
meaning and purpose. Furthermore, as O'Donovan points out, death can only
properly be understood in the relation to this horizon. In relation to the eschaton,
death can be seen as a form of judgment, but not as a final sentence. O'Donovan
states:
To see death as the emblem of divine judgement requires that we have first seen life as an
emblem of divine acquittal. Because God has said his final 'Yes' to the world, we may
understand the mysterious and world-denying absurdity of death as God's penultimate
'No', the No which supports the Yes by refusing all forms of uncreation and destruction
in the human will. 87
By understanding death in the shadow of the resurrection Christians are directed
to a very different response to death and dying. In relation to our death, instead of
the defiance 'which aims to "surmount our fate" by a moment of human assertion',88
of which euthanasia is an expression, Christians approach death with hope for a
future given in Jesus Christ. In relation to those who are dying: 'The resurrection of
Christ frees a man for approach to the dying not because it arms him with a
possession to give, but because it frees him from all this worry and confusion about
possessions.' 89
 In other words, the resurrection of Christ frees a man to abide with
contrasts with the theological premises that underpin the assessment ofeuthanasia and death in
Evangelium Vitae. For a critique of Evangeliwn Vitae in relation to this see Oliver O'Donovan,
'Review of Evangelium Vitae', SCE, 9.1(1996), 89-94.
86 O'Donovan, 'Keeping Body and Soul Together', p. 232.
87 0'Donovan, 'Keeping Body and Soul Together', p. 233.
Banner, 'Christian Anthropologj, p. 82.
89 William May, 'The Sacral Power of Death in Contemporary Experience', in On Moral Medicine, pp.
197-209 (p. 205).
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and care for the suffering-dying without either over-treating them, or neglecting
them, or intending their death.
Just as Christians reject the assumption that death is preferable to suffering, so
they also question the conception of autonomy that is such a central premise in
arguments for euthanasia. As previously noted, the conception of autonomy
proposed by advocates of euthanasia presupposes a dualism: that is, a belief that we
can separate the mind and the body. However, the Christian tradition presupposes a
very different anthropology, in which humans are conceived of as psychosomatic
wholes. Life is unitary; it is not vegetable life supplemented by animal life
supplemented by an intellectual life. 90 Augustine represents the Christian tradition
when he states that: 'A man's body is no mere adornment, or external convenience; it
belongs to his very nature as a man. ,91 Unlike Dworkin, Singer, Wamock and
others, Christians cannot argue for a separation of 'human life' from 'biological life'.
Thus, within a theological anthropology, even if one's brain has been so damaged
that one is no longer capable of intellectual acts, one does not cease to be human;
instead, one is a damaged human. Furthermore, and as Banner argues:
The conviction that Jesus Christ is the first is the conviction that the grace of God shown
in Jesus Christ is shown in creation. It is in virtue of this conviction, [...], that Augustine
commends all those practices which honour and cherish the body (of the self, the other,
the unborn, and of the dead) rather than repudiate it. These practices value the body as
itself a gift from the hand of the creator, and not as a thing of indifference, as it were, of
which truly valuable human life simply makes use.92
As creatures of God, our existence and value is not determined by any human action
or capacity. Instead, it is a gift and loan from God of which we are stewards and in
respect of which we at once owe a duty to our Creator and to one another. Hauerwas
puts it thus: 'For our creaturely status is but a reminder that our existence is not
secured by our own power, but rather requires the constant care and trust in others.'93
Thus, for the Christian, our life is not ours to dispose of as we see fit. It is not our
9° For a philosophical critique of dualistic account of human perso.ihood see Finnis, 'A Philosophical
Case Against Euthanasia', pp. 30-33.
91 Augustine, City of God, i, 13.
Banner, 'Christian Anthropology', p. 67.
Stanley Hauerwas, 'Rational Suicide and Reasons for Living', in On Moral Medicine, pp. 671-78
(p. 674).
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property and we are not autonomous.94 We come to be through God and others, and
whether we like it or not, we are always dependent on God and others.
The status of humans as creatures is not all Christians have to say about the body.
Our bodies are also destined for participation in a new creation. The coming of the
kingdom of God, which Jesus both announces through miracles that restore and heal
bodies, and the resurrection of his own body, speaks of the goodness and future of
human bodies. The human body has value and a future in and of itself and not
merely as a thing of which true 'human life' makes use of for a time. The action of
euthanasia, by contrast, not only views the body in solely instrumental terms, but
also expresses hopelessness about the future of the body. Banner points out that
these contrasting anthropologies lead to very different kinds of medical practice:
If the goodness of human life includes the goodness of bodily life and if this body is itself
to be caught up in the redemption for which the Christian hopes, then medicine is
permitted, vindicated and honoured. It is hereby commanded and summoned to serve the
good of the body which genuinely is a human good, belonging to our past, present and
future. We find, however, that medicine refuses this calling either by withdrawing
altogether from the service of the body, or by converting service into manipulation.95
Implicit in and underlying a specifically Christian anthropology is the doctrine of
recapitulation. The grace of God revealed in the redemption of humans through
Jesus Christ is a renewal of the grace given in creation. Thus, the Christian vision of
human life as a psychosomatic whole, wherein the body is cherished in and of itself;
is founded upon the reality that 'Christ does not come as the last to redeem us from a
world for which he was not the first, but comes to restore and reconcile this world to
its creator.'96
Through the contrast with a Christian conception of life, we can regain sight of
the fact that the emphasis on patient autonomy and calls for euthanasia misconstrue
the nature of freedom. It is a regaining of sight because even those philosophers who
were ambivalent about or opposed to Christianity did not think that the decision to
terminate one's life could be a free act. For example, John Stuart Mill, who is often
held to be a forebear of those who argue for euthanasia on the grounds of personal
Cf., Barth, Church Dogmatics, III: 4, pp.404-05.
Banner, 'Christian Anthropology', p. 60.
Banner, 'Christian Anthropology', p. 53.
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liberty,97 argued that one could not in the name of freedom choose unfreedoin. Mill
states that in relation to one who wishes to sell himself into slavery: 'The principle of
freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be
allowed to alienate his freedom.' 98 The same can be said for the person who chooses
euthanasia and in doing so uses (or abuses) his freedom to give up freedom. As
O'Donovan notes: 'For freedom as there exercised encompasses its own
annihilation.' 99 It is thus a 'destructive and defiant attack upon the nature of the free
agent himself who [like the slave] is permitted thereafter to make no more free
choices."°° O'Donovan goes on to point out that freedom is never merely a means
to an end which can then disappear. Rather, freedom has a teleological structure, 'in
which freedom-given serves freedom-to-be-achieved'.' 0 ' To choose death is to
choose unfreedom and that is a false exercise of autonomy.
The contrast between the notion of autonomy central to advocacy of euthanasia
and a Christian vision of life raises a further issue that is specifically Christian in
content. The specifically Christian insight is that freedom is not constituted by the
autonomous exercise of the human will. Rather, as Barth puts it: 'Life is the freedom
which is bestowed by God. To will it is to will what we are permitted. It is to will in
the freedom in which man is not sovereign or solitary, but always has God above him
as the Creator, Giver and Lord of his life.' 102 Thus, to the Christian, the action of
euthanasia far from constituting a free act is in fact an instance of alienation and
bondage to sin.
We can conclude that the assumption that humans are autonomous is not one that
should be affirmed by Christians. Rather than derive policies from notions of
autonomy in order to protect patients against the encroachments of medical
technology or the neglect of their appointed carers, Christians must seek to situate
care for the suffering-dying within the narrative of the Gospel and the practice of
hospitality. The result is that medical practice is exhorted to 'maximise care' rather
See, for example, Peter Singer, 'Justifjing Voluntary Euthanasia', in Ethical Issues in Death and
Dying, ed. by Robert Weir (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 268-74 (p. 273).




102 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III: 4, p. 407.
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than 'minimise suffering'. Implicit in such an exhortation is the view that
dependence on others is not of itself a bad thing.
Within the framework of their own tradition, Christians have a completely
divergent view from those who advocate euthanasia as a form of good care for the
suffering-dying. While euthanasia may seem a loving option to some, against the
background of Christian belief and practice, euthanasia cannot constitute an act of
love and care. Meilander notes:
Such action cannot be loving because it cannot be part of the meaning of commitment to
the well-being of another human being within the appointed limits of earthly life. The
benevolence of the euthanatizer is enough like love to give us pause, to tempt us to call it
love. And perhaps it may even be the closest those who feel themselves to bear the full
responsibility for relief of suffering and production of good in our world can come to
love. But it is not the creaturely love which Christians praise, a love which can
sometimes do no more than suffer as best we can with the sufferer. 103
Christians can say to those who advocate voluntary euthanasia: 'All honour to the
well-meaning humanitarianism of [your] underlying motive!' 104 However, as Barth
goes on to say, such a call is derived not from what Christians take to be
authoritative, but 'from another book'.'° 5 And while Christians may applaud the
humanitarian sentiment that inspires calls for euthanasia, they must conclude that
those who make such calls are tragically colluding in their own bondage.'°6
Furthermore, in contrast to those who advocate euthanasia, Christians should
recognise the suffering-dying as vulnerable strangers under threat of being neglected,
oppressed, or killed off, and thus in need of a 'place' within the church so that they
might be welcomed and cared for.
The incommensurability between the view held by Christians and that held by
those who advocate euthanasia makes the issue of what constitutes good care for the
suffering-dying a test case for our conception of hospitality. Having mapped the
incommensurability between the beliefs of Christians and those who advocate
euthanasia we need to address the following question: if Christians should reject
euthanasia, what is a Christian response to care for the suffering-dying that accords
with the model of hospitality set out in the previous chapter? Furthermore, given
103 Meilaender, 'Euthanasia and Christian Vision', p. 660.
'°' Barth, Church Dogmatics, III: 4, p. 425.
105 Ibid.
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their rejection of euthanasia, how are Christians to relate to those neighbours whose
view is incommensurable with a Christian account of what care for the suffering-
dying should consist of? To address these questions we will first review responses to
the issue of care for the suffering-dying derived from the work of Maclntyre and
Grisez. We wifi then give an account of hospice care as a paradigmatic instance of
how the conception of hospitality, as derived from the work of O'Donovan, is
practised. In addition, we will also recapitulate the central arguments of this thesis
by noting why the accounts given by Maclntyre and Grisez of how Christians and
non-Christians are to relate with regard to ethical disputes are insufficient and why
the account we gave of hospitality is the best way to approach the problem of
relations between Christians and non-Christians.
6.6 Maclntyre's own response to the care we owe the suffering-dying
Maclntyre's work suggests one possible response for Christians to make to the
suffering-dying. He argues that the good society (that is, one which embodies
relationships of giving and receiving through which our individual and common
goods can be achieved) is one in which
it is taken for granted that disability and dependence on others are something that all of us
experience at certain times in our lives [...J and that consequently our interest in how the
needs of the disabled are adequately voiced and met is not a special interest [...] but
rather the interest of the whole political society.'07
Thus, Maclntyre places care of the disabled and weaker members of society (of
which the suffering-dying are an instance) at the centre of detennining what
constitutes a good society.'° 8 Care for the weak is also central to determining what is
rational. He states:
We discover [...] in our encounters with the disabled hitherto unrecognized sources of
error in our own practical reasoning. And, insofar as these derived from hitherto
dominant norms of our social environment, we will have to transform that environment as
well as ourselves, if we are to be freed from such errors in our shared deliberative
reasoning.'°9
106 Cf., Banner, 'Christian Anthropology', p. 79.
107 DRA, p. 130.
HIS For a parallel, but theological formulation of the same conception of what constitutes the good
society see Barth, Church Dogmatics, III: 4, p. 424.
'° DRA, p. 137.
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Maclntyre is in effect calling for something very like what St Benedict advocates;
that is, a society governed by the dictum that: 'Care of the sick must rank above and
before all else, so that they may truly be served as Christ." 0 For Maclntyre, a
society in which such care is a priority wifi be a society characterised by the kind of
just generosity and acknowledged dependence that Maclntyre advocates is crucial for
developing independent rational agency.
Opposition to euthanasia would seem to be consistent with Maclntyre's account
of the good society and what constitutes rational deliberation. Euthanasia constitutes
a denial both of acknowledged dependence (by both agent and patient) and of the
importance of care for the radically disabled. Maclntyre explicitly recommends care
of those with 'extreme forms of disability and dependence'; that is, those human
beings whose 'potentialities for rationality or affective response have been
permanently frustrated'. 111 We could cite as an example of such a person someone in
a persistent vegetative state. Maclntyre sees such care neither as a burden nor as an
opportunity for benevolence, but as a form of education through which we might
learn what it is for someone else to be wholly entrusted to our care (so that we are
answerable for their well-being).
Maclntyre's approach to determining what is good and rational contradicts the
view of 'human life' advocated by Dworkin and others: that is, in Maclntyre's view,
the exercise of the will and autonomy are not paramount. Against views which
separate 'human life' from 'biological life' Maclntyre urges us to recognise the
centrality of the body to our humanity. He states that an 'attitude of denial towards
the facts of disability and dependence presuppose either a failure or a refusal to
acknowledge adequately the bodily dimension of our existence." 2 As previously
argued, euthanasia constitutes just such a refusal. Macintyre argues for a proper
acknowledgment of the role our animal and bodily nature play in constituting our
rationality by calling for a recognition of 'how our thinking is the thinking of one
species of animal'."3
110 Benedict, The Rule, p. 38.




When Maclntyre is contrasted with a theological account of the psychosomatic
unity of human life we see a fundamental difference emerge. O'Donovan points out
that the positing of a psychosomatic or body-soul unity is not enough to rule out, 'on
the one hand, an Aristotelian settlement which accepts individual perishability for the
sake of species survival; and it will not rule out, on the other, a defiance of natural
mortality (by technique, if it can be done)." 4 Thus, even though Maclntyre's
account of dependent rational animals is consistent with opposition to euthanasia, the
arguments we might put forward against advocates of euthanasia lack the
explanatory force and secure ground such a position demands. By contrast, a
Christian anthropology does not ground the psychosomatic unity of human life in
arguments about 'how our thinking is the thinking of one species of animal'; instead,
arguments for the psychosomatic unity of human life rest on the claim God has made
upon the bodily life of humans by the resurrection of Jesus Christ. As O'Donovan
puts it:
The principle of psychosomatic unity, then, has no free-standing authority for Christian
thought, but rides on the principle that the resurrection of Christ is central to Christian
faith and the resurrection of all mankind to Christian hope. it is in this context that the
Christian will wish to give his assent to the saying, 'Embodiment is the end of all God's
works."5
Thus, we are to respect the body and care for the suffering-dying neither because we
share an animal nature with them (even though we do) nor because we might learn
something (even though we might), but because care (and only care) is owed to this
dying person as someone who is called 'to an irreplaceable presence before the
judgement seat of God."16
For MacIntyre, the modem nation-state cannot embody the kind ofjust society he
envisages. It can only be realised in relatively small scale communities. It is at this
point that his call for a politics of the local community comes into play. It would be
some form of this politics - in which this vision of acknowledged dependence and
care for the radically disabled was embodied - that would form the basis of a
practical response, derived from Maclntyre's work, to calls for legalising voluntary
euthanasia. However, as we argued in the last chapter, while the response of
Christians to ethical disputes with their neighbours might well involve something
114 O'Donovan, 'Keeping Body arid Soul Together', p. 228.
115 O'Donovan, 'Keeping Body and Soul Together', p.231.
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like the local politics Maclntyre calls for, such a politics cannot constitute the whole
or only response of Christians. It cannot do so because Maclntyre envisages conflict
as endemic to such a politics. By contrast, a theologically specified account of
relations between Christians and non-Christians with regard to the issue of care for
the suffering-dying must take note of the absence of any sharp dividing line between
Christians and non-Christians. Moreover, as this chapter has discussed at length, the
views of those who advocate euthanasia are incommensurable with a Christian view
of care for the suffering-dying. The divergent nature of these two views forestalls
the point of the kind of 'local politics' Maclntyre envisages; that is, the gradual
convergence and over-coming of incommensurability. As previously argued,
because of the nature of the incommensurability between the views of Christians and
non-Christians any gradual convergence between them cannot be achieved by
following the prescriptions of Maclntyre's meta-theory.
6.7	 Grisez's understanding of the care we owe the suffering-dying
Gnsez vehemently opposes euthanasia as a form of care for the suffering-dying.
His suggestion for what does constitute good care for the suffering-dying is known
by his advocacy of hospice care. In his view, hospice care constitutes good care for
three reasons: the patient as a person is respected, so that they are not merely treated
as a patient, and the demands of their community are given priority over those of
medical intervention; the dying person is recognised as dying, and thus no irrelevant
treatment is given; and the dying person is not neglected, but cared for in every way
possible." 7 This would seem to conform to Meilander's principle that Christians
should 'maximise care' rather than 'minimise suffering'.
Interestingly, Grisez presents two quite different kinds of argument against
voluntary euthanasia. In 'Life and Death with Liberty and Justice' he excludes
theological considerations from his argument. He excludes them because he seeks to
present arguments acceptable to the general public." 8 Yet in volume two of 'Living
a Christian Life' he uses an explicitly theological framework to make his case. In
arguing that killing of the innocent is always wrong he states:
116 O'Donovan, 'Keeping Body and Soul Together', p. 235.
7 Grisez, Life and Death, p. 182-83.
Grisez, Ljfe and Death, p. 18.
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The serious wrongness of killing the innocent follows not only from the inherent
goodness of human life but from the order of creation (humans made in the image of
God) and the purpose of redemption (the covenant communion, which will be perfected
in heavenly communion, to which humankind is called). The order of creation and the
purpose of redemption are central to divine revelation. Hence Scripture makes it clear
that divine revelation teaches that killing the innocent is wrong."9
Furthermore, he argues that in the current secularised climate non-believers lack the
hope of the resurrection. This lack of hope causes them to either dread death or
undervalue it.' 2° He holds that their lack of relationship with God leads them both to
deny the sanctity of life and the essential evil of acts against human life.' 2 ' He then
cautions that: 'Christians who live in cultures largely shaped by nonbelief must be
careful not to adopt this non-Christian attitude toward life and death.' 122 However,
the grounding of his arguments against euthanasia in 'divine revelation' seems to
have no purchase on the strategy he adopts for engaging non-Christians (who he
recognises do not share the views of Christians) in relation to what is or is not
appropriate care for the suffering-dying.
Grisez holds that 'a just regard for liberty in a pluralistic society forbids any such
appeal to Christian moral norms to justi1' public policies." 23 Therefore, he excludes
explicitly Christian witness from the proposals he gives for how Christians are to
relate with non-Christians over the issue of care for the suffering-dying. Instead, he
presents an argument relating to jurisprudence and what does and does not constitute
an appropriate law. His argument rests on the assumption that it is the law, rather
than morality (the two being related but distinct) that should determine what ought to
be accepted as public policy in a pluralistic society.' 24 In other words, Grisez holds that
the apparatus of the state can be neutral between competing claims; however, as we
have already seen in relation to Maclntyre's account of the modem nation-state,
Grisez's position is inherently flawed.
In his calls for a legislative approach to resolving conflicts Grisez does not admit
any notion of the common good as relevant to or foundational for determining proper
119 LCL, p. 476.
120 LCL, p. 463.
121 LCL, p. 464.
122 Ibid
123 Grisez, Ljfe and Death, p. 461.
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legal rights and duties. He seeks to determine what minimum standards the law
should uphold in relation to case for the suffering-dying by way of notions of liberty
and justice alone. Yet in response to this approach we must raise a question inspired
by Maclntyre: that is, whose vision of justice is Grisez referring to? As Macintyre
argues, we cannot determine what constitutes justice or liberty without recourse to
some conception of the telos they serve. In practice, Grisez does refer to a specific
telos by ultimately grounding his argument about why euthanasia is unjust on notions
of the person as directed to communion with God and neighbour. 125 Furthermore,
Grisez recognises that the concept of 'the person', on which both he and John Finnis
rest their notion of the psychosomatic unity of human life (and thereby their
opposition to dualistic accounts of human life which ground calls for euthanasia) is a
distinctively Christian concept.' 26 Grisez states:
The pagans of ancient times lacked the concept of person, which was developed by
Christians to articulate the mysteries of three persons in one God and a divine person who
also is human. [...] From its theological roots, the concept gathered meaning in its
application to human individuals, considered as beings made in God's image and called
to be his children.'27
Yet Grisez, in his argument against euthanasia in public discourse, continues to
appeal to non-Christians to accept a concept he recognises can be wholly alien to
them. At the same time, he does not link Christianity with the one form of practice -
hospice care - which bears witness to the kind of care he considers appropriate for
the suffering-dying. Yet without such a link being made, appeals to terms like
'person', and advocacy of the kind of case he considers to be appropriate, are bound
to be misunderstood. This is to say, unless Christians point to embodiments of what
they are talking about then what Christians advocate can easily be misconstrued.
Grisez sees hospice care as an alternative to calls for euthanasia. He states:
If the legalization of voluntary active euthanasia is to be rejected in the interest of
protecting the lives and respecting the liberty of members of society who do no wish to be
killed and to kill, then this alternative to death by active euthanasia must be promoted.
a critique of Grisez's recourse to law as a y of settling disputes in a pluralistic society see
John Ladd, 'Euthanasia, Liberty and Religion', Ethics, 93.1(1982), 129-138.
125 For a critique of Grisez's conception of the relationship between the body and personhood see
Biggar, 'God, the Responsible Individual, and the Value of Human Life and Suffering', pp. 36-39.
Biggar argues that Grisez over-states the relationship between personhood and the body and moves
beyond what is theologically warranted.
126 Finnis, 'A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia', p. 31.
127 LCL, p. 460.
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Indeed, its seems to us, there is some duty of society to make available to all quality
palliative care.'28
However, his call for the promotion of hospice care takes no account of the explicitly
Christian witness on which such care is based. Nor does his advocacy of hospice
care play a central role in his account of how Christians are to relate to non-
Christians with regard to the dispute over what constitutes good care for the
suffering-dying.
Like Grisez, we will argue that hospice care is the best form of care for the
suffering-dying. However, it is our contention that it embodies a particular, Christian
vision of hospitality in relation to care for the suffering-dying. Furthermore, the
practice of hospitality (as embodied in hospice care) and not recourse to the law or
the state as Grisez suggests, represents the best response to the disagreement
Christians have with their neighbours about what constitutes good care for the
suffering-dying. In contrast to Maclntyre, this approach to care for the suffering-
dying, and establishing dialogue with non-Christians over this issue, is not
characterised by conflict. Instead, we find non-Christians taldng up the Christian
approach: many non-Christians attend hospices. Disagreement is not 'solved' or
eliminated, but neither is the particular approach of Christians found to exclude
others or be marginalised by non-Christians. Instead, what Christians advocate has
become accepted as defining what constitutes good care for the suffering-dying. The
acceptance of hospice care amidst continuing disagreement about what constitutes
good care for the suffering-dying is, we shall contend, a paradigm instance of how,
despite the incommensurability between their evaluative criteria for what is good and
just, Christians and non-Christians may share an ad hoc commensurability at the
level of social practices.' 29
 Furthermore, the phenomenon of the acceptance of
hospice care by non-Christians illustrates how the church is simultaneously alien to,
and a host of, its neighbours, in relation to ethical disputes.
6.8 Hospice care as an embodiment of Christian hospitality
it is our contention that hospice care is a paradigmatic instance of how the
Christian social practice of hospitality is the primary way in which Christians should
12* Grisez, Life and Death, p. 183.
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relate to non-Christians with regard to ethical disputes. Contrary to Maclntyre's
model of relations between Christians and non-Christians, the relations that develop
between Christians and non-Christians participating together in the practice of
hospice care are not characterised by rivahy. However, neither are the differences
between Christians and non-Christians capable of being resolved either over time,
along the lines Maclntyre sets out in his meta-theory, or by recourse to some
universal criteria of evaluation as Grisez argues. Rather, we will argue that hospice
care, as an embodied and institutionalised form of hospitality, recapitulates the
ascension/Pentecost moments in the Christ-event and retains specifically Christian
criteria for evaluating what is good and just in relation to the determination of what
constitutes good care for the suffering-dying. However, hospice care, in its
recapitulation and retention of specifically Christian criteria of evaluation, allows for
commensurability with non-Christians at the level of social practice. To make the
case for hospice care as a paradigmatic instance of Christian hospitality we will first
define what we mean by hospice care, then set out how the development of the
hospice movement fits within a wider tradition of Christian hospitality (noting how
the modern hospice movement is a direct response to the increased advocacy of
euthanasia), and analyse how hospice care instantiates Christian hospitality;
concluding with an assessment of its potential future development.
6.8.1 A definition of hospice care
The term 'hospice care' has come to mean a programme (rather than a place) of
care for terminally ill patients and their families. 130 For the purposes of the following
discussion, the term 'hospital' refers to an institution that focuses on caring for
patients and, if possible, curing them. The term 'hospice' (signiIing an institution
carrying out such care) is distinguished from a hospital in that it does not maintain
specific services to cure patients, only to care for them. Neither does the term
'hospice care' refer to a specific regimen of medical treatment. The term 'paffiative
medicine' refers to that technical aspect of hospice care that aims to relieve pain
129 A good example of the acceptance of hospice care amidst fundamental disagreement over the issue
of euthanasia is Derek Huinphiy who supports hospice care yet argues vociferously for euthanasia.
See Final Exit, pp. 34-37.
130 For a formal definition of hospice care see: Avril Jackson and Ann Eve, eds., Directory of Hospice
and Palliative Care Services in the United Kingdom and the Republic of freland (London: St
Christopher's Hospice Information Service, 1998), p. iv.
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through the use of specffic drugs.' 3 ' Hospice care, on the other hand, refers to an
approach to care for the suffering-dying that is much wider than simply relief of pain.
While it provides an approach to care that includes the effective and holistic relief of
patients from pain and other distressing symptoms of their condition, it also offers
psychological and spiritual care for patients so that they may come to terms with and
prepare for their own death as fully as they can, a support system to help them live as
actively and creatively as possible until death (thereby promoting independence,
personal integrity and self-esteem), and the provision of help to families so they can
cope during the patients illness and in bereavement.' 32
 A further central tenet of
hospice care is that it seeks neither to hasten nor to postpone death
In its approach to care for the suffering-dying, hospice care attempts to provide a
type of care that incorporates the technical and scientific expertise of medicine
within a broad vision of hospitality. The primary focus is neither the treatment nor
the disease, but the person and her family, and instead of each patient being treated
as part of a uniform system of medicine, the particularity of each patient, her
condition, family and background are considered. Thus, hospice care seeks to take
the whole person (and the relationships within which she is embedded) seriously, and
to structure the treatment around her rather than the reverse. 133
 For example,
intrusive surgery and treatments are used only when their benefits clearly outweigh
any potential burdens. As Cicely Saunders puts it: 'In the hospice movement we
continue to be concerned both with the sophisticated science of our treatments and
with the alt of our caring, bringing competence alongside compassion."34
The form of hospice care was shaped by a rejection of a number of trends in
medicine: the focus on cure rather than care, the emphasis on technique and
technology instead of on the patient, and the increasing advocacy of euthanasia.'35
James comments that:
'' For an assessment and definition of the term 'palliative care' see Clark, Reflectioizr on Palliative
Care, pp. 80-87.
132 Cicely Saunders, 'The Hospice: its Meaning to Patients and their Physicians', Hosp Pract, 16.6
(1981), 93-108.
Randall and Downie, Palliative Care Ethics, pp. 18-21.
134 Cicely Saunders, 'The Founding Philosophy', in Hospice: the Living Idea, p. 4.
135 Cicely Saunders, 'Care of the Dying: The Problem of Euthanasia', Nursing Times, 72, no. 27
(1976), 1049-51.
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The early hospice 'vision' emerged from individuals' personal convictions to become a
descriptive ideal, dedicated, critical of former practice and with the intention of disrupting
former patterns of care of the dying. Committed to listening to patients, to perceiving
death as a time of growth, to offering an alternative to euthanasia by providing skilled,
compassionate care for people dying of cancer, hospice aspirations were on a grand
scale.136
6.8.2 A history of the hospice movement within the tradition of Christian
hospitality
The modem hospice movement is generally recognised as being initiated by
Dame Cicely Saunders, who founded St Christopher's Hospice, London, in 1967.
The name 'hospice' was chosen deliberately for the connotation of being a place of
rest and hospitality for travellers and pilgrims. Margaret Manning places the hospice
movement within a wider Christian tradition of care for strangers, the sick and the
dying.' 37
 Moreover, Clark and Seymour state: 'In retaining the name, modern
hospices have sought self-consciously to rekindle the tradition of devotion, calling
and the ethic of service which was enshrined in the religious foundations of their
predecessors." 38
 As Clark and Seymour point out, early Christian and medieval
hospices were not specifically for the care of the dying; although there are many such
precedents. For example, in 361 Emperor Julian wrote about Fabriola, a wealthy
Roman matron and Christian convert who turned her villa into a refuge for the sick
and dying pilgrims returning from Africa.' 39
 However, the decisive influence on the
modem hospice movement is the consistent practice of care for the poor, sick, and
dying within the Christian tradition, and this practice informs the work of hospices
still.
The practice of hospitality for the sick and dying in Christianity forms the
common patrimony of both hospices and hospitals. By 320 the church in Antioch
was operating a hospice to feed and shelter the poor and sick of Syria. In the 3 70's
Basil of Caesarea opened an institution where physicians and nurses treated patients.
' 36 Nic' James, 'From Vision to System: the Maturing of the Hospice Movement', in Death Rites.
Law and Ethics as the End of Life, ed. by Robert Lee and Derek Morgan (London: Routledge, 1994),
pp. 102-130 (p. 111).
' 37 Margaret Manning, The Hospice Alternative: Living with Dying (London: Souvenir Press, 1984),
pp. 33-45. See also Stephen Connor, Hospice: Practice, Pitfalls, and Promise (Washington DC:
Taylor & Francis, 1998), pp. 4-7.
' Clark, Reflections on Palliative Care, p. 66.
' Manning, The Hospice Alternative, p. 34. See also, Jerome, 'Letter 77', in NPNF, trans. by W. H.
Fremantle and others, ed. by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, Second Series, 14 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 1996), VI, pp. 157-63 (p. 160).
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Twenty years later, John Chrysostom founded hospitals in Constantinople where
doctors tended the sick. By 410, the monk Neilos of Ankyra considered the hospital
physician a common figure in the Greek Christian world.' 40 Millar holds that these
identifiably medical institutions were distinguished from the Classical Greek
as/depieia and the Roman valetudinaria by their emphasis on care for the poor. He
notes the inspiration for this emphasis came directly from the New Testament
teaching on hospitality.' 41
 The distinctiveness of Christian care for the sick and
needy is highlighted by the Emperor Julian, who in his attempt to re-establish
Hellenic religion in the empire and withdraw imperial patronage given to the church
by Constantine, attested to the significance of Christian institutions of care for
strangers, the sick, and the po or. 142
 The hospice movement has self-consciously
appropriated this long tradition of Christian care for the sick and the outcast in its
attempt to address the question of what constitutes good care for the suffering-dying.
Manning and Saunders trace the modern form of hospice care to the renewal of
the medieval practice of establishing hospices by the French Sisters of Charity,
founded by Vincent de Paul, and their Protestant counterpart, the sisters of
Kaiserworth.' 43
 The Sisters of Charity founded Our Lady's Hospice, Dublin
specifically for the incurably ill in 1879. ' It was this establishment that 'paved the
way for a new perspective on the needs of those facing death." 45 The Irish Sisters
subsequently opened further hospices; for example, they established St Joseph's in
London in 1905. Another major influence on the modern hospice movement was St
Luke's, founded by Howard Barrett and the West London (Methodist) Mission in
1893. Goldin notes that St Luke's 'To a far greater degree than any institution of its
time in London I...] was a protohospice, using the word hospice in its contemporary
'4° Miller, 'Hospital: Medieval and Renaissance History', pp. 1160-1163 (p. 1160).
141 Ibid.
142 PohI, Making Room, p. 44.
'4° Manning, The Hospice Alternative, p. 41; Cicely Saunders, 'The Modern Hospice' (paper
presented at the In Quest of the Spiritual Component of Care for the Terminally III Colloquium, Yale
University School of Nursing, 1986), pp. 41-48. (pp. 41-42).
144 There is some dispute as to whether Mary Aikenhead, founder of the Irish congregation of the
Sisters of Charity, founded this hospice herself or whether it was founded after her death. Saunders
believes Mother Aikenhead opened the hospice (Saunders, 'The Modern Hospice', p. 42), whereas
Clark and Seymour state it was founded twenty-one years after her death (Clark, Reflections on
Palliative Care, p. 67).
145 Manning, The Hospice Alternative, p. 41.
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,146 established many precedents for contemporary care of the suffering-
dying. The founding of St Christopher's Hospice was the final step in the
development of the modern form of the hospice in Britain and throughout the
world.'47 The modern hospice is thus situated in a tradition of Christian hospitality,
medical practice and care for the dying, while at the same time being a particular
response to the contemporary context.
6.8.3 Hospice care as Christian hospitality
The hospice movement does represent a genuinely and selfconsciously Christian
response to care for the suffering-dying. Margaret Manning comments that the ideal
of Cicely Saunders 'was to build a Christian hospice, but one unattached to any
single denomination and grounded in the Christian awareness that God's wifi was
being actualised in a tangible way in her work." 48 Saunders herself stated in her
explanation of St Christopher's that it was 'a Christian Foundation, ecumenical and
practical, searching for God's plan for its work and development." 49 Clark and
Seymour conclude: 'Matters of the spirit, and of Christianity in particular, thus have
a crucial influence on the development of hospice thinking from the outset."5°
It is our contention that hospice care constitutes a witness to the Christ-event
through its practice. It constitutes a witness by answering those forms of medical
treatment that made euthanasia appear a form of loving care for the suffering-dying
with a constructive alternative. Hospice care re-situates medicine as a practice
within a specffically Christian vision of human wellbeing. Furthermore, hospice care
has sought to re-situate the response to the suffering-dying within a Christian
conception of suffering and death. By re-situating medical practice, and specifically,
care for the suffering-dying, within a wider, Christian account of what the purpose of
such care is, the hospice movement has generated new forms of care that are
'G. Goldin, 'A Protohospice at the Turn of the Century: St Luke's House, London, from 1893-
1921', Journal of the Social History of Medicine andAllied Science, 3 (1981), 383-413 (p. 385).
Quoted in Clark, Reflections on Palliative Care, p. 67.
147 James, 'From Vision to System', p. 109.
' 48 Margar Manning, The Hospice Alternative: Living with Dying (London: Souvenir Press, 1984), p.
113. For a discussion of the Christian foundations of St Christopher's Hospice see also Shirley Du
Boulay, Cicely Saunders: Founder of the Modern Hospice Movement (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1984), pp. 155-71.
149 Quoted in James, 'From Vision to System', p. 108.
'5° Clark, Reflections on Palliative Care, p. 72. See also, Saunders, 'The Modern Hospice', pp. 42-48.
Against all other assessments of the movement, Connor ties to locate the foundations of hospice care
in a 'philosophy of humanism'. Connor, Hospice: Practice, Pitfalls, and Promise, pp. 8-9.
-26 1-
genuinely good medical practice (that is, they seek neither to cure nor kill the
suffering-dying, but to maximise care) and help patients to enjoy a 'good death' (that
is, a death in which a person is neither neglected nor over-treated but attended to in
this, her very own dying, rendering it as comfortable and dignified as possible). We
have already noted that modem medicine has come to threaten the weak, how
modem conceptions of the person marginalize the suffering-dying as merely
'biological life', and how contemporary society excludes death and the dying.
Following the Christian tradition of care for the weak and the marginalized, hospice
care is an attempt to bear witness to the need to include, care for, and abide with the
suffering-dying, who, in contemporary society, find themselves excluded from the
bounds of human society and either neglected, oppressed by over-intrusive medical
treatment, or under threat of being unjustly killed. In short, by recognising,
accommodating, and creating a 'place' for the suffering-dying, hospice care gives
hospitality to vulnerable strangers.
The manner in which hospice care gives a place to the suffering-dying bears the
marks of feasting and fasting that we contended in the last chapter were a sign of
properly Christian hospitality. Hospice care neither denies the absence of Christ nor
the possibilities, even in dying, of the freedom available now through the actions of
Christ and the Spirit (even dying is not a continual fast, but may encompass times of
joyful feasting). Hospice care gives space and time for the celebration of the life
now dying, and yet, in the care it gives, it expects and longs for the full disclosure of
God's rule when 'he will wipe every tear from their eyes. Death will be no more;
mourning and crying and pain will be no more, for the first things have passed
away.' 151 Hospice care incorporates both joy at the presence of freedom through
reconciliation (the joy of the feast) and pain at the presence of unfreedom and hope
of the world's release from it (the longing of the fast).
The critique of contemporary medical practice hospice care embodies, and the
alternative patterns of care it has developed, have been widely recognised and
accepted. For example, George Young, speaking as the then Government Under-
Secretary for Health and Social Security, stated:
151 Rev 21.4.
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By its very existence it offers a wider challenge to the health professions. [...] It reminds
staff that there is an additional dimension to their patients; that we should not be so busy
developing curative medicine that we forget to care for people as individuals. [...] The
hospice movement seems to offer us a much needed antidote to a too heavy reliance on
technological medicine. It certainly does not reject technology but it begs us to reassess
its role in medicine and patient care.152
Indeed, it seems the existence of hospice care has been a central defence against
changing the legislation regarding euthanasia. For example, Lord Raglan, the
sponsor of the euthanasia bill debated in the House of Lords in 1969, admitted in
reference to St Christopher's Hospice: 'It might be said that if everyone could spend
his last days in such surroundings there would be no need for this Bill." 53 People of
other faith traditions and of no faith tradition have responded positively to and
participated in hospice care (in a manner that echoes the response of non-Christians
to Christian witness outlined earlier in relation to our exegesis of I Peter). The 1998
Hospice directory states: 'Although it is true that many hospices may have a
Christian foundation, patients and staff are from any faith or none. Hospice and
paffiative care try to meet the needs of people from all cultures and religions and of
those with no faith at all. , ' 54 Thus, even advocates of euthanasia and those who
share no sympathy with the Christian faith, have recognised the value of the social
practice of hospice care while disagreeing with the premises on which it is founded.
This response is characteristic of what we argued previously; that is, while many
non-Christians will disagree with the criteria Christians use to determine what is
good and just, this disagreement does not preclude them participating in specifically
Christian social practices. Furthermore, that hospitality is at the core of hospice care
necessarily entails hospice care being orientated toward enabling non-Christians to
participate in it.
In the previous chapter we reviewed the Christian tradition regarding the practice
of hospitality, and then analysed how this conception of hospitality both describes
and defines the way Christians should relate to their neighbours with regard to ethical
disputes. In this chapter we have sought to show how the hospitality of the church,
as instantiated in hospice care, enables the church to be both a guest (the treatment of
the suffering-dying in hospice care is, more often than not, alien to that of its
neighbours) and a host of the life of its neighbours (many non-Christians participate
152 Sir George Young Bt MP, 'Hospice and Health Care', in Hospice: the Living Idea, pp. 1-3 (p. 3).
' Quoted in Grisez, Life and Death, p. 182.
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in hospices and, moreover, many non-Christians have had their attitude and treatment
of the suffering-dying shaped by the Christian practice of hospice care). It is our
contention that this guest-host dynamic constitutes a recapitulation of the ascension
and Pentecost moments of the Christ-event.
Christian hospitality is inaugurated at Pentecost and bears witness to the eschaton
and corresponds to the tension at the heart of the eschaton, whereby it is established
but not yet fully manifest. We find a parallel dynamic in hospice care wherein the
eschatological hope for the future of the body is borne witness to in the proper
cherishing of the body, but it is recognised that the eschaton sets a limit to this life,
and so life is not prolonged at all costs. Likewise, that the eschaton is not yet fully
established is borne witness to by the fact that hospice care is precisely a response to
the recognition of the suffering of the suffering-dying, and the need to establish ways
of faithfully bearing with and caring for the dying in their suffering, and neither
attempting to deny the suffering of this age nor masking the continued power of
death by excluding death from the midst of human community.
As an eschatological social practice, hospitality is inspired and empowered by the
Holy Spirit, who enables the church to host the life of its neighbours without the
church being assimilated to, or colonised by, or having to withdraw from, the life of
its neighbours. Hospice care is a testimony to how the church can open up new
possibilities and radically change the status quo through a deep engagement with the
life of its neighbours in a way that both demands a change in the life together of the
church and the life of its neighbours. The hospice movement has achieved this by
refusing to accept euthanasia as the only response to the problems of neglect and
over-treatment of the suffering-dying, and creating new ways of relating with the
suffering-dying that are consistent with the particular, personal communion we will
enjoy with God and each other in the age to come. A further aspect of how hospice
care has changed contemporary practice and opened up new possibilities can be seen
in its reaction to, and contrast with, the character of care in contemporary hospitals.
In contrast to the often institutionalised, uniform and impersonal treatment provided
in many hospitals, in hospice care strong emphasis is given to the relationship of the
patient with God, with their family, and with themselves, and the tailoring of care to
Quoted from the Directory of Hospice and Palliative Care Services, p. vii.
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the particular situation of the patient. Furthermore, it is stifi the case that many
hospice care programmes are reliant on a large number of non-professional voluntary
staff whose contribution to the care of the suffering-dying is a costly gift rather than
a contractual obligation.
6.8.4 Future developments
While its thinking and practice is rooted in the Christian tradition, hospice care is
no longer exclusively a Christian venture. However, the further hospice care moves
away from its roots, due to its rapid growth and integration into established systems
of healthcare, the more vulnerable it is to co-option by the very trends it opposed.
For example, James notes that due to an increasing emphasis on the medical aspects
of palliative care there is a trend toward intervention and a 'technical' approach to
care. 155
 Samuel Klagsbrun, reflecting on the future of the hospice movement in 1981
noted: 'The proliferation in America of hospice courses and training programmes and
the focus on techniques is a glaring example of misunderstanding of what hospice is
all about." 56
 In addition, to use Maclntyre's terms, there is a real danger that the
'goods of excellence' are becoming subordinate to the 'goods of effectiveness'.
James states: 'As economic constraints on health authorities increase, the question of
"standards" and compromise will inevitably affect hospices." 57
 He goes on to say
that 'cost efficiency indicators running through a bureaucratic formula' will
increasingly determine the 'good death'.' 58
 For the present, however, the hospice
movement remains a form of faithful Christian hospitality.'59
6.9 Summary
We have sought to construct a theological account of the problem of how, and on
what basis, Christians and non-Christians can encounter and engage each other in
relation to their ethical differences in the contemporary context. We did this by
reflecting on the life and teaching of Jesus Christ given in Scripture, and analysing
how the early church echoed this in its actions and social formations. What emerged
'"James, 'From Vision to System', p. 123.
156 Samuel Klagsbrun, 'Hospice - a Developing Role,' iii Hospice: the Living Idea, pp. 5-8 (p. 6).
' 57 James, 'From Vision to System', p. 115.
' 58 James, 'From Vision to System', p. 117.
' 59 For a critical assessment of the future of hospice and palliative care in Britain see Clark,
Reflections on Palliative Care, pp. 176-87.
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was the motif of 'hospitality' as a way of defining and understanding relations
between Christians and non-Christians.
In order to make our analysis more concrete, we assessed the particular issue of
what constituted appropriate care for the suffering-dying in the light of our previous
discussion. To do this we analysed the call for euthanasia as the appropriate
response to the suffering-dying and the trends that drove this call: that is, that death
is at times preferable to suffering, and patient autonomy is paramount when
determining medical care. After giving a critique of these assumptions we assessed
both Maclntyre's and Grisez's response to the issue. Concluding that both of these
responses were inappropriate, we analysed why hospice care was an instance of
Christian hospitality, and thus why hospice care constituted the best Christian
response to care for the suffering-dying. In addition to this, we set out why hospice
care, as an instance of Christian hospitality, is a faithful way of engaging and
encountering non-Christians in relation to this ethical dispute in the contemporary
context.
It is our conclusion that one can see in the new patterns of sociality generated by
the hospice movement a faithful response to the reconfiguring work of the Holy
Spirit and a recapitulation of Jesus Christ in the form of life together instantiated by
hospice care. By going out to and embracing the suffering-dying and providing a
constructive alternative to the call for euthanasia, hospice care is a proleptic
disclosure of the messianic banquet amidst a suffering world that is increasingly
hostile to the terminally ill.
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Conclusion
In the European imagination the Balkans is not just a geographic place. It is also
a symbol for fragmentation, chaotic internecine rivalry and the violent assertion of
group particularity. As Maria Todorova notes: 'A spectre is haunting Western
culture - the spectre of the Balkans. [...] Where is the adversarial group that has not
been decried as "Balkan" and "balkanising" by its opponents?" This thesis began
with a journey to the actual Balkans and a description of a highly complex and
unstable situation in which the church is both part of the problem and attempting to
be part of the remedy. It was a story that highlighted the inadequacy of stigmatising
labels such as 'Balkan' with its denotation of clearly delineated tribal - and thus
retrograde - differences. Moral debate between Christians and non-Christians can
often seem to resemble the Balkans of our imagination. However, our initial story
illustrated, in stark form, the situation of Christians in Europe and America wherein
they are, for better and for worse, both like and unlike, and immersed in, the life
together of their non-Christian neighbours. It is this perspective of moral debate as
'Balkanised' (and whether such a view is accurate) that formed the background to
this thesis and led the body of this thesis to be taken up with a theological assessment
of Alasdair Maclntyre's work.
Through an assessment of Maclntyre's work we have addressed a number of
crucial questions that confront the church today as it seeks to negotiate the various
ethical disputes it finds itseff involved in. The central question under consideration
has been: what is the nature and basis of Christian moral thought and action and, in
the contemporary context, can moral disputes be resolved with those whose thought
and action is incommensurable with that of Christians? A related question was
whether the resolution of ethical differences is affected by the contemporary context
or not. Addressing these questions involved mapping the contemporary context in
which Christians and non-Christians encounter each other, defining how significant
are the differences between Christian and non-Christian moral judgements, and
analysing the shape of relations between Christians and non-Christians.
'Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 3
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To answer the above questions we assessed whether Maclntyre could provide us
with both an account of the contemporary context and a solution to the problem of
whether Christians and non-Christians can resolve ethical disputes within this
context. Having set out Maclntyre's conception of the differences between
Christians and non-Christians, and his framework for how Christians can resolve
disputes with other traditions, we then challenged this account by comparing it with
that of Germain Grisez. While Grisez agrees with Macintyre that disputes between
Christians and non-Christians are amenable to resolution, he does not consider
resolving ethical disputes to be as problematic as Macintyre does. However, we
concluded that Grisez's challenge did not undermine Maclntyre's conception of the
incommensurability between divergent traditions. We then sought to challenge
Maclntyre's work from a different perspective, by asking whether Maclntyre's
account of the differences between Christians and non-Christians took sufficient
notice of the depth of the difièrences between them. For this purpose we compared
Maclntyre's position with Oliver O'Donovan's account of the nature of the
relationship between Christian and non-Christian moral judgement. We concluded
that when compared with O'Donovan's theologically grounded account of the
differences between Christian and non-Christian moral decision making, Maclntyre's
conception of those differences is deficient. The comparison between Maclntyre and
O'Donovan forced us to return to the question of whether Christians can resolve
ethical disputes with non-Christians. We addressed this question by assessing
Maclntyre's model of how Christians are to respond to the contemporary context and
how this response constitutes a model for resolving ethical disputes.
We rejected Maclntyre's proposals for resolving ethical disputes because they
were insufficiently shaped by theological considerations. The primary problem was
the critical difference between conceiving relations between Christians and non-
Christians in terms of a rivalry between competing traditions and the eschatological
shape that belongs to a properly Christian understanding of such relations. In an
attempt to formulate a theological framework for understanding the shape and pattern
of relations between Christians and non-Christians we analysed O'Donovan's
ecciesiology and how the church, and not simply tradition, structures and determines
Christian moral action. We then analysed how ecciesiology relates to the possibility
of resolving ethical disputes. We concluded, in contrast to Maclntyre's position, that
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the line between Christians and non-Christians was fluid and that relations between
Christians and non-Christians were not necessarily characterised by rivahy. This
assessment of the theological considerations relating to resolving disputes between
Christians and non-Christians brought into sharper focus the problem of how the
church can be a specific community with its own criteria of moral evaluation, yet
have no clear dividing line between its life together and the life of its neighbours.
Moreover, our analysis established an unexpected contrast. The contrast is that while
Maclntyre argues for the possibility of philosophical convergence, the model of
practice he suggests is characterised by rivalry and conflict, whereas for O'Donovan,
for whom theoretical convergence can be neither normative nor systematic, the
model of practice his account gives rise to allows for a great deal of cooperation and
similarity between Christians and non-Christians at the level of social practice.
Contrary to Maclntyre's position, as exemplified in the work of Stanley Hauerwas,
we concluded that conflict is neither necessary nor normative in relations between
Christians and non-Christians with regard to moral problems.
To understand the nature of the difference between the church and its neighbours
we analysed how Christ and the Spirit transfigure human social reality. We
concluded that the specificity of the church lay not in its own distinctive social
reality, but in how God was actively present within the church. We concluded that
the differences between Christians and non-Christians are eschatological: as distinct
from differences based on human social realities such as family or ethnicity. This
understanding of eschatological specificity, and how God is present to the church,
pointed to how Christians are involved in relations of simultaneous distance and
belonging with their non-Christian neighbours. Such relations occur because the
church is to be a people specified by its relationship with Jesus Christ, and at the
same time it is to display a given culture's eschatological possibilities. Therefore,
Christians cannot stand outside their culture, or against it, but must participate in
their culture and the enterprises of their neighbours, as those transfigured. No clear
dividing lines can be drawn. Indeed, the life together of Christians is fashioned, by
Christ and the Spirit, out of the life together of their neighbours. Instead of clearly
demarcated lines separating Christians and non-Christians, questions about what to
reject and what to retain confront Christians constantly as they participate in God's
transfiguration of their context.
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We attempted to relate how the church was distinctive yet involved in the life of
its neighbours through an articulation and assessment of the motif of hospitality. It
was our contention that tolerance - whether understood in pragmatic, procedural
terms or as a substantive good - is inadequate to address the question of how
Christians should relate to those with whom they disagree and who have a different
conception of the good. We contended that a better, specifically theological
conceptual framework, could be derived from the notion and practice of hospitality.
We defined hospitality as a Christian social practice that recapitulates the
ascension/Pentecost moment of the Christ-event. As a social practice hospitality has
always been central to shaping relations between the church and its neighbours and
has taken many forms in the Christian tradition. Care for the sick and the suffering-
dying, hospitality to ininiigrants, educational initiatives, and peace-making
endeavours are all examples of ways in which the church hosts the life together of its
neighbours and enables that life to bear witness to its eschatological possibilities.
We assessed the contemporary practice of hospice care as a particular embodiment of
Christian hospitality. We concluded that in refusing to accept euthanasia as the only
response to the problems of neglect and over-treatment of the suffering-dying, and
creating new ways of relating with the suffering-dying that are consistent with the
particular, personal communion we will enjoy with God and each other in the age to
come, hospice care constituted a faithful witness to the recapitulation of the Christ-
event.
When confronted with moral problems the church develops specffic patterns of
thought and action. However, the response of the church is not developed in
isolation from the life together of its neighbours. As it develops its response, the
church will be engaged with the life of those around it, who will inevitably be
involved with and inform its discernment. In conjunction with the life of its
neighbours, the church will also seek to establish patterns of sociality which bear
witness to how a particular moral issue is transfigured by the actions of Christ and
the Spirit. The patterns of thought and action that constitute the response of the
church to a particular issue are constantly open to further specification in the light of
who Jesus Christ is. Such specification and alignment is a constant and ever-present
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task. Furthermore, and as the exposition of 1 Peter clarified, some of its neighbours
will participate in the church's response to the issue, some will reject it, some will
ignore it, and some will actively oppose it. Mediating disputes over moral problems
which confront Christians and non-Christians is not a question of accommodating
each other's view, nor of compromise between two positions, nor of rivahy as one
tradition seeks to vindicate its answer against the answer given by other traditions.
The only criterion by which the church can accept or reject the thought and action of
its neighbours is whether such thought and action accords with thought and action
directed to God. The only response the church can make to moral problems is to
bear witness to their resolution in and through Jesus Christ and to invite its
neighbours to participate in those patterns of thought and action that bear witness to
this resolution. At times this invitation will involve the church changing its pattern
of life together as it discerns in the life of its neighbours patterns of thought and
action that bear more truthful witness to Jesus Christ.
Retaining Jesus Christ as the criterion of evaluation and advocating hospitality as
the form of engagement is not to deny the possibility of conversation with non-
Christians. This is so for four reasons. Firstly, it sets up the possibility of real
conversation wherein theologians will have something distinctive to contribute.
Secondly, it ensures that the conversation is not shaped decisively by one or another
of the church's conversation partners. Thirdly, faithful witness to its own
presuppositions depends on the church reaching out to and entering into conversation
with the thought and action of non-Christians. Fourthly, the church, through the
actions of Christ and the Spirit, is woven out of the tangled fabric of its neighbours'
life in order that it may embody the esehatological possibilities of its neighbours'
life.
On the basis of our analysis of hospitality we set out a model of the actual practice
by which Christians have, do and should relate to their neighbours in such a way that
these relations take account of both the simultaneous continuity and radical
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